Examination of the Proofs offered by DESCARTES, MALEBRANCHE, NEWTON, &c
II.5.1On nous parle sans cesse de Dieu, & jamais personne n’est parvenu jusqu’ici à démontrer son existence ; les génies les plus sublimes ont été forcés d’échouer contre cet écueil ; les hommes les plus éclairés n’ont fait que balbutier sur la matière que tous s’accordoient à regarder comme la plus importante. Comme s’il pouvoit être nécessaire de s’occuper d’objets inaccessibles à nos sens, & sur lesquels notre esprit ne peut avoir aucune prise !
If the evidence of Clarke did not prove satisfactory—if the theologians of his day disputed the manner in which he handled his subject—if they were disposed to think he had not established his argument upon proper foundations, it did not seem probable that either the system of Descartes, the sublime reveries of Malebranche, or the more methodical mode adopted by Newton, were at all likely to meet with a better reception; the same objections will lie against them all, that they have not demonstrated the existence of their immaterial substances; although they have incessantly spoken of them, as if they were things of which they had the most intimate knowledge. Unfortunately this is a rock which the most sublime geniuses have not been competent to avoid: the most enlightened men have done little more than stammer upon a subject which they have all concurred in considering of the highest importance; which they unceasingly hold forth as the most necessary for man to know; without at the same time considering he is not in a condition to occupy himself with objects inaccessible to his senses—which his mind, consequently, can never grasp—which his utmost research cannot bring into that tangible shape by which alone he can be enabled to form a judgment.
Afin de nous convaincre du peu de solidité que les plus grands personnages ont sçu donner aux preuves qu’ils ont successivement imaginées pour établir l’existence d’un dieu, examinons en peu de mots ce qu’en ont dit les philosophes les plus célèbres, & commençons par Descartes, le restaurateur de la philosophie parmi nous. Ce grand homme nous dit lui-même. « Toute la force de l’argument dont j’ai ici usé pour prouver l’existence de Dieu, consiste en ce que je reconnais qu’il ne serait pas possible que ma nature fût telle qu’elle est, c’est-à-dire, que j’eusse en moi l’idée d’un Dieu, si Dieu n’existait véritablement ; ce même Dieu, dis-je, duquel l’idée est en moi, c’est-à-dire, qui possède toutes ces hautes perfections dont notre esprit peut bien avoir quelque légère idée sans pourtant les pouvoir comprendre, etc. » V. Medit. III Sur l’existence de Dieu page LXXI. Il avait dit peu auparavant (page LXIX). « Il faut nécessairement conclure que de » cela seul que j’existe, et que l’idée d’un être » souverainement parfait ( c’est-à-dire de Dieu ) est en moi, l’existence de Dieu est très-évidemment démontrée. »
To the end that we may be convinced of that want of solidity which the greatest men have not known how to give to the proofs they have offered, but which they have successively imagined has established their positions, let us briefly examine what the most celebrated philosophers, what the most subtile metaphysicians have said. For this purpose we will begin with Descartes, the restorer of philosophy among the moderns, to whose sublime errors we are indebted for the effulgent truths of the Newtonian system. This great man himself tells us, "All the strength of argument which I have hitherto used to prove the existence of immaterial substances, consists in this, that I acknowledge it would not be possible, my nature was such as it is, that is to say, that I should have in me the idea of immateriality, if this incorporeity did not truly exist; this same immateriality, of which the idea is in me, possesses all those high perfections of which our mind can have some slight idea, without however being able to comprehend them." In another place he says, "We must necessarily conclude from this alone, that because I exist, and have the idea of immateriality, that is to say, of a most perfect being, the existence is therefore most evidently demonstrated." There are not, perhaps, many except Descartes himself, to whom this would appear quite so conclusive; who would be impressed with the conviction which he seems to imagine is so very substantive.
I°. nous répondrons à Descartes que nous ne sommes point en droit de conclure qu’une chose existe de ce que nous en avons l’idée ; notre imagination nous présente l’idée d’un sphynx ou d’un hyppogriphe, sans que pour cela nous soyons en droit d’en conclure que ces choses existent réellement.
II°. nous dirons à Descartes qu’il est impossible qu’il ait une idée positive & véritable du dieu, dont, ainsi que les théologiens, il veut prouver l’existence. Il est impossible à tout homme, à tout être matériel, de se former une idée réelle d’un esprit, d’une substance privée d’étendue, d’un être incorporel, agissant sur la nature qui est corporelle & matérielle, vérité que nous avons déjà suffisamment prouvée.
III°. nous lui dirons qu’il est impossible que l’homme ait aucune idée positive & réelle de la perfection, de l’infini, de l’immensité & des autres attributs que la théologie assigne à la divinité. Nous ferons donc à Descartes la même réponse qui a déjà été faite dans le chapitre précédent à la proposition XIIe de Clarcke.
First, We shall reply to Descartes, it is not a warrantable deduction, that because we have an idea of a thing, we must therefore conclude it exists; to give validity to such a mode of reasoning would be productive of the greatest mischief; would, in fact, tend to subvert all human institutions. Our imagination presents us with the idea of a sphinx, or of an hippogriff, besides a thousand other fantastical beings; are we, on that authority, to insist that these things really exist? Is the mere circumstance of our having an idea of various parts of nature, discrepantly jumbled together, without any other evidence as to the assemblage, a sufficient warrantry for calling upon mankind to accredit the existence of such heterogeneous masses? If a philosopher of the most consummate experience, of the greatest celebrity, one who enjoyed the confidence of mankind above every other, was to detail the faculties and perfections of these visionary beings, although he should hold them forth as the perfection of all natural combinations, would, I say, any reasonable being lend himself to the asseveration?
Secondly, It is obvious that the mere circumstance of existence, does not prove the absolute existence of any thing anterior to itself; although in man, as well as the other beings of nature, it is evidence that something has existed before him. If this argument was to be admitted, are they aware how far it, would carry them? To maintain that the existence of one being demonstrably proves the existence of an anterior being, would be, in fact, denying that any thing was self-existent. The fallacy of such a position is too glaring to need refutation.
Thirdly, It is not possible he should have a distinct, positive idea of immateriality, of which be, as well as the theologian, labours to prove the existence. It is impossible for man, for a material being, to form to himself a correct idea, or indeed any idea, of incorporeity; of a substance without extent, acting upon nature, which is corporeal; a truth which it may not be presuming too much to say we have already sufficiently proved.
Fourthly, It is equally impossible for man to have any clear, decided idea of perfection, of infinity, of immensity, and other theological attributes. To Descartes we must therefore reply as we have done to Dr. Clarke on his twelfth proposition.
Ainsi rien de moins concluant que les preuves sur lesquelles Descartes appuie l’existence de Dieu. Il fait de ce dieu une pensée, une intelligence ; mais comment concevoir une intelligence, une pensée sans un sujet auquel ces qualités puissent adhérer ? Descartes prétend que l’on ne peut concevoir Dieu que comme une vertu qui s’applique successivement aux parties de l’univers … il dit encore que Dieu ne peut être dit étendu que comme on le dit du feu contenu dans un morceau de fer, qui n’a point à proprement parler d’autre extension que celle du fer lui-même … mais d’après ces notions on est en droit de lui reprocher qu’il annonce très clairement qu’il n’y a pas d’autre dieu que la nature, ce qui est un spinosisme pur. En effet on sçait que c’est dans les principes de Descartes que Spinosa a puisé son systême, qui en découle nécessairement.
C’est donc avec raison que l’on a accusé Descartes d’athéisme, vu qu’il détruit très fortement les foibles preuves qu’il donne de l’existence d’un dieu. On est donc fondé à lui dire que son systême renverse l’idée de la création. En effet avant que Dieu eut créé une matière il ne pouvoit coexister ni être coétendu avec elle ; & dans ce cas, selon Descartes, il n’y avoit point de dieu, vu qu’en ôtant aux modifications leur sujet, ces modifications doivent elles-mêmes disparoître. Si Dieu, selon les cartésiens, n’est autre chose que la nature, ils sont très spinosistes ; si Dieu est la force motrice de cette nature, ce dieu n’existe plus par lui-même, il n’existe qu’autant que subsiste le sujet auquel il est inhérent, c’est-à-dire la nature dont il est le moteur ; ainsi Dieu n’existe plus par lui-même, il n’existera qu’autant que la nature qu’il meut ; sans matière ou sans sujet à mouvoir, à conserver, à produire que devient la force motrice de l’univers ? Si Dieu est cette force motrice que deviendra-t-il sans un monde dans lequel il puisse exercer son action 1 ?
Thus nothing can well be less conclusive than the proofs upon which Descartes rests the existence of immateriality. He gives it thought and intelligence, but how conceive these qualities without a subject to which they may adhere? He pretends that we cannot conceive it but "as a power which applies itself successively to the parts of the universe." Again, he says, "that an immaterial substance cannot be said to have extent, but as we say of fire contained in a piece of iron, which has not, properly speaking, any other extension than that of the iron itself." According to these notions we shall be justified in taxing him with having announced in a very clear, in a most unequivocal manner, that this is nature herself: this indeed is a pure Spinosism; it was decidedly on the principles of Descartes that Spinosa drew up his system; in fact it flows out of it consecutively.
We might, therefore, with great reason, accuse Descartes of atheism, seeing that he very effectually destroys the feeble proofs he adduces in support of his own hypothesis; we have solid foundation for insisting that his system overturns the idea of the creation, because if from the modification we subtract the subject, the modification itself disappears: and if, according to the Cartesians, this immateriality is nothing without nature, they are complete Spinosians, with another name. If incorporeity is the motive-power of this nature, it no longer exists independently; it, in fact, exists no longer than the subject to which it is inherent subsists. Thus no longer existing independently, it will exist only while the nature which it moves shall endure; without matter, without a subject to move, to preserve, what is to become of it, according to this doctrine, or rather according to this elucidation of a system which is in itself untenable?
On voit donc que Descartes, loin d’établir solidement l’existence d’un dieu, la détruit totalement. La même chose arrivera nécessairement à tous ceux qui en raisonneront ; ils finiront toujours par se contredire, & se démentir eux-mêmes. Nous trouvons les mêmes inconséquences & contradictions dans les principes du célèbre père Malebranche, qui considérés avec l’attention la plus légère, semblent conduire directement au spinosisme ; en effet quoi de plus conforme au langage de Spinosa que de dire que l’univers n’est qu’une émanation de Dieu ; que nous voyons tout en Dieu ; que tout ce que nous voyons est Dieu seul ; que Dieu seul fait tout ce qui se fait ; qu’il est lui-même toute l’action & toute l’opération qui est dans toute la nature ; en un mot que Dieu est tout l’être & le seul être.
N’est-ce pas dire formellement que la nature est Dieu ? D’ailleurs en même tems que Malebranche nous assure que nous voyons tout en Dieu, il prétend qu’il n’est pas encore bien démontré qu’il y ait une matière & des corps, & que la foi seule nous enseigne ces grands mystères, dont sans elle nous n’aurions aucune connoissance. Sur quoi l’on peut avec raison lui demander comment l’on peut démontrer l’existence du dieu qui a créé la matière, si l’existence de cette matière est encore un problême ?
Malebranche reconnoît lui-même que l'on ne peut avoir de démonstration exacte de l’existence d’un autre être que de celui qui est nécessaire ; il ajoute que si l’on y prend garde de près on verra qu’il n’est pas même possible de connoître avec une entière certitude si Dieu est ou n’est pas véritablement créateur d’un monde matériel & sensible. D’après ces notions il est évident que, selon le p Malebranche, les hommes n’ont que la foi pour garant de l’existence de Dieu ; mais la foi suppose elle-même cette existence ; si l’on n’est point sûr que Dieu existe, comment pourra-t-on être persuadé qu’il faut croire ce qu’il dit ?
It will be obvious from this, that Descartes, far from establishing on a rocky foundation the existence of this immateriality, totally destroys his own system. The same thing will necessarily happen to all those who reason upon his principles; they will always finish by confuting him, and by contradicting themselves. The same want of just inference, the same discrepancy, will obtrude themselves in the principles of the celebrated Father Malebranche; which, if considered with the slightest attention, appear to conduct directly to Spinosism; in fact, can any thing be more in unison with the language of Spinosa himself, than to say, as does Malebranche, "that the universe is only an emanation from God; that we see every thing in God, that every thing we see is only God; that God alone does every thing that is done; that all the action, with every operation that takes place in nature, is God himself; in a word, that God is every being and the only being." Is not this formally asserting that nature herself is God? Moreover, at the same time Malebranche assures us we see every thing in God, he pretends that it is not yet clearly demonstrated that matter and bodies have existence; that faith alone teaches us these mysteries, of which, without it, we should not have any knowledge whatever. In reply, it might be a very fair question, how the existence of the being who created matter can be demonstrated, if the existence of this matter itself be yet a problem? He himself acknowledges "that we can have no distinct demonstration of the existence of any other being than of that which is necessary;" he further adds, "that if it be closely examined, it will be seen, that it is not even possible to know with certitude, if God be or be not truly the creator of a material, of a sensible world." According to these notions, it is evident, that, following up the system of Malebranche, man has only his faith to guarantee the existence of the world; yet faith itself supposes its existence; if it be not, however, certain that it does exist, and the Bishop of Cloyne, Dr. Berkeley, has also held this in doubt, how shall we be persuaded that we must believe the oracles which have been delivered to a visionary world?
D’un autre côté ces notions de Malebranche renversent évidemment tous les dogmes théologiques. Comment concilier avec la liberté de l’homme l’idée d’un dieu qui est la cause motrice de la nature entière ; qui meut immédiatement la matière & les corps ; sans la volonté duquel rien ne se fait dans l’univers, qui prédétermine les créatures à tout ce qu’elles font ? Comment avec cela peut-on prétendre que les ames humaines aient la faculté de former des pensées & des volontés, de se mouvoir & de se modifier elles-mêmes ? Si l’on suppose, avec les théologiens, que la conservation des créatures est une création continuée, n’est-ce pas Dieu qui en les conservant les met en état de mal faire ? Il est évident que d’après le systême de Malebranche, Dieu sait tout, & que ses créatures ne sont que des instrumens passifs dans ses mains ; leurs péchés ainsi que leurs vertus sont à lui ; les hommes ne peuvent ni mériter ni démériter ; ce qui anéantit toute religion. C’est ainsi que la théologie est perpétuellement occupée à se détruire elle-même2.
On the other hand, these notions of Malebranche completely overturns all the theological doctrines of free agency. How can the liberty of man's action be reconciled with the idea that it is the Divinity who is the immediate mover of nature; who actually gives impulse to matter and bodies, without whose immediate interference nothing takes place; who pre-determines his creatures to every thing they do? How can it be pretended, if this doctrine is to be accredited, that human souls have the faculty of forming thoughts—have the power of volition—are in a condition to move themselves—have the capacity to modify their existence? If it be supposed with the theologians, that the conservation of the creatures in the universe is a continued creation, must it not appear, that being thus perpetually recreated, they are enabled to commit evil? It will then be a self-evident fact, that, admitting the system of Malebranche, God does every thing, and that his creatures are no more than passive instruments in his hands. Under this idea they could not be answerable for their sins, because they would have no means of avoiding them. Under this notion they could neither have merit or demerit; they would be like a sharp instrument in their own hands, which whether it was applied to a good or to an evil purpose, it would attach to themselves, not to the instrument: this would annihilate all religion: it is thus that theology is continually occupied with committing suicide.
Voyons donc maintenant si l’immortel Newton nous donnera des idées plus vraies & des preuves plus sûres de l’existence de Dieu. Cet homme, dont le vaste génie a deviné la nature & ses loix, s’est égaré dès qu’il les a perdu de vue : esclave des préjugés de son enfance, il n’a pas osé porter le flambeau de ses lumières sur la chimere qu’on avoit gratuitement associé à cette nature ; il n’a pas reconnu que ses propres forces lui suffisoient pour produire tous les phénomènes qu’il avoit lui-même si heureusement expliqués. En un mot le sublime Newton n’est plus qu’un enfant quand il quitte la physique & l’évidence pour se perdre dans les régions imaginaires de la théologie. Voici comment il parle de la divinité3.
« Ce Dieu, dit-il, gouverne tout, non comme l’ame du monde, mais comme le seigneur et le souverain de toutes choses. C’est à cause de sa souveraineté qu’on l’appelle le seigneur Dieu, » Παντοκρατωρ, l’empereur universel. En effet, le mot Dieu est relatif et se rapporte à des esclaves ; la déite est la domination ou la souveraineté de Dieu, non sur son propre corps, comme le pensent ceux qui regardent Dieu comme l’ame du monde, mais sur des esclaves. »
Let us now see, if the immortal Newton, the great luminary of science, the champion of astronomical truth, will afford us clearer notions, more distinct ideas, more certain evidence of the existence of immaterial substances. This great man, whose comprehensive genius unravelled nature, whose capacious mind developed her laws, seems to have bewildered himself, the instant he lost sight of them. A slave to the prejudices of his infancy, he had not the courage to hold the lamp of his own enlightened understanding to the agent theology has so gratuitously associated with nature; he has not been able to allow that her own peculiar powers were adequate to the production of that beautiful phenomena, he has with such masterly talents so luminously explained. In short, the sublime Newton himself becomes an infant when he quits physics, when he lays aside demonstration, to lose himself in the devious sinuosities, in the inextricable labyrinths, in the delusive regions of theology. This is the manner in which he speaks of the Divinity:
"This God," says he, "governs all, not as the soul of the world, but as the lord and sovereign of all things. It is in consequence of his sovereignty that he is called the Lord God, [Greek letters], pantokrator, the universal emperor. Indeed the word God is relative and relates itself with slaves; the Deity is the dominion or the sovereignty of God, not over his own body, as those think who look upon God as the soul of the world, but over slaves."
L’on voit de là que Newton, ainsi que tous les théologiens, fait de son dieu, du pur esprit qui préside à l’univers, un monarque, un suserain, un despote, c’est-à-dire, un homme puissant, un prince dont le gouvernement a pour modèle celui que les rois de la terre exercent quelquefois sur leurs sujets transformés en esclaves, à qui pour l’ordinaire ils font sentir d’une façon très fâcheuse le poids de leur autorité. Ainsi le dieu de Newton est un despote, c’est-à-dire un homme qui a le privilège d’être bon quand il lui plaît, injuste & pervers quand sa fantaisie l’y détermine. Mais suivant les idées de Newton, le monde n’ayant point été de toute éternité, les esclaves de Dieu ayant été formés dans le tems, il faut en conclure qu’avant la création du monde le dieu de Newton étoit un souverain sans sujets & sans états. Voyons si ce grand philosophe s’accorde mieux avec lui-même dans les idées subséquentes qu’il nous donne de son despote divinisé.
« Le Dieu suprême, dit-il, est un être éternel, infini, absolument parfait ; mais quelque parfait que soit un être, ’s'il n’a point de souveraineté, il n’est point le Dieu suprême le mot Dieu signifie seigneur mais tout seigneur n’est point Dieu ; c’est la souveraineté de l’être spirituel qui constitue dieu, c’est la vrai souveraineté qui constitue le vrai Dieu, c’est la souveraineté suprême qui constitue le Dieu suprême, c’est la souveraineté fausse qui constitue le faux dieu. De la souveraineté vraie, il suit que le vrai Dieu est vivant, intelligent et puissant ; et de ses autres perfections, vl s’en suit qu’il est suprême, ou souverainement, parfait. Il est éternel, infini, il sait tout ; c’est-à-dire, qu’il dure depuis l’éternité, et ne finira jamais : (durât ab œterno, adest ab injinito in » infinitum ) il gouverne tout et il sait tout ce qui v se fait ou ce qui peut se faire. Il n’est ni l’éternité, ni l’infinité, mais il est éternel & infini ; il n’est point l’espace ou la durée, mais il dure et il est présent. »(adest)4
From this it will be seen that Newton, as well as the theologians, makes the Divinity a pure spirit, who presides over the universe as a monarch, as a lord paramount; that is to say, what man defines in earthly governors, despot, absolute princes, powerful monarchs, whose governments have no model but their own will, who exercise an unlimited power over their subjects, transformed into slaves; whom they usually compel to feel in a very grievous manner the weight of their authority. But according to the ideas of Newton, the world has not existed from eternity, the staves of God have been formed in the course of time; from this it would be a just inference, that before the creation of the world the god of Newton was a sovereign without subjects. Let us see if this truly great philosopher is more in unison with himself in the subsequent ideas which he delivers on this subject.
"The supreme God," he says, "is an eternal, infinite, and absolutely perfect being; but however perfect a being may be, if he has no sovereignty he is not the supreme God. The word God signifies Lord, but every lord is not god; it is the sovereignty of the spiritual Being which constitutes God; it is the true sovereignty which constitutes the true God; it is the supreme sovereignty which constitutes the supreme God; it is a false sovereignty which constitutes a false god. From true sovereignty, it follows, that the true God is living, intelligent, and powerful; and from his other perfections, it follows, that he is supremely or sovereignly perfect. He is eternal, infinite, omniscient; that is to say, he exists from eternity, and will never have an end; he governs all, and he knows every thing that is done, or that can be done. He is neither eternity nor infinity, but he is eternal and infinite; he is not space or duration, but he exists and is present." The term here used is adest, which appears to have been placed there to avoid saying that God is contained in space.
Dans toute cette tirade inintelligible nous ne voyons que des efforts incroyables pour concilier des attributs théologiques ou des qualités abstraites avec les attributs humains donnés au monarque divinisé ; nous y voyons des qualités négatives qui ne conviennent plus à l’homme, données pourtant au souverain de la nature que l’on suppose un roi. Quoiqu’il en soit, voilà toujours le dieu suprême qui a besoin de sujets pour établir sa souveraineté ; ainsi Dieu a besoin des hommes pour exercer son empire, sans cela il ne seroit point roi. Quand il n’y avoit rien, de quoi Dieu étoit-il seigneur ? Quoi qu’il en soit, ce seigneur, ce roi spirituel exerce-t-il vainement son empire spirituel sur des êtres qui souvent ne sont pas ce qu’il veut, qui luttent sans cesse contre lui, qui mettent le désordre dans ses états ? Ce monarque spirituel est-il le maître des esprits, des ames, des volontés, des passions de ses sujets qu’il a laissé libres de se révolter contre lui ? Ce monarque infini qui remplit tout de son immensité & qui gouverne tout, gouverne-t-il l’homme qui péche, dirige-t-il ses actions, est-il en lui lorsqu’il offense son dieu ? Le diable, le faux dieu, le mauvais principe n’a-t-il pas un empire plus étendu que le dieu véritable, dont sans cesse, suivant les dogmes de la théologie, il renverse les projets ? Le souverain véritable n’est-il pas celui dont le pouvoir dans un état influe sur le plus grand nombre des sujets ? Si Dieu est présent par-tout, n’est-il pas le triste témoin & le complice des outrages que l’on fait par-tout à sa majesté divine ? S’il remplit tout, n’a-t-il pas de l’étendue, ne répond-il pas aux divers points de l’espace, & dès-lors ne cesse-t-il pas d’être spirituel ?
In all this unintelligible series, nothing is to be found but incredible efforts to reconcile the theological attributes, the abstract with the human qualities, which have been ascribed to the Divinity; we see in it negative qualities, which can no longer be suitable to man, given, however, to the Sovereign of nature, whom he has supposed a king. However it may be, this picture always supposes the Supreme God to have occasion for subjects to establish his sovereignty. It makes God stand in need of man for the exercise of his empire; without these, according to the text, he would not be a king; he could have had no empire when there was nothing: but if this description of Newton was just, if it really represented the Divinity, we might be very fairly permitted to ask, Does not this Spiritual King exercise his spiritual empire in vain, upon refractory beings, who do not at all times do that which he is willing they should; who are continually struggling against his power; who spread disorder in his states? This Spiritual Monarch, who is master of the minds, of the souls, of the wills, of the passions of his slaves, does he leave them the freedom of revolting against him? This infinite Monarch, who fills every thing with his immensity, who governs all, does he also govern the man who sins; does he direct his actions; is he in him when he offends his God? The devil, the false god, the evil principle, hath he not, according to this, a more extensive empire than the true God, whose projects, if we are to believe the theologians, he is unceasingly overturning? In earthly governments the true sovereign is generally considered to be him whose power in a state influences the greater number of his subjects. If, then, we could suppose him to be omnipresent, that is, present in all places, should we not say he was the sad witness to all the outrages committed against his authority, and we should not entertain a very exalted opinion of his power if he permitted them to continue. This, it is true, would be arguing upon a monarch of this world, still it would be the language held by observers.
Is the spirituality of the Divinity well supported by those who say he fills all space, who from that instant give him extent, ascribe to him volume, make him correspond with the various points of space? This is the very reverse of an immaterial substance.
" Dieu est un, continue-t-il, & il est le même pour toujours & par tout, non seulement par sa seule vertu ou son énergie, mais encore par sa substance. "
Mais comment un être qui agit, qui produit tous les changemens que subissent les êtres, peut-il être toujours le même ? Qu’entend-on par la vertu ou l’énergie de Dieu ? Ces mots vagues présentent-ils des idées nettes à notre esprit ? Qu’entend-on par la substance divine ? Si cette substance est spirituelle & privée d’étendue, comment peut-elle exister quelque part ? Comment peut-elle mettre la matière en action ? Comment peut-elle être conçue.
"God is one," continues Newton, "and he is the same for ever, and every where, not only by his virtue alone, or by his energy, but also by his substance." But how are we to conceive that a being who is in continual activity, who produces all the changes which beings undergo, can always be himself the same? What is to be understood by either this virtue or this energy? These are relative terms, which do not present any clear, distinct idea to our mind, except as they apply to man: what are we, however, to understand by the divine substance? If this substance be spiritual, that is, devoid of extent, how can there exist in it any parts? How can it give impulse to matter, how set it in motion? How can it even be conceived by mortals?
Cependant Newton nous dit que " toutes les choses sont contenues en lui & se meuvent en lui, mais sans action réciproque sed sine mutuâ passione, Dieu n’éprouve rien de la part des mouvemens des corps ; ceux-ci n’éprouvent aucune résistance de la part de sa présence par tout. "
Il paroît ici que Newton donne à la divinité des caractères qui ne conviennent qu’au vuide & au néant. Sans cela nous ne pouvons concevoir qu’il puisse n’y avoir point une action réciproque, ou des rapports entre des substances qui se pénètrent, qui s’environnent de toutes parts. Il paroît évident qu’ici l’auteur ne s’entend pas.
Nevertheless Newton informs us, "that all things are contained in him, and are moved in him, but without reciprocity of action: God experiences nothing by the motion of bodies; these experience no resistance whatever by his omnipresence." It would here appear that he clothes the Divinity with that which bears the character of vacuum—of nothing; without that, it would be almost impossible not to have a reciprocal action or relation between these substances, which are either penetrated or encompassed on all sides. It must be obvious, that in this instance our scientific author does not distinctly understand himself.
« C’est une vérité incontestable que Dieu existe nécessairement, et la même nécessité fajt qu’il existe toujours et partout : d’où il suit qu’il est en tout semblable à lui-même ; il est tout œil, tout oreille, tout cerveau, tout bras, tout sentiment, tout intelligence, tout action, mais d’une façon nullement humaine, nullement corporelle, et qui nous est totalement inconnue. De même qu’un aveugle n’a point idée des couleurs, c’est ainsi que nous n’avons point idée des façons dont Dieu sent et entend. »
L’existence nécessaire de la divinité est précisément la chose en question ; c’est cette existence qu’il eût fallu constater par des preuves aussi claires & des démonstrations aussi fortes que la gravitation & l’attraction. Si la chose eût été possible, le génie de Newton en seroit (sans doute) venu à bout. Mais, ô homme ! Si grand & si fort quand vous êtes géomètre, si petit & si foible quand vous devenez théologien, c’est-à-dire quand vous raisonnez de ce qui ne peut être ni calculé ni soumis à l’expérience, comment consentez-vous à nous parler d’un être qui est, de votre aveu, pour vous ce qu’un tableau est pour un aveugle ? Pourquoi sortir de la nature pour chercher dans les espaces imaginaires des causes, des forces, une énergie que la nature vous eût montrées en elle-même, si vous eussiez voulu la consulter avec votre sagacité ordinaire ? Mais le grand Newton n’a plus de courage, on s’aveugle volontairement, dès qu’il s’agit d’un préjugé que l’habitude lui fait regarder comme sacré. Continuons pourtant encore d’examiner jusqu’où le génie de l’homme est capable de s’égarer, quand il abandonne une fois l’expérience & la raison pour se laisser entraîner par son imagination.
He proceeds, "It is an incontestible truth, that God exists necessarily, and the same necessity obliges to exist always and every where: from whence it follows, that he is in every thing similar to itself; he is all eyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, all action; but in a mode by no means human, by no means corporeal, and which is totally unknown to us. In the same manner as a blind man has no idea of colours, it is that we have no idea of the mode in which God feels and understands." The necessary existence of the Divinity is precisely the thing in question; it is this existence that it was needful to have verified by proofs as clear, by evidence as distinct, by demonstration as strong, as gravitation and attraction. One would have hardly thought it possible the expansive capabilities of Newton would not have compassed it. But oh, unrivalled genius! so mighty, so powerful, so colossal, while yet you was a geometrician; so insignificant, so weak, so inconsistent; when you became a theologian; that is to say, when you reasoned upon that which can neither be calculated, nor submitted to experience; how could you think of speaking to us on a subject which, by your own confession is to you just what a picture is to a man born blind? Wherefore quit nature, which had already explained to you so much? Why seek in imaginary spaces those causes, those powers, that energy, which she would have distinctly pointed out to you, had you been willing to have consulted her with your usual sagacity? The gigantic, the intelligent Newton, suffers himself to be hoodwinked—to be blinded by prejudice; he has not courage to look a question fairly in the face, when that question involves notions which habit has rendered sacred to him; he turns his eyes from truth, he casts behind him his experience, he lulls to sleep his reason, when it becomes necessary to probe opinions full of contradictions, yet fraught with the best interests of humanity.
Let us, however, continue to examine how far the most transcendent genius is capable of leading himself astray, when once he abandons experience, when once he chains up his reason, when once he suffers himself to be guided by his imagination.
" Dieu, continue le père de la physique moderne, est totalement destitué de corps & de figure corporelle ; voilà pourquoi il ne peut être ni vu, ni touché, ni entendu & ne doit être adoré sous aucune forme corporelle. " mais quelles idées se former d’un être qui n’est rien de ce que nous connoissons ? Quels sont les rapports que l’on peut supposer entre nous & lui ? à quoi bon l’adorer ? En effet, si vous l’adorez, vous serez malgré vous obligé d’en faire un être semblable à l’homme, sensible comme lui à des hommages, à des présens, à des flatteries, en un mot vous en ferez un roi, qui comme ceux de la terre, exige les respects de ceux qui leur sont soumis. En effet il ajoute.
« Nous avons idée de ses attributs, mais nous ne connaissons point ce que c’est qu’aucune substance ; nous ne voyons que les figures et les couleurs des corps, nous n’entendons que des sons, nous ne touchons que des surfaces extérieures, nous ne sentons que des odeurs, nous ne goûtons que des saveurs ; aucun de nos sens, aucune de nos reflexions ne peuvent nous montrer la nature intime des substances ; nous avons encore bien moins d’idées de Dieu. »
"God," continues the father of modern philosophy, "is totally destitute of body and of corporeal figure; here is the reason why he cannot be either seen, touched, or understood; and ought not to be adored under any corporeal form." What idea, however, can be formed of a being who is resembled by nothing of which we have any knowledge? What are the relations that can be supposed to exist between such very dissimilar beings? When man renders this being his adoration, does he not, in fact, in despite of himself, make him a being similar to his own species; does he not suppose that, like himself, he is sensible to homage—to be won by presents—gained by flattery; in short, he is treated like a king of the earth, who exacts the respect, demands the fealty, requires the obedience of all who are submitted to him. Newton adds, "we have ideas of his attributes, but we do not know that it is any one substance; we only see the figures and the colours of bodies; we only hear sounds; we only touch the exterior surfaces; we only scent odours; we only taste flavours: no one of our senses, no one of our reflections, can shew us the intimate nature of substances: we have still less ideas of God."
Si nous avons idée des attributs de Dieu ce n’est que parce que nous lui donnons les nôtres, que nous ne faisons jamais qu’aggrandir ou exagérer au point de rendre méconnoissables des qualités que nous connoissions d’abord. Si dans toutes les substances qui frappent nos sens nous ne connoissons que les effets qu’elles produisent sur nous, d’après lesquels nous leur assignons des qualités, au moins ces qualités sont quelque chose & font naître des idées distinctes en nous. Les connoissances superficielles ou quelconques que nos sens nous fournissent sont les seules que nous puissions avoir ; constitués comme nous le sommes, nous nous trouvons forcés de nous en contenter, & nous voyons qu’elles suffisent à nos besoins : mais nous n’avons d’un dieu distingué de la matière ou de toute substance connue, pas même l’idée la plus superficielle, & cependant nous en raisonnons sans cesse !
If we have an idea of the attributes of God, it is only because we clothe him with those which belong to ourselves; which we never do more than aggrandize, which we only augment or exaggerate; we then mistake them for those qualities with which we were at first acquainted. If in all those substances which are pervious to our senses, we only know them by the effects they produce on us, after which we assign them qualities, at least these qualities are something tangible, they give birth to clear and distinct ideas. This superficial knowledge, however slender it may be, with which our senses furnish us, is the only one we can possibly have; constituted as we are, we find ourselves under the necessity of resting contented with it, and we discover that it is sufficient for our wants; but we have not even the most superficial idea of immateriality, or a substance distinguished from all those with which we have the slightest acquaintance. Nevertheless, we hear men hourly reasoning upon it, disputing about its properties, advancing its faculties, as if they had the most demonstrable evidence of the fact; tearing each other in pieces, because the one does not readily admit what the other asserts, upon a subject which no man is competent to understand.
" Nous ne connoissons Dieu que par ses attributs, par ses propriétés, & par l’arrangement excellent & sage qu’il a donné à toutes les choses, & par leurs causes finales, & nous l’admirons à cause de ses perfections. "
Nous ne connoissons Dieu, je le répéte, que par ceux de ses attributs que nous empruntons de nous-mêmes ; mais il est évident qu’ils ne peuvent convenir à l’être universel, qui ne peut avoir ni la même nature ni les mêmes propriétés que des êtres particuliers tels que nous. C’est d’après nous que nous assignons à Dieu l’intelligence, la sagesse & la perfection, en faisant abstraction de ce que nous nommons des défauts en nous-mêmes. Quant à l’ordre ou à l’arrangement de l’univers, dont nous faisons un dieu l’auteur, nous le trouvons excellent & sage lorsqu’il nous est favorable à nous-mêmes, ou lorsque les causes qui coexistent avec nous ne troublent point notre existence propre ; sans cela nous nous plaignons du désordre, les causes finales s’évanouissent. Nous supposons au dieu immuable des motifs pareillement empruntés de notre propre façon d’agir, pour déranger le bel ordre que nous admirions dans l’univers. Ainsi c’est toujours en nous-mêmes, c’est dans notre façon de sentir que nous puisons les idées de l’ordre, les attributs de sagesse, d’excellence & de perfections que nous donnons à Dieu, tandis que tout le bien & le mal qui nous arrivent dans le monde sont des suites nécessaires des essences des choses & des loix générales de la matière ; en un mot de la gravité, de l’attraction & de la répulsion des loix du mouvement, que Newton lui-même a si bien développées, mais qu’il n’a plus osé appliquer dès qu’il a été question du phantôme à qui le prejugé fait honneur de tous les effets dont la nature est elle-même la vraie cause.
" nous révérons & nous adorons Dieu à cause de sa souveraineté : nous lui rendons un culte comme ses esclaves ; un dieu destitué de souveraineté, de providence & de causes finales ne seroit que la nature & le destin. "
Il est vrai que nous adorons Dieu comme des esclaves ignorans, qui tremblent sous un maître qu’ils ne connoissent pas ; nous le prions follement, quoiqu’on nous le représente comme immuable ; quoique, dans le vrai, ce dieu ne soit autre chose que la nature agissante par des loix nécessaires, la nécessité personnifiée ou le destin à qui l’on a donné le nom de Dieu.
Our author goes on "We only have a knowledge of God by his attributes, by his properties, by the excellent and wise arrangement which he has given to all things, and by their FINAL CAUSES: we admire him in consequence of his perfections." I repeat, that we have no real knowledge of the Divinity; that we borrow his attributes from ourselves; but it is evident these cannot be suitable to the Universal Being, who neither can have the same nature nor the same properties as particular beings; it is nevertheless after ourselves that we assign him intelligence, wisdom, perfection, in subtracting from them what we call defects. As to the order, or the arrangement of the universe, man finds it excellent, esteems it the perfection of wisdom, as long as it is favorable to his species; or when the causes which are co-existent with himself do not disturb his own peculiar existence; otherwise he is apt to complain of confusion, and final causes vanish: he then attributes to an immutable God, motives equally borrowed from his own peculiar mode of action, for deranging the beautiful order he so much admires in the universe. Thus it is always in himself, that is, in his own individual mode of feeling, that he draws up the ideas of the order, the wisdom, the excellence, the perfection which he ascribes to the Deity; whilst the good as well as the evil which take place in the world, are the necessary consequence of the essence of things; of the general, immutable laws of nature; in short, of the gravitation, of the repulsion of matter; of those unchangeable laws of motion, which Newton himself has so ably thrown into light; but which he has by a strange fatuity forborne to apply when the question was concerning the cause of these phenomena, which prejudice has refused to the capabilities of nature. He goes on, "We revere, and we adore God, on account of his sovereignty: we worship him like his slaves; a God destitute of sovereignty, of providence, and of final causes, would be no more than nature and destiny." It is true that superstition enjoins man to adore its gods like ignorant slaves, who tremble under a master whom they know not; he certainly prays to them on all occasions, sometimes requesting nothing less than an entire change in the essence of things, to gratify his capricious desires, and it is perhaps well for him they are not competent to grant his request: in the origin, as we have shewn, these gods were nothing more than nature acting by necessary laws, clothed under a variety of fables; or necessity personified under a multitude of names. However this may be, we do not believe that true religion, that sterling worship which renders man grateful, whilst it exalts the majesty of the Divinity, requires any such meanness from man that he should act like a slave; he is rather expected to sit down to the banquet prepared for him, with all the dignity of an invited guest; under the cheering consciousness of a welcome that is never accorded to slaves; nothing is required at his hands, but that he should conduct himself temperately in the banquetting-house; that he should be grateful for the good cheer he receives; that he should have virtue; (which we have already sufficiently explained is to render himself useful, by making others happy); that he should not by pertinaciously setting up whimsical opinions, and insisting on their adoption by his neighbour, disturb the harmony of the feast; that he should be sufficiently intelligent to know when he is really felicitous, and not seek to put down the gaiety of his fellow guests; but that he should rise from the board satisfied with himself, contented with others; in short, to comprise the whole in a trite axiom of one of the Greek philosophers, he should learn the invaluable secret, "to bear and forbear."
Cependant Newton nous dit " d’une nécessité physique & aveugle qui seroit partout & toujours la même, il ne pourroit sortir aucune variété dans les êtres ; la diversité que nous voyons ne peut venir que des idées & de la volonté d’un être qui existe nécessairement. "
Pourquoi cette diversité ne viendroit-elle pas des causes naturelles, d’une matière agissante par elle-même, & dont le mouvement rapproche & combine des élémens variés & pourtant analogues, ou sépare des êtres à l’aide de substances qui ne se trouvent point propres à faire union ? Le pain ne vient-il pas de la combinaison de la farine, du levain & de l’eau ? Quant à la nécessité aveugle comme on l’a dit ailleurs, c’est celle dont nous ignorons l’énergie, ou dont aveugles nous-mêmes, nous ne connoissons pas la manière d’agir. Les physiciens expliquent tous les phénomènes par les propriétés de la matière ; & quand ils ne peuvent les expliquer faute de connoître les causes naturelles, ils ne les croient pas moins déductibles de ces propriétés ou de ces causes. Les physiciens sont donc en cela des athées ? Sans quoi ils répondroient que c’est Dieu qui est l’auteur de tous ces phénomènes.
But to proceed. Newton tells us, "that from a physical and blind necessity, which should preside every where, and be always the same, there could not emanate any variety in the beings; the diversity which we behold, could only have its origin in the ideas and in the will of a being which exists necessarily;" but wherefore should not this diversity spring out of natural causes, from matter acting upon matter; the action of which either attracts and combines various yet analogous elements, or else separates beings by the intervention of those substances which have not a disposition to unite? Is not bread the result of the combination of flour, yeast and water? As for the blind necessity, as it is elsewhere said, we must acknowledge it is that of which we are ignorant, either of its properties or its energies; of which being blind ourselves we have no knowledge of its mode of action. Philosophers explain all the phenomena that occur by the properties of matter; and though they feel the want of a more intimate acquaintance with natural causes, they do not therefore the less believe them deducible from these properties or these causes. Are, therefore, the philosophers atheists, because they do not reply, it is God who is the author of these effects? Is the industrious workman, who makes gunpowder, to be challenged as an atheist, because he says the terrible effects of this destructive material, which inspired the native Americans with such awe, which raised in their winds such wonder, are to be ascribed to the junction of the apparently harmless substances of nitre, charcoal and sulpher, set in activity by the accession of trivial scintillations, produced from the collision of steel with flint, merely because some bigoted Priest of the Sun, who is ignorant of the composition, chooses to think it is not possible such a striking phenomenon could be the work of any thing short of the secret agents, whom he has himself appointed to govern the world?
" On dit, par allégorie, que Dieu voit, entend, parle, rit, aime, hait, desire, donne, reçoit, se réjouit ou se met en colère, combat, fait & fabrique, etc. Car tout ce qu’on dit de Dieu s’emprunte de la conduite des hommes par une sorte d’analogie imparfaite & telle quelle. "
Les hommes n’ont pu faire autrement : faute de connoître la nature & ses voies, ils ont imaginé une énergie particulière qu’ils ont appellée Dieu, & ils l’ont fait agir suivant les mêmes principes qui les font agir eux-mêmes, ou suivant lesquels ils agiroient s’ils en étoient les maîtres ; c’est de cette théantropie que sont découlées toutes les idées absurdes & souvent dangereuses sur lesquelles sont fondées toutes les religions du monde, qui toutes adorent dans leur dieu un homme puissant & méchant. Nous verrons par la suite les funestes effets qui ont résulté pour l’espèce humaine des idées que l’on s’est faites de la divinité, que l’on n’a jamais envisagée que comme un souverain absolu, un despote, un tyran. Quant à présent continuons d’examiner les preuves que nous donnent les déicoles de l’existence de leur dieu, qu’ils s’imaginent voir par-tout.
"It is allegorically said that God sees, hears, speaks, smiles, loves, hates, desires, gives, receives, rejoices, grows angry, fights, makes, or fashions, &c. because all that is said of God, is borrowed from the conduct of man, by an imperfect analogy." Man has not been able to act otherwise, for want of being acquainted with nature and her eternal course: whenever he has imagined a peculiar energy which he has not been able to fathom, he has given it the name of God; and he has then made him act upon the self-same principles, as he himself would adopt, according to which he would act if he was the master. It is from this proneness to Theanthropy, that has flowed all those absurd, and frequently dangerous ideas, upon which are founded the superstitions of the world; who all adore in their gods either natural causes of which they are ignorant, or else powerful mortals of whose malice they stand in awe. The sequel will shew the fatal effects that have resulted to mankind from the absurd ideas they have very frequently formed to themselves of the Divinity; that nothing could be more degrading to him, more injurious to themselves, than the idea of comparing him to an absolute sovereign, to a despot, to a tyrant. For the present let us continue to examine the proofs offered in support of their various systems.
Ils ne cessent en effet de nous répéter que ces mouvemens réglés, que cet ordre invariable que l’on voit régner dans l’univers, que ces bienfaits dont les hommes sont comblés, annoncent une sagesse, une intelligence, une bonté que l’on ne peut refuser de reconnoître dans la cause qui produit ces effets si merveilleux. Nous répondrons que les mouvemens réglés que nous voyons dans l’univers sont des suites nécessaires des loix de la matière ; elle ne peut cesser d’agir comme elle fait tant que les mêmes causes agissent en elle ; ces mouvemens cessent d’être réglés, l’ordre fait place au désordre, dès que de nouvelles causes viennent troubler ou suspendre l’action des premières. L’ordre, comme on l’a fait voir ailleurs, n’est que l’effet qui résulte pour nous d’une suite de mouvemens ; il ne peut y avoir de désordre réel relativement au grand ensemble où tout ce qui se fait est nécessaire & déterminé par des loix que rien ne peut changer. L’ordre de la nature peut bien se démentir ou se détruire pour nous ; mais jamais il ne se dément pour elle, puisqu’elle ne peut agir autrement qu’elle ne fait. Si, d’après les mouvemens réglés & bien ordonnés que nous voyons, nous attribuons de l’intelligence, de la sagesse, de la bonté à la cause inconnue ou supposée de ces effets, nous sommes obligés de lui attribuer pareillement de l’extravagance & de la malice toutes les fois que ces mouvemens deviennent désordonnés, c’est-à-dire cessent d’être réglés pour nous, ou nous troublent nous-mêmes dans notre façon d’exister.
It is unceasingly repeated that the regular action, the invariable order, which reigns in the universe, the benefits heaped upon mortals, announce a wisdom, an intelligence, a goodness, which we cannot refuse to acknowledge, in the cause which produces these marvellous effects. To this we must reply, that it is unquestionably true that not only these things, but all the phenomena he beholds, indicate the existence of something gifted very superiorly to erring man; the great question, however, is one that perhaps will never be solved, what is this being? Is this question answered by heaping together the estimable qualities of man? Speaking with relation to ourselves, which is all that the theologian really does, although in such numerous regions he pretends to do a great deal more, we can apply the terms goodness, wisdom, intelligence, the best with which we are acquainted, to this being for the want of having those that may be appropriate; but I maintain, this does not, in point of fact, afford us one single idea of the Great Cause of causes; we admire his works; and knowing that what we approve highly in our own species, we attribute to their being wise, we say the Divinity displays wisdom. So far it is well; but this, after all, is a human quality. If we consult experience, we shall presently be convinced that our wisdom does not bear the least affinity to the actions attributed to the Divinity. To get at this a little closer, we must endeavour to find out what we do not call wisdom in man; this will help us to form an estimate, how very incompetent we are to describe the qualities of a being that differs so very materially from ourselves. We most certainly should not call him a wise man, who having built a beautiful residence, should himself set it on fire; and thus destroy what he had laboured so much to bring to perfection: yet this happens every day in nature, without its being in any manner a warrantry for us to charge her with folly. If therefore we were to form our judgments after our own puny ideas of wisdom, what should we say? Why, in point of fact, just what the man does, who, thinking he has had too much rain, implores fine weather? Which, properly translated, is neither more nor less than giving the Divinity to understand he best knows what is proper for himself. The just, the only fair inference to be drawn from this, is, that we positively know nothing about the matter; that those who pretend they do, would, if it was upon any other subject, he suspected of having an unsound mind. We do not mean to insist that we are in the right, but we mean to aver that the object of this work is not so much either to build up new systems, or to put down old ones, as by shewing man the inconclusiveness of his reasonings upon matters not accessible to his comprehension—to induce him to be more tolerant to his neighbour—to invite him to be less rancorous against those who do not see with his eyes—to hold forth to him motives for forbearance, against those whose system of faith may not exactly harmonize with his own—to render him less ferocious in support of opinions, which, if he will but discard his prejudices, he may find not so solidly bottomed as he imagines. All we know is scarcely more than that the motion we witness in the universe is the necessary consequence of the laws of matter; that the uniformity of this motion is evidence of their immutability; that it is not too much to say it cannot cease to act in the manner it does, as long as the same causes operate, governed by the same circumstances. We evidently see that motion, however regular in our mind, that order, however beautiful to our admiring optics, yields to what we term disorder, to that which we designate frightful confusion, as soon as new causes, not analogous to the preceding, either disturb or suspend their action. We further know that a better knowledge of nature, the consequence of time, the result of patient, laborious, physical researches, with the comparison of facts and the application of experience, has enabled man in many instances to divert from himself the evil effects of inevitable causes, which anterior to these discoveries overwhelmed his unhappy progenitors with ruin. How far these salutary developements are to be carried by industry, what may be achieved by honesty, what light is to be gathered from the recession of prejudice, the wisest among men is not competent to decide. Certain it is, that phenomena which for ages were supposed to denounce the anger of the Deity against mankind, are now well understood to be common effects of natural causes.
Order, as we have elsewhere shewn, is only the effects which result to ourselves from a series of motion; there cannot be any disorder relatively to the great whole; in which all that takes place is necessary; in which every thing is determined by laws which nothing can change. The order of nature may be damaged or destroyed relatively to ourselves, but it is never contradicted relatively to herself, since she cannot act otherwise than she does: if we attribute to her the evils we sustain, we are equally obliged to acknowledge we owe to her the good we experience.
On prétend que les animaux nous fournissent une preuve convaincante d’une cause puissante de leur existence ; on nous dit que l’accord admirable de leurs parties, que l’on voit se prêter des secours mutuels afin de remplir leurs fonctions & de maintenir leur ensemble, nous annoncent un ouvrier qui réunit la puissance à la sagesse. Nous ne pouvons douter de la puissance de la nature5 ; elle produit tous les animaux que nous voyons à l’aide des combinaisons de la matière qui est dans une action continuelle ; l’accord des parties de ces mêmes animaux est une suite des loix nécessaires de leur nature & de leur combinaison, dès que cet accord cesse, l’animal se détruit nécessairement. Que deviennent alors la sagesse, l’intelligence ou la bonté de la cause prétendue à qui l’on faisoit honneur d’un accord si vanté ? Ces animaux si merveilleux que l’on dit être les ouvrages d’un dieu immuable, ne s’altèrent-ils point sans cesse & ne finissent-ils pas toujours par se détruire ? Où est la sagesse, la bonté, la prévoyance, l’immutabilité d’un ouvrier qui ne paroît occupé qu’à déranger & briser les ressorts des machines qu’on nous annonce comme les chefs-d’ œuvres de sa puissance & de son habileté ? Si ce dieu ne peut faire autrement, il n’est ni libre ni tout puissant. S’il change de volontés, il n’est point immuable. S’il permet que des machines qu’il a rendu sensibles éprouvent de la douleur, il manque de bonté. S’il n’a pu rendre ses ouvrages plus solides, c’est qu’il a manqué d’habileté. En voyant que les animaux, ainsi que tous les autres ouvrages de la divinité, se détruisent, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher d’en conclure ou que tout ce que la nature fait est nécessaire & n’est qu’une suite de ses loix, ou que l’ouvrier qui la fait agir est dépourvu de plan, de puissance, de constance, d’habileté, de bonté.
It in said, that animals furnish a convincing proof of the powerful cause of their existence; that the admirable harmony of their parts, the mutual assistance they lend each other, the regularity with which they fulfill their functions, the preservation of these parts, the conservation of such complicated wholes, announce a workman who unites wisdom with power; in short, whole tracts of anatomy and botany have been copied to prove nothing more than that these things exist, for of the power that produced them there cannot remain a doubt. We shall never learn more from these erudite tracts, save that there exists in nature certain elements with an aptitude to attraction; a disposition to unite, suitable to form wholes, to induce combinations capable of producing very striking effects. To be surprised that the brain, the heart, the arteries, the veins, the eyes, the ears of an animal, act as we see them—that the roots of plants attract juices, or that trees produce fruit, is to be surprised that a tree, a plant, or an animal exists at all. These beings would not exist, or would no longer be that which we know they are, if they ceased to act as they do: this is what happens when they die. If the formation, the combination, the modes of action, variously possessed by these beings, if their conservation for a season, followed by their destruction or dissolution, prove any thing, it is the immutability of those laws which operate in nature: we cannot doubt the power of nature; she produces all the animals we behold, by the combination, of matter, continually in motion; the harmony that subsists between the component parts of these beings, is a consequence of the necessary laws of their nature, and of that which results from their combination. As soon as this accord ceases, the animal is necessarily destroyed: from this we must conclude that every mutation in nature is necessary; is only a consequence of its laws; that it could not be otherwise than it is, under the circumstances in which it is placed.
L’homme, qui se regarde lui-même comme le chef-d’ œuvre de la divinité, nous fourniroit plus que toute autre production la preuve de l’incapacité ou de la malice de son auteur prétendu : dans cet être sensible, intelligent, pensant, qui se croit l’objet constant de la prédilection divine, & qui fait son dieu d’après son propre modèle, nous ne voyons qu’une machine plus mobile, plus frêle, plus sujette à se déranger par sa grande complication que celle des êtres les plus grossiers. Les bêtes dépourvues de nos connoissances, les plantes qui végétent, les pierres privées de sentiment, sont à bien des égards des êtres plus favorisés que l’homme ; ils sont au moins exempts des peines de l’esprit, des tourmens de la pensée des chagrins dévorans dont celui-ci est si souvent la proie. Qui est-ce qui ne voudroit point être un animal ou une pierre toutes les fois qu’il se rappelle la perte irréparable d’un objet aimé ? Ne vaudroit-il pas mieux être une masse inanimée qu’un superstitieux inquiet qui ne fait que trembler ici bas sous le joug de son dieu, & qui prévoit encore des tourmens infinis dans une vie future ? Les êtres privés de sentiment, de vie, de mémoire & de pensée ne sont point affligés par l’idée du passé, du présent & de l’avenir ; ils ne se croient pas en danger de devenir éternellement malheureux pour avoir mal raisonné, comme tant d’êtres favorisés qui prétendent que c’est pour eux que l’architecte du monde a construit l’univers6.
Man, who looks upon himself as the chef d'oeuvre, furnishes more than any other production a proof of the immutability of the laws of nature: in this sensible, intelligent, thinking being, whose vanity leads him to believe himself the sole object of the divine predilection, who forms his God after his own peculiar model, we see only a more inconstant, a more brittle machine; one more subject to be deranged by its extreme complication, than the grosser beings: beasts destitute of our knowledge, plants that vegetate, stones devoid of feeling, are in many respects beings more highly favored than man: they are at least exempted from the sorrows of the mind—from the torments of reflection—from that devouring, chagrin to which he is so frequently a prey. Who is he who would not be a plant or a stone, every time reminiscence forces upon his imagination the irreparable loss of a beloved object? Would it not be better to be an inanimate mass, than a restless, turbulent, superstitious being, who does nothing but tremble under the imaginary displeasure of beings of his own creation; who to support his own gloomy opinions, immolates his fellow creatures at the shrine of his idol; who ravages the country, and deluges the earth with the blood of those who happen to differ from him on a speculative point of an unintelligible creed? Beings destitute of life, bereft of feeling, without memory, not having the faculties of thought, at least are not afflicted by the idea of either the past, the present, or the future; they do not at any rate believe themselves in danger of becoming eternally unhappy, because they way have reasoned badly; or because they happened to be born in a land where truth has never yet shed its refulgent beams on the darkened mind of perplexed mortals.
Que l’on ne nous dise point que nous ne pouvons avoir l’idée d’un ouvrage sans avoir celle d’un ouvrier distingué de son ouvrage. la nature n’est point un ouvrage ; elle a toujours existé par elle-même, c’est dans son sein que tout se fait ; elle est un attellier immense pourvu des matériaux & qui fait les instrumens dont elle se sert pour agir : tous ses ouvrages sont des effets de son énergie & des agens ou causes qu’elle fait, qu’elle renferme, qu’elle met en action. Des élémens éternels, incréés, indestructibles, toujours en mouvement, en se combinant diversement font éclore tous les êtres & les phénomènes que nous voyons, tous les effets bons ou mauvais que nous sentons, l’ordre ou le désordre, que nous ne distinguons jamais que par les différentes façons dont nous sommes affectés, en un mot toutes les merveilles sur lesquelles nous méditons & raisonnons. Ces élémens n’ont besoin pour cela que de leurs propriétés soit particulières soit réunies, & du mouvement qui leur est essentiel, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de recourir à un ouvrier inconnu pour les arranger, les façonner, les combiner, les conserver & les dissoudre.
Let it not then be said that we cannot have an idea of a work, without also having an idea of the workman, as distinguished from his work: the savage, when he first beheld the terrible operation of gunpowder, did not form the most distant idea that it was the work of a man like himself. Nature is not to be contemplated as a work of this kind; she is self-existent. In her bosom every thing is produced: she is an immense elaboratory, provided with materials, who makes the instruments of which she avails herself in her operations. All her works are the effects of her own energies; of those agents which she herself produces; of those immutable laws by which she sets every thing in activity. Eternal, indestructible elements, ever in motion, combine themselves variously, and thus give birth to all beings, to all the phenomena which fill the weak eyes of erring mortals with wonder and dismay; to all the effects, whether good or bad, of which man experiences the influence; to all the vicissitudes he undergoes, from the moment of his birth until that of his death; to order and to confusion, which he never discriminates but by the various modes in which he is affected: in short, to all those miraculous spectacles with which he occupies his meditation—upon which he exercises his reason—which frequently spread consternation over the surface of the earth. These elements need nothing when circumstances favour their junction, save their own peculiar properties, whether individual or united, with the motion that is essential to them, to produce all those phenomena which powerfully striking the senses of mankind, either fill him with admiration, or stagger him with alarm.
Mais en supposant pour un instant qu’il soit impossible de concevoir l’univers sans un ouvrier qui l’ait formé & qui veille à son ouvrage, où placerons-nous cet ouvrier ? Sera-t-il dedans ou hors de l’univers ? Est-il matière ou mouvement ? Ou bien n’est-il que l’espace, le néant ou le vuide ? Dans tous ces cas, ou il ne seroit rien, ou il seroit contenu dans la nature & soumis à ses loix. S’il est dans la nature je n’y peux voir que de la matière en mouvement, & je dois en conclure que l’agent qui la meut est corporel & matériel, & que par conséquent il est sujet à se dissoudre. Si cet agent est hors de la nature, je n’ai plus aucune idée du lieu qu’il occupe, ni d’un être immatériel, ni de la façon dont un esprit sans étendue peut agir sur la matière dont il est séparé. Ces espaces ignorés que l’imagination a placé au-delà du monde visible n’existent point pour un être qui voit à peine à ses pieds ; la puissance idéale qui les habite ne peut se peindre à mon esprit que lorsque mon imagination combinera au hazard les couleurs fantastiques qu’elle est toujours forcée de prendre dans le monde où je suis ; dans ce cas je ne ferai que reproduire en idée ce que mes sens auront réellement apperçu ; & ce dieu que je m’efforce de distinguer de la nature ou de placer hors de son enceinte, y rentrera toujours nécessairement & malgré moi.7
But supposing for a moment that it was impossible to conceive the work, without also conceiving the workman, who watches over his work, where must we place this workman? Shall it be interior or exterior to his production? Is he matter and motion, or is he only space or the vacuum? In all these cases either he would be nothing, or he would be contained in nature: as nature contains only matter and motion, it must be concluded that the agent who moves it is material; that he is corporeal; if this agent be exterior to nature, then we can no longer form any idea of the place which he occupieth: neither can we better conceive an immaterial being; nor the mode in which a spirit without extent can act upon matter from which it is separated. These unknown spaces, which imagination has placed beyond the visible world, can have no existence for a being, who with difficulty sees down to his feet; he cannot paint to his mind any image of the power which inhabit them; but if he is compelled to form some kind of a picture, he must combine at random the fantastical colours which he is ever obliged to draw from the world he inhabits: in this case he will really do no more than reproduce in idea, part or parcels of that which he has actually seen; he will form a whole which perhaps has no existence in nature, but which it will be in vain he strives to distinguish from her; to place out of her bosom. When he shall be ingenuous with himself, When he shall be no longer willing to delude others, he will be obliged to acknowledge, that the portrait he has painted, although in its combination it resembles nothing in the universe, is nevertheless in all its constituent members an exact delineation of that which nature presents to our view. Hobbes in his Leviathan says, "The universe, the whole mass of things, is corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part of the universe; and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing; and consequently no where: nor does it follow from hence, that spirits are nothing, for they have dimensions, and are therefore really bodies; though that name in common speech be given to such bodies only as are visible, or palpable, that is, that have some degree of opacity: but for spirits they call them incorporeal; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed to God himself, in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best his nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire to honour him."
L’on insistera, & l’on dira que si l’on portoit une statue ou une montre à un sauvage qui n’en auroit jamais vu, il ne pourroit s’empêcher de reconnoître que ces choses sont des ouvrages de quelque agent intelligent plus habile & plus industrieux que lui-même : l’on conclura de là que nous sommes pareillement forcés de reconnoître que la machine de l’univers, que l’homme, que les phénomènes de la nature sont des ouvrages d’un agent dont l’intelligence & le pouvoir surpassent de beaucoup les nôtres.
Je réponds en premier lieu que nous ne pouvons douter que la nature ne soit très-puissante & très industrieuse ; nous admirons son industrie toutes les fois que nous sommes surpris des effets étendus, variés & compliqués que nous trouvons dans ceux de ses ouvrages que nous prenons la peine de méditer ; cependant elle n’est ni plus ni moins industrieuse dans l’un de ses ouvrages que dans les autres. Nous ne comprenons pas plus comment elle a pu produire une pierre ou un métal qu’une tête organisée comme celle de Newton. Nous appellons industrieux un homme qui peut faire des choses que nous ne pouvons pas faire nous-mêmes ; la nature peut tout, & dès qu’une chose existe c’est une preuve qu’elle a pu la faire. Ainsi ce n’est jamais que relativement à nous-mêmes que nous jugeons la nature industrieuse ; nous la comparons alors à nous-mêmes ; & comme nous jouissons d’une qualité que nous nommons intelligence, à l’aide de laquelle nous produisons des ouvrages où nous montrons notre industrie, nous en concluons que les ouvrages de la nature qui nous étonnent le plus, ne lui appartiennent point, mais sont dûs à un ouvrier intelligent comme nous, mais dont nous proportionnons l’intelligence à l’étonnement que ses œuvres produisent en nous, c’est-à-dire à notre foiblesse & à notre propre ignorance.
It will be insisted that if a statue or a watch were shewn to a savage, who had never before seen either, he would not be able to prevent himself from acknowledging that these things were the works of some intelligent agent of greater ability, possessing more industry than himself: it will be concluded from thence, that we are in like manner obliged to acknowledge that the universe, that man, that the various phenomena, are the works of an agent, whose intelligence is more comprehensive, whose power far surpasses our own. Granted: who has ever doubted it? the proposition is self-evident; it cannot admit of even a cavil. Nevertheless we reply, in the first place, that it is not to be doubted that nature is extremely powerful; diligently industrious: we admire her activity every time we are surprised by the extent, every time we contemplate the variety, every time we behold those complicated effects which are displayed in her works; or whenever we take the pains to meditate upon them: nevertheless, she is not really more industrious in one of her works than she is in another; she is not fathomed with more ease in those we call her most contemptible productions, than she is in her most sublime efforts: we no more understand how she has been capable of producing a stone or a metal, than the means by which she organized a head like that of the illustrious Newton. We call that man industrious who can accomplish things which we cannot; nature is competent to every thing: as soon therefore as a thing exists, it is a proof she has been capable of producing it: but it is never more than relatively to ourselves that we judge beings to be industrious: we then compare them to ourselves; and as we enjoy a quality which we call intelligence, by the assistance of which we accomplish things, by which we display our diligence, we naturally conclude from it, that those works which most astonish us, do not belong to her, but are to be ascribed to an intelligent being like ourselves, but in whom we make the intelligence commensurate with the astonishment these phenomena excite in us; that is to say, in other words, to our own peculiar ignorance, and the weakness incident to our nature.
Je réponds en second lieu que le sauvage à qui l’on portera une statue ou une montre, aura, ou n’aura pas d’idées de l’industrie humaine : s’il en a des idées, il sentira que cette montre ou cette statue peuvent être des ouvrages d’un être de son espèce, jouissant des facultés qui lui manquent à lui-même. Si le sauvage n’a aucune idée de l’industrie humaine & des ressources de l’art, en voyant le mouvement spontané d’une montre, il croira qu’elle est un animal qui ne peut être l’ouvrage de l’homme. Des expériences multipliées confirment la façon de penser que je prête à ce Sauvage8. Ainsi, de même que beaucoup d’hommes qui se croient bien plus fins que lui, ce sauvage attribuera les effets étranges qu’il voit à un génie, à un esprit, à un dieu, c’est-à-dire à une force inconnue à qui il assignera un peu voir dont il croit que les êtres de son espèce sont absolument privés : par là il ne prouvera rien, sinon qu’il ne sçait pas ce que l’homme est capable de produire. C’est ainsi que les gens grossiers lévent les yeux au ciel toutes les fois qu’ils sont témoins de quelque phénomène inusité. C’est ainsi que le peuple appelle miraculeux, surnaturels, divins tous les effets étranges dont il ignore les causes naturelles ; & comme pour l’ordinaire il ne connoît les causes de rien, tout est miracle pour lui, ou du moins il s’imagine que Dieu est la cause de tous les biens & de tous les maux qu’il éprouve. Enfin c’est ainsi que les théologiens tranchent toutes les difficultés en attribuant à Dieu tout ce dont ils ignorent, ou ne veulent pas que l’on connoisse, les causes véritables.
Je réponds en troisieme lieu que le sauvage en ouvrant la montre, en l’examinant par parties, sentira peut-être que ces parties annoncent un ouvrage qui ne peut venir que du travail de l’homme. Il verra qu’il diffère des productions immédiates de la nature, à qui il n’a point vu produire des roues faites d’un métal poli. Il verra encore que ces parties séparées les unes des autres n’agissent plus comme lorsqu’elles étoient assemblées ; d’après ces observations le sauvage attribuera la montre à un homme, c’est-à-dire, à un être comme lui, dont il a des idées, mais qu’il juge capable de faire des choses qu’il ne sçait pas faire lui-même ; en un mot il fera honneur de cet ouvrage à un être connu à quelques égards, pourvu de quelques facultés supérieures aux siennes, mais il se gardera bien de penser qu’un ouvrage matériel puisse être l’effet d’une cause immatérielle, ou d’un agent privé d’organes & d’étendue, dont il est impossible de concevoir l’action sur des êtres matériels : au lieu que, faute de connoître le pouvoir de la nature, nous faisons honneur de ses ouvrages à un être que nous connoissons bien moins qu’elle, & à qui, sans le connoître, nous attribuons ceux d’entre ses travaux que nous comprenons le moins. En voyant le monde nous reconnoissons une cause matérielle des phénomènes qui s’y passent ; & cette cause c’est la nature, dont l’énergie se montre à ceux qui l’étudient.
In the second place, we must observe, that the savage, to whom either the statue or the watch is brought, will or will not have ideas of human industry: if he has ideas of it, he will feel that this watch or this statue, way be the work of a being of his own species, enjoying faculties of which he is himself deficient: if he has no idea of it, if he has no comprehension of the resources of human art, when he beholds the spontaneous motion of the watch, he will be impressed with the belief that it is an animal, which cannot be the work of man. Multiplied experience confirms this mode of thinking which is ascribed to the savage. The Peruvians mistook the Spaniards for gods, because they made use of gunpowder, rode on horseback, and came in vessels which sailed quite alone. The inhabitants of the island of Tenian being ignorant of fire before the arrival of Europeans, the first time they saw it, conceived it to be an animal who devoured the wood. Thus it is, that the savage, in the same manner as many great and learned men, who believe themselves much more acute, will attribute the strange effects that strike his organs, to a genius or to a spirit; that is to say, to an unknown power; to whom he will ascribe capabilities of which he believes the beings of his own species are entirely destitute: by this he will prove nothing, except that he is himself ignorant of what man is capable of producing. It is thus that a raw unpolished people raise their eyes to heaven, every time they witness some unusual phenomenon. It is thus that the people denominate all those strange effects, with the natural causes of which they are ignorant, miraculous, supernatural, divine; but these are not by reasonable persons therefore considered proofs of what they assert: as the multitude are generally unacquainted with the cause of any thing, every object becomes a miracle in their eyes; at least they imagine God is the immediate cause of the good they enjoy—of the evil they suffer. In short, it is thus that the theologians themselves solve every difficulty that starts in their road; they ascribe to God all those phenomena, of the causes of which either they are themselves ignorant, or else unwilling that man should be acquainted with the source.
In the third place, the savage, in opening the watch, and examining its parts, will perhaps feel, that this machinery announces a work which can only be the result of human labour. He will perhaps perceive, that they very obviously differ from the immediate productions of nature, whom he has not observed to produce wheels made of polished metal. He will further notice, perhaps, that these parts when separated, no longer act as they did when they were combined; that the motion he so much admired, ceases when their union is broken. After these observations, he will attribute the watch to the ingenuity of man; that is to say, to a being like himself, of whom he has some ideas, but whom he judges capable to construct machines to which he is himself utterly incompetent. In short, he will ascribe the honour of his watch to a being known to him in some respects, provided with faculties very far superior to his own; but he will be at an immense distance from the belief, that this material work, whose ingenuity pleases him so much, can be the effect of an immaterial cause; or of an agent destitute of organs, without extent; whose action upon material beings cannot be within, the sphere of his comprehension. Nevertheless, man, when he cannot embrace the causes of things, does not scruple to insist that they are impossible to be the production of nature, although he is entirely ignorant how far the powers of this nature extend; to what her capabilities are equal. In viewing the world, we must acknowledge material causes for many of those phenomena which take place in it; those who study nature are continually adding fresh discoveries to this list of physical causes; science, as she enriches the intellectual stores of human enjoyment, every day throws a broader light on the energies of nature, which prejudice, aided by its almost inseparable companion, ignorance, would for ever bind down in the fetters of impotence.
Que l’on ne nous dise point que d’après cette hypothèse nous attribuons tout à une cause aveugle, au concours fortuit des atômes, au hazard. Nous n’appellons causes aveugles que celles dont nous ne connoissons point le concours, la force & les loix. Nous appellons fortuits des effets dont nous ignorons les causes & que notre ignorance & notre inexpérience nous empêchent de pressentir. Nous attribuons au hazard tous les effets dont nous ne voyons point la liaison nécessaire avec leurs causes. La nature n’est point une cause aveugle ; elle n’agit point au hazard ; tout ce qu’elle fait ne seroit jamais fortuit pour celui qui connoîtroit sa façon d’agir, ses ressources & sa marche. Tout ce qu’elle produit est nécessaire & n’est jamais qu’une suite de ses loix fixes & constantes ; tout en elle est lié par des nœuds invisibles, & tous les effets que nous voyons découlent nécessairement de leurs causes soit que nous les connoissions, soit que nous ne le connoissions pas. Il peut bien y avoir ignorance de notre part, mais les mots Dieu, esprit, intelligence etc. Ne remédieront point à cette ignorance ; ils ne feront que la redoubler en nous empêchant de chercher les causes naturelles des effets que nous voyons.
Let us not, however, be told, that pursuing this hypothesis, we attribute every thing to a blind cause—to the fortuitous concurrence of atoms—to chance. Those only are called blind causes of which we know not either the combination, the laws, or the power. Those effects are called fortuitous, with whose causes man is unacquainted; to which his experience affords him no clue; which his ignorance prevents him from foreseeing. All those effects, of which he does not see the necessary connection with their causes, he attributes to chance. Nature is not a blind cause; she never acts by chance; nothing that she does would ever be considered fortuitous, by him who should understand her mode of action—who had a knowledge of her resources—who was intelligent in her ways. Every thing that she produces is strictly necessary—is never more than a consequence of her eternal, immutable laws; all is connected in her by invisible bonds; every effect we witness flows necessarily from its cause, whether we are in a condition to fathom it, or whether we are obliged to let it remain hidden from our view. It is very possible there should be ignorance on our part; but the words spirit, intelligence, will not remedy this ignorance; they will rather redouble it, by arresting our research; by preventing us from conquering those impediments which obstruct us in probing the natural causes of the effects, with which our visual faculties bring us acquainted.
Cela peut servir de réponse à l’objection éternelle que l’on fait aux partisans de la nature, que l’on accuse sans cesse de tout attribuer au hazard. Le hazard est un mot vuide de sens, ou du moins il n’indique que l’ignorance de ceux qui l’employent. Cependant l’on nous dit & l’on nous répète qu’un ouvrage régulier ne peut être dû aux combinaisons du hazard. Jamais, nous dit-on, l’on ne pourra parvenir à faire un poëme tel que l’ iliade avec des lettres jettées ou combinées au hazard. Nous en conviendrons sans peine ; mais en bonne foi, sont-ce des lettres, jettées avec la main comme des dés, qui produisent un poëme ? Autant vaudroit-il dire que ce n’est point avec le pied que l’on peut faire un discours. C’est la nature qui combine d’après les loix certaines & nécessaires une tête organisée de manière à faire un poëme : c’est la nature qui lui donne un cerveau propre à enfanter un pareil ouvrage : c’est la nature qui par le tempérament, l’imagination, les passions qu’elle donne à un homme le met en état de produire un chef-d’ œuvre : c’est son cerveau modifié d’une certaine manière, orné d’idées ou d’images, fécondé par les circonstances, qui peut devenir la seule matrice dans laquelle un poëme puisse être conçu & développé. Une tête organisée comme celle d’Homère, pourvue de la même vigueur, & de la même imagination, enrichie des mêmes connoissances, placée dans les mêmes circonstances, produira nécessairement, & non pas au hazard, le poëme de l’iliade ; à moins que l’on ne voulut nier que des causes semblables en tout dussent produire des effets parfaitement identiques9.
This may serve for an answer to the clamour of those who raise perpetual objections to the partizans of nature, by unceasingly accusing them with attributing every thing to chance. Chance is a word devoid of sense, which furnishes no substantive idea; at least it indicates only the ignorance of its employers. Nevertheless, we are triumphantly told, it is reiterated continually, that a regular work cannot be ascribed to the concurrence of chance. Never, we are informed, will it be possible to arrive at the formation of a poem such as the Iliad, by means of letters thrown together promiscuously or combined at random. We agree to it without hesitation; but, ingenuously, are the letters which compose a poem thrown with the hand in the manner of dice? It would avail as much to say, we could not pronounce a discourse with the feet. It is nature, who combines according to necessary laws, under given circumstances, a head organized in a mode suitable to bring forth a poem: it is nature who assembles the elements, which furnish man with a brain competent to give birth to such a work: it is nature, who, through the medium of the imagination, by means of the passions, in consequence of the temperament which she bestows upon man, capacitates him to produce such a masterpiece of fancy; such a never-fading effort of the mind: it is his brain modified in a certain manner, crowded with ideas, decorated with images, made fruitful by circumstances, that alone can become the matrix in which a poem can be conceived—in which the matter of it can be digested: this is the only womb whose activity could usher to an admiring world, the sublime stanzas which develope the story of the unfortunate Priam, and immortalize their author. A head organized like that of Homer, furnished with the same vigour, glowing with the same vivid imagination, enriched with the same erudition, placed under the same circumstances, would necessarily, and not by chance, produce the poem of the Iliad; at least, unless it be denied that causes similar in every thing must produce effects perfectly identical. We should without doubt be surprised, if there were in a dice-box a hundred thousand dice, to see a hundred thousand sixes follow in succession; but if these dice were all cogged or loaded, our surprise would cease: the particles of matter may be compared to cogged dice, that is to say, always producing certain determinate effects under certain given circumstances; these particles being essentially varied in themselves, countless in their combinations, they are cogged in myriads of different modes. The head of Homer, or of Virgil, was no more than an assemblage of particles, possessing peculiar properties; or if they will, of dice cogged by nature; that is to say, of beings so combined, of matter so wrought, as to produce the beautiful poems of the Iliad or the Aeneid. As much may be said of all other productions: indeed, what are men themselves but cogged dice—machines into which nature has infused the bias requisite to produce effects of a certain description? A man of genius produces a good work, in the same manner as a tree of a good species, placed in a prolific soil, cultivated with care, grafted with judgment, produces excellent fruit.
Il y a donc de la puérilité, ou de la mauvaise foi, à proposer de faire à force de jets de la main, ou en mêlant des lettres au hazard, ce qui ne peut être fait qu’à l’aide d’un cerveau organisé & modifié d’une certaine manière. Le germe humain ne se développe point au hazard ; il ne peut être conçu ou formé que dans le sein d’une femme. Un amas confus de caractères ou de figures n’est qu’un assemblage de signes, destinés à peindre des idées ; mais pour que ces idées puissent être peintes, il faut préalablement qu’elles ayent été reçues, combinées, nourries, développées & liées dans la tête d’un poëte, où les circonstances les font fructifier & meurir, en raison de la fécondité, de la chaleur, & de l’énergie du sol où ces germes intellectuels auront été jettés. Les idées se combinent, s’étendent, se lient, s’associent, font un ensemble comme tous les corps de la nature : cet ensemble nous plaît quand il fait naître dans notre esprit des idées agréables, quand il nous offre des tableaux qui nous remuent vivement. C’est ainsi que le poëme d’Homère, enfanté dans sa tête, a le pouvoir de plaire à des têtes analogues & capables d’en sentir les beautés.
Then is it not either knavery or puerility, to talk of composing a work by scattering letters with the hand; by promiscuously mingling characters; or gathering together by chance, that which can only result from a human brain, with a peculiar organization, modified after a certain manner? The principle of human generation does not develope itself by chance; it cannot be nourished with effect, expanded into life, but in the womb of a woman: a confused heap of characters, a jumble of symbols, is nothing more than an assemblage of signs, whose proper arrangement is adequate to paint human ideas; but in order that these ideas may be correctly delineated, it is previously requisite that they should have been conceived, combined, nourished, connected, and developed in the brain of a poet; where circumstances make them fructify, mature them, and bring them forth in perfection, by reason of the fecundity, generated by the genial warmth and the peculiar energy of the matrix, in which these intellectual seeds shall have been placed. Ideas in combining, expanding, connecting, and associating themselves, form a whole, like all the other bodies of nature: this whole affords us pleasure, becomes a source of enjoyment, when it gives birth to agreeable sensations in the mind; when it offers to our examination pictures calculated to move us in a lively manner. It is thus that the history of the Trojan war, as digested in the head of Homer, ushered into the world with all the fascinating harmony of numbers peculiar to himself, has the power of giving a pleasurable impulse to heads, who by their analogy with that of this incomparable Grecian, are in a capacity to feel its beauties.
On voit donc que rien ne se fait au hazard. Tous les ouvrages de la nature se font d’après des loix certaines, uniformes, invariables ; soit que notre esprit puisse avec facilité suivre la chaîne des causes successives qu’elle met en action, soit que dans ses ouvrages trop compliqués nous nous trouvions dans l’impossibilité de distinguer les différens ressorts qu’elle fait agir. Il n’en coûte pas plus à la nature pour produire un grand poëte, capable de faire un ouvrage admirable, que pour produire un métal brillant ou une pierre qui gravite sur la terre. La façon dont elle s’y prend pour produire ces différens êtres nous est également inconnue, quand nous n’y avons point médité. L’homme naît par le concours nécessaire de quelques élémens ; il s’accroît & se fortifie de la même manière qu’une plante ou qu’une pierre, qui se sont, ainsi que lui, accrues & augmentées par des substances qui viennent s’y joindre : cet homme sent, pense, agit, reçoit des idées, c’est-à-dire, est, par son organisation particulière, susceptible de modifications dont la plante & la pierre sont totalement incapables : en conséquence l’homme de génie produit de bons ouvrages & la plante des fruits, qui nous plaisent & nous surprennent en raison des sensations qu’ils opérent en nous-mêmes ; ou en raison de la rareté, de la grandeur, de la variété des effets qu’ils nous font éprouver. Ce que nous trouvons de plus admirable dans les productions de la nature & dans celles des animaux ou des hommes, n’est jamais qu’un effet naturel des parties de la matière, diversement arrangées & combinées ; d’où résultent en eux des organes, des cerveaux, des tempéramens, des goûts, des propriétés, des talens différens.
From this it will be obvious, that nothing can be produced by chance; that no effect can exist without an adequate cause for its existence; that the one must ever be commensurate with the other. All the works of nature grow out of the uniform action of invariable laws, whether our mind can with facility follow the concatenation of the successive causes which operate; or whether, as in her more complicated productions, we find ourselves in the impossibility of distinguishing the various springs which she sets in motion to give birth to her phenomena. To nature, the difficulty is not more to produce a great poet, capable of writing an admirable poem, than to form a glittering stone or a shining metal which gravitates towards a centre. The mode she adopts to give birth to these various beings, is equally unknown to us, when we have not meditated upon it; frequently the most sedulous attention, the most patient investigation affords us no information; sometimes, however, the unwearied industry of the philosopher is rewarded, by throwing into light the most mysterious operations. Thus the keen penetration of a Newton, aided by uncommon diligence, developed the starry system, which, for so many thousand years, had eluded the research of all the astronomers by whom he was preceded. Thus the sagacity of a Harvey giving vigour to his application, brought out of the obscurity in which for almost countless centuries it had been buried, the true course pursued by the sanguinary fluid, when circulating through the veins and arteries of man, giving activity to his machine, diffusing life through his system, and enabling him to perform those actions which so frequently strike an astonished world with wonder and regret. Thus Gallileo, by a quickness of perception, a depth of reasoning peculiar to himself, held up to an admiring world, the actual form and situation of the planet we inhabit; which until then had escaped the observation of the most profound geniuses—the most subtle metaphysicians—the whole host of priests; which when first promulgated was considered so extraordinary, so contradictory to all the then received opinions, either sacred or profane, that he was ranked as an atheist, as an impious blasphemer, to hold communion with whom, would secure to the communers a place in the regions of everlasting torment; in short, it was held an heresy of such an indelible dye, that notwithstanding the infallibility of his sacred function, Pope Gregory, who then filled the papal chair, excommunicated all those who had the temerity to accredit so abominable a doctrine.
Man is born by the necessary concurrence of those elements suitable to his construction; he increases in bulk, corroborates his system, expands his powers, in the same manner as a plant or a stone; which as well as himself, are augmented in their volume, invigorated in their capabilities, by the addition of homogeneous matter, that exists within the sphere of their attraction. Man feels, thinks, receives ideas, acts after a certain manner, that is to say, according to his organic structure, which is peculiar to himself; that renders him susceptible of modifications, of which the stone and the plant are utterly incapable. On the other hand, the organization of these beings is of a nature to enable them to receive other modifications, which man is not more capacitated to experience, than the stone or the plant are those which constitute him what he is. In consequence of this peculiar arrangement, the man of genius produces works of merit; the plant when it is healthy yields delicious fruits the stone when it is placed in a suitable matrix possesses a glittering brilliance which dazzles the eyes of mortals; each in their sphere of action both surprise and delight us; because we feel that they excite in us sensations, that harmonize with what we call order; in consequence of the pleasure they infuse, by the rarity, by the magnitude, and by the variety of the effects which they occasion us to experience. Nevertheless, that which is found most admirable in the productions of nature, that which is most esteemed in the actions of man, most highly valued in animals, most sought after in vegetation, most in request among fossils, is never more than the natural effects of the different particles of matter, diversely arranged, variously combined, submitted to numerous modifications; from matter thus united result organs, brains, temperament, taste, talents, all the multifarious properties, all the multitudinous qualities, which discriminate the beings whose multiplied activity make up the sum of what is designated animated nature.
La nature ne fait donc rien que de nécessaire ; ce n’est point par des combinaisons fortuites & par des jets hazardés qu’elle produit les êtres que nous voyons ; tous ses jets sont sûrs, toutes les causes qu’elle employe ont immanquablement leurs effets. Quand elle produit des êtres extraordinaires, merveilleux & rares, c’est que dans l’ordre des choses les circonstances nécessaires ou le concours des causes productrices de ces êtres, n’arrivent que rarement. Dès que ces êtres existent ils sont dus à la nature, pour qui tout est également facile, & à qui tout est possible, quand elle rassemble les instrumens ou causes nécessaires pour agir. Ainsi, ne limitons jamais les forces de la nature. Les jets & les combinaisons qu’elle fait pendant une éternité, peuvent aisément produire tous les êtres ; sa marche éternelle doit nécessairement amener & ramener de nouveau les circonstances les plus étonnantes & les plus rares pour des êtres, qui ne sont qu’un moment à portée de les considérer, sans jamais avoir ni le tems ni les moyens d’en approfondir les causes. Des jets infinis, faits pendant l’éternité, avec des élémens & des combinaisons infiniment variés, suffisent pour produire tout ce que nous connoissons, & beaucoup d’autres choses que nous ne connoîtrons jamais.
Nature then produces nothing but what is necessary; it is not by fortuitous combinations, by chance throws, that she exhibits to our view the beings we behold; all her throws are sure, all the causes she employs have infallibly their effects. Whenever she gives birth to extraordinary, marvellous, rare beings, it is, that the requisite order of things the concurrence of the necessary productive causes, happens but seldom. As soon as those beings exist, they are to be ascribed to nature, equally with the most familiar of her productions; to nature every thing is equally possible, equally facile, when she assembles together the instruments or the causes necessary to act. Thus it seems presumption in man to set limits to the powers of nature, which he so very imperfectly understands. The combinations, or if they will, the throws that she makes in an eternity of existence, can easily produce all the beings that have existed: her eternal march must necessarily bring forth, again and again, the most astonishing circumstances; the most rare occurrences; those most calculated to rouse the wonder, to elicit the admiration of beings, who are only in a condition to give them a momentary consideration; who can get nothing more than a glimpse, without ever having either the leisure or the means to search into causes, which lie hid from their weak eyes, in the depths of Cimmerian obscurity. Countless throws during eternity, with elements and combinations varied almost to infinity, quite with relation to man, suffice to produce every thing of which he has a knowledge, with multitudes of other effects, of which he will never have the least conception.
Ainsi l’on ne peut trop le répéter aux déicoles, qui prêtent communément à leurs adversaires des opinions ridicules pour obtenir un triomphe facile & passager aux yeux prévenus de ceux qui n’osent rien approfondir, le hazard n’est rien, qu’un mot imaginé, ainsi que le mot Dieu, pour couvrir l’ignorance où l’on est des causes agissantes dans une nature dont la marche est souvent inexplicable. Ce n’est point le hazard qui a produit l’univers, il est de lui-même ce qu’il est ; il existe nécessairement & de toute éternité. Quelque cachées que soient les voies de la nature, son existence est indubitable ; & sa façon d’agir nous est au moins bien plus connue que celle de l’être inconcevable, qu’on a prétendu lui associer, qu’on a distingué d’elle-même, que l’on a supposé nécessaire & existant par lui-même ; tandis que jusqu’ici l’on n’a pu ni démontrer son existence, ni le définir, ni en rien dire de raisonnable, ni former sur son compte autre chose que des conjectures que la réflexion détruit aussi-tôt qu’elles ont été enfantées.
Thus, we cannot too often repeat to the metaphysicians, to the supporters of immateriality, to the inconsistent theologians, who commonly ascribe to their adversaries the most ridiculous opinions, in order to obtain an easy, short-lived triumph in the prejudiced eyes of the multitude; or in the stagnant minds of those who never examine deeply; that chance is nothing but a word, as well as many other words, imagined solely to cover the ignorance of those to whom the course of nature is inexplicable—to shield the idleness of others who are too slothful to seek into the properties of acting causes. It is not chance that has produced the universe, it is self-existent; nature exists necessarily from all eternity: she is omnipotent because every thing is produced by her energies; she is omnipresent, because she fills all space; she is omniscient, because every thing can only be what it actually is; she is immovable, because as a whole she cannot be displaced; she is immutable, because her essence cannot change, although her forms may vary; she is infinite, because she cannot have any bounds; she is all perfect, because she contains every thing: in short, she has all the abstract qualities of the metaphysician, all the moral faculties of the theologian, without involving any contradiction, since that which is the assemblage of all, must of necessity contain the properties of all.
However concealed may be her ways, the existence of nature is indubitable; her mode of action is in some respects known to us. Experience amply demonstrates we might, if we were more industrious, become better acquainted with her secrets; but with an immaterial substance, with a pure spirit, the mind of man can never become familiar: he has no means by which he can picture to himself this incomprehensible, this inconceivable quality: in despite therefore of the roundness of assertion adopted by the theologian, notwithstanding all the subtilties of the metaphysician, it will always be for man, while he remains such as he now is, in the language of Doctor Samuel Clarke, that, of which nothing can with truth be affirmed.