❦ The System of NaturePaul-Henri Thiry, baron d'Holbach Part II, Chapter XIII: Of the motives which lead to what is falsely called Atheism.—Can this System be dangerous?—Can it be embraced by the Illiterate?

The System of Nature · Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d'Holbach

Part II, Chapter XIII: Of the motives which lead to what is falsely called Atheism.—Can this System be dangerous?—Can it be embraced by the Illiterate? Partie II, chapitre XIII : Des motifs qui portent à l’athéisme : ce systême peut-il être dangereux ? Peut-il être embrassé par le vulgaire ?

French (1770)Wilkinson (1820–21)

Of the motives which lead to what is falsely called Atheism.—Can this System be dangerous?—Can it be embraced by the Illiterate?

II.13.1

Ces réflexions & ces faits nous fourniront de quoi répondre à ceux qui nous demandent quel intérêt les hommes ont de ne point admettre un dieu ? Les tyrannies, les persécutions, les violences sans nombre que l’on exerce au nom de ce dieu, l’abrutissement & l’esclavage dans lesquels ses ministres plongent partout les peuples ; les disputes sanglantes que ce dieu fait éclore ; le nombre de malheureux dont son idée funeste remplit le monde, ne sont-ils donc point des motifs assez forts, assez intéressans pour déterminer tout homme sensible & capable de penser à examiner les titres d’un être qui fait tant de mal aux habitans de la terre ?

Un théiste, très estimable par ses talens, demande s’il peut y avoir d’autre cause que la mauvaise humeur qui puisse faire des athées ? 1 Oui, lui dirai-je, il y a d’autres causes ; il y a le desir de connoitre des vérités intéressantes ; il y a le puissant intérêt de sçavoir à quoi s’en tenir sur l’objet que l’on nous annonce comme le plus important pour nous ; il y a la crainte de se tromper sur un être qui s’occupe des opinions des hommes & qui ne souffre pas que l’on se trompe sur son compte. Mais quand ces motifs ou ces causes ne subsisteroient pas, l’indignation ou, si l’on veut la mauvaise humeur, ne sont-elles pas des causes légitimes, des motifs honnêtes & puissans pour examiner de près les prétentions & les droits d’un tyran invisible au nom duquel on commet tant de crimes sur la terre ? Tout homme qui pense, qui sent, qui a du ressort dans l’ame, peut-il donc s’empêcher de prendre de l’humeur contre un despote farouche, qui est visiblement le prétexte & la source de tous les maux dont le genre-humain est assailli de toutes parts ? N’est-ce pas ce dieu fatal qui est à la fois la cause & le prétexte du joug de fer qui l’opprime, de l’asservissement où il vit, de l’aveuglement qui le couvre, de la superstition qui l’avilit, des pratiques insensées qui le gênent, des querelles qui le divisent, des violences qu’il éprouve ? Toute ame en qui l’humanité n’est point éteinte ne doit-elle pas s’irriter contre un phantôme que l’on ne fait parler en tout pays que comme un tyran capricieux, inhumain, déraisonnable.

The reflections, as well as the facts which have preceded, will furnish a reply to those who inquire what interest man has in not admitting unintelligible systems? The tyrannies, the persecutions, the numberless outrages committed under these systems; the stupidity, the slavery, into which their ministers almost every where plunge the people; the sanguinary disputes to which they give birth; the multitude of unhappy beings with which their fatal notions fill the world; are surely abundantly sufficient to create the most powerful, the most interesting motives, to determine all sensible men, who possess the faculty of thought, to examine into the authenticity of doctrines, which cause so many serious evils to the inhabitants of the earth.

A theist, very estimable for his talents, asks, "if there can be any other cause than an evil disposition, which can make men atheists?" I reply to him, yes, there are other causes. There is the desire, a very laudable one, of having a knowledge of interesting truths; there is the powerful interest of knowing what opinions we ought to hold upon the object which is announced to us as the most important; there is the fear of deceiving ourselves upon systems which are occupied with the opinions of mankind, which do not permit he should deceive himself respecting them with impunity. But when these motives, these causes, should not subsist, is not indignation, or if they will, an evil disposition, a legitimate cause, a good and powerful motive, for closely examining the pretensions, for searching into the rights of systems, in whose name so many crimes are perpetrated? Can any man who feels, who thinks, who has any elasticity in his soul, avoid being incensed against austere theories, which are visibly the pretext, undeniably the source, of all those evils, which on every side assail the human race? Are they not these fatal systems which are at once the cause and the ostensible reason of that iron yoke that oppresses mankind; of that wretched slavery in which he lives; of that blindness which hides from him his happiness; of that superstition, which disgraces him; of those irrational customs which torment him; of those sanguinary quarrels which divide him; of all the outrages which he experiences? Must not every breast in which humanity is not extinguished, irritate itself against that theoretical speculation, which in almost every country is made to speak the language of capricious, inhuman, irrational tyrants?

II.13.2

A des motifs si naturels nous en joindrons de plus pressans encore, de plus personnels à tout homme qui réfléchit. En est-il un plus fort que la crainte importune que doit faire naître & alimenter sans cesse dans l’esprit de tout raisonneur conséquent l’idée d’un dieu bizarre, si sensible qu’il s’irrite même de ses pensées les plus secretes, que l’on peut offenser sans le sçavoir, & à qui l’on n’est jamais sûr de plaire, qui d’ailleurs n’est astreint à aucunes des règles de la justice ordinaire, qui ne doit rien aux foibles ouvrages de ses mains, qui permet que ses créatures aient des penchans malheureux, qui leur donne la liberté de les suivre, afin d’avoir la satisfaction odieuse de les punir des fautes qu’il leur permet de commettre ? Quoi de plus raisonnable & de plus juste que de constater l’existence, l’essence, les qualités & les droits d’un juge si sévère qu’il vengera sans terme les délits d’un moment ? Ne seroit-ce pas le comble de la folie que de porter sans inquiétude, comme font la plûpart des mortels, le joug accablant d’un dieu toujours prêt à les écraser dans sa fureur. Les qualités affreuses dont la divinité est défigurée par les imposteurs qui annoncent ses decrets forcent tout être raisonnable à la repousser de son cœur, à secouer son joug détesté, à nier l’existence d’un dieu que l’on rend haïssable par la conduite qu’on lui prête, à se moquer d’un dieu que l’on rend ridicule par les fables qu’on en débite en tout pays. S’il existoit un dieu jaloux de sa gloire, le crime le plus propre à l’irriter seroit, sans doute, le blasphême de ces fourbes qui le peignent sans cesse sous les traits les plus révoltans ; ce dieu devroit être bien plus offensé contre ses affreux ministres que contre ceux qui nient son existence. Le phantôme que le superstitieux adore, en le maudissant au fond de son cœur, est un objet si terrible que tout sage qui le médite est obligé de lui refuser ses hommages, de le haïr, de préférer l’anéantissement à la crainte de tomber dans ses cruelles mains. il est affreux, nous crie le fanatique, de tomber entre les mains du dieu vivant ; pour n’y point tomber, l’homme qui pense mûrement se jettera dans les bras de la nature ; & c’est là seulement qu’il trouvera un asyle sûr contre toutes les chimeres inventées par le fanatisme, & l’imposture ; c’est là qu’il trouvera un port assûré contre les orages continuels que les idées surnaturelles produisent dans les esprits.

Le déiste ne manquera pas de lui dire que Dieu n’est point tel que la superstition le dépeint. Mais l’athée lui répondra que la superstition elle-même, & toutes les notions absurdes & nuisibles qu’elle fait naître, ne sont que des corollaires des principes obscurs & faux que l’on se fait de la divinité. Que son incompréhensibilité suffit pour autoriser les absurdités & les mystères incompréhensibles que l’on en dit, que ces absurdités mystérieuses découlent nécessairement d’une chimere absurde qui ne peut enfanter que d’autres chimeres, que l’imagination égarée des mortels fera incessamment pulluler. Il faut anéantir cette chimere fondamentale pour assûrer son repos, pour connoître ses vrais rapports & ses devoirs, pour se procurer la sérénité de l’ame sans laquelle il n’est point de bonheur sur la terre. Si le dieu du superstitieux est révoltant & lugubre, le dieu du théiste sera toujours un être contradictoire qui deviendra funeste, quand on voudra le méditer, ou dont l’imposture ne manquera pas tôt ou tard d’abuser. La nature seule & les vérités qu’elle nous découvre sont capables de donner à l’esprit & au cœur une assiette que le mensonge ne puisse point ébranler.

To motives so natural, so substantive, we shall join those which are still more urgent, more personal to every reflecting man: namely, that benumbing terror, that incommodious fear, which must be unceasingly nourished by the idea of capricious theories, which lay man open to the most severe penalties, even for secret thoughts, over which he himself has not any controul; that dreadful anxiety arising out of inexorable systems, against which he may sin without even his own knowledge; of morose doctrines, the measure of which he can never be certain of having fulfilled; which so far from being equitable, make all the obligations lay on one side; which with the most ample means of enforcing restraint, freely permit evil, although they hold out the most excruciating punishments for the delinquents? Does it not then, embrace the best interests of humanity, become of the highest importance to the welfare of mankind, of the greatest consequence to the quiet of his existence, to verify the correctness of these systems? Can any thing be more rational than to probe to the core these astounding theories? Is it possible that any thing can be more just, than to inquire rigorously into the rights, sedulously to examine the foundations, to try by every known test, the stability of doctrines, that involve in their operations, consequences of such colossal magnitude; that embrace, in their dictatory mandates, matters of such high behest; that implicate the eternal felicity of such countless millions in the vortex of their action? Would it not be the height of folly to wear such a tremendous yoke without inquiry; to let such overwhelming notions pass current unauthenticated; to permit the soi-disant ministers of these terrific systems to establish their power, without the most ample verification of their patents of mission? Would it, I repeat, be at all wonderful, if the frightful qualities of some of these systems, as exhibited by their official expounders, whom the accredited functionaries of similar systems, do not scruple, in the face of day, to brand as impostors, should induce rational beings to drive them entirely from their hearts; to shake off such an intolerable burden of misery; to even deny the existence of such appalling doctrines, of such petrifying systems, which the superstitious themselves, whilst paying them their homage, frequently curse from the very bottom of their hearts?

The theist, however, will not fail to tell the atheist, as he calls him, that these systems are not such as superstition paints them; that the colours are coarse, too glaring, ill assorted, the perspective out of all keeping; he will then exhibit his own picture, in which the tints are certainly blended with more mellowness, the colouring of a more pleasing hue, the whole more harmonious, but the distances equally indistinct: the atheist, in reply, will say, that superstition itself, with all the absurd prejudices, all the mischievous notions to which it gives birth, are only corollaries drawn from the fallacious ideas, from those obscure principles, which the deicolist himself indulges. That his own incomprehensible system authorizes the incomprehensible absurdities, the inconceivable mysteries, with which superstition abounds; that they flow consecutively from his own premises; that when once the mind of mortals is bewildered in the dark, inextricable mazes of an ill-directed imagination, it will incessantly multiply its chimeras. To assure the repose of mankind, fundamental errors must be annihilated; that he may understand his true relations, be acquainted with his imperative duties, primary delusions must be rectified; to procure him that serenity of soul, without which there can be no substantive happiness, original fallacies must be undermined. If the systems of the superstitious be revolting, if their theories be gloomy, if their dogmas are unintelligible, those of the theist will always be contradictory; will prove fatal, when he shall be disposed to meditate upon them; will become the source of illusions, with which, sooner or later, imposture will not omit to abuse his credulity. Nature alone, with the truths she discovers, is capable of lending to the human mind that firmness which falsehood will never be able to shake; to the human heart that self-possession, against which imposture will in vain direct its attacks.

II.13.3

Répondons encore à ceux qui répétent sans cesse que l’intérêt des passions conduit seul à l’Athéisme, & que c’est la crainte des châtimens à venir qui détermine des hommes corrompus à faire des efforts pour anéantir le juge qu’ils ont des raisons de redouter. On conviendra sans peine que ce sont les passions & les intérêts des hommes qui les poussent à faire des recherches ; sans intérêt nul homme n’est tenté de chercher, sans passion nul homme ne cherchera vivement. Il s’agit donc d’examiner ici si les passions & les intérêts qui déterminent quelques penseurs à discuter les droits des dieux sont légitimes ou non. Nous venons d’exposer ces intérêts & nous avons trouvé que tout homme sensé trouvoit dans ses inquiétudes & ses craintes des motifs raisonnables pour s’assûrer s’il est nécessaire de passer sa vie dans des transes continuelles. Dira-t-on qu’un malheureux injustement condamné à gémir dans les fers n’est pas en droit de desirer de les briser, ou de prendre les moyens de s’affranchir de sa prison & des supplices qui le menacent à chaque instant ? Prétendra-t-on que sa passion pour la liberté n’a rien de légitime & qu’il fait tort aux compagnons de sa misère en se dérobant lui-même aux coups de la tyrannie & en leur fournissant des secours pour s’y soustraire ? Un incrédule est-il donc autre chose qu’un échappé de la prison universelle où l’imposture tyrannique retient tous les mortels ? Un athée qui écrit n’est-il pas un échappé qui fournit à ceux de ses associés assez courageux pour le suivre les moyens de se soustraire aux terreurs qui les ménacent ? 2

Nous conviendrons encore que souvent la corruption des mœurs, la débauche, la licence & même la légéreté d’esprit peuvent conduire à l’irréligion ou à l’incrédulité ; mais on peut être libertin, irréligieux & faire parade d’incrédulité sans être un athée pour cela. Il y a de la différence, sans doute, entre ceux que le raisonnement conduit à l’irréligion, & ceux qui ne rejettent ou ne méprisent la religion que parce qu’ils la regardent comme un objet lugubre ou un frein incommode. Bien des gens renoncent aux préjugés reçus par vanité ou sur parole ; ces prétendus esprits forts n’ont rien examiné par eux-mêmes, ils s’en rapportent à d’autres qu’ils supposent avoir pesé les choses plus mûrement. Ces sortes d’incrédules n’ont donc point d’idées certaines ; peu capables de raisonner par eux-mêmes, à peine sont-ils en état de suivre les raisonnemens des autres. Ils sont irréligieux de la même manière que la plupart des hommes sont religieux, c’est-à-dire par la crédulité, comme le peuple, ou par intérêt, comme le prêtre. Un voluptueux, un débauché enseveli dans la crapule, un ambitieux, un intriguant, un homme frivole & dissipé, une femme déréglée, un bel esprit à la mode sont-ils donc des personnages bien capables de juger d’une religion qu’ils n’ont point approfondie, de sentir la force d’un argument, d’embrasser l’ensemble d’un systême ? S’ils entrevoient quelquefois de foibles lueurs de vérité au milieu du nuage des passions qui les aveuglent, elles ne laissent en eux que des traces passagères, aussitôt effacées que reçues. Les hommes corrompus n’attaquent les dieux que lorsqu’ils les croient ennemis de leurs passions. 3 L’homme de bien les attaque parce qu’il les trouve ennemis de la vertu, nuisibles à son bonheur, contraires à son repos, funestes au genre-humain.

Let us again reply to those who unceasingly repeat that the interest of the passions alone conduct man to what is termed atheism: that it is the dread of future punishment that determines corrupt individuals to make the most strenuous efforts to break up a system they have reason to dread. We shall, without hesitation, agree that it is the interest of man's passions which excites him to make inquiries; without interest, no man is tempted to seek; without passion, no man will seek vigorously. The question, then, to be examined, is, if the passions and interests, which determine some thinkers to dive into the stability or the systems held forth to their adoption, are or are not legitimate? These interests have, already been exposed, from which it has been proved, that every rational man finds in his inquietudes, in his fears, reasonable motives to ascertain, whether or not it be necessary to pass his life in perpetual dread; in never ceasing agonies? Will it be said, that an unhappy being, unjustly condemned to groan in chains, has not the right of being willing to render them asunder; to take some means to liberate himself from his prison; to adopt some plan to escape from those punishments, which every instant threaten him? Will it be pretended that his passion for liberty has no legitimate foundation, that he does an injury to the companions of his misery, in withdrawing himself from the shafts of tyrannical infliction; or in furnishing, them also with means to escape from its cruel strokes? Is, then, an incredulous man, any thing more than one who has taken flight from the general prison, in which despotic superstition detains nearly all mankind? Is not an atheist, as he is called, who writes, one who has broken his fetters, who supplies to those of his associates who have sufficient courage to follow him, the means of setting themselves free from the terrors that menace them? The priests unceasingly repeat that it is pride, vanity, the desire of distinguishing himself from the generality of mankind, that determines man to incredulity. In this they are like some of those wealthy mortals, who treat all those as insolent who refuse to cringe before them. Would not every rational man have a right to ask the priest, where is thy superiority in matters of reasoning? What motives can I have to submit my reason to thy delirium? On the other hand, way it not be said to the hierarchy, that it is interest which makes them priests; that it is interest which renders them theologians; that it is for the interest of their passions, to inflate their pride, to gratify their avarice, to minister to their ambition, &c. that they attach themselves to systems, of which they alone reap the benefits? Whatever it may be, the priesthood, contented with exercising their power over the illiterate, ought to permit those men who do think, to be excused from bending the knee before their vain, illusive idols.

We also agree, that frequently the corruption of morals, a life of debauchery, a licentiousness of conduct, even levity of mind, may conduct man to incredulity; but is it not possible to be a libertine, to be irreligious, to make a parade of incredulity, without being on that account an atheist? There is unquestionably a difference between those who are led to renounce belief in unintelligible systems by dint of reasoning, and those who reject or despise superstition, only because they look upon it as a melancholy object, or an incommodious restraint. Many persons, no doubt, renounce received prejudices, through vanity or upon hearsay; these pretended strong minds have not examined any thing for themselves; they act upon the authority of others, whom they suppose to have weighed things more maturely. This kind of incredulous beings, have not, then, any distinct ideas, any substantive opinions, and are but little capacitated to reason for themselves; they are indeed hardly in a state to follow the reasoning of others. They are irreligious in the same manner as the majority of mankind are superstitious, that is to say, by credulity like the people; or through interest like the priest. A voluptuary devoted to his appetites; a debauche� drowned in drunkenness; an ambitious mortal given up to his own schemes of aggrandizement; an intriguer surrounded by his plots; a frivolous, dissipated mortal, absorbed by his gewgaws, addicted to his puerile pursuits, buried in his filthy enjoyments; a loose woman abandoned to her irregular desires; a choice spirit of the day: are these I say, personages, actually competent to form a sound judgment of superstition, which they have never examined? Are they in a condition to maturely weigh theories that require the utmost depth of thought? Have they the capabilities to feel the force of a subtle argument; to compass the whole of a system: to embrace the various ramifications of an extended doctrine? If some feeble scintillations occasionally break in upon the cimmerian darkness of their minds; if by any accident they discover some faint glimmerings of truth amidst the tumult of their passions; if occasionally a sudden calm, suspending, for a short season, the tempest of their contending vices, permits the bandeau of their unruly desires by which they are blinded, to drop for an instant from their hoodwinked eyes, these leave on them only evanescent traces; scarcely sooner received than obliterated. Corrupt men only attack the gods when they conceive them to be the enemies to their vile passions. Arrian says, "that when men imagine the gods are in opposition to their passions, they abuse them, and overturn their altars." The Chinese, I believe, do the same. The honest man makes war against systems which he finds are inimical to virtue—injurious to his own happiness—baneful to that of his fellow mortals—contradictory to the repose, fatal to the interests of the human species. The bolder, therefore, the sentiments of the honest atheist, the more strange his ideas, the more suspicious they appear to other men, the more strictly he ought to observe his own obligations; the more scrupulously he should perform his duties; especially if he be not desirous that his morals shall calumniate his system; which duly weighed, will make the necessity of sound ethics, the certitude of morality, felt in all its force; but which every species of superstition tends to render problematical, or to corrupt.

II.13.4

Lorsque notre volonté est poussée par des motifs cachés & compliqués il est très difficile de démêler ce qui la détermine ; un méchant homme peut être conduit à l’irréligion ou à l’athéisme par des motifs qu’il n’ose s’avouer : il peut se faire illusion à lui-même & ne suivre que l’intérêt de ses passions, en croyant chercher la vérité ; la crainte d’un dieu vengeur le déterminera peut-être à nier son existence sans beaucoup d’examen, uniquement parce qu’elle lui est incommode. Cependant les passions rencontrent quelquefois juste ; un grand intérêt nous porte à examiner les choses de plus près, il peut souvent faire découvrir la vérité à celui-même qui la cherche le moins ou qui ne vouloit que s’endormir & se tromper. Il en est d’un homme pervers qui rencontre la vérité, comme de celui qui pour fuir un danger imaginaire trouveroit sur son chemin un serpent dangereux qu’il écraseroit en courant ; il fait par hazard &, pour ainsi dire, sans dessein, ce qu’un homme moins troublé eût fait de propos délibéré. Un méchant qui craint son dieu & qui veut se soustraire à lui, peut très bien découvrir l’absurdité des notions qu’on lui donne, sans découvrir pour cela que ces mêmes notions ne changent rien à l’évidence & à la nécessité de ses devoirs.

Il faut être désintéressé pour juger sainement des choses ; il faut avoir des lumières & de la suite dans l’esprit pour saisir un grand systême. Il n’appartient qu’à l’homme de bien d’examiner les preuves de l’existence d’un dieu & les principes de toute religion ; il n’appartient qu’à l’homme instruit de la nature & de ses voies d’embrasser avec connoissance de cause le systême de la nature. Le méchant & l’ignorant sont incapables de juger avec candeur ; l’homme honnête & vertueux est seul juge compétent dans une si grande affaire. Que dis-je ! N’est-il pas alors dans le cas de desirer l’existence d’un dieu rémunérateur de la bonté des hommes ? S’il renonce à ces avantages que sa vertu le mettroit en droit d’espérer, c’est qu’il les trouve imaginaires, ainsi que le rémunérateur qu’on lui annonce, & qu’en réfléchissant au caractère de ce dieu, il est forcé de reconnoître que l’on ne peut point compter sur un despote capricieux, & que les indignités & les folies auxquelles il sert de prétexte surpassent infiniment les chétifs avantages qui peuvent résulter de sa notion. En effet tout homme qui réfléchit s’apperçoit bientôt que pour un mortel timide dont ce dieu retient les foibles passions il en est des millions qu’il ne peut retenir, & dont au contraire il excite les fureurs ; que pour un seul qu’il console il en est des milliers qu’il consterne, qu’il afflige, qu’il force de gémir ; en un mot il trouve que contre un enthousiaste inconséquent que ce dieu, qu’il croit bon, rend heureux, il porte la discorde, le carnage & l’affliction dans de vastes contrées, & plonge des peuples entiers dans la douleur & dans les larmes.

Whenever our will is moved by concealed and complicated motives, it is extremely difficult to decide what determines it; a wicked man may be conducted to incredulity or to scepticism by those motives which he dare not avow, even to himself; in believing he seeks after truth, he may form an illusion to his mind, only to follow the interest of his passions; the fear of an avenging system will perhaps determine him to deny their existence without examination; uniformly because he feels them incommodious. Nevertheless, the passions sometimes happen to be just; a great interest carries us on to examine things more minutely; it may frequently make a discovery of the truth, even to him who seeks after it the least, or who is only desirous to be lulled to sleep, who is only solicitous to deceive himself. It is the same with a perverse man who stumbles upon truth, as it is with him, who flying from an imaginary danger, should encounter in his road a dangerous serpent, which in his haste he should destroy; he does that by accident, without design, which a man, less disturbed in his mind, would have done with premeditated deliberation.

To judge properly of things, it is necessary to be disinterested; it is requisite to have an enlightened mind, to have connected ideas to compass a great system. It belongs, in fact, only to the honest man to examine the proofs of systems—to scrutinize the principles of superstition; it belongs only to the man acquainted with nature, conversant with her ways, to embrace with intelligence the cause of the SYSTEM OF NATURE. The wicked are incapable of judging with temper; the ignorant are inadequate to reason with accuracy; the honest, the virtuous, are alone competent judges in so weighty an affair. What do I say? Is not the virtuous man, from thence in a condition to ardently desire the existence of a system that remunerates the goodness of men? If he renounces those advantages, which his virtue confers upon him the right to hope, it is, undoubtedly, because he finds them imaginary. Indeed, every man who reflects will quickly perceive, that for one timid mortal, of whom these systems restrain the feeble passions, there are millions whose voice they cannot curb, of whom, on the contrary, they excite the fury; for one that they console, there are millions whom they affright, whom they afflict; whom they make unhappy: in short, he finds, that against one inconsistent enthusiast, which these systems, which are thought so excellent, render happy, they carry discord, carnage, wretchedness into vast countries; plunge whole nations into misery; deluge them with tears.

II.13.5

Quoiqu’il en soit, ne nous enquérons point des motifs qui peuvent déterminer un homme à embrasser un systême : examinons ce systême, assurons-nous s’il est vrai, & si nous le trouvons fondé sur la vérité, nous ne pourrons jamais l’estimer dangereux. C’est toujours le mensonge qui nuit aux hommes ; si l’erreur est visiblement la source unique de leurs maux, la raison en est le vrai remède. Ne nous informons pas davantage de la conduite de l’homme qui nous présente un systême ; ses idées, comme on l’a dit déjà, peuvent être très-saines, quand même ses actions seroient très-dignes de blâme. Si le systême de l’athéisme ne peut rendre pervers celui qui ne l’est pas par son tempérament, il ne peut rendre bon celui qui ne connoit point, d’ailleurs les motifs qui devroient le porter au bien. Au moins avons-nous prouvé que le superstitieux quand il a des passions fortes & un cœur dépravé, trouve dans sa religion même mille prétextes de plus que l’athée, pour nuire à l’espèce humaine. Celui-ci n’a pas au moins le manteau du zèle pour couvrir sa vengeance, ses emportemens, ses fureurs ; l’athée n’a pas la faculté d’expier à prix d’argent ou à l’aide de quelques cérémonies, les outrages qu’il fait à la société, il n’a pas l’avantage de pouvoir se réconcilier avec son dieu, & par quelques pratiques aisées de calmer les remords de sa conscience inquiete ; si le crime n’a point amorti tout sentiment dans son cœur, il est forcé de porter toujours au dedans de lui-même un juge inexorable, qui sans cesse lui reproche une conduite odieuse, qui le force de rougir, de se haïr lui-même, de craindre les regards & les ressentimens des autres. Le superstitieux, s’il est méchant, se livre au crime avec remords ; mais sa religion lui fournit bientôt les moyens de s’en débarrasser ; sa vie n’est communément qu’une longue chaîne de fautes & de regrêts, de péchés & d’expiations ; bien plus, il commet souvent, comme on a vu, des crimes plus grands pour expier les premiers : dépourvus d’idées fixes sur la morale, il s’accoutume à ne regarder comme des fautes que ce que les ministres & les interprêtes de son dieu lui défendent : il prend pour des vertus, ou pour des moyens d’effacer ses forfaits, les actions les plus noires que souvent on lui dit être agréables à ce dieu. C’est ainsi qu’on a vu des fanatiques expier par des persécutions atroces leurs adultères, leurs infamies, leurs guerres injustes, leurs usurpations ; & pour se laver de leurs iniquités se baigner dans le sang des superstitieux dont l’entêtement faisoit des victimes & des martyrs.

Un athée, s’il a bien raisonné, s’il a consulté sa nature, a des principes plus sûrs & toujours plus humains que le superstitieux : sa religion ou sombre ou enthousiaste, conduit toujours celui-ci soit à la folie, soit à la cruauté. Jamais on n’enivrera l’imagination d’un athée au point de lui faire croire que des violences, des injustices, des persécutions, des assassinats sont des actions vertueuses ou légitimes. Nous voyons tous les jours que la religion ou la cause du ciel aveuglent des personnes humaines, équitables & sensées sur toute matière, au point de leur faire un devoir de traiter avec la dernière barbarie des hommes qui s’écartent de leur façon de penser. Un hérétique, un incrédule cessent d’être des hommes aux yeux du superstitieux. Toutes les sociétés, infectées du venin de la religion, nous offrent des exemples sans nombre d’assassinats juridiques que les tribunaux commettent sans scrupules & sans remords ; des juges, équitables sur toute autre matière, ne le sont plus dès qu’il s’agit des chimeres théologiques ; en se baignant dans le sang ils croient se conformer aux vues de la divinité. Presque par-tout les loix subordonnées à la superstition se rendent complices de ses fureurs ; elles légitiment ou transforment en devoirs les cruautés les plus contraires aux droits de l’humanité4. Tous ces vengeurs de la religion, qui de gaieté de cœur, par piété, par devoir lui immolent les victimes qu’elle leur désigne, ne sont-ils pas des aveugles ? Ne sont-ils pas des tyrans qui ont l’injustice de violer la pensée, qui ont la folie de croire que l’on peut l’enchaîner ? Ne sont-ils pas des fanatiques à qui la loi, dictée par des préjugés inhumains, impose la nécessité de devenir des bêtes féroces ? Tous ces souverains qui pour venger le ciel tourmentent & persécutent leurs sujets & sacrifient des victimes humaines à la mechanceté de leurs dieux antropophages, ne sont-ils pas des hommes que le zèle religieux convertit en des Tigres ? Ces prêtres si soigneux du salut des ames, qui forcent insolemment le sanctuaire de la pensée, afin de trouver dans les opinions de l’homme des motifs pour lui nuire, ne sont-ils pas des fourbes odieux & des perturbateurs du repos des esprits, que la religion honore & que la raison déteste ? Quels scélérats plus odieux aux yeux de l’humanité que ces infâmes inquisiteurs, qui, par l’aveuglement des princes, jouissent de l’avantage de juger leurs propres ennemis & de les livrer aux flammes ? Cependant la superstition des peuples les respecte & la faveur des rois les comble de bienfaits ! Enfin mille exemples ne nous prouvent-ils pas que la religion a par-tout produit & justifié les horreurs les plus étranges ? N’a-t-elle pas mille fois armé les mains des hommes de poignards homicides, déchaîné des passions bien plus terribles encore que celles qu’elle prétendoit contenir, brisé pour les mortels les nœuds les plus sacrés ? Sous prétexte de devoir, de foi, de piété, de zèle n’a-t-elle pas favorisé la cruauté, la cupidité, l’ambition, la tyrannie ? La cause de Dieu n’a-t-elle pas mille fois légitimé le meurtre, la perfidie, le parjure, la rébellion, le régicide ? Ces princes, qui souvent se sont faits les vengeurs du ciel & les licteurs de la religion, n’en ont-ils pas été cent fois les victimes déplorables ? En un mot, le nom de Dieu n’a-t-il pas été le signal des plus tristes folies & des attentats les plus affreux ? Les autels de tous les dieux n’ont-ils point par-tout nagé dans le sang ; & sous quelque forme que l’on ait montré la divinité, ne fut-elle pas en tout tems la cause ou le prétexte de la violation la plus insolente des droits de l’humanité ? 5

However this may be, do not let us inquire into motives which may determine a man to embrace a system; let us rather examine the system itself; let us convince ourselves of its rectitude; if we shall find that it is founded upon truth, we shall never, be able to esteem it dangerous. It is always falsehood that is injurious to man; if error be visibly the source of his sorrows, reason is the true remedy for them; this is the panacea that can alone carry consolation to his afflictions. Do not let us farther examine the conduct of a man who presents us with a system; his ideas, as we have already said, may be extremely sound, when even his actions are highly deserving of censure. If the system of atheism cannot make him perverse, who is not so by his temperament, it cannot render him good, who does not otherwise know the motives that should conduct him to virtue. At least we have proved, that the superstitious man, when he has strong passions, when he possesses a depraved heart, finds even in his creed a thousand pretexts more than the atheist, for injuring the human species. The atheist has not, at least, the mantle of zeal to cover his vengeance; he has not the command of his priest to palliate his transports; he has not the glory of his gods to countenance his fury; the atheist does not enjoy the faculty of expiating, at the expence of a sum of money, the transgressions of his life; of availing himself of certain ceremonies, by the aid of which he may atone for the outrages he may have committed against society; he has not the advantage of being able to reconcile himself with heaven, by some easy custom; to quiet the remorse of his disturbed conscience, by an attention to outward forms: if crime has not deadened every feeling of his heart, he is obliged continually to carry within himself an inexorable judge, who unceasingly reproaches him for his odious conduct; who forces him to blush for his own folly; who compels him to hate himself; who imperiously obliges him to fear examination, to dread the resentment of others. The superstitious man, if he be wicked, gives himself up to crime, which is followed by remorse; but his superstition quickly furnishes him with the means a getting rid of it; his life is generally no more than a long series of error and grief, of sin and expiation, following each other in alternate succession; still more, he frequently, as we have seen, perpetrates crimes of greater magnitude, in order to wash away the first. Destitute of any permanent ideas on morality, he accustoms himself to look upon nothing as criminal, but that which the ministers, the official expounders of his system, forbid him to commit: he considers actions of the blackest dye as virtues, or as the means of effacing those transgressions, which are frequently held out to him as faithfully executing the duties of his creed. It is thus we have seen fanatics expiate their adulteries by the most atrocious persecutions; cleanse their souls from infamy by the most unrelenting cruelty; make atonement for unjust wars by the foulest means; qualify their usurpations by outraging every principle of virtue; in order to wash away their iniquities, bathe themselves in the blood of those superstitious victims, whose infatuation made them martyrs.

An atheist, as he is falsely called, if he has reasoned justly, if he has consulted nature, hath principles more determinate, more humane, than the superstitious; his system, whether gloomy or enthusiastic, always conducts the latter either to folly or cruelty; the imagination of the former will never be intoxicated to that degree, to make him believe that violence, injustice, persecution, or assassination are either virtuous or legitimate actions. We every day see that superstition, or the cause of heaven, as it is called, hoodwinks even those persons who on every other occasion are humane, equitable, and rational; so much so, that they make it a paramount duty to treat with determined barbarity, those men who happen to step aside from their mode of thinking. An heretic, an incredulous being, ceases to be a man, in the eyes of the superstitious. Every society, infected with the venom of bigotry, offers innumerable examples of juridical assassination, which the tribunals commit without scruple, even without remorse. Judges who are equitable on every other occasion, are no longer so when there is a question of theological opinions; in steeping their hands in the blood of their victims, they believe, on the authority of the priests, they conform themselves to the views of the Divinity. Almost every where the laws are subordinate to superstition; make themselves accomplices in its fanatical fury; they legitimate those actions most opposed to the gentle voice of humanity; they even transform into imperative duties, the most barbarous cruelties. The president Grammont relates, with a satisfaction truly worthy of a cannibal, the particulars of the punishment of Vanini, who was burned at Thoulouse, although he had disavowed the opinions with which he was accused; this president carries his demoniac prejudices so far, as to find wickedness in the piercing cries, in the dreadful howlings, which torment wrested from this unhappy victim to superstitious vengeance. Are not all these avengers of the gods miserable men, blinded by their piety, who, under the impression of duty, wantonly immolate at the shrine of superstition, those wretched victims whom the priests deliver over to them? Are they not savage tyrants, who have the rank injustice to violate thought; who have the folly to believe they can enslave it? Are they not delirious fanatics, on whom the law, dictated by the most inhuman prejudices, imposes the necessity of acting like ferocious brutes? Are not all those sovereigns, who to gratify the vanity of the priesthood, torment and persecute their subjects, who sacrifice to their anthropophagite gods human victims, men whom superstitious zeal has converted into tygers? Are not those priests, so careful of the soul's health, who insolently break into the sacred sanctuary of man's mind, to the end that they may find in his opinions motives for doing him an injury, abominable knaves, disturbers of the public repose, whom superstition honours, but whom virtue detests? What villains are more odious in the eyes of humanity, what depredators more hateful to the eye of reason, than those infamous inquisitors, who by the blindness of princes, by the delirium of monarchs, enjoy the advantage of passing judgment on their own enemies; who ruthlessly commit them to the charity of the flames? Nevertheless, the fatuity of the people makes even these monsters respected; the favour of kings covers them with kindness; the mantle of superstitious opinion shields them from the effect of the just execration of every honest man. Do not a thousand examples prove, that superstition has every where produced the most frightful ravages: that it has continually justified the most unaccountable horrors? Has it not a thousand times armed its votaries with the dagger of the homicide; let loose passions much wore terrible than those which it pretended to restrain; broken up the most sacred bonds by which mortals are connected with each other? Has it not, under the pretext of duty, under the colour of faith, under the semblance of zeal, under the sacred name of piety, favoured cupidity, lent wings to ambition, countenanced cruelty, given a spring to tyranny? Has it not legitimatized murder; given a system to perfidy; organized rebellion; made a virtue of regicide? Have not those princes who have been foremost as the avengers of heaven, who have been the lictors of superstition, frequently themselves become its victims? In short, has it not been the signal for the most dismal follies, the most wicked outrages, the most horrible massacres? Has not its altars been drenched with human gore? Under whatever form it has been exhibited, has it not always been the ostensible cause of the most bare-faced violation—of the sacred rights of humanity?

II.13.6

Jamais un Athée, tant qu’il jouira de son bon sens, ne se persuadera que de semblables actions puissent être justifiées, jamais il ne pourra croire que celui qui les commet puisse être un homme estimable ; il n’y a qu’un superstitieux à qui son aveuglement fait oublier les principes les plus évidens de la morale, de la nature, de la raison, qui puisse imaginer que les attentats les plus destructeurs sont des vertus. Si l’athée est un pervers, il sçait au moins qu’il fait mal ; ni ses prêtres ni son Dieu ne lui persuaderont pas qu’il fait bien, & quelques crimes qu’il se permette, ils ne pourront jamais excéder ceux que la superstition fait commettre sans scrupule à ceux qu’elle enivre de ses fureurs, ou à qui elle montre ces crimes mêmes comme des expiations & des actions méritoires.

Ainsi l’athée, quelque méchant qu’on le suppose, ne sera tout au plus que sur la même ligne que le dévôt que sa religion encourage souvent au crime qu’elle transforme en vertu. Quant à la conduite, s’il est débauché, voluptueux, intempérant, adultère, l’athée ne diffère en rien du superstitieux le plus crédule, qui souvent à sa crédulité sçait allier des vices & des crimes que ses prêtres lui pardonneront toujours, pourvu qu’il rende hommage à leur pouvoir. S’il est dans l’Indostan, ses bramines le laveront dans le Gange en récitant des prières. S’il est juif, en faisant des offrandes ses péchés seront effacés. S’il est au Japon, il en sera quitte pour des pélérinages. S’il est mahométan, il sera réputé saint, pour avoir visité le tombeau de son prophête. S’il est chrétien, il priera, il jeûnera, il se prosternera aux pieds de ses prêtres pour leur confesser ses fautes ; ceux-ci l’absolveront au nom du très-haut, lui vendront les indulgences du ciel, mais jamais ils ne le blâmeront des crimes qu’il aura commis pour eux.

Never will an atheist, as he is called, as called, as he enjoys his proper senses, persuade himself that similar actions can be justifiable; never will he believe that he who commits them can be an estimable man; there is no one but the superstitious, whose blindness makes him forget the most evident principles of morality, whose callous soul renders him deaf to the voice of nature, whose zeal causes him to overlook the dictates of reason, who can by any possibility imagine the most destructive crimes are the most prominent features of virtue. If the atheist be perverse, he, at least, knows that he acts wrong; neither these systems, nor their priests, will be able to persuade him that he does right: one thing, however, is certain, whatever crimes he may allow himself to commit, he will never be capable of exceeding those which superstition perpetrates without scruple; that it encourages in those whom it intoxicates with its fury; to whom it frequently holds forth wickedness itself, either as expiations for offences, or else as orthodox, meritorious actions.

Thus the atheist, however wicked he may be supposed, will at most be upon a level with the devotee, whose superstition encourages him to commit crimes, which it transforms into virtue. As to conduct, if he be debauched, voluptuous, intemperate, adulterous, the atheist in this differs in nothing from the most credulously superstitious, who frequently knows how to connect these vices with his credulity, to blend with his superstition certain atrocities, for which his priests, provided he renders due homage to their power, especially if he augments their exchequer, will always find means to pardon him. If he be in Hindoostan, his brahmins will wash him in the sacred waters of the Ganges, while reciting a prayer. If he be a Jew, upon making an offering, his sins will be effaced. If he be in Japan, he will be cleansed by performing a pilgrimage. If he be a Mahometan, he will be reputed a saint, for having visited the tomb of his prophet; the Roman pontiff himself will sell him indulgences; but none of them will ever censure him for those crimes he may have committed in the support of their several faiths.

II.13.7

On nous dit tous les jours que la conduite indécente ou criminelle des prêtres & de leurs sectateurs ne prouve rien contre la bonté du systême religieux ; pourquoi ne diroit-on pas la même chose de la conduite d’un athée, qui, comme on l’a déjà prouvé, peut avoir une morale très-bonne & très-vraie, même en suivant une conduite déréglée ? S’il falloit juger les opinions des hommes d’après leur conduite, quelle est la religion qui soutiendroit cette épreuve ? Examinons donc les opinions de l’athée sans approuver sa conduite ; adoptons sa façon de penser, si nous la jugeons vraie, utile, raisonnable ; rejettons sa façon d’agir, si nous la trouvons blâmable. à la vue d’un ouvrage rempli de vérités, nous ne nous embarrassons pas des mœurs de l’ouvrier. Qu’importe à l’univers que Newton ait été sobre ou intempérant, chaste ou débauché ? Il ne s’agit pour nous que de sçavoir s’il a bien raisonné, si ses principes sont sûrs, si les parties de son systême sont liées, si son ouvrage renferme plus de vérités démontrées que d’idées hazardées. Jugeons de même les principes d’un athée ; s’ils sont étranges & inusités c’est une raison de les examiner avec plus de rigueur ; s’il a dit vrai, s’il a démontré, que l’on se rende à l’évidence ; s’il s’est trompé quelque part, que l’on distingue le vrai du faux, mais que l’on ne tombe point dans le préjugé trop commun qui pour une erreur dans les détails fait rejetter une foule de vérités incontestables. L’athée quand il se trompe a, sans doute, autant de droit de rejetter ses fautes sur la fragilité de sa nature que le superstitieux. Un athée peut avoir des vices & des défauts, il peut mal raisonner ; mais au moins ses erreurs n’auront jamais les conséquences des nouveautés religieuses, elles n’allumeront point comme elles le feu de la discorde au sein des nations ; l’auteur ne justifiera pas ses vices & ses égaremens par la religion ; il ne prétendra point à l’infaillibilité comme ces théologiens superbes qui attachent la sanction divine à leurs folies, & qui supposent que le ciel autorise les sophismes, les mensonges & les erreurs qu’ils se croient obligés de répandre sur la terre.

On nous dira peut-être que le refus de croire à la divinité rompt un des plus puissans liens de la société en faisant disparoître la sainteté des sermens. Je réponds que le parjure n’est point rare dans les nations les plus religieuses, ni dans les personnes qui se vantent d’être le plus convaincues de l’existence des dieux. Diagoras, de superstitieux qu’il étoit, devint, dit-on, athée, en voyant que les dieux n’avoient point foudroyé un homme qui les avoit pris à témoin d’une fausseté. Sur ce principe que d’athées devroient se former parmi nous ! De ce qu’on a fait un être invisible & inconnu dépositaire des engagemens des hommes, nous ne voyons pas que leurs engagemens & leurs pactes les plus solemnels en soient plus solides pour cette vaine formalité. C’est vous sur-tout que j’en atteste, conducteurs des nations ! Ce dieu dont vous vous dites les images, dont vous prétendez tenir le droit de commander ; ce dieu que vous rendez si souvent le témoin de vos sermens, le garant de vos traités, ce dieu dont vous assurez que vous craignez les jugemens, vous en impose-t-il beaucoup, dès qu’il s’agit de l’intérêt le plus futile ? Observez-vous religieusement ces engagemens si sacrés que vous avez contractés avec vos alliés, avec vos sujets ? Princes ! Qui à tant de religion joignez souvent si peu de probité, je vois que la force de la vérité vous accable ; à cette demande vous rougissez, sans doute ; & vous êtes contraints d’avouer que vous vous jouez également & des dieux & des hommes. Que dis-je ! La religion elle-même ne vous dispense-t-elle pas souvent de vos sermens ? Ne vous prescrit-elle pas d’être perfides, de violer la foi jurée, quand il s’agit sur-tout de ses intérêts sacrés ; ne vous dispense-t-elle pas de garder vos engagemens avec ceux qu’elle condamne ? Après vous avoir rendus vous-mêmes & perfides & parjures, ne s’est-elle pas quelquefois arrogé le droit d’absoudre vos sujets des sermens qui les lioient à vous 6 ? Si nous considérons attentivement les choses nous verrons que sous de tels chefs la religion & la politique sont de véritables écoles de parjure. Aussi les fripons de tous états ne reculent jamais quand il s’agit d’attester le nom de dieu dans les fraudes les plus manifestes & pour les plus vils intérêts. à quoi servent donc les sermens ? Ce sont des piéges auxquels la simplicité seule pourroit se laisser prendre ; les sermens sont par-tout de vaines formalités, ils n’en imposent point aux scélérats & n’ajoûtent rien aux engagemens des ames honnêtes, qui, même sans sermens, n’eussent point eu la témérité de les violer. Un superstitieux parjure & perfide n’a, sans doute, aucun avantage sur un athée qui manqueroit à ses promesses ; l’un & l’autre ne méritent pas plus la confiance de leurs concitoyens ni l’estime des gens de bien : si l’un ne respecte pas son Dieu qu’il croit, l’autre ne respecte ni sa raison, ni sa réputation, ni l’opinion publique, auxquelles tout homme sensé ne peut refuser de croire.7

We are constantly told, that the indecent behaviour of the official expounders of superstition, the criminal conduct of the priests, or of their sectaries, proves nothing against the goodness of their systems. Admitted: but wherefore do they not say the same thing of the conduct of those whom they call atheists, who, as we have already proved, way have a very substantive, a very correct system of morality, even while leading a very dissolute life? If it be necessary to judge the opinions of mankind according to their conduct, which is the theory that would bear the scrutiny? Let us, then, examine the opinion of the atheist, without approving his conduct; let us adopt his mode of thinking, if we find it marked by the truth; if it shall appear useful; if it shall be proved rational; but let us reject his mode of action, if that should be found blameable. At the sight of a work performed with truth, we do not embarrass ourselves with the morals of the workman: of what importance is it to the universe, whether the illustrious Newton was a sober, discreet citizen, or a debauched intemperate man? It only remains for us to examine his theory; we want nothing more than to know whether he has reasoned acutely; if his principles be steady; if the parts of his system are connected; if his work contains more demonstrable truths, than bold ideas? Let us judge in the same manner of the principles of the atheist; if they appear strange, if they are unusual, that is a solid reason for probing them more strictly; if he has spoken truth, if he has demonstrated his positions, let us yield to the weight of evidence; if he be deceived in some parts, let us distinguish the true from the false; but do not let us fall into the hacknied prejudice, which on account of one error in the detail, rejects a multitude of incontestible truisms. Doctor Johnson, I think, says in his preface to his Dictionary, "when a man shall have executed his task with all the accuracy possible, he will only be allowed to have done his duty; but if he commits the slightest error, a thousand snarlers are ready to point it out." The atheist, when he is deceived, has unquestionably as much right to throw his faults on the fragility of his nature, as the superstitious man. An atheist may have vices, may be defective, he may reason badly; but his errors will never have the consequences of superstitious novelties; they will not, like these, kindle up the fire of discord in the bosom of nations; the atheist will not justify his vices, defend his wanderings by superstition; he will not pretend to infallibility, like those self-conceited theologians who attach the Divine sanction to their follies; who initiate that heaven authorizes those sophisms, gives currency to those falsehoods, approves those errors, which they believe themselves warranted to distribute over the face of the earth.

It will perhaps be said, that the refusal to believe in these systems, will rend asunder one of the most powerful bonds of society, by making the sacredness of an oath vanish. I reply, that perjury is by no means rare, even in the most superstitious nations, nor even among the most religious, or among those who boast of being the most thoroughly convinced of the rectitude of their theories. Diagoras, superstitious as he was, and it was not well possible to be more so, it is said became an atheist, on seeing that the gods did not thunder their vengeance on a man who had taken them as evidence to a falsity. Upon this principle, how many atheists ought there to be? From the systems that have made invisible unknown beings the depositaries of man's engagements, we do not always see it result that they are better observed; or that the most solemn contracts have acquired a greater solidity. If history was consulted, it would now and then be in evidence, that even the conductors of nations, those who have said they were the images of the Divinity, who have declared that they held their right of governing immediately from his hands, have sometimes taken the Deity as the witness to their oaths, have made him the guarantee of their treaties, without its having had all the effect that might have been expected, when very trifling interests have intervened; it would appear, unless historians are incorrect, that they did not always religiously observe those sacred engagements they made with their allies, much less with their subjects. To form a judgment from these historic documents, we should be inclined to say, there have been those who had much superstition, joined with very little probity; who made a mockery both of gods and men; who perhaps blushed when they reviewed their own conduct: nor can this be at all surprising, when it not unfrequently happened that superstition itself absolved them from their oaths. In fact, does not superstition sometimes inculcate perfidy; prescribe violation of plighted faith? Above all, when there is a question of its own interests, does it not dispense with engagements, however solemn, made with those whom it condemns? It is, I believe, a maxim in the Romish church, that "no faith is to be held with heretics." The general council of Constance decided thus, when, notwithstanding the emperor's passport, it decreed John Hus and Jerome of Prague to be burnt. The Roman pontiff has, it is well known, the right of relieving his sectaries from their oaths; of annulling their vows: this same pontiff has frequently arrogated to himself the right of deposing kings; of absolving their subjects from their oaths of fidelity. Indeed, it is rather extraordinary that oaths should be prescribed, by the laws of those nations which profess Christianity, seeing that Christ has expressly forbidden the use of them. If things were considered attentively, it would be obvious that under such management, superstition and politics are schools of perjury. They render it common: thus knaves of every description never recoil, when it is necessary to attest the name of the Divinity to the most manifest frauds, for the vilest interests. What end, then, do oaths answer? They are snares, in which simplicity alone can suffer itself to be caught: oaths, almost every where, are vain formalities, that impose nothing upon villains; nor do they add any thing to the sacredness of the engagements of honest men; who would neither have the temerity nor the wish to violate them; who would not think themselves less bound without an oath. A perfidious, perjured, superstitious being, has not any advantage over an atheist, who should fail in his promises: neither the one nor the other any longer deserves the confidence of their fellow citizens nor the esteem of good men; if one does not respect his gods, in whom he believes, the other neither respects his reason, his reputation, nor public opinion, in which all rational men cannot refuse to believe. Hobbes says, "an oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the oath, as much as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all: though it be confirmed with an oath." The heathen form was, "let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast." Adjuration only augments, in the imagination of him who swears, the fear of violating an engagement, which he would have been obliged to keep, even without the ceremony of an oath.

II.13.8

On a souvent demandé s’il y avoit une nation qui n’eût aucune idée de la divinité, & si un peuple uniquement composé d’athées pourroit subsister ? Quoique puissent en dire quelques spéculateurs, il ne paroit pas vraisemblable qu’il y ait sur notre globe un peuple nombreux qui n’ait aucune idée de quelque puissance invisible à qui il donne des marques de respect & de soumission8. L’homme, en tant qu’il est un animal craintif & ignorant, devient nécessairement superstitieux dans ses malheurs : ou il se fait un dieu pour lui-même, ou il admet le dieu que d’autres veulent lui donner. Il ne paroit donc pas que l’on puisse raisonnablement supposer qu’il y ait un peuple sur la terre totalement étranger à la notion de quelque divinité. L’un nous montrera le soleil ou la lune & les étoiles ; l’autre nous montrera la mer, des lacs, des rivières qui lui fournissent sa subsistance ; des arbres qui lui donnent un asyle contre l’inclémence de l’air ; un autre nous montrera une roche d’une forme bizarre, une montagne élevée, un volcan qui souvent l’étonne ; un autre vous présentera son crocodile dont il craint la malignité, son serpent dangereux, le reptile auquel il attribue sa bonne ou sa mauvaise fortune. Enfin chaque homme vous fera voir avec respect son fétiche ou son Dieu domestique & tutélaire.

Mais de l’existence de ses dieux, le sauvage n’en tire pas les mêmes inductions que l’homme policé ; un peuple sauvage ne croit pas devoir beaucoup raisonner de ses divinités ; il n’imagine pas qu’elles doivent influer sur ses mœurs ni fortement occuper sa pensée : content d’un culte grossier, simple, extérieur il ne croit pas que ces puissances invisibles s’embarassent de sa conduite à l’égard de ses semblables ; en un mot il ne lie pas sa morale à sa religion. Cette morale est grossière, comme le peut être celle de tout peuple ignorant ; elle est proportionnée à ses besoins, qui sont en petit nombre ; elle est souvent déraisonnable, parce qu’elle est le fruit de l’ignorance, de l’inexpérience & des passions peu contraintes d’hommes pour ainsi dire, dans l’enfance. Ce n’est que dans une société nombreuse, fixée & civilisée que les besoins, venant à se multiplier & les intérêts à se croiser, l’on est obligé de recourir à des gouvernemens, à des loix, à des cultes publics, à des systêmes uniformes de religion, pour maintenir la concorde : c’est alors que les hommes rapprochés raisonnent, combinent leurs idées, raffinent & subtilisent leurs notions : c’est alors que ceux qui les gouvernent se servent de la crainte des puissances invisibles pour les contenir, pour les rendre dociles, pour les forcer d’obéir & de vivre en paix. C’est ainsi que peu-à-peu la morale & la politique se trouvent liées au systême religieux. Les chefs des nations, souvent superstitieux eux-mêmes, peu éclairés sur leurs propres intérêts, peu versés dans la saine morale, peu instruits des vrais mobiles du cœur humain, croient avoir tout fait pour leur propre autorité ainsi que pour le bien être & le repos de la société, en rendant leurs sujets superstitieux, en les menaçant de leurs phantômes invisibles, en les traitant comme des enfans que l’on appaise par des fables & des chimeres. à l’aide de ces merveilleuses inventions dont les chefs & les guides des nations sont souvent eux-mêmes les dupes & qui se transmettent d’une race à l’autre, les souverains sont dispensés de s’instruire, ils négligent les loix, ils s’énervent dans la mollesse, ils ne suivent que leurs caprices, ils se reposent sur les dieux du soin de contenir leurs sujets ; ils confient l’instruction des peuples à des prêtres, chargés de les rendre bien soumis & dévôts & de leur apprendre de bonne heure à trembler sous le joug des dieux invisibles & visibles.

It has frequently been asked, if there ever was a nation that had no idea of the Divinity: and if a people, uniformly composed of atheists, would be able to subsist? Whatever some speculators may say, it does not appear likely that there ever has been upon our globe, a numerous people who have not had an idea of some invisible power, to whom they have shewn marks of respect and submission: it has been sometimes believed that the Chinese were atheists: but this is an error, due to the Christian missionaries, who are accustomed to treat all those as atheists, who do not hold opinions similar with their own upon Divinity. It always appears that the Chinese are a people extremely addicted to superstition, but that they are governed by chiefs who are not so, without however their being atheists for that reason. If the empire of China be as flourishing as it is said to be, it at least furnishes a very forcible proof that those who govern have no occasion to be themselves superstitious, in order to govern with propriety a people who are so. It is pretended that the Greenlanders have no idea of the Divinity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe it of a nation so savage. Man, inasmuch as he is a fearful, ignorant animal, necessarily becomes superstitious in his misfortunes: either he forms gods for himself, or he admits the gods which others are disposed to give him; it does not then appear, that we can rationally suppose there may have been, or that there actually is, a people on the earth a total stranger to some Divinity. One will shew us the sun, the moon, or the stars; the other will shew us the sea, the lakes, the rivers, which furnish him his subsistence, the trees which afford him an asylum against the inclemency of the weather; another will shew us a rock of an odd form; a lofty mountain; or a volcano that frequently astonishes him by its emission of lava; another will present you with his crocodile, whose malignity he fears; his dangerous serpent, the reptile to which he attributes his good or bad fortune. In short, each individual will make you behold his phantasm or his tutelary or domestic gods with respect.

But from the existence of his gods, the savage does not draw the same inductions as the civilized, polished man: the savage does not believe it a duty to reason continually upon their qualities; he does not imagine that they ought to influence his morals, nor entirely occupy his thoughts: content with a gross, simple, exterior worship, he does not believe that these invisible powers trouble themselves with his conduct towards his fellow creatures; in short, he does not connect his morality with his superstition. This morality is coarse, as must be that of all ignorant people; it is proportioned to his wants, which are few; it is frequently irrational, because it is the fruit of ignorance; of inexperience; of the passions of men but slightly restrained, or to say thus, in their infancy. It is only numerous, stationary, civilized societies, where man's wants are multiplied, where his interests clash, that he is obliged to have recourse to government, to laws, to public worship, in order to maintain concord. It is then, that men approximating, reason together, combine their ideas, refine their notions, subtilize their theories; it is then also, that those who govern them avail themselves of invisible powers, to keep them within bounds, to render them docile, to enforce their obedience, to oblige them to live peaceably. It was thus, that by degrees, morals and politics found themselves associated with superstitious systems. The chiefs of nations, frequently, themselves, the children of superstition, but little enlightened upon their actual interests; slenderly versed in sound morality; with an extreme exilty of knowledge on the actuating motives of the human heart; believed they had effected every thing requisite for the stability of their own authority; as well as achieved all that could guarantee the repose of society, that could consolidate the happiness of the people, in rendering their subjects superstitious like themselves; by menacing them with the wrath of invisible powers; in treating them like infants who are appeased with fables, like children who are terrified by shadows. By the assistance of these marvellous inventions, to which even the chiefs, the conductors of nations, are themselves frequently the dupes; which are transmitted as heirlooms from race to race; sovereigns were dispensed from the trouble of instructing themselves in their duties; they in consequence neglected the laws, enervated themselves in luxurious ease, rusted in sloth; followed nothing but their caprice: the care of restraining their subjects was reposed in their deities; the instruction of the people was confided to their priests, who were commissioned to train them to obedience, to make them submissive, to render them devout, to teach them at an early age to tremble under the yoke of both the visible and invisible gods.

II.13.9

C’est ainsi que les nations sont tenues par leurs tuteurs dans une enfance perpétuelle & ne sont contenues que par de vaines chimeres. C’est ainsi que la politique, la jurisprudence, l’éducation, la morale sont par tout infectées par la superstition. C’est ainsi que les hommes ne connoissent plus de devoirs que ceux de la religion ; c’est ainsi que l’idée de la vertu s’associe faussement avec celle des puissances imaginaires que l’imposture fait parler comme elle veut ; c’est ainsi que la morale devient incertaine & flottante ; c’est ainsi qu’on persuade aux hommes que sans dieu il n’existe plus de morale pour eux. C’est ainsi que les princes & les sujets également aveuglés sur leurs intérêts véritables, sur les devoirs de la nature, sur leurs droits réciproques, se sont habitués à regarder la religion comme nécessaire aux mœurs, comme indispensable pour gouverner les hommes, comme le moyen le plus sûr de parvenir à la puissance & au bonheur.

C’est sur ces suppositions, dont nous avons si souvent démontré la fausseté, que tant de personnes, très éclairées d’ailleurs, regardent comme impossible qu’une société d’athées pût longtems subsister. Il n’est point douteux qu’une société nombreuse qui n’auroit ni religion, ni morale, ni gouvernement, ni loix, ni éducation, ni principes ne pourroit se maintenir, & qu’elle ne feroit que rapprocher des êtres disposés à se nuire, ou des enfans qui suivroient en aveugles les impulsions les plus fâcheuses ; mais avec toute la religion du monde, les sociétés humaines ne sont-elles pas à-peu-près dans cet état ? Presque en tout pays les souverains ne sont-ils pas dans une guerre continuelle avec leurs sujets ? Ces sujets, en dépit de la religion & des notions terribles qu’elle leur donne de la divinité, ne sont-ils pas sans cesse occupés à se nuire réciproquement & à se rendre malheureux ? La religion elle-même & ses notions surnaturelles ne servent-elles pas sans cesse à flatter les passions & la vanité des souverains, & à attiser les feux de la discorde entre les citoyens divisés d’opinions ? Ces puissances infernales, que l’on suppose occupées du soin de nuire au genre-humain seroient-elles capables de produire de plus grands maux sur la terre que le fanatisme & les fureurs enfantées par la théologie ? En un mot des athées, rassemblés en société, quelque insensés qu’on les suppose, se conduiroient-ils entre eux d’une façon plus criminelle que ces superstitieux remplis de vices réels & de chimeres extravagantes, qui ne font depuis tant de siécles que se détruire & s’égorger sans raison & sans pitié ? On ne peut le prétendre ; au contraire on ose avancer très hardiment qu’une société d’athées privée de toute religion, gouvernée par de bonnes loix, formée par une bonne éducation, invitée à la vertu par des récompenses, détournée du crime par des châtimens équitables, dégagée d’illusions, de mensonges & de chimeres, seroit infiniment plus honnête & plus vertueuse que ces sociétés religieuses où tout conspire à enivrer l’esprit & à corrompre le cœur.

It was thus that nations, kept by their tutors in a perpetual state of infancy, were only restrained by vain, chimerical theories. It was thus that politics, jurisprudence, education, morality, were almost every where infected with superstition; that man no longer knew any duties, save those which grew out of its precepts: the ideas of virtue were thus falsely associated with those of imaginary systems, to which imposture generally gave that language which was most conducive to its own immediate interests: mankind thus fully persuaded, that without these marvellous systems, there could not exist any sound morality, princes, as well as subjects, equally blind to their actual interests, to the duties of nature, to their reciprocal rights, habituated themselves to consider superstition as necessary to mortals—as indispensibly requisite to govern men—as the most effectual method of preserving power—as the most certain means of attaining happiness.

It is from these dispositions, of which we have so frequently demonstrated the fallacy, that so many persons, otherwise extremely enlightened, look upon it as an impossibility that a society formed of atheists, as they are termed, could subsist for any length of time. It does not admit a question, that a numerous society, who should neither have religion, morality, government, laws, education, nor principles, could not maintain itself; that it would simply congregate beings disposed to injure each other, or children who would follow nothing but the blindest impulse; but then is it not a lamentable fact, that with all the superstition that floats in the world, the greater number of human societies are nearly in this state? Are not the sovereigns of almost every country in a continual state of warfare with their subjects? Are not the people, in despite of their superstition, not withstanding the terrific notions which it holds forth, unceasingly occupied with reciprocally injuring each other; with rendering themselves mutually unhappy? Does not superstition itself, with its supernatural notions, unremittingly flatter the vanity of monarchs, unbridle the passions of princes, throw oil into the fire of discord, which it kindles between those citizens who are divided in their opinion? Could those infernal powers, who are supposed to be ever on the alert to mischief mankind, be capable of inflicting greater evils upon the human race than spring from fanaticism, than arise out of the fury to which theology gives birth? Could atheists, however irrational they may be supposed, if assembled together in society, conduct themselves in a more criminal manner? In short, is it possible they could act worse than the superstitious, who, saturated with the most pernicious vices, guided by the most extravagant systems, during so many successive ages, have done nothing more than torment themselves with the most cruel inflictions; savagely cut each other's throats, without a shadow of reason; make a merit of mutual extermination? It cannot be pretended they would. On the contrary, we boldly assert, that a community of atheists, as the theologian calls them, because they cannot fall in with his mysteries, destitute of all superstition, governed by wholesome laws, formed by a salutary education, invited to the practice of virtue by instantaneous recompences, deterred from crime by immediate punishments, disentangled from illusive theories, unsophisticated by falsehood, would be decidedly more honest, incalculably more virtuous, than those superstitious societies, in which every thing contributes to intoxicate the mind; where every thing conspires to corrupt the heart.

II.13.10

Quand on voudra s’occuper utilement du bonheur des hommes c’est par les dieux du ciel que la réforme doit commencer ; c’est en faisant abstraction de ces êtres imaginaires, destinés à effrayer des peuples ignorans & dans l’enfance, que l’on pourra se promettre de conduire l’homme à sa maturité. On ne peut trop le répéter ; nulle morale sans consulter la nature de l’homme & ses vrais rapports avec les êtres de son espèce. Nuls principes fixes pour la conduite en la réglant sur des dieux injustes, capricieux, méchans. Nulle saine politique, sans consulter la nature de l’homme vivant en société pour satisfaire ses besoins & assûrer son bonheur & ses jouissances. Nul bon gouvernement ne peut se fonder sur un dieu despotique, il fera toujours des tyrans de ses représentans. Nulles loix ne seront bonnes sans consulter la nature & le but de la société. Nulle jurisprudence ne peut être avantageuse pour les nations, si elle se règle sur les caprices & les passions des tyrans divinisés. Nulle éducation ne sera raisonnable, si elle ne se fonde sur la raison & non sur des chimeres & des préjugés. Enfin nulle vertu, nulle probité, nuls talens sous des maîtres corrompus, & sous la conduite de ces prêtres, qui rendent les hommes ennemis d’eux-mêmes & des autres, & qui cherchent à étouffer en eux les germes de la raison, de la science & du courage.

On demandera peut-être si l’on pourroit raisonnablement se flatter de jamais parvenir à faire oublier à tout un peuple ses opinions religieuses ou les idées qu’il a de la divinité ? Je réponds que la chose paroit entiérement impossible, & que ce n’est pas le but que l’on puisse se proposer. L’idée d’un dieu, inculquée dès l’enfance la plus tendre, ne paroît pas de nature à pouvoir se déraciner de l’esprit du plus grand nombre des hommes : il seroit peut-être aussi difficile de la donner à des personnes qui, parvenues à un certain âge n’en auroient jamais entendu parler, que de la bannir de la tête de ceux qui depuis l’ âge le plus tendre en ont été imbus. Ainsi l’on ne peut supposer que l’on puisse faire passer une nation entière de l’abîme de la superstition, c’est-à-dire du sein de l’ignorance & du délire, à l’athéisme absolu, qui suppose de la réflexion, de l’étude, des connoissances, une longue chaîne d’expériences, l’habitude de contempler la nature, la science des vraies causes de ses phénomènes divers, de ses combinaisons, de ses loix, des êtres qui la composent & de leurs différentes propriétés. Pour être athée, ou pour s’assûrer des forces de la nature, il faut l’avoir méditée ; un coup d’œil superficiel ne la fera point connoitre ; des yeux peu exercés s’y tromperont sans cesse ; l’ignorance des vraies causes en fera supposer d’imaginaires ; & l’ignorance ainsi ramenera le physicien lui-même aux pieds d’un phantôme, dans lequel ses vues bornées ou sa paresse croiront trouver la solution de toutes les difficultés.

When we shall be disposed usefully to occupy ourselves with the happiness of mankind, it is with superstition that the reform must commence; it is by abstracting these imaginary theories, destined to affright the ignorant, who are completely in a state of infancy, that we shall be able to promise ourselves the desirable harvest of conducting man to a state of maturity. It cannot be too often repeated, there can be no morality without consulting the nature of man, without studying his actual relations with the beings of his own species; there can be no fixed principle for man's conduct, while it is regulated upon unjust theories; upon capricious doctrines; upon corrupt systems; there can be no sound politics without attending to human temperament, without contemplating him as a being associated for the purpose of satisfying his wants, consolidating his happiness, and assuring its enjoyment. No wise government can found itself upon despotic systems; they will always make tyrants of their representatives. No laws can be wholesome, that do not bottom themselves upon the strictest equity; which have not for their object the great end of human society. No jurisprudence can be advantageous for nations, if its administration be regulated by capricious systems, or by human passions deified. No education can be salutary, unless it be founded upon reason; to be efficacious to its proposed end, it must neither be construed upon chimerical theories, nor upon received prejudices. In short, there can be no probity, no talents, no virtue, either under corrupt masters, or under the conduct of those priests who render man the enemy to himself—the determined foe to others; who seek to stifle in his bosom the germ of reason; who endeavour to smother science, or who try to damp his courage.

It will, perhaps, be asked, if we can reasonably flatter ourselves with ever reaching the point to make a whole people entirely forget their superstitious opinions; or abandon the ideas which they have of their gods? I reply, that the thing appears utterly impossible; that this is not the end we can propose to ourselves. These ideas, inculcated from the earliest ages, do not appear of a nature to admit eradication from the mind of the majority of mankind: it would, perhaps be equally arduous to give them to those persons, who, arrived at a certain time of life, should never have heard them spoken of, as to banish them from the minds of those, who have been imbued with them from their tenderest infancy. Thus, it cannot be reckoned possible to make a whole nation pass from the abyss of superstition, that is to say, from the bosom of ignorance, from the ravings of delirium, into absolute naturalism, or as the priests of superstition would denominate it, into atheism; which supposes reflection—requires intense study—demands extensive knowledge—exacts a long series of experience—includes the habit of contemplating nature—the faculty of observing her laws; which, in short, embraces the expansive science of the causes producing her various phenomena; her multiplied combinations, together with the diversified actions of the beings she contains, as well as their numerous properties. In order to be an atheist, or to be assured of the capabilities of nature, it is imperative to have meditated her profoundly: a superficial glance of the eye will not bring man acquainted with her resources; optics but little practised on her powers, will unceasingly be deceived; the ignorance of actual causes will always induce the supposition of those which are imaginary; credulity will, thus re-conduct the natural philosopher himself to the feet of superstitious phantoms, in which either his limited vision, or his habitual sloth, will make him believe he shall find the solution to every difficulty.

II.13.11

L’athéisme, ainsi que la philosophie & toutes les sciences profondes & abstraites, n’est donc point fait pour le vulgaire, ni même pour le plus grand nombre des hommes. Il est dans toutes les nations nombreuses & civilisées des personnes que leurs circonstances mettent à portée de méditer, de faire des recherches & des découvertes utiles, qui finissent tôt ou tard par s’étendre & fructifier, quand elles ont été jugées avantageuses & vraies. Le géometre, le méchanicien, le chimiste, le médecin, le jurisconsulte, l’artisan même travaillent dans leurs cabinets ou dans leurs atteliers à chercher des moyens de servir la société chacun dans sa sphêre ; cependant aucune des sciences ou professions dont ils s’occupent ne sont connues du vulgaire, qui ne laisse pas d’en profiter & de recueillir à la longue les fruits de travaux dont il n’a pas d’idées. C’est pour le matelot que l’astronome travaille ; c’est pour lui que le géometre & le méchanicien calculent ; c’est pour le maçon & le manœuvre que l’architecte habile trace de savans desseins. Quelle que soit l’utilité prétendue des opinions religieuses, le théologien profond & subtil ne peut se vanter de travailler, d’écrire, de disputer pour l’avantage du peuple à qui l’on fait pourtant payer si chérement des systêmes & des mystères qu’il n’entendra jamais, & qui ne pourront dans aucun tems être d’aucune utilité pour lui.

Ce n’est donc pas pour le commun des hommes que le philosophe doit se proposer d’écrire ou de méditer. Les principes de l’athéisme ou le systême de la nature ne sont pas même faits, comme on l’a fait sentir, pour un grand nombre de personnes très éclairées sur d’autres points, mais souvent trop prévenues en faveur des préjugés universels. Il est très rare de trouver des hommes, qui à beaucoup d’esprit, de connoissances & de talens joignent ou une imagination bien réglée, ou le courage nécessaire pour combattre avec succès des chimeres habituelles dont leur cerveau s’est longtems pénétré. Une pente secrète & invincible raméne souvent, en dépit du raisonnement, les esprits les plus solides & les mieux raffermis aux préjugés qu’ils voient généralement établis, & dont eux-mêmes se sont abbreuvés dès la plus tendre enfance. Cependant peu-à-peu des principes, qui d’abord paroissoient étranges ou révoltans, quand ils ont la vérité pour eux, s’insinuent dans les esprits, leur deviennent familiers, se répandent au loin, produisent des effets avantageux sur toute la société : avec le tems elle se familiarise avec les idées qu’elle avoit dans l’origine regardé comme absurdes & déraisonnables ; du moins on cesse de regarder comme odieux ceux qui professent des opinions, sur lesquelles l’expérience fait voir qu’il est permis d’avoir des doutes sans danger pour le public.

Atheism, then, as well as philosophy, like all profound abstruse sciences, is not calculated for the vulgar; neither is it suitable to the great mass of mankind. There are, in all populous, civilized nations, persons whose circumstances enable them to devote their time to meditation, whose easy finances afford them leisure to make deep researches into the nature of things, who frequently make useful discoveries, which, sooner or later, after they have been submitted to the infallible test of experience, when they have passed the fiery ordeal of truth, extend widely their salutary effects, become extremely beneficial to society, highly advantageous to individuals. The geometrician, the chemist, the mechanic, the natural philosopher, the civilian, the artizan himself, are industriously employed, either in their closets, or in their workshops, seeking the means to serve society, each in his sphere: nevertheless, not one of their sciences or professions are familiar to the illiterate; not one of the arts with which they are respectively occupied, are known to the uninitiated: these, however, do not fail, in the long run, to profit by them, to reap substantive advantages from those labours, of which they themselves have no idea. It is for the mariner, that the astronomer explores his arduous science; it is for him the geometrician calculates; for his use the mechanic plies his craft: it is for the mason, for the carpenter, for the labourer, that the skilful architect studies his orders, lays down well-proportioned elaborate plans. Whatever may be the pretended utility of Pneumatology, whatever may be the vaunted advantages of superstitious opinions, the wrangling polemic, the subtle theologian, cannot boast either of toiling, of writing, or of disputing for the advantage of the people, whom, notwithstanding, he contrives to tax, very exorbitantly, for those systems they can never understand; from whom he levies the most oppressive contributions, as a remuneration for the detail of those mysteries, which under any possible circumstances, cannot, at any time whatever, be of the slightest benefit to them. It is not, then, for the multitude that a philosopher should propose to himself, either to write or to meditate: the Code of Nature, or the principles of atheism, as the priest calls it, are not, as we have shewn, even calculated for the meridian of a great number of persons, who are frequently too much prepossessed in favour of the received prejudices, although extremely enlightened on other points. It is extremely rare to find men, who, to an enlarged mind, extensive knowledge, great talents, join either a well regulated imagination, or the courage necessary to successfully oppugn habitual errors; triumphantly to attack those chimerical systems, with which the brain has been inoculated from the first hour of its birth. A secret bias, an invincible inclination, frequently, in despite of all reasoning, re-conducts the most comprehensive, the best fortified, the most liberal minds, to those prejudices which have a wide-spreading establishment; of which they have themselves taken copious draughts during the early stages of life. Nevertheless, those principles, which at first appear strange, which by their boldness seem revolting, from which timidity flies with trepidation, when they have the sanction of truth, gradually insinuate themselves into the human mind, become familiar to its exercise, extend their happy influence on every side, and finally produce the most substantive advantages to society. In time, men habituate themselves to ideas which originally they looked upon as absurd; which on a superficial glance they contemplated as either noxious or irrational: at least, they cease to consider those as odious, who profess opinions upon subjects on which experience makes it evident they may be permitted to have doubts, without imminent danger to public tranquillity.

II.13.12

L’on ne doit donc pas craindre de répandre des idées parmi les hommes. Sont-elles utiles ; elles fructifient peu-à-peu. Tout homme qui écrit ne doit point fixer ses yeux sur le tems où il vit ni sur ses concitoyens actuels, ni sur la contrée qu’il habite. Il doit parler au genre-humain, il doit prévoir les races futures ; envain attendroit-il les applaudissemens de ses contemporains ; envain se flatteroit-il de voir ses principes précoces reçus avec bienveillance, par des esprits prévenus ; s’il a dit vrai les siècles à venir rendront justice à ses efforts ; en attendant qu’il se contente de l’idée d’avoir bien fait, ou des suffrages secrets des amis de la vérité peu nombreux sur la terre. C’est après sa mort que l’écrivain véridique triomphe ; c’est alors que les aiguillons de la haîne & les traits de l’envie épuisés ou émoussés font place à la vérité, qui étant éternelle, doit survivre à toutes les erreurs de la terre. 9.

D’ailleurs nous dirons avec Hobbes. "Que l’on ne peut faire aucun mal aux hommes en leur proposant ses idées ; le pis aller est de les laisser dans le doute & la dispute ; n’y sont-ils pas déjà ? " si un auteur qui écrit s’est trompé, c’est qu’il a pu mal raisonner. A-t-il posé de faux principes ? Il s’agit de les examiner. Son systême est-il faux & ridicule ? Il ne servira qu’à faire paroitre la vérité dans tout son jour ; son ouvrage tombera dans le mépris ; & l’écrivain, s’il est témoin de sa chûte, sera suffisamment puni de sa témérité ; s’il est mort, les vivans ne pourront troubler sa cendre. Nul homme n’écrit dans le dessein de nuire à ses semblables, il se propose toujours de mériter leurs suffrages, soit en les amusant, soit en piquant leur curiosité, soit en leur communiquant des découvertes qu’il croit utiles. Nul ouvrage ne peut être dangereux, sur-tout s’il contient des vérités. Il ne le seroit pas même s’il contenoit des principes évidemment contraires à l’expérience & au bon sens. Que résulteroit-il en effet d’un ouvrage qui nous diroit aujourd’hui que le soleil n’est point lumineux, que le parricide est légitime, que le vol est permis, que l’adultère n’est point un crime ? La moindre réflexion nous feroit sentir le faux de ces principes, & la race humaine toute entière réclameroit contre eux. On riroit de la folie de l’auteur, & bientôt son livre & son nom ne seroient connus que par leurs extravagances ridicules. Il n’y a que les folies religieuses qui soient pernicieuses aux mortels ; & pourquoi ? C’est que toujours l’autorité prétend les établir par violence, les faire passer pour des vérités, & punir avec rigueur ceux qui voudroient en rire ou les examiner. Si les hommes étoient plus raisonnables, ils regarderoient les opinions religieuses & les systêmes de la théologie des mêmes yeux que les systêmes de physique ou les problêmes de géométrie : ceux-ci ne troublent jamais le repos des sociétés, quoi qu’ils excitent quelquefois des disputes très vives entre quelques sçavans. Les querelles théologiques ne tireroient jamais à conséquence, si l’on parvenoit à faire sentir à ceux qui ont le pouvoir en main qu’ils ne doivent avoir que de l’indifférence & du mépris pour les disputes de personnages qui n’entendent point eux-mêmes les questions merveilleuses sur lesquelles ils ne cessent de disputer.

Then the diffusion of ideas among mankind is not an event to be dreaded: if they are truths, they will of necessity be useful: by degrees they will fructify. The man who writes, must neither fix his eyes upon the time in which he lives, upon his actual fellow citizens, nor upon the country he inhabits. He must speak to the human race; he must instruct future generations; he must extend his views into the bosom of futurity; in vain he will expect the eulogies of his contemporaries; in vain will he flatter himself with seeing his reasoning adopted; in vain he will soothe himself with the pleasing reflection, that his precocious principles will be received with kindness; if he has exhibited truisms, the ages that shall follow will do justice to his efforts; unborn nations shall applaud his exertions; his future countrymen shall crown his sturdy attempts with those laurels, which interested prejudice withholds from him in his own days; it must therefore be from posterity, he is to expect the need of applause due to his services; the present race is hermetically sealed against him: meantime let him content himself with having done well; with the secret suffrages of those few friends to veracity who are so thinly spread over the surface of the earth. It is after his death, that the trusty reasoner, the faithful writer, the promulgator of sterling principles, the child of simplicity, triumphs; it is then that the stings of hatred, the shafts of envy, the arrows of malice, either exhausted or blunted, enable mankind to judge with impartiality; to yield to conviction; to establish eternal truth upon its own imperishable altars, which from its essence must survive all the error of the earth. It is then that calumny, crushed like the devouring snail by the careful gardener, ceases to besmear the character of an honest man, while its venomous slime, glazed by the sun, enables the observant spectator to trace the filthy progress it had made.

It is a problem with many people, if truth may not be injurious? The best intentioned persons are frequently in great doubt upon this important point. The fact is, it never injures any but those who deceive mankind: this has, however, the greatest interest in being undeceived. Truth may be injurious to the individual who announces it, but it can never by any possibility harm the human species; never can it be too distinctly presented to beings, always either little disposed to listen to its dictates, or too slothful to comprehend its efficacy. If all those who write to publish important truths, which, of all others, are ever considered the most dangerous, were sufficiently ardent for the public welfare to speak freely, even at the risk of displeasing their readers, the human race would be much more enlightened, much happier than it now is. To write in ambiguous terms, is very frequently to write to nobody. The human mind is idle; we must spare it, as much as possible, the trouble of reflection; we must relieve it from the embarrassment of intense thinking. What time does it not consume, what study does it not require, at the present day, to unravel the amphibological oracles of the ancient philosophers, whose actual sentiments are almost entirely lost to the present race of men? If truth be useful to human beings, it is an injustice to deprive them of its advantages; if truth ought to be admitted, we must admit its consequences, which are also truths. Man, taken generally, is fond of truth, but its consequences often inspire him with so much dread, so alarm his imbecility, that, frequently, he prefers remaining in error, of which a confirmed habit prevents him from feeling the deplorable effects. Besides, we shall say with Hobbes, "that we cannot do men any harm by proposing truth to them; the worst mode is to leave them in doubt, to let them remain in dispute." If an author who writes be deceived, it is because he may have reasoned badly. Has he laid down false principles? It remains to examine them. Is his system fallacious? Is it ridiculous? It will serve to make truth appear with the greatest splendor: his work will fall into contempt; the writer, if he be witness to its fall, will be sufficiently punished for his temerity; if he be defunct, the living cannot disturb his ashes. No man writes with a design to injure his fellow creatures; he always proposes to himself to merit their suffrages, either by amusing them, by exciting their curiosity, or by communicating to them discoveries, which he believes useful. Above all, no work can be really dangerous, if it contains truth. It would not be so, even if it contained principles evidently contrary to experience—opposed to good sense. Indeed, what would result from a work that should now tell us the sun is not luminous; that parricide is legitimate; that robbery is allowable; that adultery is not a crime? The smallest reflection would make us feet the falsity of these principles; the whole human race would protest against them. Men would laugh at the folly of the author; presently his book, together with his name, would be known only by its ridiculous extravagancies. There is nothing but superstitious follies that are pernicious to mortals; and wherefore? It is because authority always pretends to establish them by violence; to make them pass for substantive virtues; rigorously punishes those who shall be disposed to smile at their inconsistency, or examine into their pretensions. If man was more rational, he would examine superstitious opinions as he examines every thing else; he would look upon theological theories with the same eyes that he contemplates systems of natural philosophy, or problems in geometry: the latter never disturbs the repose of society, although they sometimes excite very warm disputes in the learned world. Theological quarrels would never be attended with any evil consequences, if man could gain the desirable point of making those who exercise power, feel that the disputes of persons, who do not themselves understand the marvellous questions upon which they never cease wrangling, ought not to give birth to any other sensations than those of indifference; to rouse no other passion than that of contempt.

II.13.13

C’est du moins cette indifférence si juste, si raisonnable, si avantageuse aux états que la saine philosophie peut se proposer d’introduire peu à peu sur la terre. Le genre humain ne seroit-il pas plus heureux, si les souverains du monde, occupés du bien-être de leurs sujets, laissoient à la superstition ses démêlés futiles, soumettoient la religion à la politique, forçoient ses ministres altiers à devenir des citoyens, & empêchoient soigneusement leurs querelles d’intéresser la tranquillité publique ? Quels avantages pour les sciences, pour les progrès de l’esprit humain, pour la perfection de la morale, de la jurisprudence, de la législation, de l’éducation ne résulteroient pas de la liberté de penser ? Aujourd’hui le génie trouve partout des entraves ; la religion s’oppose continuellement à sa marche, l’homme entouré de bandelettes ne jouit d’aucunes de ses facultés, son esprit même est à la gêne, & paroit continuellement enveloppé des langes de l’enfance. Le pouvoir civil, ligué avec le pouvoir spirituel, ne semble vouloir commander qu’à des esclaves abrutis, confinés dans un cachot obscur, où ils se font sentir réciproquement les effets de leur mauvaise humeur. Les souverains détestent la liberté de penser, parce qu’ils craignent la vérité ; cette vérité leur paroit redoutable, parce qu’elle condamneroit leurs excès ; ces excès leur sont chers parce qu’ils ne connoissent pas plus que leurs sujets leurs véritables intérêts qui devroient se confondre.

Que le courage du philosophe ne se laisse point abbattre par tant d’obstacles réunis, qui semblent exclure pour jamais la vérité de son domaine ; la raison, de l’esprit des hommes ; la nature, de ses droits. La millieme partie des soins que l’on a pris de tout tems pour infecter l’esprit humain suffiroit pour le guérir. Ne désespérons donc point de ses maux ; ne lui faisons point l’injure de croire que la vérité n’est pas faite pour lui ; son esprit la cherche sans cesse ; son cœur la desire ; son bonheur la demande à grands cris ; il ne la craint ou ne la méconnoit que parce que la religion, renversant toutes ses idées, lui tient perpétuellement le bandeau sur les yeux & s’efforce de lui rendre la vertu totalement étrangère.

It is, at least, this indifference not speculative theories, so just, so rational, so advantageous for states, that sound philosophy may propose to introduce, gradually, upon the earth. Would not the human race be much happier—if the sovereigns of the world, occupied with the welfare of their subjects, leaving to superstitious theologians their futile contests, making their various systems yield to healthy politics; obliged these haughty ministers to become citizens; carefully prevented their disputes from interrupting the public tranquillity? What advantage might there not result to science; what a start would be given to the progress of the human mind, to the cause of sound morality, to the advancement of equitable jurisprudence, to the improvement of legislation, to the diffusion of education, from an unlimited freedom of thought? At present, genius every where finds trammels; superstition invariably opposes itself to its course; man, straitened with bandages, scarcely enjoys the free use of any one of his faculties; his mind itself is cramped; it appears continually wrapped up in the swaddling clothes of infancy. The civil power, leagued with spiritual domination, appears only disposed to rule over brutalized slaves, shut up in a dark prison, where they reciprocally goad each other with the efferverscence of their mutual ill humour. Sovereigns, in general, detest liberty of thought, because they fear truth; this appears formidable to them, because it would condemn their excesses; these irregularities are dear to them, because they do not, better than their subjects, understand their true interests; properly considered, these ought to blend themselves into one uniform mass.

Let not the courage of the philosopher, however, be abated by so many united obstacles, which would appear for ever to exclude truth from its proper dominion; to banish reason from the mind of man; to spoil nature of her imprescriptible rights. The thousandth part of those cares which are bestowed to infect the human mind, would be amply sufficient to make it whole. Let us not, then, despair of the case: do not let us do man the injury to believe that truth is not made for him; his mind seeks after it incessantly; his heart desires it faithfully; his happiness demands it with an imperious voice; he only either fears it, or mistakes it, because superstition, which has thrown all his ideas into confusion, perpetually keeps the bandeau of delusion fast bound over his eyes; strives, with an almost irresistible force, to render him an entire stranger to virtue.

II.13.14

Malgré les soins prodigieux que l’on prend pour écarter la vérité, la raison, la science de la demeure des mortels ; le tems, aidé des lumières progressives des siècles, peut un jour éclairer ces princes mêmes que nous voyons si déchaînés contre la vérité, si ennemis de la justice & de la liberté des hommes. Le destin conduira peut-être au trône des souverains instruits, équitables, courageux, bienfaisans, qui reconnoissant la vraie source des misères humaines, tenteront de leur appliquer les remèdes que la sagesse leur fournira : peut-être sentiront-ils que ces dieux dont ils prétendent emprunter leur pouvoir sont les vrais fléaux de leurs peuples ; que les ministres de ces dieux sont leurs ennemis & leurs propres rivaux ; que la religion, qu’ils regardoient comme l’appui de leur pouvoir, ne fait que l’affoiblir & l’ébranler ; que la morale superstitieuse est fausse & ne sert qu’à pervertir leurs sujets & leur donner les vices des esclaves, au lieu des vertus du citoyen ; en un mot ils verront dans les erreurs religieuses la source féconde des malheurs du genre humain ; ils sentiront qu’elles sont incompatibles avec toute administration équitable.

En attendant cet instant desirable pour l’humanité, les principes du Naturalisme ne seront adoptés que par un petit nombre de penseurs ; ils ne peuvent se flatter d’avoir beaucoup d’approbateurs ou de prosélytes ; au contraire ils trouveront des adversaires ardens, ou même des contempteurs dans les personnes qui, sur tout autre objet, montrent le plus d’esprit & de lumières. Les hommes qui ont le plus de talens, comme nous l’avons déja fait observer, ne peuvent se résoudre à faire un divorce complet avec leurs idées religieuses ; l’imagination, si nécessaire aux talens brillans, est souvent en eux un obstacle insurmontable à la ruine totale des préjugés ; elle dépend beaucoup plus du jugement que de l’esprit. à cette disposition, déja si prompte à leur faire illusion, se joint encore la force de l’habitude ; pour bien des gens, leur ôter les idées de Dieu, ce seroit leur arracher une portion d’eux-mêmes, les priver d’un aliment habituel, les plonger dans le vuide, forcer leur esprit inquiet à périr faute d’exercice10.

Maugre the prodigious exertions that are made to drive truth from the earth; in spite of the extraordinary pains used to exile reason—of the uninterrupted efforts to expel true science from the residence of mortals; time, assisted by the progressive knowledge of ages, may one day be able to enlighten even those princes who are the most outrageous in their opposition to the illumination of the human mind; who appear such decided enemies to justice, so very determined against the liberties of mankind. Destiny will, perhaps, when least expected, conduct these wandering outcasts to the throne of some enlightened, equitable, courageous, generous, benevolent sovereign, who, smitten with the charms of virtue, shall throw aside duplicity, frankly acknowledge the true source of human misery, and apply to it those remedies with which wisdom has furnished him: perhaps he may feel, that those systems, from whence it is pretended he derives his power, are the true scourges of his people; the actual cause of his own weakness: that the official expounders of these systems are his most substantial enemies—his most formidable rivals; he may find that superstition, which he has been taught to look upon as the main support to his authority, in point of fact only enfeebles it—renders it tottering: that superstitious morality, false in its principles, is only calculated to pervert his subjects; to break down their intrepidity; to render them perfidious; in short, to give them the vices of slaves, in lieu of the virtues of citizens. A prince thus disentangled from prejudice, will perhaps behold, in superstitious errors, the fruitful source of human sorrows, and commiserations, the condition of his race, it may be, will generously declare, that they are incompatible with every equitable administration.

Until this epoch, so desirable for humanity, shall arrive, the principles of naturalism will be adopted only by a small number of liberal-minded men, who shall dive below the surface; these cannot flatter themselves either with making proselytes, or having a great number of approvers: on the contrary, they will meet with zealous adversaries, with ardent contemners, even in those persons who upon every other subject discover the most acute minds; display the most consummate knowledge. Those men who possess the greatest share of ability, as we have already observed, cannot always resolve to divorce themselves completely from their superstitious ideas; imagination, so necessary to splendid talents, frequently forms in them an insurmountable obstacle to the total extinction of prejudice; this depends much more upon the judgment than upon the mind. To this disposition, already so prompt to form illusions to them, is also to be joined the force of habit; to a great number of men, it would he wresting from them a portion of themselves to take away their superstitious notions; it would be depriving them of an accustomed aliment; plunging them into a dreadful vacuum: obliging their distempered minds to perish for want of exercise. Menage remarks, "that history speaks of very few incredulous women, or female atheists:" this is not surprising; their organization renders them fearful; their nervous system undergoes periodical variations; the education they receive disposes them to credulity. Those among them who have a sound constitution, who have a well ordered imagination, have occasion for chimeras suitable to occupy their leisure; above all, when the world abandons them, then superstitious devotion, with its attractive ceremonies, becomes either a business or an amusement.

II.13.15

Ne soyons donc point surpris si nous voyons de très grands hommes s’obstiner à fermer les yeux, ou démentir leur sagacité ordinaire toutes les fois qu’il s’agit d’un objet qu’ils n’ont point eu le courage d’examiner avec l’attention qu’ils ont prêtée à beaucoup d’autres. Le chancelier Bacon prétend que peu de philosophie dispose à l’athéïsme, mais que beaucoup de profondeur ramène à la religion. Si nous voulons analyser cette proposition nous trouverons qu’elle signifie que des penseurs très médiocres sont à portée de s’appercevoir très promptement des absurdités grossières de la religion, mais que peu accoutumés à méditer, ou dépourvus de principes sûrs qui servent à les guider, leur imagination les remet bientôt dans le labyrinthe théologique, d’où une raison trop foible sembloit vouloir les tirer. Des ames timides craignent même de se rassûrer ; des esprits accoutumés à se payer des solutions théologiques ne voient plus dans la nature qu’une énigme inexplicable, qu’un abîme impossible à sonder. Habitués à fixer leurs yeux sur un point idéal & mathématique qu’ils ont fait le centre de tout, l’univers se confond pour eux dès qu’ils le perdent de vue ; & dans le trouble où ils se trouvent ils aiment mieux revenir aux préjugés de leur enfance, qui semblent leur expliquer tout, que de flotter dans le vuide, ou de quitter le point d’appui qu’ils jugent inébranlable. Ainsi la proposition de Bacon ne semble indiquer rien, sinon que les personnes les plus habiles ne peuvent se défendre des illusions de leur imagination, dont l’impétuosité résiste aux raisonnemens les plus forts.

Cependant une étude réfléchie de la nature suffit pour détromper tout homme qui pourra regarder les choses d’un œil tranquille : il verra que dans l’univers tout est lié par des chaînons invisibles, pour l’observateur ou superficiel ou trop bouillant, mais très sensibles pour celui qui voit les choses de sang froid. Il trouvera que les effets les plus rares, les plus merveilleux, ainsi que les plus petits & les plus ordinaires, sont également inexplicables, mais doivent découler de causes naturelles, & que des causes surnaturelles, sous quelque nom qu’on les désigne, de quelques qualités qu’on les orne, ne feront que multiplier les difficultés & faire pulluler des chimeres. Les observations les plus simples lui prouveront invinciblement que tout est nécessaire, que les effets qu’il apperçoit sont matériels, & ne peuvent par conséquent venir que de causes de même nature, quand même il ne pourroit à l’aide des sens remonter jusques à ces causes. Ainsi son esprit ne lui montrera par-tout que de la matière agissante tantôt d’une façon que ses organes lui permettent de suivre, tantôt d’une façon imperceptible pour lui : il verra tous les êtres suivre des loix constantes, toutes les combinaisons se former & se détruire, toutes les formes changer, & le grand tout demeurer toujours le même. Alors revenu des notions dont il s’étoit imbu, détrompé des idées erronées qu’il attachoit par habitude à des êtres de raison, il consentira d’ignorer ce que ses organes ne peuvent saisir ; il connoîtra que des termes obscurs & vuides de sens ne sont point propres à résoudre des difficultés ; & guidé par l’expérience il écartera toutes les hypothèses de l’imagination pour s’attacher à des réalités confirmées par l’expérience.

La plûpart de ceux qui étudient la nature ne la considérent souvent qu’avec les yeux du préjugé ; ils n’y trouvent que ce qu’ils ont d’avance résolu d’y trouver ; dès qu’ils apperçoivent des faits contraires à leurs idées, ils en détournent promptement leurs regards ; ils croient avoir mal vu ; ou bien s’ils y reviennent, c’est dans l’espoir de parvenir à les concilier avec les notions dont leur esprit est imbu. C’est ainsi que nous trouvons des physiciens enthousiastes à qui leurs préventions montrent, dans les choses mêmes qui contredisent le plus ouvertement leurs opinions, des preuves incontestables des systêmes dont ils sont préoccupés. De là ces prétendues démonstrations de l’existence d’un dieu bon, que nous voyons tirer des causes finales, de l’ordre de la nature, de ses bienfaits pour l’homme, etc. Ces mêmes enthousiastes apperçoivent-ils du désordre, des calamités, des révolutions ? Ils en tirent des preuves nouvelles de la sagesse, de l’intelligence, de la bonté de leur dieu, tandis que toutes ces choses semblent aussi visiblement démentir ces qualités que les premières sembloient les confirmer ou les établir. Ces observateurs prévenus sont en extase à la vue des mouvemens périodiques & réglés des astres, des productions de la terre, de l’accord étonnant des parties dans les animaux ; ils oublient pour lors les loix du mouvement, les forces de l’attraction, de la répulsion, de la gravitation, & vont assigner tous ces grands phénomènes à une cause inconnue dont ils n’ont point d’idées. Enfin dans la chaleur de leur imagination ils placent l’homme au centre de la nature ; ils le supposent l’objet & la fin de tout ce qui existe ; c’est pour lui que tout est fait ; c’est pour le réjouir que tout a été créé ; tandis qu’ils ne s’apperçoivent pas que très souvent la nature entière semble se déchaîner contre lui, & le destin s’obstiner à en faire le plus malheureux des êtres11.

Let us not be surprised, if very intelligent, extremely learned men, either obstinately shut their eyes, or run counter to their ordinary sagacity, every time there is a question respecting an object which they have not the courage to examine with that attention they lend to many others. Lord Chancellor Bacon pretends, "that a little philosophy disposes men to atheism, but that great depth re-conducts them to religion." If we analyze this proposition, we shall find it signifies, that even moderate, indifferent thinkers, are quickly enabled to perceive the gross absurdities of superstition; but that very little accustomed to meditate, or else destitute of those fixed principles which could serve them for a guide, their imagination presently replaces them in the theological labyrinth, from whence reason, too weak for the purpose, appeared disposed to withdraw them: these timid souls, who fear to take courage, with minds disciplined to be satisfied with theological solutions, no longer see in nature any thing but an inexplicable enigma; an abyss which it is impossible for them to fathom: these, habituated to fix their eyes upon an ideal, mathematical point, which they have made the centre of every thing, whenever they lose sight of it, find the universe becomes an unintelligible jumble to them; then the confusion in which they feel themselves involved, makes them rather prefer returning to the prejudices of their infancy, which appear to explain every thing, than to float in the vacuum, or quit a foundation which they judge to be immoveable. Thus the proposition of Bacon should seem, to indicate nothing, except it be that the most experienced persons cannot at all times defend themselves against the illusions of their imagination; the impetuosity of which resists the strongest reasoning.

Nevertheless, a deliberate study of nature is sufficient to undeceive every man who will calmly consider things: he will discover that the phenomena of the world is connected by links, invisible to superficial notice, equally concealed from the too impetuous observer, but extremely intelligible to him who views her with serenity. He will find that the most unusual, the most marvellous, as well as the most trifling, or ordinary effects, are equally inexplicable, but that they all equally flow from natural causes; that supernatural causes, under whatever name they way be designated, with whatever qualities they may be decorated, will never do more than increase difficulties; will only make chimeras multiply. The simplest observation will incontestibly prove to him that every thing is necessary; that all the effects he perceives are material; that they can only originate in causes of the same nature, when he even shall not be able to recur to them by the assistance of his senses. Thus his mind, properly directed, every where show him nothing but matter, sometimes acting in a manner which his organs permit him to follow, at others in a mode imperceptible by the faculties he possesses: he will see that all beings follow constant invariable laws, by which all combinations are united and destroyed; he will find that all forms change, but that, nevertheless, the great whole ever remains the same. Thus, cured of the idle notions with which he was imbued, undeceived in those erroneous ideas, which from habit be attached to imaginary systems, he will cheerfully consent to be ignorant of whatever his organs do not enable him to compass; he will know that obscure terms, devoid of sense, are not calculated to explain difficulties; guided by reason, he will throw aside all hypothesis of the imagination; the champion of rectitude, he will attach himself to realities, which are confirmed by experience, which are evidenced by truth.

The greater number of those who study nature, frequently do not consider, that prejudiced eyes will never discover more than that which they have previously determined to find: as soon as they perceive facts contrary to their own ideas, they quickly turn aside, and believe their visual organs have deceived them; if they return to the task, it is in hopes to find means by which they may reconcile the facts to the notions with which their own mind is previously tinctured. Thus we find enthusiastic philosophers, whose determined prepossession shews them what they denominate incontestible evidences of the systems with which they are pre-occupied, even in those things, that most openly contradict their hypothesis: hence those pretended demonstrations of the existence of theories, which are drawn from final causes—from the order of nature—from the kindness evinced to man, &c. Do these same enthusiasts perceive disorder, witness calamities? They induct new proofs of the wisdom, fresh evidence of the intelligence, additional testimony to the bounty of their system, whilst all these occurrences as visibly contradict these qualities, as the first seem to confirm or to establish them. These prejudiced observers are in an ecstacy at the sight of the periodical motions of the planets; at the order of the stars; at the various productions of the earth; at the astonishing harmony in the component parts of animals: in that moment, however, they forget the laws of motion; the powers of gravitation; the force of attraction and repulsion; they assign all these striking phenomena to unknown causes, of which they have no one substantive idea. In short, in the fervor of their imagination they place man in the centre of nature; they believe him to be the object, the end, of all that exists; that it is for his convenience every thing is made; that it is to rejoice his mind, to pleasure his senses, that the whole was created; whilst they do not perceive, that very frequently the entire of nature appears to be loosed against his weakness; that the elements themselves overwhelm him with calamity; that destiny obstinately persists in rendering him the most miserable of beings. The progress of sound philosophy will always be fatal to superstition, whose notions will be continually contradicted by nature.

Astronomy has caused judiciary astrology to vanish; experimental philosophy, the study of natural history and chemistry, have rendered it impossible for jugglers, priests or sorcerers, any longer to perform miracles. Nature, profoundly studied, must necessarily cause the overthrow of those chimerical theories, which ignorance has substituted to her powers.

II.13.16

L’athéisme n’est si rare que parce que tout conspire à enivrer l’homme dès l’ âge le plus tendre d’un enthousiasme éblouissant, ou à le gonfler d’une ignorance systématique & raisonnée, qui est de toutes les ignorances la plus difficile à vaincre & à déraciner. La théologie n’est qu’une science de mots qu’à force de les répéter on s’accoutume à prendre pour des choses ; dès qu’on veut les analyser on trouve qu’ils ne présentent aucun sens véritable. Il est peu d’hommes dans le monde qui pensent, qui se rendent compte de leurs idées, qui aient des yeux pénétrans ; la justesse dans l’esprit est un des dons les plus rares que la nature fasse à l’espèce humaine. Une imagination trop vive, une curiosité précipitée, sont des obstacles aussi puissans à la découverte de la vérité que trop de flegme, que la lenteur de la conception, que la paresse de l’esprit, que l’inhabitude de penser. Tous les hommes ont plus ou moins d’imagination, de curiosité, de flegme, de bile, de paresse, d’activité ; c’est du juste équilibre que la nature a mis dans leur organisation que dépend la justesse de leur esprit. Cependant, comme on l’a dit ci-devant, l’organisation de l’homme est sujette à changer, & les jugemens de son esprit varient avec les changemens que sa machine est forcée de subir : de là les révolutions presque continuelles qui se font dans les idées des mortels, sur-tout quand il s’agit des objets sur lesquels l’expérience ne leur fournit aucuns points fixes pour s’appuyer.

Pour chercher & rencontrer la vérité, que tout s’efforce de nous cacher, que, complices de ceux qui nous égarent, nous voulons souvent nous dissimuler à nous-mêmes, ou que nos terreurs habituelles nous font craindre de trouver, il faut un esprit juste, un cœur droit & de bonne foi avec lui-même, une imagination tempérée par la raison. Avec ces dispositions nous découvrirons la vérité ; elle ne se montre jamais ni à l’enthousiaste épris de ses rêveries ; ni au superstitieux nourri de mélancolie ; ni à l’homme vain gonflé de son ignorance présomptueuse ; ni à l’homme livré à la dissipation & aux plaisirs ; ni au raisonneur de mauvaise foi qui ne veut que se faire illusion à lui-même. Avec ces dispositions le physicien attentif, le géomètre, le moraliste, le politique, le théologien lui-même, quand ils chercheront sincérement la vérité, trouveront que la pierre angulaire qui sert de fondement à tous les systêmes religieux porte évidemment à faux. Le physicien trouvera dans la matière la cause suffisante de son existence, de ses mouvemens, de ses combinaisons, de ses façons d’agir toujours réglées par des loix générales incapables de varier. Le géomêtre calculera les forces de la matière, & sans sortir de la nature, il trouvera que pour expliquer ses phénomènes, il n’est pas besoin de recourir à un être ou à une force incommensurable avec toutes les forces connues. Le politique, instruit des vrais mobiles qui peuvent agir sur les esprits des nations, sentira qu’il n’est pas besoin de recourir à des mobiles imaginaires, tandis qu’il en est de réels pour agir sur les volontés des citoyens, & les déterminer à travailler au maintien de l’association ; il reconnoîtra qu’un mobile fictif n’est propre qu’à rallentir, ou même à troubler le jeu d’une machine aussi compliquée que la société. Celui qui sera plus épris de la vérité que des subtilités de la théologie, s’appercevra bientôt que cette science vaine n’est qu’un amas inintelligible de fausses hypothèses, de pétitions de principes, de sophismes, de cercles vicieux, de distinctions futiles, de subtilités captieuses, d’argumens de mauvaise foi, dont il ne peut résulter que des puérilités, ou des disputes sans fin. Enfin tout homme qui aura des idées saines de morale, de vertu, de ce qui est utile à l’homme en société, soit pour se conserver lui-même, soit pour conserver le corps dont il est membre, reconnoitra que les mortels n’ont besoin pour découvrir leurs rapports & leurs devoirs que de consulter leur propre nature, & doivent bien se garder de les fonder sur un être contradictoire, ou de les emprunter d’un modèle qui ne feroit que de leur troubler l’esprit & les rendre incertains sur leur façon d’agir.

Atheism, as it is termed, is only so rare, because every thing conspires to intoxicate man with a dazzling enthusiasm, from his most tender age; to inflate him from his earliest infancy, with systematic error, with organized ignorance, which of all others is the most difficult to vanquish, the most arduous to root out. Theology is nothing more than a science of words, which by dint of repetition we accustom ourselves to substitute for things: as soon as we feel disposed to analyze them, we are astonished to find they do not present us with any actual sense. There are, in the whole world, very few men who think deeply: who render to themselves a faithful account of their own ideas; who have keen penetrating minds. Justness of intellect is one of the rarest gifts which nature bestows on the human species. It is not, however, to be understood by this, that nature has any choice in the formation of her beings; it is merely to be considered, that the circumstances very rarely occur which enable the junction of a certain quantity of those atoms or parts, necessary to form the human machine in such due proportions, that one disposition shall not overbalance the others; and thus render the judgment erroneous, by giving it a particular bias. We know the general process of making gunpowder; nevertheless, it will sometimes happen that the ingredients have been so happily blended, that this destructive article is of a superior quality to the general produce of the manufactory, without, however, the chemist being on that account entitled to any particular commendation; circumstances have been decidedly favorable, and these seldom occur. Too lively an imagination, an over eager curiosity, are as powerful obstacles to the discovery of truth, as too much phlegm, a slow conception, indolence of mind, or the want of a thinking habit: all men have more or less imagination, curiosity, phlegm, bile, indolence, activity: it is from the happy equilibrium which nature has observed in their organization, that depends that invaluable blessing, correctness of mind. Nevertheless, as we have heretofore said, the organic structure of man is subject to change; the accuracy of his mind varies with the mutations of his machine: from hence may be traced those almost perpetual revolutions that take place in the ideas of mortals; above all when there is a question concerning those objects, upon which experience does not furnish any fixed basis whereon to rest their merits.

To search after right, to discover truth, requires a keen, penetrating, just, active mind; because every thing strives to conceal from us its beauties: it needs an upright heart, one in good faith with itself, joined to an imagination tempered with reason, because our habitual fears make us frequently dread its radiance, sometimes bursting like a meteor on our darkened faculties; besides, it not unfrequently happens, that we are actually the accomplices of those who lead us astray, by an inclination we too often manifest to dissimilate with ourselves on this important measure. Truth never reveals itself either to the enthusiast smitten with his own reveries; to the fellifluous fanatic enslaved by his prejudices; to the vain glorious mortal puffed up with his own presumptuous ignorance; to the voluptuary devoted to his pleasures; or to the wily reasoner, who, disingenuous with himself, has a peculiar spontaneity to form illusions to his mind. Blessed, however, with a heart, gifted with a mind such as described, man will surely discover this rara avis: thus constituted, the attentive philosopher, the geometrician, the moralist, the politician, the theologian himself, when he shall sincerely seek truth, will find that the corner-stone which serves for the foundation of all superstitious systems, is evidently rested upon fiction. The philosopher will discover in matter a sufficient cause for its existence; he will perceive that its motion, its combination, its modes of acting, are always regulated by general laws, incapable of variation. The geometrician, without quiting nature, will calculate the active force of matter; it will then become obvious to him, that to explain its phenomena, it is by no means necessary to have recourse to that which is incommensurable with all known powers. The politician, instructed in the true spring which can act upon the mind of nations, will feel distinctly, that it is not imperative to recur to imaginary theories, whilst there are actual motives to give play to the volition of the citizens; to induce them to labour efficaciously to the maintenance of their association; he will readily acknowledge that fictitious systems are calculated either to slaken the exertions, or to disturb the motion of so complicated a machine an human society. He who shall more honor truth than the vain subtilities of theology, will quickly perceive that this pompous science is nothing more than an unintelligible jumble of false hypothesis; that it continually begs its principles; is full of sophisms; contains only vitiated circles; embraces the most subdolous distinctions; is ushered to mankind by the most disingenuous arguments, from which it is not possible, under any given circumstances, there should result any thing but puerilities—the most endless disputes. In short, all men who have sound ideas of morality, whose notions of virtue are correct, who understand what is useful to the human being in society, whether it be to conserve himself individually, or the body of which he is a member, will acknowledge, that in order to discover his relations, to ascertain his duties, he has only to consult his own nature; that he ought to be particularly careful neither to found them upon discrepant systems, nor to borrow them from models that never can do more than disturb his mind; that will only render his conduct fluctuating; that will leave him for ever uncertain of its proper character.

II.13.17

Ainsi tout penseur raisonnable, en renonçant à ses préjugés, peut sentir l’inutilité & le faux de tant de systêmes abstraits qui jusqu’ici n’ont servi qu’à confondre toutes les notions & à rendre douteuses les vérités les plus claires. En rentrant dans sa sphère, quittant les régions de l’empyrée, où son esprit ne peut que s’égarer ; en consultant la raison, tout homme découvrira ce qu’il a besoin de connoitre, & se détrompera des causes chimériques que l’enthousiasme, l’ignorance & le mensonge ont par-tout substituées aux causes véritables & aux mobiles réels qui agissent dans une nature dont l’esprit humain ne peut jamais sortir sans s’égarer & sans se rendre malheureux.

Les déicoles & leurs théologiens reprochent sans cesse à leurs adversaires leur goût pour le paradoxe ou pour le systême, tandis qu’eux-mêmes fondent toutes leurs idées sur des hypothèses imaginaires, & se font un principe de renoncer à l’expérience, de mépriser la nature, de ne tenir aucun compte du témoignage de leurs sens, de soumettre leur entendement au joug de l’autorité. Les disciples de la nature ne seroient-ils donc pas autorisés à leur dire, " nous n’assurons que ce que nous voyons ; nous ne nous rendons qu’à l’évidence ; si nous avons un systême, il n’est fondé que sur des faits. Nous n’appercevons en nous-mêmes & partout que de la matière, & nous en concluons que la matière peut sentir & penser. Nous voyons dans l’univers tout s’exécuter par des loix méchaniques, par des propriétés, par des combinaisons, par des modifications de la matière, & nous ne cherchons pas d’autre explication aux phénomènes que la nature nous présente. Nous ne concevons qu’un monde seul & unique, où tout est enchaîné, où chaque effet est dû à une cause naturelle connue ou inconnue qui le produit suivant des loix nécessaires. Nous n’affirmons rien qui ne soit démontré, & que vous ne soyez forcés d’admettre comme nous : les principes dont nous partons sont clairs, sont évidens, ce sont des faits ; si quelque chose est obscure ou inintelligible pour nous, nous convenons de bonne foi de son obscurité, c’est-à-dire, des bornes de nos lumières, 12 mais nous n’imaginons aucune hypothèse pour l’expliquer, nous consentons à l’ignorer toujours, ou nous attendons que le tems, l’expérience, les progrès de l’esprit humain l’éclaircissent. Notre manière de philosopher n’est-elle pas la véritable ? En effet dans tout ce que nous avançons au sujet de la nature nous ne procédons que de la même manière que nos adversaires eux-mêmes procèdent dans toutes les autres sciences, telles que l’histoire naturelle, la physique, les mathématiques, la chymie, la morale, la politique. Nous nous renfermons scrupuleusement dans ce qui nous est connu par l’intermède de nos sens, les seuls instrumens que la nature nous ait donnés pour découvrir la vérité. Que sont nos adversaires ? Ils imaginent pour expliquer les choses qui leur sont inconnues des êtres plus inconnus encore que les choses qu’ils veulent expliquer ; des êtres dont ils avouent eux-mêmes n’avoir nulle notion ! Ils renoncent donc aux vrais principes de la logique, qui consistent à procéder du plus connu au moins connu. Mais surquoi fondent-ils l’existence de ces êtres à l’aide desquels ils prétendent résoudre toutes les difficultés ? C’est sur l’ignorance universelle des hommes, sur leur inexpérience, sur leurs terreurs, sur leurs imaginations troublées, sur un prétendu sens intime qui n’est réellement que l’effet de l’ignorance, de la crainte, de l’inhabitude de réfléchir par eux-mêmes & de l’habitude de se laisser guider par l’autorité. C’est, ô théologiens sur des fondemens si ruineux que vous bâtissez l’édifice de votre doctrine. Après cela vous vous trouvez dans l’impossibilité de vous faire aucune idée précise de ces dieux qui servent de base à vos systêmes, de leurs attributs, de leur existence, de leur manière d’être dans le lieu, de leur façon d’agir. Ainsi, de votre aveu même, vous êtes dans une ignorance profonde des premiers élémens, qu’il est indispensable de connoître, d’une chose que vous constituez comme la cause de tout ce qui existe. Ainsi, sous quelque point de vue que l’on vous envisage, c’est vous qui bâtissez des systêmes en l’air, & vous êtes les plus absurdes de tous les systématiques ; car vous en rapportant à votre imagination pour créer une cause, cette cause devroit au moins répandre de la lumière sur tout ; c’est à cette condition qu’on en pourroit pardonner l’incompréhensibilité : mais cette cause peut-elle servir à expliquer quelque chose ? Nous fait-elle mieux connoître l’origine du monde, la nature de l’homme, les facultés de l’ame, la source du bien & du mal ? Non, sans doute, cette cause imaginaire ou n’explique rien, ou multiplie par elle-même les difficultés à l’infini, ou jette de l’embarras & de l’obscurité sur toutes les matières dans lesquelles on la fait intervenir. Quelque soit la question qu’on agite elle se complique aussitôt qu’on y fait entrer le nom de Dieu : ce nom ne se présente dans les sciences les plus claires qu’accompagné de nuages qui rendent compliquées & énigmatiques les notions les plus évidentes. Quelles idées de morale nous présente votre divinité, sur les volontés & sur l’exemple de laquelle vous fondez toutes les vertus ? Toutes vos révélations ne nous la montrent-elles pas sous les traits d’un tyran qui se joue du genre-humain, qui fait le mal pour le plaisir de mal faire, qui ne gouverne le monde que d’après les règles de ses injustes caprices que vous nous faites adorer ? Tous vos systêmes ingénieux, tous vos mystères, toutes les subtilités que vous avez inventées sont-ils capables de laver votre dieu si parfait des noirceurs dont le bon sens doit le faire accuser ? Enfin n’est-ce pas en son nom que vous troublez l’univers, que vous persécutez, que vous exterminez tous ceux qui refusent de souscrire aux rêveries systématiques par vous décorées du nom pompeux de religion. Convenez donc, ô théologiens ! Que vous êtes, non seulement des systématiques absurdes, mais encore que vous finissez par être atroces & cruels par l’importance que votre orgueil & votre intêret mettent à des systêmes ruineux, sous lesquels vous accablez & la raison humaine & la félicité des nations. "

Thus, every rational thinker, who renounces his prejudices, will be enabled to feel the inutility, to comprehend the fallacy of so many abstract systems; he will perceive that they have hitherto answered no other purpose than to confound the notions of mankind; to render doubtful the clearest truths. In quitting the regions of the empyreum, where his mind can only bewilder itself, in re-entering his proper sphere, in consulting reason, man will discover that of which he needs the knowledge; he will be able to undeceive himself upon those chimerical theories, which enthusiasm has substituted for actual natural causes; to detect those figments, by which imposture has almost every where superseded the real motives that can give activity in nature; out of which the human mind never rambles, without going woefully astray; without laying the foundation of future misery.

The Deicolists, as well as the theologians, continually reproach their adversaries with their taste for paradoxes—with their attachment to systems; whilst they themselves found all their reasoning upon imaginary hypothesis—upon visionary theories; make a principle of submitting their understanding to the yoke of authority; of renouncing experience; of setting down as nothing the evidence of their senses. Would it not be justifiable in the disciples of nature, to say to these men, who thus despise her, "We only assure ourselves of that which we see; we yield to nothing but evidence; if we have a system, it is one founded upon facts; we perceive in ourselves, we behold every where else, nothing but matter; we therefore conclude from it that matter can both feel and think: we see that the motion of the universe is operated after mechanical laws; that the whole results from the properties, is the effect of the combination, the immediate consequence of the modification of matter; thus, we are content, we seek no other explication of the phenomena which nature presents. We conceive only an unique world, in which every thing is connected; where each effect is linked to a natural cause, either known or unknown, which it produces according to necessary laws; we affirm nothing that is not demonstrable; nothing that you are not obliged to admit as well as ourselves: the principles we lay down are distinct: they are self-evident: they are facts. If we find some things unintelligible, if causes frequently become arduous, we ingenuously agree to their obscurity; that is to say, to the limits of our own knowledge. But in order to explain these effects, we do not imagine an hypothesis; we either consent to be for ever ignorant of them, or else we wait patiently until time, experience, with the progress of the human mind, shall throw them into light: is not, then, our manner of philosophizing consistent with truth? Indeed, in whatever we advance upon the subject of nature, we proceed precisely in the same manner as our opponents themselves pursue in all the other sciences, such as natural history, experimental philosophy, mathematics, chemistry, &c. We scrupulously confine ourselves to what comes to our knowledge through the medium of our senses; the only instruments with which nature has furnished us to discover truth. What is the conduct of our adversaries? In order to expound things of which they are ignorant, they imagine theories still more incomprehensible than what they are desirous to explain; theories of which they themselves are obliged to acknowledge they have not the most slender notion. Thus they invert the true principles of logic, which require we should proceed gradually from that which is most known, to that with which we are least acquainted. Again, upon what do they found the existence of these theories, by whose aid they pretend to solve all difficulties? It is upon the universal ignorance of mankind; upon the inexperience of man; upon his fears; upon his disordered imagination; upon a pretended intimate sense, which in reality is nothing more than the effect of vulgar prejudice; the result of dread; the consequence of the want of a reflecting habit, which induces them to crouch to the opinions of others; to be guided by the mandates of authority, rather than take the trouble to examine for their own information. Such, O theologians! are the ruinous foundations upon which you erect the superstructure of your doctrine. Accordingly, you find it impossible to form to yourselves any distinct idea of those theories which serve for the basis of your systems; you are unable to comprehend either their attributes, their existence, the nature of their localities, or their mode of action. Thus, even by your own confession, ye are in a state of profound ignorance, on the primary elements of that which ye constitute the cause of all that exists: of which, according to your own account, it is imperative to have a correct knowledge. Under whatever point of view, therefore, ye are contemplated, it must be admitted ye are the founders of aerial systems; of fanciful theories: of all systematizers, ye are consequently the most absurd; because in challenging your imagination to create a cause, this cause, at least, ought to diffuse light over the whole; it would be upon this condition alone that its incomprehensibility could be pardonable; but to speak ingenuously, does this cause serve to explain any thing? Does it make us conceive more clearly the origin of the world; bring us more distinctly acquainted with the actual nature of man; does it more intelligibly elucidate the faculties of the soul; or point out with more perspicuity the source of good and evil? No! unquestionably: these subtle theories explain nothing, although they multiply to infinity their own difficulties; they, in fact, embarrass elucidation, by plunging into greater obscurity those matters in which they are interposed. Whatever may be the question agitated, it becomes complicated: as soon as these theories are introduced, they envelope the most demonstrable sciences with a thick, impenetrable mist; render the most simple notions complex; give opacity to the most diaphanous ideas; turn the most evident opinions into insolvable enigmas. What exposition of morality does the theories, upon which ye found all the virtue, present to man? Do not all your oracles breathe inconsistency? Does not your doctrines embrace every gradation of character, however discrepant: every known property, however opposed. All your ingenious systems, all your mysteries, all the subtilties which ye have invented, are they capable of reconciling that discordant assemblage of amiable and unamiable qualities, with which ye have dressed up your figments? In short, is it not by these theories that ye disturb the harmony of the universe; is it not in their name ye follow up your barbarous proscriptions; in their support, that ye so inhumanly exterminate all who refuse to subscribe to your organized reveries; who withhold assent to those efforts of the imagination which ye have collectively decorated with the pompous name of religion; but which, individually, ye brand as superstition, always excepting that to which ye lend yourselves. Agree, then, O Theologians! Acknowledge, then, ye subtle metaphysicians! Consent, then, ye organizers of fanciful theories! that not only are ye systematically absurd, but also that ye finish by being atrocious; because whenever ye obtain the ascendancy one over the other, your unfortunate pre-eminence is distinguished by the most malevolent persecution; your domination is ushered in with cruelty; your career is described with blood: from the importance which your own interest attaches to your ruinous dogmas; from the pride with which ye tumble down the less fortunate systems of those who started with you for the prize of plunder; from that savage ferocity, under which ye equally overwhelm human reason, the happiness of the individual, and the felicity of nations."

Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d'. The System of Nature. Translated by Samuel Wilkinson. 1820. The Trove. https://adagraves.com/trove/holbach-systeme-de-la-nature/part-2-chapter-13/.

French text published 1770 (author died 1789). English translation by Samuel Wilkinson published 1820–21; Project Gutenberg's text is from a facsimile reprint of it. Sources