❦ The System of NaturePaul-Henri Thiry, baron d'Holbach Part II, Chapter IV: Examination of the Proofs of the Existence of the Divinity, as given by CLARKE (part 1 of 2)

The System of Nature · Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d'Holbach

Part II, Chapter IV: Examination of the Proofs of the Existence of the Divinity, as given by CLARKE (part 1 of 2) Partie II, chapitre IV : Examen des preuves de l’existence de Dieu, données par Clarke (1/2)

French (1770)Wilkinson (1820–21)

Examination of the Proofs of the Existence of the Divinity, as given by CLARKE

II.4.1

L’unanimité des hommes à reconnoître un dieu est communément regardée comme la preuve la plus forte de l’existence de cet être. Il n’est point, nous dit-on, de peuple sur la terre qui n’ait des idées vraies ou fausses d’un agent tout puissant qui gouverne le monde. Les sauvages les plus grossiers, ainsi que les nations les plus civilisées, sont également forcés de remonter par la pensée à une cause première de tout ce qui existe ; ainsi, nous assûre-t-on, le cri de la nature même doit nous convaincre de l’existence d’un dieu, dont elle a pris soin de graver la notion dans l’esprit de tous les hommes, & l’on conclut de là que l’idée de Dieu est une idée innée.

Si dégagés de préjugés nous analysons cette preuve, qui paroît si triomphante à bien des gens, nous verrons que le consentement universel des hommes, sur un objet qu’aucun d’entre eux n’a jamais pu connoître, ne prouve rien ; il nous prouve seulement qu’ils ont été des ignorans & des insensés toutes les fois qu’ils ont tenté de se faire quelqu’idée d’un être caché qu’ils ne pouvoient soumettre à l’expérience, ou raisonner sur la nature de cet être qu’ils ne purent jamais saisir par aucun côté. Les notions fâcheuses de la divinité, que nous voyons répandues sur la terre, nous annoncent uniquement que les hommes en toute contrée, ont essuyé d’affreux revers, ont éprouvé des désastres & des révolutions, ont ressenti des peines, des chagrins, des douleurs dont ils ont méconnu les causes physiques & naturelles. Les événemens dont ils ont été les victimes ou les témoins ont excité leur admiration ou leur frayeur ; faute de connoître les forces & les loix de la nature, ses ressources infinies, les effets qu’elle doit nécessairement produire dans des circonstances données, ils ont cru que ces phénomenes étoient dûs à quelqu’agent secret, dont ils n’ont eu que des idées vagues, ou qu’ils ont supposé se conduire d’après les mêmes motifs & suivant les mêmes regles qu’ils avoient eux-mêmes.

The unanimity of man in acknowledging the Divinity, is commonly looked upon as the strongest proof of his existence. There is not, it is said, any people on the earth who have not some ideas, whether true or false, of an all-powerful agent who governs the world. The rudest savages as well as the most polished nations, are equally obliged to recur by thought to the first cause of every thing that exists; thus it is affirmed, the cry of Nature herself ought to convince us of the existence of the Godhead, of which she has taken pains to engrave the notion in the minds of men: they therefore conclude, that the idea of God is innate.

Perhaps there is nothing of which man should be more sedulously careful than permitting a promiscuous assemblage of right with wrong—of suffering false conclusions to be drawn from true propositions; this will not improbably be found to be pretty much the case in this instance; the existence of the great Cause of causes, the Parent of parents, does not, I think, admit of any doubt in the mind of any one who has reasoned: but, if this existence did not rest upon better foundations than the unanimity of man on this subject, I am fearful it would not be placed upon so solid a rock as those who make this asseveration may imagine: the fact is, man is not generally agreed upon this point; if he was, superstition could have no existence; the idea of God cannot be innate, because, independent of the proofs offered on every side of the almost impossibility of innate ideas, one simple fact will set such an opinion for ever at rest, except with those who are obstinately determined not to be convinced by even their own arguments: if this idea was innate, it must be every where the same; seeing that that which is antecedent to man's being, cannot have experienced the modifications of his existence, which are posterior. Even if it were waived, that the same idea should be expected from all mankind, but that only every nation should have their ideas alike on this subject, experience will not warrant the assertion, since nothing can be better established than that the idea is not uniform even in the same town; now this would be an insuperable quality in an innate idea. It not unfrequently happens, that in the endeavour to prove too much, that which stood firm before the attempt, is weakened; thus a bad advocate frequently injures a good cause, although he may not be able to overturn the rights on which it is rested. It would, therefore, perhaps, come nearer to the point if it was said, "that the natural curiosity of mankind have in all ages, and in all nations, led him to seek after the primary cause of the phenomena he beholds; that owing to the variations of his climate, to the difference of his organization, the greater or less calamity he has experienced, the variety of his intellectual faculties, and the circumstances under which he has been placed, man has had the most opposite, contradictory, extravagant notions of the Divinity, but that he has uniformly been in accord in acknowledging both the existence, and the wisdom of his work—NATURE."

If disengaged from prejudice, we analyze this proof, we shall see that the universal consent of man, so diffused over the earth, actually proves little more than that he has been in all countries exposed to frightful revolutions, experienced disasters, been sensible to sorrows of which he has mistaken the physical causes; that those events to which he has been either the victim or the witness, have called forth his admiration or excited his fear; that for want of being acquainted with the powers of nature, for want of understanding her laws, for want of comprehending her infinite resources, for want of knowing the effects she must necessarily produce under given circumstances, he has believed these phenomena were due to some secret agent of which he has had vague ideas—to beings whom he has supposed conducted themselves after his own manner; who were operated upon by similar motives with himself.

II.4.2

Le consentement des hommes à reconnoître un Dieu ne prouve donc rien, sinon que dans le sein de l’ignorance ils ont admiré ou tremblé, & que leur imagination troublée a cherché des moyens de fixer ses incertitudes sur la cause inconnue des phénomenes qui frappoient leurs regards ou qui les obligeoient de frissonner. Leur imagination diverse a diversement travaillé sur cette cause toujours incompréhensible pour eux. Tous avouent qu’ils ne peuvent ni connoître ni définir cette cause, tous disent néanmoins qu’ils sont assûrés de son existence, & quand on vient à les presser, ils nous parlent d’un esprit, mot qui ne nous apprend rien que l’ignorance de celui qui le prononce, sans pouvoir y attacher aucune idée certaine.

N’en soyons point étonnés, l’homme ne peut avoir d’idées réelles que des choses qui agissent, ou qui ont précédemment agi, sur ses sens ; or il n’y a que des objets matériels, physiques ou naturels qui puissent remuer nos organes & nous donner des idées ; vérité qui a été assez clairement prouvée au commencement de cet ouvrage pour nous empêcher d’y insister davantage. Nous dirons donc seulement que ce qui acheve de démontrer que l’idée de Dieu est une notion acquise, & non une idée innée, c’est la nature même de cette notion, qui varie d’un siecle à l’autre, d’une contrée à une autre, d’un homme à un autre homme ; que dis-je ! qui n’est jamais constante dans le même individu. Cette diversité, cette fluctuation, ces changemens successifs ont les vrais caracteres d’une connoissance, ou plutôt, d’une erreur acquise. D’un autre côté la preuve la plus forte que l’idée de la Divinité n’est fondée que sur une erreur, c’est que les hommes sont peu-à-peu parvenus à perfectionner toutes les sciences qui avoient pour objet quelque chose de réel, tandis que la science de Dieu est la seule qu’ils n’aient jamais perfectionnée ; elle est par-tout au même point ; tous les hommes ignorent également quel est l’objet qu’ils adorent, & ceux qui s’en sont le plus sérieusement occupés n’ont fait qu’obscurcir de plus en plus les idées primitives que les mortels s’en étoient formées.

The consent then of man in acknowledging a variety of gods, proves nothing, except that in the bosom of ignorance he has either admired the phenomena of nature, or trembled under their influence; that his imagination was disturbed by what he beheld or suffered; that he has sought in vain to relieve his perplexity, upon the unknown cause of the phenomena he witnessed, which frequently obliged him to quake with terror: the imagination of the human race has laboured variously upon these causes, which have almost always been incomprehensible to him; although every thing confessed his ignorance, his inability to define these causes, yet he maintained that he was assured of their existence; when pressed, he spoke of a spirit, (a word to which it was impossible to attach any determinate idea) which taught nothing but the sloth, which evidenced nothing but the stupidity of those who pronounced it.

It ought, however, not to excite any surprise that man is incapable of forming any substantive ideas, save of those things which act, or which have heretofore acted upon his senses; it is very evident that the only objects competent to move his organs are material,—that none but physical beings can furnish him with ideas,—a truth which has been rendered sufficiently clear in the commencement of this work, not to need any further proof. It will suffice therefore to say that the idea of God is not an innate, but an acquired notion; that it is the very nature of this notion to vary from age to age; to differ in one country from another; to be viewed variously by individuals. What do I say? It is, in fact, an idea hardly ever constant in the same mortal. This diversity, this fluctuation, this change, stamps it with the true character of an acquired opinion. On the other hand, the strongest proof that can be adduced that these ideas are founded in error, is, that man by degrees has arrived at perfectioning all the sciences which have any known objects for their basis, whilst the science of theology has not advanced; it is almost every where at the same point; men seem equally undecided on this subject; those who have most occupied themselves with it, have effected but little; they seem, indeed, rather to have rendered the primitive ideas man formed to himself on this head more obscure,—to have involved in greater mystery all his original opinions.

II.4.3

Dès qu’on demande quel est le Dieu devant lequel on voit les hommes prosternés, on voit aussitôt les sentimens partagés. Pour que leurs opinions fussent d’accord il faudroit que des idées, des sensations, des perceptions uniformes eussent par-tout fait naître les opinions sur la Divinité ; ce qui supposeroit des organes parfaitement semblables, remués ou modifiés par des événemens parfaitement analogues. Or comme cela n’a pu arriver ; comme les hommes, essentiellement différens par leurs tempéramens, se sont trouvés dans des circonstances très différentes, il a fallu nécessairement que leurs idées ne fussent point les mêmes sur une cause imaginaire qu’ils virent si diversement. D’accord sur quelques points généraux, chacun se fit un Dieu à sa maniere, il le craignit, il le servit à sa façon. Ainsi le Dieu d’un homme ou d’une nation ne fut presque jamais le Dieu d’un autre homme ou d’une autre nation. Le Dieu d’un peuple sauvage & grossier est communément un objet matériel sur lequel l’esprit s’est fort peu exercé ; ce Dieu paroit très ridicule aux yeux d’un autre peuple plus policé, c’est-à-dire, dont l’esprit a bien plus travaillé. Un Dieu spirituel, dont les adorateurs méprisent le culte que rend un Sauvage à un objet matériel, est la production subtile du cerveau de plusieurs penseurs qui ont longtems médité dans une société policée où l’on s’en est fortement & longtems occupé. Le Dieu Théologique que les nations les plus civilisées admettent aujourd’hui sans le comprendre est, pour ainsi dire le dernier effort de l’imagination humaine ; il est au Dieu d’un Sauvage comme un habitant de nos villes où regne le faste revêtu d’un habit de pourpre artistement brodé, est à un homme tout nud ou couvert simplement de la peau des bêtes. Ce n’est que dans les sociétés civilisées, où le loisir & l’aisance procurent la faculté de rêver & de raisonner, que des penseurs oisifs méditent, disputent, font de la métaphysique : la faculté de penser est presque nulle dans les Sauvages occupés de la chasse, de la pêche & du soin de se procurer une subsistance incertaine par beaucoup de travaux. L’homme du peuple parmi nous n’a point des idées plus relevées de la Divinité, & ne l’analyse pas plus que le Sauvage. Un Dieu spirituel, immatériel, n’est fait que pour occuper le loisir de quelques hommes subtiles, qui n’ont pas besoin de travailler pour subsister. La Théologie, cette science si importante & si vantée, n’est utile qu’à ceux qui vivent aux dépens des autres, ou qui s’arrogent le droit de penser pour tous ceux qui travaillent. Cette science futile occupée de chimeres devient dans les sociétés policées, qui n’en sont pas plus éclairées pour celà, une branche de commerce très avantageuse pour les Prêtres & très nuisible pour leurs concitoyens, sur-tout quand ils ont la folie de vouloir prendre part à leurs opinions inintelligibles.

Quelle distance infinie entre une pierre informe, un animal, un astre, une statue & le Dieu si abstrait que la Théologie moderne a revêtu d’attributs dans lesquels elle se perd elle même ! Le Sauvage se trompe, sans doute, sur l’objet auquel il adresse ses vœux ; semblable à un enfant, il s’éprend du premier être qui frappe vivement sa vue, ou il a peur de celui dont il croit avoir reçu quelque disgrace ; mais au moins ses idées sont-elles fixées par un être réel qu’il a devant les yeux. Le Lapon, qui adore une roche, le Negre qui se prosterne devant un serpent monstrueux, voient au moins ce qu’ils adorent : l’Idolâtre se met à genoux devant une statue, dans laquelle il croit que réside une vertu cachée qu’il juge utile ou nuisible à lui-même : mais le raisonneur subtile qu’on nomme Théologien dans les nations civilisées, & qui, en vertu de sa science inintelligible, se croit en droit de se moquer du Sauvage, du Lapon, du Negre, de l’Idolâtre, ne voit pas qu’il est lui-même à genou devant un être qui n’existe que dans son propre cerveau, & dont il lui est impossible d’avoir aucune idée, à moins que, comme le Sauvage ignorant, il ne rentre promptement dans la nature visible pour lui donner des qualités possibles à concevoir.

Ainsi les notions de la divinité que nous voyons répandues par toute la terre ne prouvent point l’existence de cet être ; elles ne sont qu’une erreur générale, diversement acquise & modifiée dans l’esprit des nations, qui ont reçu de leurs ancêtres ignorans & tremblans les Dieux qu’ils adorent aujourd’hui. Ces Dieux ont été successivement altérés, ornés, subtilisés par les penseurs, les législateurs, les prêtres, les inspirés qui les ont médités, qui ont prescrit des cultes au vulgaire, qui se sont servi de ses préjugés pour le soumettre à leur empire ou pour tirer parti de ses erreurs, de ses craintes & de sa crédulité ; ces dispositions seront toujours une suite nécessaire de son ignorance & du trouble de son cœur.

As soon as it is asked of man, what are the gods before whom he prostrates himself, forthwith his sentiments are divided. In order that his opinions should be in accord, it would be requisite that uniform ideas, analogous sensations, unvaried perceptions, should every where have given birth to his notions upon this subject: but this would suppose organs perfectly similar, modified by sensations which have a perfect affinity: this is what could not happen: because man, essentially different by his temperament, who is found under circumstances completely dissimilar, must necessarily have a great diversity of ideas upon objects which each individual contemplates so variously. Agreed in some general points, each made himself a god after his own manner; he feared him, he served him, after his own mode. Thus the god of one man, or of one nation, was hardly ever that of another man, or of another nation. The god of a savage, unpolished people, is commonly some material object, upon which the mind has exercised itself but little; this god appears very ridiculous in the eyes of a more polished community, whose minds have laboured more intensely upon the subject. A spiritual god, whose adorers despise the worship paid by the savage to a coarse, material object, is the subtle production of the brain of thinkers, who, lolling in the lap of polished society quite at their leisure, have deeply meditated, have long occupied themselves with the subject. The theological god, although for the most part incomprehensible, is the last effort of the human imagination; it is to the god of the savage, what an inhabitant of the city of Sybaris, where effiminacy and luxury reigned, where pomp and pageantry had reached their climax, clothed with a curiously embroidered purple habit of silk, was to a man either quite naked, or simply covered with the skin of a beast perhaps newly slain. It is only in civilized societies, that leisure affords the opportunity of dreaming—that ease procures the facility of reasoning; in these associations, idle speculators meditate, dispute, form metaphysics: the faculty of thought is almost void in the savage, who is occupied either with hunting, with fishing, or with the means of procuring a very precarious subsistence by dint of almost incessant labour. The generality of men, however, have not more elevated notions of the divinity, have not analyzed him more than the savage. A spiritual, immaterial God, is formed only to occupy the leisure of some subtle men, who have no occasion to labour for a subsistence. Theology, although a science so much vaunted, considered so important to the interests of man, is only useful to those who live at the expense of others; or of those who arrogate to themselves the privilege of thinking for all those who labour. This science becomes, in some polished societies, who are not on that account more enlightened, a branch of commerce extremely advantageous to its professors; equally unprofitable to the citizens; above all when these have the folly to take a very decided interest in their unintelligible system—in their discordant opinions.

What an infinite distance between an unformed stone, an animal, a star, a statue, and the abstracted Deity, which theology hath clothed with attributes under which it loses sight of him itself! The savage without doubt deceives himself in the object to which he addresses his vows; like a child he is smitten with the first object that strikes his sight—that operates upon him in a lively manner; like the infant, his fears are alarmed by that from which he conceives he has either received an injury or suffered disgrace; still his ideas are fixed by a substantive being, by an object which he can examine by his senses. The Laplander who adores a rock,—the negro who prostrates himself before a monstrous serpent, at least see the objects they adore. The idolater falls upon his knees before a statue, in which he believes there resides some concealed virtue, some powerful quality, which he judges may be either useful or prejudicial to himself; but that subtle reasoner, called a metaphysician, who in consequence of his unintelligible science, believes he has a right to laugh at the savage, to deride the Laplander, to scoff at the negro, to ridicule the idolater, doth not perceive that he is himself prostrate before a being of his own imagination, of which it is impossible he should form to himself any correct idea, unless, like the savage, he re-enters into visible nature, to clothe him with qualities capable of being brought within the range of his comprehension.

For the most part the notions on the Divinity, which obtain credit even at the present day, are nothing more than a general terror diversely acquired, variously modified in the mind of nations, which do not tend to prove any thing, save that they have received them from their trembling, ignorant ancestors. These gods have been successively altered, decorated, subtilized, by those thinkers, those legislators, those priests, who have meditated deeply upon them; who have prescribed systems of worship to the uninformed; who have availed themselves of their existing prejudices, to submit them to their yoke; who have obtained a dominion over their mind, by seizing on their credulity,—by making them participate in their errors,—by working on their fears; these dispositions will always be a necessary consequence of man's ignorance, when steeped in the sorrows of his heart.

II.4.4

S’il est vrai, comme on l’assûre, qu’il n’y ait sur la terre aucune nation si farouche & si sauvage qui n’ait un culte religieux ou qui n’adore quelque Dieu, il n’en résultera rien en faveur de la réalité de cet être. Le mot Dieu ne désignera jamais que la cause inconnue des effets que les hommes ont admirés ou redoutés. Ainssi cette notion si généralement répandue ne prouvera rien, sinon que tous les hommes & toutes les générations ont ignoré les causes naturelles des effets qui ont excité leur surprise & leurs craintes. Si nous ne trouvons point aujourd’hui de peuple qui n’ait un Dieu, un culte, une religion, une théologie plus ou moins subtile, c’est qu’il n’est aucun peuple qui n’ait essuyé des malheurs dont ses ancêtres ignorans n’aient été allarmés, & qu’ils n’aient assignés à une cause inconnue & puissante qu’ils ont transmise à leur postérité, qui d’après eux n’a plus rien examiné.

D’ailleurs l’universalité d’une opinion ne prouve rien en faveur de sa vérité. Ne voyons-nous pas un grand nombre de préjugés & d’erreurs grossieres jouir même aujourd’hui de la sanction presqu’universelle du genre humain ? Ne voyons-nous pas tous les peuples de la terre imbus des idées de magie, de divinations, d’enchantemens, de présages, de sortileges, de revenans ? Si les personnes les plus instruites se sont guéries de ces préjugés, ils trouvent encore des partisans très zélés dans le plus grand nombre des hommes, qui les croient pour le moins aussi fermement que l’existence d’un Dieu. En conclura-t-on que ces chimeres appuyées du consentement presqu’unanime de l’espece humaine, ont quelque réalité ? Avant Copernic il n’y avoit personne qui ne crut que la terre étoit immobile, & que le soleil tournoit autour d’elle ; cette opinion universelle en étoit-elle moins une erreur pour celà ? Chaque homme a son Dieu : tous ces Dieux existent-ils, ou n’en existe-t-il aucun ? Mais on nous dira, chaque homme a son idée du soleil, tous ces soleils existent-ils ? Il est facile de répondre que l’existence du soleil est un fait constaté par l’usage journalier des sens, au lieu que l’existence d’un Dieu n’est constatée par l’usage d’aucun sens ; tout le monde voit le soleil, mais personne ne voit Dieu. Voilà la seule différence entre la réalité & la chimere : la réalité est presqu’aussi diverse dans la tête des hommes que la chimere, mais l’une existe & l’autre n’existe pas ; il y a d’un côté des qualités sur lesquelles on ne dispute point, de l’autre côté on dispute sur toutes les qualités. Personne n’a jamais dit, il n’y a point de soleil ou le soleil n’est point lumineux & chaud, au lieu que plusieurs hommes sensés ont dit il n’y a point de Dieu. Ceux qui trouvent cette proposition affreuse & insensée & qui affirment que Dieu existe, ne nous disent-ils pas en même tems qu’ils ne l’ont jamais vu ni senti & que l’on n’y connoît rien ? La Théologie est un monde où tout suit des loix inverses de celui que nous habitons !

Que devient donc cet accord si vanté de tous les hommes à reconnoître un Dieu & la nécessité du culte qu’on doit lui rendre ? Il prouve qu’eux, ou leurs Peres ignorans, ont éprouvé des malheurs sans pouvoir les rapporter à leurs véritables causes. 1 Si nous avions le courage d’examiner les choses de sang froid & de mettre à l’écart les préjugés que tout conspire à rendre aussi durables que nous, nous serions bientôt forcés de reconnoître que l’idée de la divinité ne nous est aucunement infuse par la nature, qu’il fut un tems où elle n’existoit point en nous, & nous verrions que nous la tenons par tradition de ceux qui nous ont élevés, que ceux-ci l’avoient reçue de leurs ancêtres, & qu’en dernier ressort elle est venue des Sauvages ignorans qui furent nos premiers peres, ou, si l’on veut, des Législateurs adroits qui sçurent mettre à profit les craintes, l’ignorance & la crédulité de nos devanciers pour les soumettre à leur joug.

If it be true, as asserted, that the earth has never witnessed any nation so unsociable, so savage, to be without some form of religious worship—who did not adore some god—but little will result from it respecting the Divinity. The word GOD, will rarely be found to designate more than the unknown cause of those effects which man has either admired or dreaded. Thus, this notion so generally diffused, upon which so much stress is laid; will prove little more than that man in all generations has been ignorant of natural causes,—that he has been incompetent, from some cause or other, to account for those phenomena which either excited his surprise or roused his fears. If at the present day a people cannot be found destitute of some kind of worship, entirely without superstition, who do not acknowledge a God, who have not adopted a theology more or less subtle, it is because the uninformed ancestors of these people have all endured misfortunes—have been alarmed by terrifying effects, which they have attributed to unknown causes—have beheld strange sights, which they have ascribed to powerful agents, whose existence they could not fathom; the details of which, together with their own bewildered notions, they have handed down to their posterity who have not given them any kind of examination.

It will readily be allowed, that the universality of an opinion by no means proves its truth. Do we not see a great number of ignorant prejudices, a multitude of barbarous errors, even at the present day, receive the almost universal sanction of the human race? Are not nearly all the inhabitants of the earth imbued with the idea of magic—in the habit of acknowledging occult powers—given to divination—believers in enchantment—the slaves to omens—supporters of witchcraft—thoroughly persuaded of the existence of ghosts? If some of the most enlightened persons are cured of these follies, they still find very zealous partizans in the greater number of mankind, who accredit them with the firmest confidence. It would not, however, be concluded by men of sound sense, in many instances not by the theologian himself, that therefore these chimeras actually have existence, although sanctioned with the credence of the multitude. Before Copernicus, there was no one who did not believe that the earth was stationary, that the sun described his annual revolution round it. Was, however, this universal consent of man upon a principle of astronomical science, which endured for so many thousand years, less an error on that account? Yet to have doubted the truth of such a generally-diffused opinion, one that had received the sanction of so many learned men—that was clothed with the sacred vestments of so many ages of credulity—that had been adopted by Moses, acknowledged by Solomon, accredited by the Persian magi—that Elijah himself had not refuted—that had obtained the fiat of the most respectable universities, the most enlightened legislators, the wisest kings, the most eloquent ministers; in short, a principle that embraced all the stability that could be derived from the universal consent of all ranks: to have doubted, I say, of this, would at one period have been held as the highest degree of profanation, as the most presumptuous scepticism, as an impious blasphemy, that would have threatened the very existence of that unhappy country from whose unfortunate bosom such a venomous, sacrilegious mortal could have arisen. It is well known what opinion was entertained of Gallileo for maintaining the existence of the antipodes. Pope Gregory excommunicated as atheists all those who gave it credit. Thus each man has his God: But do all these gods exist? In reply it will be said, somewhat triumphantly, each man hath his ideas of the sun, do all these suns exist? However narrow may be the pass by which superstition imagines it has thus guarded its favourite hypothesis, nothing will perhaps be more easy than the answer: the existence of the sun is a fact verified by the daily use of the senses; all the world see the sun; no one bath ever said there is no sun; nearly all mankind have acknowledged it to be both luminous and hot: however various may be the opinions of man, upon this luminary, no one has ever yet pretended there was more than one attached to our planetary system. But we may perhaps be told, there is a wide difference between that which can be contemplated by the visual organs, which can be understood by the sense of feeling, and that which does not come under the cognizance of any part of the organic structure of man. We must confess theology here has the advantage; that we are unable to follow it through its devious sinuosities; amidst its meandering labyrinths: but then it is the advantage of those who see sounds, over those who only hear them; of those who hear colours, over those who only see them; of the professors of a science, where every thing is built upon laws inverted from those common to the globe we inhabit; over those common understandings, who cannot be sensible to any thing that does not give an impulse to some of their organs.

If man, therefore, had the courage to throw aside his prejudices, which every thing conspires to render as durable as himself—if divested of fear he would examine coolly—if guided by reason he would dispassionately view the nature of things, the evidence adduced in support of any given doctrine; he would, at least, be under the necessity to acknowledge, that the idea of the Divinity is not innate—that it is not anterior to his existence—that it is the production of time, acquired by communication with his own species—that, consequently, there was a period when it did not actually exist in him: he would see clearly, that he holds it by tradition from those who reared him: that these themselves received it from their ancestors: that thus tracing it up, it will be found to have been derived in the last resort, from ignorant savages, who were our first fathers. The history of the world will shew that crafty legislators, ambitious tyrants, blood-stained conquerors, have availed themselves of the ignorance, the fears, the credulity of his progenitors, to turn to their own profit an idea to which they rarely attached any other substantive meaning than that of submitting them to the yoke of their own domination.

II.4.5

Cependant il y eût des mortels qui se vanterent d’avoir vu la divinité : le premier qui osa le dire aux hommes fut évidemment un menteur, dont l’objet fut de tirer parti de leur simplicité crédule, ou un enthousiaste, qui débita pour des vérités les rêveries de son imagination. Nos ancêtres nous ont transmis les divinités qu’ils avoient ainsi reçues de ceux qui les ont trompés eux-mêmes, & dont les fourberies modifiées depuis d’âges en âges ont peu-à-peu acquis la sanction publique & la solidité que nous voyons. En conséquence le nom de Dieu est un des premiers mots que l’on ait fait retentir dans nos oreilles ; on nous en a parlé sans cesse ; on nous l’a fait balbutier avec respect & crainte, on nous a fait un devoir d’adresser nos vœux & de fléchir le genou devant un phantôme que ce nom représentoit, mais qu’il ne nous fut jamais permis d’examiner. A force de nous répéter ce mot vuide de sens, à force de nous menacer de cette chimere, à force de nous raconter les antiques fables qu’on lui attribue, nous nous persuadons que nous en avons des idées, nous confondons des habitudes machinales avec les instincts de notre nature, & nous croyons bonnement que tout homme apporte au monde l’idée de la Divinité.

C’est faute de nous rappeller les premieres circonstances où notre imagination fut frappée du nom de Dieu & des récits merveilleux qui nous en ont été faits pendant le cours de notre enfance & de notre éducation, que nous croyons cette idée abstraite inhérente à notre être & innée dans tous les hommes2. Notre mémoire ne nous rappelle pas la succession des causes qui ont gravé ce nom dans notre cerveau. C’est uniquement par habitude que nous admirons & craignons un objet que nous ne connoissons que par le nom dont nous l’avons entendu désigner, dès l’enfance. Aussitôt qu’on le prononce, nous lui associons machinalement & sans réflexion les idées que ce mot réveille dans notre imagination, & les sensations dont on nous a dit qu’il devoit être accompagné. Ainsi, pour peu que nous voulions être de bonne foi avec nous-mêmes, nous conviendrons que l’idée de Dieu & des qualités que nous lui attribuons, n’a d’autre fondement que l’opinion de nos Peres, traditionnellement infuse en nous par l’éducation, confirmée par l’habitude & fortifiée par l’exemple & par l’autorité.

On voit donc comment les idées de Dieu, enfantées dans l’origine par l’ignorance, l’admiration & la crainte ; adoptées par l’inexpérience & la crédulité ; propagées par l’éducation, par l’exemple, par l’habitude, par l’autorité sont devenues inviolables & sacrées ; nous les avons reçues malgré nous sur la parole de nos Peres, de nos Instituteurs, de nos Législateurs, de nos Prêtres ; nous y tenons par habitude & sans les avoir jamais examinées ; nous les regardons comme sacrées parce qu’on nous a toujours assûré qu’elles étoient essentielles à notre bonheur ; nous croyons les avoir toujours eues, parce que nous les avions dès notre enfance ; nous les jugeons indubitables, parce que nous n’avions jamais eu l’intrépidité d’en douter. Si notre sort nous eût fait naître sur les côtes de l’Afrique, nous adorerions avec autant d’ignorance & de simplicité le serpent révéré par les Negres, que nous adorons le Dieu spirituel & métaphysique que l’on adore en Europe. Nous serions aussi indignés si quelqu’un nous disputoit la divinité de ce reptile, que nous aurions appris à respecter au sortir du sein de nos meres, que nos Théologiens le sont quand on dispute à leur Dieu les attributs merveilleux dont ils l’ont orné. Cependant si l’on contestoit ses titres & ses qualités au Dieu-serpent des Negres, au moins ne pourroit-on pas lui contester son existence, dont on seroit à portée de se convaincre par ses yeux. Il n’en est pas de même du Dieu immatériel, incorporel, contradictoire, ou de l’homme divinisé que nos penseurs modernes ont si subtilement composé. A force de rêver, de raisonner, de subtiliser, ils ont rendu son existence impossible pour quiconque osera la méditer de sang froid. On ne pourra jamais se figurer un être qui n’est composé que d’abstractions & de qualités négatives, c’est-à-dire, qui n’a aucunes des qualités que l’esprit humain est susceptible de juger. Nos Théologiens ne sçavent ce qu’ils adorent ; ils n’ont aucune idée réelle de l’être dont ils s’occupent sans cesse ; cet être seroit depuis longtems anéanti, si ceux à qui on l’annonce avoient osé l’examiner.

En effet dès le premier pas nous nous trouvons arrêtés : l’existence même de l’être le plus important & le plus révéré est encore un problême pour quiconque veut peser de sang froid les preuves qu’en donne la Théologie ; & quoiqu’avant de raisonner ou de disputer sur la nature & les qualités d’un être il fut à propos de constater son existence, celle de la divinité n’est rien moins que démontrée pour tout homme qui voudra consulter le bon sens. Que dis-je ! Les Théologiens eux mêmes n’ont presque jamais été d’accord sur les preuves dont on se servoit pour établir l’existence divine. Depuis que l’esprit humain s’occupe de son Dieu, & quand ne s’en est-il pas occupé ! on n’est point jusqu’ici parvenu à démontrer l’existence de cet objet intéressant, d’une façon pleinement satifaisante, pour ceux-mêmes qui veulent que nous en soyons convaincus. D’âges en âges de nouveaux champions de la divinité, des philosophes profonds, des Théologiens subtiles ont cherché de nouvelles preuves de l’existence de Dieu, parce qu’ils étoient, sans doute, peu contents de celles de leurs prédécesseurs. Les penseurs qui s’étoient flattés d’avoir démontré ce grand problême furent souvent accusés d’athéisme & d’avoir trahi la cause de Dieu par la foiblesse des argumens dont ils l’avoient appuyée. 3 Des hommes d’un très grand génie ont en effet successivement échoué dans leurs démonstrations ou dans les solutions qu’ils ont voulu donner ; en croyant lever une difficulté, ils en ont continuellement fait éclore cent autres. C’est en pure perte que les plus grands métaphysiciens ont épuisé tous leurs efforts soit pour prouver que Dieu existoit, soit pour concilier ses attributs incompatibles, soit pour répondre aux objections les plus simples ; ils n’ont encore pu réussir à mettre leur Divinité hors d’atteinte ; les difficultés qu’on leur oppose sont assez claires pour être entendues par un enfant, tandis que dans les nations les plus instruites, l’on trouveroit à peine douze hommes capables d’entendre les démonstrations, les solutions & les réponses d’un Descartes, d’un Leibnitz, d’un Clarcke quand ils veulent nous prouver l’existence de la Divinité. N’en soyons point étonnés ; les hommes ne s’entendent jamais eux mêmes quand ils nous parlent de Dieu ; comment pourroient-ils donc s’entendre les uns les autres, ou convenir entre-eux quand ils raisonnent sur la nature & les qualités d’un être créé par des imaginations diverses que chaque homme est forcé de voir diversement, & sur le compte duquel les hommes seront toujours dans une égale ignorance faute d’avoir une mesure commune pour en juger ?

Pour nous convaincre du peu de solidité des preuves qu’on nous donne de l’existence du Dieu Théologique, & de l’inutilité des efforts que l’on a faits pour concilier ses attributs discordans, écoutons ce qu’en a dit le célebre Docteur Samuel Clarcke, qui dans son traité de l’existence & des attributs de Dieu, passe pour en avoir parlé de la façon la plus convaincante. 4 Ceux qui l’ont suivi n’ont fait en effet que répéter ses idées, ou présenter ses preuves sous des formes nouvelles. D’après l’examen que nous allons en faire, l’on ose dire que l’on trouvera que ses preuves sont peu concluantes, que ses principes sont peu fondés, & que ses prétendues solutions ne sont propres à rien résoudre. En un mot, dans le dieu du dr Clarcke ainsi que dans celui des plus grands théologiens, on ne verra qu’une chimere établie sur des suppositions gratuites, & formée par l’assemblage confus de qualités disparates, qui rendent son existence totalement impossible ; enfin dans ce dieu l’on ne trouvera qu’un vain phantôme, substitué à l’énergie de la nature que l’on s’est toujours obstiné à méconnoître. Nous allons suivre pied-à-pied les différentes propositions dans lesquelles ce sçavant Théologien développe les opinions reçues sur la Divinité.

Without doubt there have been mortals who have dreamed they have seen the Divinity. Mahomet, I believe, boasted he had a long conversation with the Deity, who promulgated to him the system of the Mussulmans. But are there not thousands, even of the theologians, who will exhaust their breath, and fatigue their lungs with vociferating this man was a liar; whose object was to take advantage of the simplicity, to profit by the enthusiasm, to impose on the credulity of the Arabs; who promulgated for truths, the crazy reveries of his own distempered imagination? Nevertheless, is it not a truth, that this doctrine of the crafty Arab, is at this day the creed of millions, transmitted to them by their ancestors, rendered sacred by time, read to them in their mosques, adorned with all the ceremonies of superstitious worship; of which the inhabitants of a vast portion of the earth do not permit themselves for an instant to doubt the veracity; who, on the contrary, hold those who do not accredit it as dogs, as infidels, as beings of an inferior rank, of meaner capacities than themselves? Indeed that man, even if he were a theologian, would not experience the most gentle treatment from the infuriated Mahometan, who should to his face venture to dispute the divine mission of his prophet. Thus the ancestors of the Turk have transmitted to their posterity, those ideas of the Divinity which they manifestly received from those who deceived them; whose impositions, modified from age to age, subtilized by the priests, clothed with the reverential awe inspired by fear, have by degrees acquired that solidity, received that corroboration, attained that veteran stability, which is the natural result of public sanction, backed by theological parade.

The word God is, perhaps, among the first that vibrate on the ear of man; it is reiterated to him incessantly; he is taught to lisp it with respect; to listen to it with fear; to bend the knee when it is reverberated: by dint of repetition, by listening to the fables of antiquity, by hearing it pronounced by all ranks and persuasions, he seriously believes all men bring the idea with them into the world; he thus confounds a mechanical habit with instinct; whilst it is for want of being able to recal to himself the first circumstances under which his imagination was awakened by this name; for want of recollecting all the recitals made to him during the course of his infancy; for want of accurately defining what was instilled into him by his education; in short, because his memory does not furnish him with the succession of causes that have engraven it on his brain, that he believes this idea is really inherent to his being; innate in all his species. Iamblicus, indeed, who was a Pythagorean philosopher not in the highest repute with the learned world, although one of those visionary priests in some estimation with theologians, (at least if we may venture to judge by the unlimited draughts they have made on the bank of his doctrines) who was unquestionably a favourite with the emperor Julian, says, "that anteriorly to all use of reason, the notion of the gods is inspired by nature, and that we have even a sort of feeling of the Divinity, preferable to the knowledge of him." It is, however, uniformly by habit, that man admires, that he fears a being, whose name he has attended to from his earliest infancy. As soon as he hears it uttered, he without reflection mechanically associates it with those ideas with which his imagination has been filled by the recitals of others; with those sensations which he has been instructed to accompany it. Thus, if for a season man would be ingenuous with himself, he would concede that in the greater number of his race, the ideas of the gods, and of those attributes with which they are clothed, have their foundation, take their rise in, are the fruit of the opinions of his fathers, traditionally infused into him by education—confirmed by habit—corroborated by example—enforced by authority. That it very rarely happens he examines these ideas; that they are for the most part adopted by inexperience, propagated by tuition, rendered sacred by time, inviolable from respect to his progenitors, reverenced as forming part of those institutions he has most learned to value. He thinks he has always had them, because he has had them from his infancy; he considers them indubitable, because he is never permitted to question them—because he never has the intrepidity to examine their basis.

If it had been the destiny of a Brachman, or a Mussulman, to have drawn his first breath on the shores of Africa, he would adore, with as much simplicity, with as much fervour, the serpent reverenced by the Negroes, as he does the God his own metaphysicians have offered to his reverence. He would be equally indignant if any one should presumptuously dispute the divinity of this reptile, which he would have learned to venerate from the moment he quitted the womb of his mother, as the most zealous, enthusiastic fakir, when the marvellous wonders of his prophet should be brought into question; or as the most subtile theologian when the inquiry turned upon the incongruous qualities with which he has decorated his gods. Nevertheless, if this serpent god of the Negro should be contested, they could not at least dispute his existence. Simple as may be the mind of this dark son of nature, uncommon as may be the qualities with which he has clothed his reptile, he still may be evidenced by all who choose to exercise their organs of sight; not so with the theologian; he absolutely questions the existence of every other god but that which he himself has formed; which is questioned in its turn by his brother metaphysician. They are by no means disposed to admit the proofs offered by each other. Descartes, Paschal, and Doctor Samuel Clarke himself, have been accused of atheism by the theologians of their time. Subsequent reasoners have made use of their proofs, and even given them as extremely valid. Doctor Bowman published a work, in which he pretends all the proofs hitherto brought forward are crazy and fragile: he of course substitutes his own; which in their turn have been the subject of animadversion. Thus it would appear these theologians are not more in accord with themselves than they are with Turks or Pagans. They cannot even agree as to their proofs of existence: from age to age new champions arise, new evidence is adduced, the old discarded, or treated with contempt; profound philosophers, subtle metaphysicians, are continually attacking each other for their ignorance on a point of the very first importance. Amidst this variety of discussion, it is very difficult for simple winds, for those who steadily search after truth, who only wish to understand what they believe, to find a point upon which they can fix with reliance—a standard round which they may rally without fear of danger—a common measure that way serve them for a beacon to avoid the quicksands of delusion—the sophistry of polemics.

Men of very great genius have successively miscarried in their demonstrations; have been held to have betrayed their cause by the weakness of the arguments by which they have supported it; by the manner in which they have attempted to establish their positions. Thus many of them, when they believed they had surmounted a difficulty, had the mortification to find they had only given birth to an hundred others. They seem, indeed, not to be in a capacity to understand each other, or to agree among themselves, when they reason upon the nature and qualities of beings created by such a variety of imaginations, which each contemplates diversely, upon which the natural self-love of each disputant induces him to reject with vehement indignation every thing that does not fall in with his own peculiar mode of thinking—that does not quadrate either with his superstition or his ignorance, or sometimes with both.

The opponents of Clarke charge him with begging the question in his work on The Being and Attributes of God. They say he has pretended to prove this existence a priori, which they deem impossible, seeing there is nothing anterior to the first of causes; that therefore it can only be proved a posteriori, that is to say, by its effects. Law, in his Inquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, &c. has attacked him very triumphantly, for this manner of proof, which is stated to be so very repugnant to the school-men. His arguments have been treated with no more ceremony by Thomas D'Aquinas, John Scott, and others of the schools. At the present day I believe he is held in more respect—that his authority outweighs that of all his antagonists together. Be that as it may, those who have followed him have done nothing more than either repeat his ideas, or present his evidence under a new form. Tillotson argues at great length, but it would be rather difficult to understand which side of the question he adopts on this momentous subject; whether he is a Necessitarian, or among the opposers of Fatalism. Speaking of man, he says, "he is liable to many evils and miseries, which he can neither prevent or redress; he is full of wants, which he cannot supply, and compassed about with infirmities which he cannot remove, and obnoxious to dangers which he can never sufficiently provide against: he is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he is never able to obtain." If the proofs of Clarke, who has drawn them up in twelve propositions, are examined with attention, I think they may be fairly shielded from the reproach with which they have been loaded; it does not appear that he has proved his positions a priori, but a posteriori, according to rule. It seems clear, however, that he has mistaken the proof of the existence of the effects, for the proof of the existence of the cause: but here he seems to have more reason than his critics, who in their eagerness to prove that Clarke has not conformed to the rules of the schools, would entirely overlook the best, the surest foundation whereon to rest the existence of the Great Cause of causes, that Parent of Parents, whose wisdom shines so manifestly in nature, of which Clarke's work may be said to be such a masterly evidence. We shall follow, step by step, the different propositions in which this learned divine developes the received opinions upon the Divinity; which, when applied to nature, will be found to be so accurate, so correct, as to leave no further room to doubt either the existence or the wisdom of her great author, thus proved through her own existence. Dr. Clarke sets out with saying:

II.4.6

I. Quelque chose, dit M. Clarcke, a existé de toute éternité.

Cette proposition est évidente & n’a pas besoin de preuves. Mais quelle est cette chose qui a existé de toute éternité ? Pourquoi ne sseroit-ce pas plutôt la nature ou la matiere, dont nous avons des idées, qu’un pur esprit, ou qu’un agent dont il nous est impossible de nous faire aucune idée ? Ce qui existe, ne suppose-t-il point, dès lors même, que l’existence lui est essentielle ? Ce qui ne peut point s’anéantir n’existe-t-il pas nécessairement ? Et comment peut-on concevoir que ce qui ne peut cesser d’exister ou ce qui ne peut s’anéantir ait eu un commencement ? Si la matiere ne peut être anéantie elle n’a pu commencer d’être ; ainsi nous dirons à Mr. Clarcke que c’est la matiere, que c’est la nature agissante par sa propre énergie, dont aucune partie n’est jamais dans un repos absolu, qui a toujours existé ; les différens corps matériels que cette nature renferme changent bien de formes, de combinaisons, de propriétés & de façons d’agir, mais leurs principes ou élémens sont indestructibles & n’ont jamais pu commencer.

"1st. Something has existed from all eternity."

This proposition is evident—hath no occasion for proofs. Matter has existed from all eternity, its forms alone are evanescent; matter is the great engine used by nature to produce all her phenomena, or rather it is nature herself. We have some idea of matter, sufficient to warrant the conclusion that this has always existed. First, that which exists, supposes existence essential to its being. That which cannot, annihilate itself, exists necessarily; it is impossible to conceive that that which cannot cease to exist, or that which cannot annihilate itself, could ever have had a beginning. If matter cannot be annihilated, it could not commence to be. Thus we say to Dr. Clarke, that it is matter, it is nature, acting by her own peculiar energy, of which no particle is ever in an absolute state of rest, which hath always existed. The various material bodies which this nature contains often change their form, their combination, their properties, their mode of action: but their principles or elements are indestructible—have never been able to commence. What this great scholar actually understands, when he makes the assertion "that an eternal duration is now actually past," is not quite so clear; yet he affirms, "that not to believe it would be a real and express contradiction." We may, however, safely admit his argument, "that when once any proposition is clearly demonstrated to, be true, it ought not to disturb us that there be perhaps some perplexing difficulties on the other side, which merely for want of adequate ideas of the manner of the existence of the things demonstrated, are not easily to be cleared."

II.4.7

II. Un être indépendant & immuable a existé de toute éternité.

Nous demanderons toujours quel est cet être ? Nous demanderons s’il est indépendant de sa propre essence ou des propriétés qui le constituent ce qu’il est ? Nous demanderons si cet être quelconque peut faire que les êtres qu’il produit ou qu’il meut agissent autrement qu’ils ne font d’après les propriétés qu’il a pu leur donner ; & dans ce cas nous demanderons si cet être, tel qu’on puisse le supposer, n’agit pas nécessairement & n’est pas forcé d’employer les moyens indispensables pour remplir ses vues & parvenir aux fins qu’il a, ou qu’on lui suppose ? Pour lors nous dirons que la nature est forcée d’agir d’après son essence ; que tout ce qui se fait en elle est nécessaire, & que si on la suppose gouvernée par un Dieu, ce Dieu ne peut agir autrement qu’il ne fait, & parconséquent est soumis lui même à la nécessité.

On dit qu’un homme est indépendant, lorsqu’il n’est déterminé dans ses actions que par les causes générales qui ont coutume de le mouvoir ; on dit qu’il est dépendant d’un autre homme, lorsqu’il ne peut agir qu’en conséquence des déterminations que ce dernier lui donne. Un corps est dépendant d’un autre corps, lorsqu’il lui doit sson existence & sa façon d’agir. Un être existant de toute éternité ne peut devoir son existence à aucun autre être ; il ne pourroit donc être dépendant de lui que parce qu’il lui devroit son action ; mais il est évident qu’un être éternel, ou existant par lui même, renferme dans sa nature tout ce qu’il faut pour agir ; donc la matiere étant éternelle est nécessairement indépendante dans le sens que nous avons expliqué. Donc elle n’a pas besoin d’un moteur dont elle doive dépendre.

L’être éternel est aussi immuable, si par cet attribut l’on entend qu’il ne peut changer de nature ; car si l’on vouloit dire par là qu’il ne peut point changer de façon d’être ou d’agir, on se tromperoit, sans doute, puisque, même en supsupposant un être immatériel, on seroit forcé de reconnoître en lui différentes manières d’être, différentes volitions, différentes façons d’agir ; à moins qu’on ne le supposât totalement privé d’action, auquel cas il seroit parfaitement inutile. En effet pour changer de manière d’agir, il faut nécessairement changer de façon d’être. D’où l’on voit que les théologiens, en faisant Dieu immuable, le rendent immobile, & par conséquent inutile. Un être immuable dans ce sens de ne point changer de façon d’être, ne pourroit évidemment avoir ni des volontés successives, ni produire des actions successives ; si cet être a créé la matière ou enfanté l’univers, il fut un tems où il voulut que cette matière & cet univers existassent, & ce tems fut précédé d’un autre tems où il avoit voulu qu’ils n’existassent point encore. Si Dieu est l’auteur de toutes choses, ainsi que des mouvemens & des combinaisons de la matière, il est sans cesse occupé à produire & à détruire ; par conséquent il ne peut être appellé immuable quant à sa façon d’exister. L’univers matériel se maintient toujours lui-même par les mouvemens & les changemens continuels de ses parties ; la somme des êtres qui le composent, ou des élémens qui agissent en lui, est invariablement la même ; dans ce sens l’immutabilité de l’univers est bien plus facile à concevoir & bien plus démontrée, que celle d’un dieu distingué de lui, à qui l’on attribue tous les effets & changemens qui s’opèrent à nos yeux. La nature n’est pas plus accusable de mutabilité à cause de la succession de ses formes, que l’être éternel des théologiens par la diversité de ses décrets.

2nd, "There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent Being."

We may fairly inquire what is this Being? Is it independent of its own peculiar essence, or of those properties which constitute it such as it is? We shall further inquire, if this Being, whatever it may be, can make the other beings which it produces, or which it moves, act otherwise than they do, according to the properties which it has given them? And in this case we shall ask, if this Being, such as it way be supposed to be, does not act necessarily; if it is not obliged to employ indispensible means to fulfil its designs, to arrive at the end which it either has, or may be supposed to have in view? Then we shall say, that nature is obliged to act after her essence; that every thing which takes place in her is necessary; but that she is independent of her forms.

A man is said to be independent, when he is determined in his actions only by the general causes which are accustomed to move him; he is equally said to be dependent on another, when he cannot act but in consequence of the determination which this last gives him. A body is dependent on another body when it owes to it its existence, and its mode of action. A being existing from eternity cannot owe his existence to any other being; he cannot then be dependent upon him, except he owes his action to him; but it is evident that an eternal or self-existent Being contains in his own nature every thing that is necessary for him to act: then, matter being eternal, is necessarily independent in the sense we have explained; of course it hath no occasion for a mover upon which it ought to depend.

This eternal Being is also immutable, if by this attribute be understood that he cannot change his nature; but if it be intended to infer by it that he cannot change his mode of action or existence, it is without doubt deceiving themselves, since even in supposing an immaterial being, they would be obliged to acknowledge in him different modes of being, different volitions, different ways of acting; particularly if he was not supposed totally deprived of action, in which case he would be perfectly useless. Indeed it follows of course that to change his mode of action he must necessarily change his manner of being. From hence it will be obvious, that the theologians, in making their gods immutable, render them immoveable, consequently they cannot act. An immutable being, could evidently neither have successive volition, nor produce successive action; if this being hath created matter, or given birth to the universe, there must have been a time in which he was willing that this matter, this universe, should exist; and this time must have been preceded by another time, in which he was willing that it might not yet exist. If God be the author of all things, as well as of the motion and of the combinations of matter, he is unceasingly occupied in producing and destroying; in consequence, he cannot be called immutable, touching his mode of existing. The material world always maintains itself by motion, and the continual change of its parts; the sum of the beings who compose it, or of the elements which act in it, is invariably the same; in this sense the immutability of the universe is much more easy of comprehension, much more demonstrable than that of an other being to whom, they would attribute all the effects, all the mutations which take place. Nature is not more to be accused of mutability, on account of the succession of its forms, than the eternal Being is by the theologians, by the diversity of his decrees. Here we shall be able to perceive that, supposing the laws by which nature acts to be immutable, it does not require tiny of these logical distinctions to account for the changes that take place: the mutation which results, is, on the contrary, a striking proof of the immutability of the system which produces them; and completely brings mature under the range of this second proposition as stated by Dr. Clarke.

II.4.8

III. Cet être immuable & indépendant, qui existe de toute éternité, existe par lui-même.

Cette proposition n’est qu’une répétition de la première. Nous y répondrons donc en demandant pourquoi la matière, qui est indestructible, n’existeroit point par elle-même ? Il est évident qu’un être qui n’a point eu de commencement doit exister par lui-même ; s’il eût existé par un autre, il auroit commencé d’être, & par conséquent il ne seroit point éternel. Ceux qui font la matière coéternelle à Dieu ne font que multiplier les êtres sans nécessité.

3dly, "That unchangeable and independent Being which has existed from eternity without any eternal cause of its existence, must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing."

This proposition is merely a repetition of the first; we reply to it by inquiring, Why matter, which is indestructible, should not be self-existent? It is evident that a being who had no beginning, must be self-existent; if he had existed by another, he would have commenced to be; consequently he would not be eternal.

II.4.9

IV. L’essence de l’être qui existe par lui-même est incompréhensible.

M. Clarcke eût parlé plus exactement, s’il eût dit que son essence est impossible. Cependant nous conviendrons que l’essence de la matière est incompréhensible, ou du moins que nous ne la concevons que foiblement par les façons dont nous en sommes affectés ; mais nous dirons que nous sommes encore bien moins à portée de concevoir la divinité, que nous ne pouvons saisir par aucun côté. Ainsi nous conclurons toujours que c’est une folie d’en raisonner ; que rien n’est plus ridicule que d’attribuer des qualités à un être distingué de la matière, tandis que, s’il existoit, ce seroit par la matière seule que nous pourrions le connoître, c’est-à-dire, nous assûrer de son existence & de ses qualités. Enfin nous en conclurons que tout ce qu’on nous dit de Dieu le rend matériel, ou prouve l’impossibilité où nous serons toujours de concevoir un être différent de la matière ; non étendu, & pourtant en tout lieu ; immatériel, & pourtant agissant sur la matière ; spirituel, & produisant la matière immuable, & mettant tout en mouvement. Etc. Etc. Etc.

En effet l’incompréhensibilité de Dieu ne le distingue point de la matière ; celle-ci n’en sera pas plus aisée à comprendre, quand nous lui associerons un être encore bien moins compréhensible qu’elle-même, que nous connoissons du moins par quelques-uns de ses côtés. Nous ne connoissons l’essence d’aucun être, si par le mot essence l’on entend ce qui constitue la nature qui lui est propre ; nous ne connoissons la matière que par les perceptions, les sensations & les idées qu’elle nous donne ; c’est d’après cela que nous en jugeons bien ou mal, selon la disposition particulière de nos organes ; mais dès qu’un être n’agit sur aucun de nos organes ; il n’existe point pour nous, & nous ne pouvons sans extravagance parler de sa nature ou lui assigner des qualités. L’incompréhensibilité de Dieu devroit convaincre les hommes qu’ils ne devroient point s’en occuper : mais cette indifférence n’accommoderoit point ses ministres, qui veulent en raisonner sans cesse pour montrer leur sçavoir, & nous en occuper sans cesse pour nous soumettre à leurs vues. Cependant si Dieu est incompréhensible, nous devrions en conclure que nos prêtres ne le comprennent pas mieux que nous, & non pas en conclure que le parti le plus sûr est de nous en rapporter à l’imagination de ces prêtres.

4thly, "What the substance or essence of that Being which is self-existent, or necessarily existing, is, we have no idea; neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it."

Dr. Clarke would perhaps have spoken more correctly if he had said his essence is impossible to be known: nevertheless, we shall readily concede that the essence of matter is incomprehensible, or at least that we conceive it very feebly by the manner in which we are affected by it; but without this we should be less able to conceive the Divinity, who would then be impervious on any side. Thus it must necessarily be concluded, that it is folly to argue upon it, since it is by matter alone we can have any knowledge of him; that is to say, by which we can assure ourselves of his existence,—by which we can at all guess at his qualities. In short we must conclude, that every thing related of the Divinity, either proves him material, or else proves the impossibility in which the human mind will always find itself, of conceiving any being different from matter; without extent, yet omnipresent; immaterial, yet acting upon matter; spiritual, yet producing matter; immutable, yet putting every thing in activity, &c.

Indeed it must be allowed that the incomprehensibility of the Divinity does not distinguish him from matter; this will not be more easy of comprehension when we shall associate it with a being much less comprehensible than itself; we have some slender knowledge of it through some of its parts. We do not certainly know the essence of any being, if by that word we are to understand that which constitutes its peculiar nature. We only know matter by the sensations, the perceptions, the ideas which it furnishes; it is according to these that we judge it to be either favorable or unfavourable, following the particular disposition of our organs. But when a being does not act upon any part of our organic structure, it does not exist for us; we cannot, without exhibiting folly, without betraying our ignorance, without falling into obscurity, either speak of its nature, or assign its qualities; our senses are the only channel by which we could have formed the slightest idea of it; these not having received any impulse, we are, in point of fact, unacquainted with its existence. The incomprehensibility of the Divinity ought to convince man that it is a point at which he is bound to stop; indeed he is placed in a state of utter incapacity to proceed: this, however, would not suit with those speculators who are willing to reason upon him continually, to shew the depth of their learning,—to persuade the uninformed they understand that which is incomprehensible to all men; by which they expect to be able to submit him to their own views. Nevertheless, if the Divinity be incomprehensible, It would not be straining a point beyond its tension, to conclude that a priest, or metaphysician, did not comprehend him better than other men: it is not, perhaps, either the wisest or the surest way to become acquainted with him, to represent him to ourselves, by the imagination of a theologian.

II.4.10

5 l’être qui existe nécessairement par lui-même est nécessairement éternel.

cette proposition est la même que la première, à moins qu’ici le docteur Clarcke n’entende que, comme l’être existant par lui-même n’a point eu de commencement, il ne peut avoir de fin. Quoiqu’il en soit, on demandera toujours pourquoi l’on s’obstine à distinguer cet être de l’univers ? Et l’on dira que la matiere ne pouvant point s’anéantir, existe nécessairement & ne cessera point d’exister. D’ailleurs comment faire dériver cette matiere d’un être qui n’est point matiere ? Ne voit-on pas que la matiere est nécessaire, & qu’il n’y a que sa force, son arrangement, ses combinaisons qui soient contingentes, ou plutôt passageres ? Le mouvement général est nécessaire, mais un mouvement donné ne l’est que tant que subsiste la combinaison dont ce mouvement est la suite ou l’effet : on peut changer les directions, accélérer ou retarder, suspendre ou arrêter un mouvement particulier, mais le mouvement général ne peut être anéanti. L’homme en mourant cesse de vivre ; c’est-à-dire, de marcher, de penser, d’agir de la façon qui est propre à l’organisation humaine ; mais la matiere qui composoit son corps & son ame ne cesse point de se mouvoir pour cela, elle devient simplement susceptible d’un autre genre de mouvement.

5thly, "Though the substance, or essence of the self-existent Being, is in itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the essential attributes of his nature are strictly demonstrable, as well as his existence. Thus, in the first place, the self-existent Being must of necessity be eternal."

This proposition differs in nothing from the first, except Dr. Clarke does not here understand that as the self-existent Being had no beginning, he can have no end. However this may be, we must ever inquire, Why this should not be matter? We shall further observe, that matter not being capable of annihilation, exists necessarily, consequently will never cease to exist; that the human mind has no means of conceiving how matter should originate from that which is not itself matter: is it not obvious, that matter is necessary; that there is nothing, except its powers, its arrangement, its combinations, which are contingent or evanescent? The general motion is necessary, but the given motion is not so; only during the season that the particular combinations subsist, of which this motion is the consequence, or the effect: we may be competent to change the direction, to either accelerate or retard, to suspend or arrest, a particular motion, but the general motion can never possibly be annihilated. Man, in dying, ceases to live; that is to say, he no longer either walks, thinks, or acts in the mode which is peculiar to human organization: but the matter which composed his body, the matter which formed his mind, does not cease to move on that account: it simply becomes susceptible of another species of motion.

II.4.11

VI. L’être qui existe par lui même doit être infini & présent par-tout.

Le mot infini ne présente qu’une idée négative qui exclut toutes les bornes. Il est évident qu’un être qui existe nécessairement, qui est indépendant, ne peut être limité par rien qui soit hors de lui, il doit être sa limite à lui même, en ce sens l’on peut dire qu’il est infini.

Quant à ce qu’on nous dit qu’il est présent par-tout, il est évident que s’il n’y a rien hors de lui, il n’y a point de lieu où il ne soit présent, ou qu’il n’y aura que lui & le vuide. Celà posé, je demande au Docteur Clarcke si la matiere existe, & si elle n’occupe pas du moins une portion de l’espace ? Dans ce cas la matiere ou l’univers doivent au moins exclure la Divinité, qui n’est point matiere, de la place que les êtres matériels occupent dans l’espace. Le Dieu des Théologiens seroit-il par hazard l’être abstrait que l’on nomme l’espace ou le vuide ? Ils nous répondront que non ; & ils nous diront que Dieu qui n’est point matiere, pénetre la matiere. Mais pour pénétrer la matiere, il faut correspondre à la matiere, & par conséquent avoir de l’étendue ; or avoir de l’étendue, c’est avoir une des propriétés de la matiere. Si Dieu pénetre la matiere, il est matériel & se confond avec l’univers, dont il est impossible de le distinguer ; & par une suite nécessaire Dieu ne peut jamais se séparer de la matiere ; il sera dans mon corps, dans mon bras, &c. Ce qu’aucun Théologien ne voudra m’accorder. Il me dira que c’est un mystere ; & je comprendrai par là qu’il ne sçait où placer son Dieu, qui pourtant, selon lui, remplit tout de son immensité.

6thly, "The self-existent Being must of necessity be infinite and omnipresent."

The word infinite presents only a negative idea—which excludes all bounds: it is evident that a being who exists necessarily, who is independent, cannot be limited by any thing which is out of himself; he must consequently be his own limits; in this sense we may say he is infinite.

Touching what is said of his omnipresence, it is equally evident that if there be nothing exterior to this being, either there is no place in which he must not be present, or that there will be only himself and the vacuum. This granted, I shall inquire if matter exists; if it does not at least occupy a portion of space? In this case, matter, or the universe, must exclude every other being who is not matter, from that place which the material beings occupy in space. In asking whether the gods of the theologians be by chance the abstract being which they call the vacuum or space, they will reply, no! They will further insist, that their gods, who are not matter, penetrate that which is matter. But it must be obvious, that to penetrate matter, it is necessary to have some correspondence with matter, consequently to have extent; now to have extent, is to have one of the properties of matter. If the Divinity penetrates matter, then he is material; by a necessary deduction he is inseparable from matter; then if he is omnipresent, he will be in every thing. This the theologian will not allow: he will say it is a mystery; by which I shall understand that he is himself ignorant how to account for his own positions; this will not be the case with making nature act after immutable laws; she will of necessity be every where, in my body, in my arm, in every other material being, because matter composes them all. The Divinity who has given this invariable system, will without any incongruous reasoning, without any subterfuge, be also present every where, inasmuch as the laws he has prescribed will unchangeably act through the whole; this does not seem inconsistent with reason to suppose.

II.4.12

VII. L’être existant nécessairement est nécessairement unique.

S’il n’y a rien hors d’un être qui existe nécessairement, il faut qu’il soit unique. On voit que cette proposition est la même que la précédente ; à moins que l’on ne voulut nier l’existence de l’univers matériel, ou que l’on ne voulut dire avec Spinosa, qu’il n’y a, & que l’on ne peut concevoir d’autre substance que Dieu. Præter Deum neque dari neque concipi potest substantia, dit

7th, "The Self-existent Being must of necessity be but one."

If there he nothing exterior to a being who exists necessarily, it must follow that he is unique. It will be obvious that this proposition is the same with the preceding one; at least, if they are not willing to deny the existence of the material world.

II.4.13

VIII. L’être existant par lui-même est nécessairement intelligent.

Ici le Docteur Clarcke assigne à Dieu une qualité humaine. L’intelligence est une qualité des êtres organisés ou animés que nous ne connoissons nulle part hors de ces êtres. Pour avoir de l’intelligence, il faut penser ; pour penser, il faut avoir des idées ; pour avoir des idées, il faut avoir des sens ; quand on a des sens, on est matériel ; & quand on est matériel, on n’est point un pur esprit.

L’être nécessaire qui comprend, qui renferme & produit des êtres animés, renferme, comprend & produit des intelligences. Mais le grand tout a-t-il une intelligence particuliere qui le meuve, le fasse agir, le détermine, comme l’intelligence meut & détermine les corps animés ? C’est ce que rien ne peut prouver. L’homme s’étant mis à la premiere place de l’univers, a voulu juger de tout par ce qu’il voyoit en lui-même ; il a prétendu que pour être parfait, il falloit être comme lui ; voilà la source de tous ses faux raisonnemens sur la nature & sur son Dieu. On s’imagine donc que ce seroit faire tort à la Divinité que de lui refuser une qualité qui se trouve dans l’homme, & à laquelle il attache une idée de perfection & de supériorité. Nous voyons que nos semblables s’offensent lorsque nous disons qu’ils manquent d’intelligence, & nous jugeons qu’il en est de même de l’agent, que nous ne substituons à la nature que par ce que nous reconnoissons qu’elle n’a point cette qualité. On n’accorde point de l’intelligence à la nature, quoiqu’elle renferme des êtres intelligens, c’est pour celà que l’on imaimagina un dieu qui pense, qui agisse, qui ait de l’intelligence pour elle. Ainsi ce dieu n’est que la qualité abstraite, la modification de notre être nommée intelligence que l’on a personnifiée. C’est dans la terre que s’engendrent des animaux vivans que nous nommons des vers ; cependant nous ne disons point que la terre soit un être vivant. Le pain que nous mangeons & le vin que nous buvons ne sont point de substances pensantes, mais ils nourrissent, soutiennent & font penser des êtres susceptibles de cette modification particulière. C’est dans la nature que se forment des êtres intelligens, sentans, pensans ; cependant nous ne pouvons dire que la nature sente, pense & soit intelligente.

Comment, nous dira-t-on, refuser au créateur des qualités que nous voyons dans ses créatures ? L’ouvrage seroit-il donc plus parfait que l’ouvrier ? le dieu qui a fait l’œil ne verra-t-il point, le dieu qui a fait l’oreille n’entendra-t-il point ? mais d’après ce raisonnement ne devrions-nous pas attribuer à Dieu toutes les autres qualités que nous rencontrons dans ses créatures ? Ne dirions-nous pas avec autant de fondement que le dieu qui a fait la matière est lui-même matière ; que le dieu qui a fait le corps doit posséder un corps ; que le dieu qui a fait tant d’insensés est insensé lui-même ; que le dieu qui a fait des hommes qui péchent est sujet à pécher ? Si de ce que les ouvrages de Dieu possédent certaines qualités & sont susceptibles de certaines modifications, nous allons en conclure que Dieu les posséde aussi, à plus forte raison nous serons forcés d’en conclure pareillement que Dieu est matériel, est étendu, est pesant, est méchant &c.

Pour attribuer à Dieu, c’est-à-dire, au moteur universel de la nature, une sagesse ou une intelligence infinies, il faudroit qu’il n’y eut ni folies, ni maux, ni méchanceté, ni désordre sur la terre. On nous dira, peut-être, que même d’après nos principes les maux & les désordres sont nécessaires ; mais nos principes n’admettent point un Dieu intelligent & sage qui auroit la puissance de les empêcher. Si en admettant un pareil Dieu, le mal n’en est pas moins nécessaire, à quoi ce Dieu si sage, si puissant, si intelligent peut-il servir ? Puisqu’il est lui-même soumis à la nécessité ; dès lors il n’est plus indépendant, sa puissance disparoît, il est forcé de laisser un libre cours aux essences des choses ; il ne peut empêcher les causes de produire leurs effets ; il ne peut s’opposer au mal ; il ne peut rendre l’homme plus heureux qu’il n’est ; il ne peut parconséquent être bon ; il est parfaitement inutile ; il n’est que le témoin tranquille de ce qui doit nécessairement arriver ; il ne peut s’empêcher de vouloir tout ce qui se fait dans le monde. Cependant on nous dit dans la proposition suivante que,

8th, "The self-existent and original Cause of all things, must be an intelligent being."

Here Dr. Clarke most unquestionably assigneth a human quality: intelligence is a faculty appertaining to organized or animated beings, of which we have no knowledge out of these beings. To have intelligence, it is necessary to think; to think, it is requisite to have ideas; to have ideas, supposes senses; when senses exist they are material; when they are material, they cannot be a pure spirit, in the language of the theologian.

The necessary Being who comprehends, who contains, who produces animated beings, contains, includes, and produceth intelligence. But has the great whole a peculiar intelligence, which moveth it, which maketh it act, which determineth it in the mode that intelligence moves and determines animated bodies; or rather, is not this intelligence the consequence of immutable laws, a certain modification resulting from certain combinations of matter, which exists under one form of these combinations, but is wanting under another form? This is assuredly what nothing is competent absolutely, and demonstrably to prove. Man having placed himself in the first rank in the universe, has been desirous to judge of every thing after what he saw within himself, because he hath pretended that in order to be perfect it was necessary to be like himself. Here is the source of all his erroneous reasoning upon nature—the foundation of his ideas upon his gods. He has therefore concluded, perhaps not with the most polished wisdom, that it would be indecorous in himself, injurious to the Divinity, not to invest him with a quality which is found estimable in man—which he prizes highly—to which he attaches the idea of perfection—which he considers as a manifest proof of superiority. He sees his fellow-creature is offended when he is thought to lack intelligence; he therefore judges it to be the same with the Divinity. He denies this quality to nature, because he considers her a mass of ignoble matter, incapable of self-action; although she contains and produces intelligent beings. But this is rather a personification of an abstract quality, than an attribute of the Deity, with whose perfections, with whose mode of existence, he cannot by any possible means become acquainted according to the fifth proposition of Dr. Clarke himself. It is in the earth that is engendered those living animals called worms; yet we do not say the earth is a living creature. The bread which man eats, the wine that he drinks, are not themselves thinking substances; yet they nourish, sustain, and cause those beings to think, who are susceptible of this modification of their existence. It is likewise in nature, that is formed intelligent, feeling, thinking beings; yet it cannot be rationally said, that nature feels, thinks, and is intelligent after the manner of these beings, who nevertheless spring out of her bosom.

How! cries the metaphysician, the subtilizing philosopher, what! refuse to the Divinity, those qualities we discover in his creatures? Must, then, the work be more perfect than the workman? Shall God, who made the eye, not himself see? Shall God, who formed the ear, not himself hear! This at a superficial view appears insuperable: but are the questioners, however triumphantly they may make the inquiry, themselves aware of the length this would carry them, even if their queries were answered with the most unqualified affirmative? Have they sufficiently reflected on the tendency of this mode of reasoning? If this be admitted as a postulatum, are they prepared to follow it in all its extent? Suppose their argument granted, what is to be done with all those other qualities upon which man does not set so high a value? Are they also to be ascribed to the Divinity, because we do not refuse him qualities possessed by his creatures? By a parity of reasoning we should attach faculties that would be degrading to the Divinity. Thus it ever happens with those who travel out of the limits of their own knowledge; they involve themselves in perpetual contradictions which they can never reconcile; which only serve to prove that in arguing upon points, on which universal ignorance prevails, the result is constantly that all the deductions made from such unsteady principles, must of necessity be at war with each other, in hostility with themselves. Thus, although we cannot help feeling the profound wisdom, that must have dictated the system we see act with such uniformity, with such constancy, with such astonishing power, we cannot form the most slender idea of the particular nature of that wisdom; because if we were for an instant to assimilate it to our own, weak and feeble as it is, we should from that instant be in a state of contradiction; seeing we could not then avoid considering the evil we witness, the sorrow we experience, as a dereliction of this wisdom, which at least proves one great truth, that we are utterly incapable of forming an idea of the Divinity. But in contemplating things as our own experience warrants in whatever we do understand, in considering nature as acting by unchangeable laws, we find good and evil necessarily existing, without at all involving the wisdom of the great Cause of causes; who thus has no need to remedy that, which the further progress of the eternal system will regulate of itself, or which industry and patient research on our parts will enable us to discover the means of futurely avoiding.

II.4.14

IX. L’être existant par lui-même est un agent libre.

Un homme est appellé libre lorsqu’il trouve en lui-même des motifs qui le déterminent à l’action, ou lorsque sa volonté ne trouve point d’obstacles à faire ce à quoi ses motifs le déterminent. Dieu, ou l’être nécessaire dont il est ici question, ne trouve-t-il point d’obstacles dans l’exécution de ses projets ? Veut-il que le mal se fasse ou ne peut-il point l’empêcher ? Dans ce cas il n’est point libre, & sa volonté rencontre des obstacles continuels, ou bien il faudra dire qu’il conssent au péché, qu’il veut qu’on l’offense, qu’il souffre que les hommes gênent sa liberté & dérangent ses projets. Comment les Théologiens se tireront-ils de ces embarras ?

D’un autre côté, le Dieu que l’on suppose ne peut agir qu’en conséquence des loix de sa propre existence ; on pourroit donc l’appeller un être libre, en tant que ses actions ne seroient déterminées par rien qui seroit hors de lui, mais ce seroit abuser visiblement des termes : en effet on ne peut point dire qu’un être qui ne peut point agir autrement qu’il ne fait, & qui jamais ne peut cesser d’agir qu’en vertu des loix de son existence propre, soit un être libre, il est évidemment nécessité dans toutes ses actions. Demandons à un Théologien si Dieu peut récompenser le crime & punir la vertu ? Demandons lui encore si Dieu peut aimer le péché, ou s’il est libre, lorsque l’action d’un homme produit nécessairement en lui une volonté nouvelle ; un homme est un être hors de Dieu, & néanmoins l’on prétend que la conduite de cet homme influe sur cet être libre & détermine nécessairement sa volonté. Enfin nous demanderons si Dieu peut ne pas vouloir ce qu’il veut & ne pas faire ce qu’il fait ? Sa volonté n’est-elle pas nécessitée par l’intelligence, la sagesse & les vues qu’on lui suppose ? Si Dieu est ainsi lié, il n’est pas plus libre que l’homme : si tout ce qu’il fait est nécessaire, il n’est autre chose que le Destin, la fatalité, le fatum des anciens, & les modernes n’ont point changé de Divinité, quoiqu’ils aient changé son nom.

On nous dira peut-être, que Dieu est libre, en tant qu’il n’est point lié par les loix de la nature ou par celles qu’il impose à tous les êtres. Cependant s’il est vrai qu’il ait fait ces loix, si elles sont les effets de sa sagesse infinie & de son intelligence suprême, il est par son essence obligé de les suivre, ou bien on sera forcé de convenir que Dieu pourroit agir en insensé. Les Théologiens, dans la crainte, sans doute, de gêner la liberté de Dieu, ont supposé qu’il n’étoit asservi à aucunes regles, comme nous l’avons prouvé ci-devant ; en conséquence ils en ont fait un être despotique, fantasque & bizarre, que sa puissance mettoit en droit de violer toutes les loix qu’il avoit lui-même établies. Par les prétendus miracles qu’on lui attribue, il déroge aux loix de la nature ; par la conduite qu’on lui suppose, il agit très souvent d’une façon contraire à sa sagesse divine & à la raison qu’il a donnée aux hommes pour régler leurs jugemens. Si Dieu est libre en ce sens, toute religion est inutile ; elle ne peut se fonder que sur les regles immuables que ce Dieu s’est prescrites à lui-même & sur les engagemens qu’il a pris avec le genre-humain : dès qu’une religion ne le suppose point lié par ses engagemens, elle se détruit elle-même.

9th, "The self-existent and original Cause of all things, is not a necessary agent, but a being endued with liberty and choice."

Man is called free, when he finds within himself motives that determine him to action, or when his will meets no obstacle to the performance of that to which his motives have determined him. The necessary Being of which question is here made, doth he find no obstacles to the execution of the projects which are attributed to him? Is he willing, adopting their own hypothesis, that evil should be committed, or can he not prevent it? In this latter case he is not free; if his will does meet with obstacles, if he is willing to permit evil; then he suffers man to restrain his liberty, by deranging his projects; if he has not these projects, then they are themselves in error who ascribe them to him. How will the metaphysicians draw themselves out of this perplexing intricacy?

The further a theologian goes, whilst considering his gods as possessed of human qualities, as acting by mortal motives, the more he flounders—the greater the mass of contradiction he heaps together: thus if it be asked of him, can God reward crime, punish virtue, he will immediately answer, no! In this answer he will have truth: but then this truth, and the freedom which is ascribed to him, cannot, according to human ideas, exist together; because if this being cannot love vice, cannot hate virtue, and it is evident he cannot, he is in fact not more free than man himself. Again, God is said to have made a covenant with his creatures; now it is the very essence of a covenant to restrict choice; and that being must be considered a necessary agent who is under the necessity of fulfilling any given act. As it is impossible to suppose the Divinity can act irrationally, it must be conceded that as he made these laws, he is himself obliged to follow them: because if he was not, as we must again suppose he does nothing without a good reason, he would thereby imply, that the mode of action he adopted would be wiser; which would again involve a contradiction. The theologians fearing, without doubt, to restrain the liberty of the Divinity, have supposed it was necessary that he should not be bound by his own laws, in which they have shewn somewhat more ignorance of their subject than they imagined.

Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d'. The System of Nature. Translated by Samuel Wilkinson. 1820. The Trove. https://adagraves.com/trove/holbach-systeme-de-la-nature/part-2-chapter-4-part-1/.

French text published 1770 (author died 1789). English translation by Samuel Wilkinson published 1820–21; Project Gutenberg's text is from a facsimile reprint of it. Sources