La science commence par eux, et se resout en eux. Apres tout, nous ne sçaurions non plus qu'vne pierre, si nous ne sçauions, qu'il y a son, odeur, lumiere, faueur, mesure, poix, mollesse, durté, aspreté, couleur, polisseure, largeur, profondeur. Voyla le plant et les principes de tout le bastiment de nostre science. Et selon aucuns, science n'est rien autre chose, que sentiment. Quiconque me peut pousser à contredire les sens, il me tient à la gorge, il ne me sçauroit faire reculer plus arriere. Les sens sont le commencement et la fin de l'humaine cognoissance.
Inuenies primis ab sensibus esse creatamNotitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli.Quid maiore fide porro quàm sensus haberiDebet?
Science begins by them, and is resolved into them. After all, we should know no more than a stone if we did not know there is sound, odour, light, taste, measure, weight, softness, hardness, sharpness, colour, smoothness, breadth, and depth; these are the platforms and principles of the structure of all our knowledge; and, according to some, science is nothing else but sense. He that could make me contradict the senses, would have me by the throat; he could not make me go further back. The senses are the beginning and the end of human knowledge:—
Invenies primis ab sensibns esse creatamNotitiam veil; neque sensus posse refelli....Quid majore fide porro, quam sensus, haberi Debet?
“Of truth, whate’er discoveries are made,Are by the senses to us first conveyed;Nor will one sense be baffled; for on whatCan we rely more safely than on that?”
Qu'on leur attribue le moins qu'on pourra, tousiours faudra il leur donner cela, que par leur voye et entremise s'achemine toute nostre instruction. Cicero dit que Chrysippus ayant essayé de rabattre de la force des sens et de leur vertu, se representa à soy-mesmes des argumens au contraire, et des oppositions si vehementes, qu'il n'y peut satisfaire. Surquoy Carneades, qui maintenoit le contraire party, se vantoit de se seruir des armes mesmes et paroles de Chrysippus, pour le combattre: et s'escrioit à cette cause contre luy: O miserable, ta force t'a perdu. Il n'est aucun absurde, selon nous, plus extreme, que de maintenir que le feu n'eschauffe point, que la lumiere n'esclaire point, qu'il n'y a point de pesanteur au fer, ny de fermeté, qui sont notices que nous apportent les sens; ny creance, ou science en l'homme, qui se puisse comparer à celle-là en certitude. La premiere consideration que i'ay sur le subiect des sens, est que ie mets en doubte que l'homme soit prouueu de tous sens naturels. Ie voy plusieurs animaux, qui viuent vne vie entiere et parfaicte, les vns sans la veuë, autres sans l'ouye: qui sçait si à nous aussi il ne manque pas encore vn, deux, trois, et plusieurs autres sens? Car s'il en manque quelqu'vn, nostre discours n'en peut découurir le défaut. C'est le priuilege des sens, d'être l'extreme borne de nostre aperceuance. Il n'y a rien au delà d'eux, qui nous puisse seruir à les descouurir: voire ny l'vn sens n'en peut descouurir l'autre.
An poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an auresTactus, an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris,An confutabunt nares, oculiue reuincent?
Let us attribute to them the least we can, we must, however, of necessity grant them this, that it is by their means and mediation that all our instruction is directed. Cicero says, that Chrysippus having attempted to extenuate the force and virtue of the senses, presented to himself arguments and so vehement oppositions to the contrary that he could not satisfy himself therein; whereupon Cameades, who maintained the contrary side, boasted that he would make use of the very words and arguments of Chrysippus to controvert and confute him, and therefore thus cried out against him: “O miserable! thy force has destroyed thee.” There can be nothing absurd to a greater degree than to maintain that fire does not warm, that light does not shine, and that there is no weight nor solidity in iron, which are things conveyed to us by the senses; neither is there belief nor knowledge in man that can be compared to that for certainty.
The first consideration I have upon the subject of the senses is that I make a doubt whether or no man be furnished with all natural senses. I see several animals who live an entire and perfect life, some without sight, others without hearing; who knows whether to us also one, two, three, or many other senses may not be wanting? For if any one be wanting, our examination cannot discover the defect. ‘Tis the privilege of the senses to be the utmost limit of our discovery; there is nothing beyond them that can assist us in exploration, not so much as one sense in the discovery of another:—
An poterunt oculos aures reprehendere? an auresTactus an hunc porro tactum sapor argnet oris?An confutabunt nares, oculive revincent?
“Can ears the eyes, the touch the ears, correct?Or is that touch by tasting to be check’d?Or th’ other senses, shall the nose or eyesConfute in their peculiar faculties?”
Ils font trestous, la ligne extreme de nostre faculté.
Seorsum cuique potestasDiuisa est, sua vis cuique est.
Il est impossible de faire conceuoir à vn homme naturellement aueugle, qu'il n'y void pas, impossible de luy faire desirer la veuë et regretter son defaut. Parquoy, nous ne deuons prendre aucune asseurance de ce que nostre ame est contente et satisfaicte de ceux que nous auons: veu qu'elle n'a pas dequoy sentir en cela sa maladie et son imperfection, si elle y est. Il est impossible de dire chose à cet aueugle, par discours, argument, ny similitude, qui loge en son imagination aucune apprehension, de lumiere, de couleur, et de veuë. Il n'y a rien plus arriere, qui puisse pousser le sens en euidence. Les aueugles nais, qu'on void desirer à voir, ce n'est pas pour entendre ce qu'ils demandent: ils ont appris de nous, qu'ils ont à dire quelque chose, qu'ils ont quelque chose à desirer, qui est en nous, laquelle ils nomment bien, et ses effects et consequences: mais ils ne sçauent pourtant pas que c'est, ny ne l'apprehendent ny pres ny loing. I'ay veu vn Gentil-homme de bonne maison, aueugle nay, aumoins aueugle de tel aage, qu'il ne sçait que c'est que de veuë: il entend si peu ce qui luy manque, qu'il vse et se sert comme nous, des paroles propres au voir, et les applique d'vne mode toute sienne et particuliere. On luy presentoit vn enfant duquel il estoit parrain, l'ayant pris entre ses bras: Mon Dieu, dit-il, le bel enfant, qu'il le fait beau voir, qu'il a le visage gay. Il dira comme l'vn d'entre nous, Cette sale a vne belle veuë, il fait clair, il fait beau soleil. Il y a plus: car par ce que ce sont nos exercices que la chasse, la paume, la bute, et qu'il l'a ouy dire, il s'y affectionne et s'y embesoigne: et croid y auoir la mesme part, que nous y auons: il s'y picque et s'y plaist, et ne les reçoit pourtant que par les oreilles. On luy crie, que voyla vn liéure, quand on est en quelque belle splanade, où il puisse picquer: et puis on luy dit encore, que voyla vn lieure pris: le voyla aussi fier de sa prise, comme il oit dire aux autres, qu'ils le sont. L'esteuf, il le prend à la main gauche, et le pousse à tout sa raquette: de la harquebouse, il en tire à l'aduenture, et se paye de ce que ses gens luy disent, qu'il est ou haut, ou costier. Que sçait-on si le genre humain fait vne sottise pareille, à faute de quelque sens, et que par ce defaut, la plus part du visage des choses nous soit caché? Que sçait-on, si les difficultez que nous trouuons en plusieurs ouurages de Nature, viennent de là? et si plusieurs effets des animaux qui excedent nostre capacité, sont produicts par la faculté de quelque sens, que nous ayons à dire? et si aucuns d'entre eux ont vne vie plus pleine par ce moyen, et entiere que la nostre? Nous saisissons la pomme quasi par tous nos sens: nous y trouuons de la rougeur, de la polisseure, de l'odeur et de la douceur: outre cela, elle peut auoir d'autres vertus, comme d'asseicher ou restreindre, ausquelles nous n'auons point de sens qui se puisse rapporter. Les proprietez que nous appellons occultes en plusieurs choses, comme à l'aymant d'attirer le fer, n'est-il pas vraysemblable qu'il y a des facultez sensitiues en Nature propres à les iuger et à les apperceuoir, et que le defaut de telles facultez, nous apporte l'ignorance de la vraye essence de telles choses? C'est à l'auanture quelque sens particulier, qui descouure aux coqs l'heure du matin et de minuict, et les esmeut à chanter: qui apprend aux poulles, avaut tout vsage et experience, de craindre vn esparuier, et non vne oye, ny vn paon, plus grandes bestes: qui aduertit les poulets de la qualité hostile, qui est au chat contr'eux, et à ne se deffier du chien: s'armer contre le miaulement, voix aucunement flatteuse, non contre l'abayer, voix aspre et quereleuse. Aux freslons, aux formis, et aux rats, de choisir tousiours le meilleur formage et la meilleure poire, auant que d'y auoir tasté, et qui achemine le cerf, l'elephant et le serpent à la cognoissance de certaine herbe propre à leur guerison. Il n'y a sens, qui n'ait vne grande domination, et qui n'apporte par son moyen vn nombre infiny de cognoissances. Si nous auions à dire l'intelligence des sons, de l'harmonie, et de la voix, cela apporteroit vne confusion inimaginable à tout le reste de nostre science. Car outre ce qui est attaché au propre effect de chaque sens, combien d'argumens, de consequences, et de conclusions tirons nous aux autres choses par la comparaison de l'vn sens à l'autre? Qu'vn homme entendu, imagine l'humaine nature produicte originellement sans la veuë, et discoure combien d'ignorance et de trouble luy apporteroit vn tel defaut, combien de tenebres et d'aueuglement en nostre ame: on verra par là, combien nous importe, à la cognoissance de la verité, la priuation d'vn autre tel sens, ou de deux, ou de trois, si elle est en nous. Nous auons formé vne verité par la consultation et concurrence de nos cinq sens: mais à l'aduenture falloit-il l'accord de huict, ou de dix sens, et leur contribution, pour l'apperceuoir certainement et en son essence. Les sectes qui combatent la science de l'homme, elles la combatent principalement par l'incertitude et foiblesse de nos sens. Car puis que toute cognoissance vient en nous par leur entremise et moyen, s'ils faillent au rapport qu'ils nous font, s'ils corrompent ou alterent ce, qu'ils nous charrient du dehors, si la lumiere qui par eux s'écoule en nostre ame est obscurcie au passage, nous n'auons plus que tenir. De cette extreme difficulté sont nées toutes ces fantasies: que chaque subiect a en soy tout ce que nous y trouuons: qu'il n'a rien de ce que nous y pensons trouuer: et celle des Epicuriens, que le soleil n'est non plus grand que ce que nostre veuë le iuge:
Quicquid id est, nihilo fertur maiore figura,Quàm, nostris oculis quam cernimus, esse videtur:
que les apparences, qui representent vn corps grand, à celuy qui en est voisin, et plus petit, à celuy qui en est esloigné, sont toutes deux vrayes:
Nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum;Proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli:
et resolument qu'il n'y a aucune tromperie aux sens: qu'il faut passer à leur mercy, et chercher ailleurs des raisons pour excuser la difference et contradiction que nous y trouuons. Voyre inuenter toute autre mensonge et resuerie (ils en viennent iusques là) plustost que d'accuser les sens. Timagoras iuroit, que pour presser ou biaiser son œuil, il n'auoit iamais apperceu doubler la lumiere de la chandelle: et que cette semblance venoit du vice de l'opinion, non de l'instrument. De toutes les absurditez la plus absurde aux Epicuriens, est, desauoüer la force et l'effect des sens.
Proinde quod in quoque est his visum tempore, verum est.Et, si non potuit ratio dissoluere causam,Cur ea quæ fuerint iuxtim quadrata, procul sintVisa rotunda: tamen præstat rationis egentemReddere mendosè causas vtriusque figuræ,Quàm manibus manifesta suis emittere quæquam,Et violare fidem primam, et conuellere totaFundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salúsque.Non modò enim ratio ruat omnis, vita quoque ipsaConcidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis,Præcipitésque locos vitare, et cætera quæ sintIn genere hoc fugienda.
They all make the extremest limits of our ability:—
Seorsum cuique potestas Divisa est, sua vis cuique est,
“Each has its power distinctly and alone,And every sense’s power is its own.”
It is impossible to make a man naturally blind conceive that he does not see; impossible to make him desire sight, or to regret his defect; for which reason we ought not to derive any assurance from the soul’s being contented and satisfied with those we have; considering that it cannot be sensible herein of its infirmity and imperfection, if there be any such thing. It is impossible to say any thing to this blind man, either by reasoning, argument, or similitude, that can possess his imagination with any apprehension of light, colour, or sight; there’s nothing remains behind that can push on the senses to evidence. Those that are born blind, whom we hear wish they could see, it is not that they understand what they desire; they have learned from us that they want something; that there is something to be desired that we have, which they can name indeed and speak of its effect and consequences; but yet they know not what it is, nor apprehend it at all.
I have seen a gentleman of a good family who was born blind, or at least blind from such an age that he knows not what sight is; who is so little sensible of his defect that he makes use as we do of words proper for seeing, and applies them after a manner wholly particular and his own. They brought him a child to which he was god-father, which, having taken into his arms, “Good God,” said he, “what a fine child! How beautiful to look upon! what a pretty face it has!” He will say, like one of us, “This room has a very fine prospect;—it is clear weather;—the sun shines bright.” And moreover, being that hunting, tennis, and butts are our exercises, and he has heard so, he has taken a liking to them, will ride a-hunting, and believes he has as good share of the sport as we have; and will express himself as angry or pleased as the best of us all, and yet knows nothing of it but by the ear. One cries out to him, “Here’s a hare!” when he is upon some even plain where he may safely ride; and afterwards, when they tell him, “The hare is killed,” he will be as overjoyed and proud of it as he hears others say they are. He will take a tennis-ball in his left hand and strike it away with the racket; he will shoot with a harquebuss at random, and is contented with what his people tell him, that he is over, or wide.
Who knows whether all human kind commit not the like absurdity, for want of some sense, and that through this default the greatest part of the face of things is concealed from us? What do we know but that the difficulties which we find in several works of nature proceed hence; and that several effects of animals, which exceed our capacity, are not produced by faculty of some sense that we are defective in? and whether some of them have not by this means a life more full and entire than ours? We seize an apple with all our senses; we there find redness, smoothness, odour, and sweetness; but it may have other virtues besides these, as to heat or binding, which no sense of ours can have any reference unto. Is it not likely that there are sensitive faculties in nature that are fit to judge of and to discern those which we call the occult properties in several things, as for the loadstone to attract iron; and that the want of such faculties is the cause that we are ignorant of the true essence of such things? ‘Tis perhaps some particular sense that gives cocks to understand what hour it is at midnight, and when it grows to be towards day, and that makes them crow accordingly; that teaches chickens, before they have any experience of the matter, to fear a sparrow-hawk, and not a goose or a peacock, though birds of a much larger size; that cautions them against the hostile quality the cat has against them, and makes them not to fear a dog; to arm themselves against the mewing, a kind of flattering voice, of the one, and not against the barking, a shrill and threatening voice, of the other; that teaches wasps, ants, and rats, to fall upon the best pear and the best cheese before they have tasted them, and inspires the stag, elephant, and serpent, with the knowledge of a certain herb proper for their cure. There is no sense that has not a mighty dominion, and that does not by its power introduce an infinite number of knowledges. If we were defective in the intelligence of sounds, of harmony, and of the voice, it would cause an unimaginable confusion in all the rest of our science; for, besides what belongs to the proper effect of every sense, how many arguments, consequences, and conclusions do we draw to other things, by comparing one sense with another? Let an understanding man imagine human nature originally produced without the sense of seeing, and consider what ignorance and trouble such a defect would bring upon him, what a darkness and blindness in the soul; he will then see by that of how great importance to the knowledge of truth the privation of such another sense, or of two or three, should we be so deprived, would be. We have formed a truth by the consultation and concurrence of our five senses; but perhaps we should have the consent and contribution of eight or ten to make a certain discovery of it in its essence.
The sects that controvert the knowledge of man do it principally by the uncertainty and weakness of our senses; for since all knowledge is by their means and mediation conveyed unto us, if they fail in their report, if they corrupt or alter what they bring us from without, if the light which by them creeps into the soul be obscured in the passage, we have nothing else to hold by. From this extreme difficulty all these fancies proceed: “That every subject has in itself all we there find. That it has nothing in it of what we think we there find;” and that of the Epicureans, “That the sun is no bigger than ‘tis judged by our sight to be:—”
Quidquid id est, nihilo fertur majore figura,Quam nostris oculis quam cemimus, esse videtur:
“But be it what it will in our esteems,It is no bigger than to us it seems:”
that the appearances which represent a body great to him that is near, and less to him that is more remote, are both true:—
Nee tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum....Proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli:
“Yet that the eye’s deluded we deny;Charge not the mind’s faults, therefore, on the eye:”
“and, resolutely, that there is no deceit in the senses; that we are to lie at their mercy, and seek elsewhere reasons to excuse the difference and contradictions we there find, even to the inventing of lies and other flams, if it come to that, rather than accuse the senses.” Timagoras vowed that, by pressing or turning his eye, he could never perceive the light of the candle to double, and that the seeming so proceeded from the vice of opinion, and not from the instrument. The most absurd of all absurdities, with the Epicureans, is to deny the force and effect of the senses:—
Proinde, quod in quoquo est his visum tempore, verum estEt, si non potuit ratio dissolvere causam,Cur ea, qu fuerint juxtim quadrata, procul sintVisa rotunda; tamen prstat rationis egentemBeddere mendose causas utriusque figur,Quam manibus manifesta suis emittere ququam,Et violare fidem primam, et convellere totaFundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salusque:Non modo enim ratio ruat omnis, vita quoque ipsaConcidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis,Procipitesque locos vitare, et ctera, qu sintIn genere hoc fugienda.
“That what we see exists I will maintain,And if our feeble reason can’t explainWhy things seem square when they are very near,And at a greater distance round appear;‘Tis better yet, for him that’s at a pause,‘T’ assign to either figure a false cause,Than shock his faith, and the foundations rendOn which our safety and our life depend:For reason not alone, but life and all,Together will with sudden ruin fall;Unless we trust our senses, nor despiseTo shun the various dangers that arise.”
Ce conseil desesperé et si peu philosophique, ne represente autre chose, sinon que l'humaine science ne se peut maintenir que par raison des-raisonnable, folle et forcenée: mais qu'encore vaut-il mieux, que l'homme, pour se faire valoir, s'en serue, et de tout autre remede, tant fantastique soit-il, que d'aduoüer sa necessaire bestise: verité si desaduantageuse. Il ne peut fuïr, que les sens ne soyent les souuerains maistres de sa cognoissance: mais ils sont incertains et falsifiables à toutes circonstances. C'est-là, où il faut battre à outrance: et, si les forces iustes nous faillent, comme elles font, y employer l'opiniastreté, la temerité, l'impudence. Au cas, que ce que disent les Epicuriens soit vray, à sçauoir, que nous n'auons pas de science, si les apparences des sens sont fauces: et ce que disent les Stoïciens, s'il est aussi vray, que les apparences des sens sont si fauces qu'elles ne nous peuuent produire aucune science: nous concluerons aux despens de ces deux grandes sectes dogmatistes, qu'il n'y a point de science. Quant à l'erreur et incertitude de l'operation des sens, chacun s'en peut fournir autant d'exemples qu'il luy plaira: tant les faultes et tromperies qu'ils nous font, sont ordinaires. Au retentir d'vn valon, le son d'vne trompette semble venir deuant nous, qui vient d'vne lieuë derriere.
Extantésque procul medio de gurgite montes,Iïdem apparent, longè diuersi licet.Et fugere ad puppim colles campique videnturQuos agimus propter nauim.Vbi in medio nobis equus acer obhæsitFlumine, equi corpus transuersum ferre videturVis, et in aduersum flumen contrudere raptim.
This so desperate and unphilosophical advice expresses only this,—that human knowledge cannot support itself but by reason unreasonable, foolish, and mad; but that it is yet better that man, to set a greater value upon himself, make use of any other remedy, how fantastic soever, than to confess his necessary ignorance—a truth so disadvantageous to him. He cannot avoid owning that the senses are the sovereign lords of his knowledge; but they are uncertain, and falsifiable in all circumstances; ‘tis there that he is to fight it out to the last; and if his just forces fail him, as they do, to supply that defect with obstinacy, temerity, and impudence. In case what the Epicureans say be true, viz: “that we have no knowledge if the senses’ appearances be false;” and if that also be true which the Stoics say, “that the appearances of the senses are so false that they can furnish us with no manner of knowledge,” we shall conclude, to the disadvantage of these two great dogmatical sects, that there is no science at all.
As to the error and uncertainty of the operation of the senses, every one may furnish himself with as many examples as he pleases; so ordinary are the faults and tricks they put upon us. In the echo of a valley the sound of a trumpet seems to meet us, which comes from a place behind:—
Exstantesque procul medio de gurgite montes,Classibus inter qnos liber patet exitus, idemApparent, et longe divolsi licet, ingensInsula conjunctis tamen ex his ana videtur...Et fugere ad puppim colies campique videntur,Qnos agimns proter navim, velisque volamus....Ubi in medio nobis equus acer obhsitFlamine, equi corpus transversum ferre videturVis, et in adversum flumen contrudere raptim.
“And rocks i’ th’ seas that proudly raise their head,Though far disjoined, though royal navies spread,Their sails between; yet if from distance shown,They seem an island all combin’d in one.Thus ships, though driven by a prosperous gale,Seem fix’d to sailors; those seem under sailThat ride at anchor safe; and all admire,As they row by, to see the rocks retire.Thus, when in rapid streams my horse hath stood,And I look’d downward on the rolling flood;Though he stood still, I thought he did divideThe headlong streams, and strive against the tide,And all things seem’d to move on every side.”
A manier vne balle d'arquebuse, soubs le second doigt, celuy du milieu estant entrelassé par dessus, il faut extremement se contraindre, pour aduoüer, qu'il n'y en ait qu'vne, tant le sens nous en represente deux. Car que les sens soyent maintesfois maistres du discours, et le contraignent de receuoir des impressions qu'il sçait et iuge estre faulces, il se void à tous coups. Ie laisse à part celuy de l'attouchement, qui a ses functions plus voisines, plus viues et substantielles, qui renuerse tant de fois par l'effect de la douleur qu'il apporte au corps, toutes ces belles resolutions Stoïques, et contraint de crier au ventre, celuy qui a estably en son ame ce dogme auec toute resolution, que la colique, comme toute autre maladie et douleur, est chose indifferente, n'ayant la force de rien rabbattre du souuerain bon-heur et felicité, en laquelle le sage est logé par sa vertu. Il n'est cœur si mol, que le son de nos tabourins et de nos trompettes n'eschauffe, ny si dur que la douceur de la musique n'esueille et ne chatouille: ny ame si reuesche, qui ne se sente touchée de quelque reuerence, à considerer cette vastité sombre de noz eglises, la diuersité d'ornemens, et ordre de noz ceremonies, et ouyr le son deuotieux de noz orgues, et l'harmonie si posée, et religieuse de noz voix. Ceux mesme qui y entrent auec mespris, sentent quelque frisson dans le cœur, et quelque horreur, qui les met en deffiance de leur opinion. Quant à moy, ie ne m'estime point assez fort, pour ouyr en sens rassis, des vers d'Horace, et de Catulle, chantez d'vne voix suffisante, par vne belle et ieune bouche. Et Zenon auoit raison de dire, que la voix estoit la fleur de la beauté. On m'a voulu faire accroire, qu'vn homme que tous nous autres François cognoissons, m'auoit imposé, en me recitant des vers, qu'il auoit faicts: qu'ils n'estoyent pas tels sur le papier, qu'en l'air: et que mes yeux en feroyent contraire iugement à mes oreilles: tant la prononciation a de credit à donner prix et façon aux ouurages, qui passent à sa mercy. Surquoy Philoxenus ne fut pas fascheux, en ce, qu'oyant vn, donner mauuais ton à quelque sienne composition, il se print à fouler aux pieds, et casser de la brique, qui estoit à luy: disant, Ie romps ce qui est à toy, comme tu corromps ce qui est à moy. A quoy faire, ceux mesmes qui se sont donnez la mort d'vne certaine resolution, destournoyent-ils la face, pour ne voir le coup qu'ils se faisoyent donner? et ceux qui pour leur santé desirent et commandent qu'on les incise et cauterise, ne peuuent soustenir la veuë des apprests, vtils et operation du chirurgien, attendu que la veuë ne doit auoir aucune participation à cette douleur? Cela ne sont ce pas propres exemples à verifier l'authorité que les sens ont sur le discours? Nous auons beau sçauoir que ces tresses sont empruntées d'vn page ou d'vn lacquais: que cette rougeur est venue d'Espaigne, et cette blancheur et polisseure, de la mer Oceane: encore faut-il que la veuë nous force d'en trouuer le subject plus aimable et plus agreable, contre toute raison. Car en cela il n'y a rien du sien.
Auferimur cultu, gemmis: auróque tegunturCrimina, pars minima est ipsa puella sui.Sæpe vbi sit quod ames inter tam multa requiras:Decipit hac oculos ægide, diues amor.
Combien donnent à la force des sens les poëtes, qui font Narcisse esperdu de l'amour de son ombre:
Cunctáque miratur, quibus est mirabilis ipse;Se cupit imprudens; et qui probat, ipse probatur;Dûmque petit, petitur: paritérque accendit et ardent:
Take a musket-ball under the forefinger, the middle finger being lapped over it, it feels so like two that a man will have much ado to persuade himself there is but one; the end of the two fingers feeling each of them one at the same time; for that the senses are very often masters of our reason, and constrain it to receive impressions which it judges and knows to be false, is frequently seen. I set aside the sense of feeling, that has its functions nearer, more lively, and substantial, that so often, by the effects of the pains it helps the body to, subverts and overthrows all those fine Stoical resolutions, and compels him to cry out of his belly, who has resolutely established this doctrine in his soul—“That the colic, and all other pains and diseases, are indifferent things, not having the power to abate any thing of the sovereign felicity wherein the wise man is seated by his virtue.” There is no heart so effeminate that the rattle and sound of our drums and trumpets will not inflame with courage; nor so sullen that the harmony of our music will not rouse and cheer; nor so stubborn a soul that will not feel itself struck with some reverence in considering the gloomy vastness of our churches, the variety of ornaments, and order of our ceremonies; and in hearing the solemn music of our organs, and the grace and devout harmony of our voices. Even those that come in with contempt feel a certain shivering in their hearts, and something of dread that makes them begin to doubt their opinions. For my part I do not think myself strong enough to hear an ode of Horace or Catullus sung by a beautiful young mouth without emotion; and Zeno had reason to say “that the voice was the flower of beauty.” One would once make me believe that a certain person, whom all we Frenchmen know, had imposed upon me in repeating some verses that he had made; that they were not the same upon paper that they were in the air; and that my eyes would make a contrary judgment to my ears; so great a power has pronunciation to give fashion and value to works that are left to the efficacy and modulation of the voice. And therefore Philoxenus was not so much to blame, hearing one giving an ill accent to some composition of his, in spurning and breaking certain earthen vessels of his, saying, “I break what is thine, because thou corruptest what is mine.” To what end did those men who have, with a firm resolution, destroyed themselves, turn away their faces that they might not see the blow that was by themselves appointed? And that those who, for their health, desire and command incisions to be made, and cauteries to be applied to them, cannot endure the sight of the preparations, instruments, and operations of the surgeon, being that the sight is not in any way to participate in the pain? Are not these proper examples to verify the authority the senses have over the imagination? ‘Tis to much purpose that we know these tresses were borrowed from a page or a lackey; that this rouge came from Spain, and this pearl-powder from the Ocean Sea. Our sight will, nevertheless, compel us to confess their subject more agreeable and more lovely against all reason; for in this there is nothing of its own:—
Auferinrar cultu; gemmis, auroque tegunturCrimina; pars minima est ipsa puella sni.Spe, ubi sit quod ames, inter tarn multa requiras:Decipit hac oculos gide dives Amor.
“By dress we’re won; gold, gems, and rich brocadesMake up the pageant that your heart invades;In all that glittering figure which you see,The far least part of her own self is she;In vain for her you love amidst such costYou search, the mistress in such dress is lost.”
What a strange power do the poets attribute to the senses, that make Narcissus so desperately in love with his own shadow,
Cunctaque miratur, quibus est mirabilis ipse;Se cupit imprudens, et, qui probat, ipse probatur;Dumque petit, petitur; pariterque accendit, et ardet:
“Admireth all; for which to be admired;And inconsiderately himself desir’d.The praises which he gives his beauty claim’d,Who seeks is sought, th’ inflamer is inflam’d:”
et l'entendement de Pygmalion si troublé par l'impression de la veuë de sa statue d'iuoire, qu'il l'aime et la serue pour viue:
Oscula dat reddique putat, sequitúrque tenétque,Et credit tactis digitos infidere membris,Et metuit pressos veniat ne liuor in artus.
and Pygmalion’s judgment so troubled by the impression of the sight of his ivory statue that he loves and adores it as if it were a living woman!
Oscnla dat, reddique putat: sequi turque, tenetque,Et credit tactis digitos insidere membris;Et metuit, pressos veniat ne livor in artus.
“He kisses, and believes he’s kissed again;Seizes, and ‘twixt his arms his love doth strain,And thinks the polish’d ivory thus heldDoth to his fingers amorous pressure yield,And has a timorous fear, lest black and blueShould in the parts with ardour press’d ensue.”
Qu'on loge vn philosophe dans vne cage de menus filets de fer clair-semez, qui soit suspendue au hault des tours nostre Dame de Paris; il verra par raison euidente, qu'il est impossible qu'il en tombe; et si ne se sçauroit garder, s'il n'a accoustumé le mestier des couureurs, que la veuë de cette haulteur extreme, ne l'espouuante et ne le transisse. Car nous auons assez affaire de nous asseurer aux galeries, qui sont en nos clochers, si elles sont façonnées à iour, encores qu'elles soyent de pierre. Il y en a qui n'en peuuent pas seulement porter la pensée. Qu'on iette vne poultre entre ces deux tours d'vne grosseur telle qu'il nous la faut à nous promener dessus, il n'y a sagesse philosophique de si grande fermeté, qui puisse nous donner courage d'y marcher, comme nous ferions si elle estoit à terre. I'ay souuent essayé cela, en noz montaignes de deça, et si suis de ceux qui ne s'effrayent que mediocrement de telles choses, que ie ne pouuoy souffrir la veuë de cette profondeur infinie, sans horreur et tremblement de iarrets et de cuisses, encores qu'il s'en fallust bien ma longueur, que ie ne fusse du tout au bord, et n'eusse sçeu choir, si ie ne me fusse porté à escient au danger. I'y remarquay aussi, quelque haulteur qu'il y eust, pourueu qu'en cette pente il s'y presentast vn arbre, ou bosse de rocher, pour soustenir vn peu la veuë, et la diuiser, que cela nous allege et donne asseurance; comme si c'estoit chose dequoy à la cheute nous peussions receuoir secours: mais que les precipices coupez et vniz, nous ne les pouuons pas seulement regarder sans tournoyement de teste: vt despici sine vertigine simul oculornm animique non possit la veuë. Ce fut pourquoy ce beau philosophe se creua les yeux, pour descharger l'ame de la desbauche qu'elle en receuoit, et pouuoir philosopher plus en liberté. Mais à ce comte, il se deuoit aussi faire estoupper les oreilles, que Theophrastus dit estre le plus dangereux instrument que nous ayons pour receuoir des impressions violentes à nous troubler et changer; et se deuoit priuer en fin de tous les autres sens; c'est à dire de son estre et de sa vie. Car ils ont tous cette puissance, de commander nostre discours et nostre ame. Fit etiam sæpe specie quadam, sæpe vocum grauitate et cantibus, vt pellantur animi vehementius: sæpe etiam cura et timore. Les medecins tiennent, qu'il y a certaines complexions, qui s'agitent par aucuns sons et instrumens iusques à la fureur. I'en ay veu, qui ne pouuoient ouyr ronger vn os soubs leur table sans perdre patience: et n'est guere homme, qui ne se trouble à ce bruit aigre et poignant, que font les limes en raclant le fer: comme à ouyr mascher pres de nous, ou ouyr parler quelqu'vn, qui ayt le passage du gosier ou du nez empesché, plusieurs s'en esmeuuent, iusques à la colere et la haine. Ce flusteur protocole de Gracchus, qui amollissoit, roidissoit, et contournoit la voix de son maistre, lors qu'il haranguoit à Rome, à quoy seruoit il, si le mouuement et qualité du son, n'auoit force à esmouuoir et alterer le iugement des auditeurs? Vrayement il y a bien dequoy faire si grande feste de la fermeté de cette belle piece, qui se laisse manier et changer au bransle et accidens d'vn si leger vent. Cette mesme pipperie, que les sens apportent à nostre entendement, ils la reçoiuent à leur tour. Nostre ame par fois s'en reuenche de mesme, ils mentent, et se trompent à l'enuy. Ce que nous voyons et oyons agitez de colere, nous ne l'oyons pas tel qu'il est.
Et solem geminum, et duplices se ostendere Thebas.
Put a philosopher into a cage of small thin set bars of iron, hang him on the top of the high tower of Notre Dame at Paris; he will see, by manifest reason, that he cannot possibly fall, and yet he will find (unless he has been used to the plumber’s trade) that he cannot help but the sight of the excessive height will fright and astound him; for we have enough to do to assure ourselves in the galleries of our steeples, if they are made with open work, although they are of stone; and some there are that cannot endure so much as to think of it. Let there be a beam thrown over betwixt these two towers, of breadth sufficient to walk upon, there is no philosophical wisdom so firm that can give us the courage to walk over it as we should do upon the ground. I have often tried this upon our mountains in these parts; and though I am one who am not the most subject to be afraid, I was not able to endure to look into that infinite depth without horror and trembling, though I stood above my length from the edge of the precipice, and could not have fallen unless I would. Where I also observed that, what height soever the precipice was, provided there were some tree, or some jutting out of a rock, a little to support and divide the sight, it a little eases our fears, and gives greater assurance; as if they were things by which in falling we might have some relief; but that direct precipices we are not to look upon without being giddy; Ut despici vine vertigine timid ocvlorum animique non possit: “‘To that one cannot look without dizziness;” which is a manifest imposture of the sight. And therefore it was that that fine philosopher put out his own eyes, to free the soul from being diverted by them, and that he might philosophize at greater liberty; but, by the same rule, he should have dammed up his ears, that Theophrastus says are the most dangerous instruments about us for receiving violent impressions to alter and disturb us; and, finally, should have deprived himself of all his other senses, that is to say, of his life and being; for they have all the power to command our soul and reason: Fit etiam sope specie qudam, sope vocum gravitate et cantibus, ut pettantur animi vehementius; sope etiam cura et timor, “For it often falls out that the minds are more vehemently struck by some sight, by the quality and sound of the voice, or by singing; and ofttimes also by grief and fear.” Physicians hold that there are certain complexions that are agitated by the same sounds and instruments even to fury. I have seen some who could not hear a bone gnawed under the table without impatience; and there is scarce any man who is not disturbed at the sharp and shrill noise that the file makes in grating upon the iron; as also to hear chewing near them, or to hear any one speak who has an impediment in the throat or nose, will move some people even to anger and hatred. Of what use was that piping prompter of Gracchus, who softened, raised, and moved his master’s voice whilst he declaimed at Rome, if the movements and quality of the sound had not the power to move and alter the judgments of the auditory? In earnest, there is wonderful reason to keep such a clutter about the firmness of this fine piece, that suffers itself to be turned and twined by the motion and accidents of so light a wind.
The same cheat that the senses put upon our understanding they have in turn put upon them; the soul also some times has its revenge; they lie and contend which should most deceive one another. What we see and hear when we are transported with passion, we neither see nor hear as it is:—
Et solem geminum, et duplices se ostendere Thebas.
“Thebes seems two cities, and the sun two suns.”
L'obiect que nous aymons, nous semble plus beau qu'il n'est:
Multimodis igitur prauas turpésque videmusEsse in deliciis, summóque in honore vigere:
et plus laid celuy que nous auons à contre-cœur. A vn homme ennuyé et affligé, la clarté du iour semble obscurcie et tenebreuse. Noz sens sont non seulement alterez, mais souuent hebetez du tout, par les passions de l'ame. Combien de choses voyons nous, que nous n'apperceuons pas, si nous auons nostre esprit empesché ailleurs?
In rebus quoque apertis noscere possis,Si non aduertas animum, proinde esse, quasi omniTempore semotæ fuerint, longéque remotæ.
The object that we love appears to us more beautiful than it really is;
Multimodis igitur pravas turpesque videmusEsse in deliciis, summoque in honore vigere;
“Hence ‘tis that ugly things in fancied dressSeem gay, look fair to lovers’ eyes, and please;”
and that we hate more ugly; to a discontented and afflicted man the light of the day seems dark and overcast. Our senses are not only depraved, but very often stupefied by the passions of the soul; how many things do we see that we do not take notice of, if the mind be occupied with other thoughts?
In rebus quoque apertis noscere possis,Si non advertas animum, proinde esse quasi omniTempore semot fuerint, longeque remot:
“Nay, even in plainest things, unless the mindTake heed, unless she sets herself to find,The thing no more is seen, no more belov’d,Than if the most obscure and most remov’d:”
Il semble que l'ame retire au dedans, et amuse les puissances des sens. Par ainsin et le dedans et le dehors de l'homme est plein de foiblesse et de mensonge. Ceux qui ont apparié nostre vie à vn songe, ont eu de la raison, à l'aduanture plus qu'ils ne pensoyent. Quand nous songeons, nostre ame vit, agit, exerce toutes ses facultez, ne plus ne moins que quand elle veille; mais si plus mollement et obscurement; non de tant certes, que la difference y soit, comme de la nuict à vne clarté vifue: ouy, comme de la nuict à l'ombre: là elle dort, icy elle sommeille: plus et moins; ce sont tousiours tenebres, et tenebres Cymmeriennes. Nous veillons dormants, et veillants dormons. Ie ne voy pas si clair dans le sommeil: mais quant au veiller, ie ne le trouue iamais assez pur et sans nuage. Encore le sommeil en sa profondeur, endort par fois les songes: mais nostre veiller n'est iamais si esueillé, qu'il purge et dissipe bien à poinct les resueries, qui sont les songes des veillants, et pires que songes. Nostre raison et nostre ame receuant les fantasies et opinions, qui luy nayssent en dormant, et authorizant les actions de noz songes de pareille approbation, qu'elle fait celles du iour: pourquoy ne mettons nous en doubte, si nostre penser, nostre agir, est pas vn autre songer, et nostre veiller, quelque espece de dormir? Si les sens sont noz premiers iuges, ce ne sont pas les nostres qu'il faut seuls appeller au conseil: car en cette faculté, les animaux ont autant ou plus de droit que nous. Il est certain qu'aucuns ont l'ouye plus aigue que l'homme, d'autres la veue, d'autres le sentiment, d'autres l'attouchement ou le goust. Democritus disoit que les Dieux et les bestes auoyent les facultez sensitiues beaucoup plus parfaictes que l'homme. Or entre les effects de leurs sens, et les nostres, la difference est extreme. Nostre saliue nettoye et asseche noz playes, elle tue le serpent.
Tantáque in his rebus distantia differitásque est,Vt quod aliis cibus est, aliis fuat acre venenum.Sæpe etenim serpens, hominis contacta saliua,Disperit, ac sese mandendo conficit ipsa.
it would appear that the soul retires within, and amuses the powers of the senses. And so both the inside and the outside of man is full of infirmity and falsehood.
They who have compared our lives to a dream were, perhaps, more in the right than they were aware of. When we dream, the soul lives, works, and exercises all its faculties, neither more nor less than when awake; but more largely and obscurely, yet not so much, neither, that the difference should be as great as betwixt night and the meridian brightness of the sun, but as betwixt night and shade; there she sleeps, here she slumbers; but, whether more or less, ‘tis still dark, and Cimmerian darkness. We wake sleeping, and sleep waking. I do not see so clearly in my sleep; but as to my being awake, I never found it clear enough and free from clouds; moreover, sleep, when it is profound, sometimes rocks even dreams themselves asleep; but our waking is never so sprightly that it rightly purges and dissipates those whimsies, which are waking dreams, and worse than dreams. Our reason and soul receiving those fancies and opinions that come in dreams, and authorizing the actions of our dreams with the like approbation that they do those of the day, wherefore do we not doubt whether our thought, our action, is not another sort of dreaming, and our waking a certain kind of sleep?
If the senses be our first judges, it is not ours that we are alone to consult; for, in this faculty, beasts have as great, or greater, than we; it is certain that some of them have the sense of hearing more quick than man; others that of seeing, others that of feeling, others that of touch and taste. Democritus said, that the gods and brutes had the sensitive faculties more perfect than man. But betwixt the effects of their senses and ours the difference is extreme. Our spittle cleanses and dries up our wounds; it kills the serpent:—
Tantaque in his rebas distantia differitasque est,Ut quod aliis cibus est, aliis fuat acre venenum.Spe etenim serpens, hominis contacta saliv,Disperit, ac sese mandendo conficit ipsa:
“And in those things the difference is so greatThat what’s one’s poison is another’s meat;For serpents often have been seen, ‘tis said,When touch’d with human spittle, to go mad,And bite themselves to death:”
Quelle qualité donnerons nous à la saliue, ou selon nous, ou selon le serpent? Par quel des deux sens verifierons nous sa veritable essence que nous cherchons? Pline dit qu'il y a aux Indes certains lieures marins, qui nous sont poison, et nous à eux: de maniere que du seul attouchement nous les tuons. Qui sera veritablement poison, ou l'homme, ou le poisson? à qui en croirons nous, ou au poisson de l'homme, ou à l'homme du poisson? Quelque qualité d'air infecte l'homme qui ne nuit point au bœuf; quelque autre le bœuf, qui ne nuit point à l'homme; laquelle des deux sera en verité et en nature pestilente qualité? Ceux qui ont la iaunisse, ils voyent toutes choses iaunastres et plus pasles que nous:
Lurida præterea fiunt quæcunque tuenturArquati.
what quality shall we attribute to our spittle? as it affects ourselves, or as it affects the serpent? By which of the two senses shall we prove the true essence that we seek for?
Pliny says there are certain sea-hares in the Indies that are poison to us, and we to them; insomuch that, with the least touch, we kill them. Which shall be truly poison, the man or the fish? Which shall we believe, the fish of the man, or the man of the fish? One quality of the air infects a man, that does the ox no harm; some other infects the ox, but hurts not the man. Which of the two shall, in truth and nature, be the pestilent quality? To them who have the jaundice, all things seem yellow and paler than to us:—
Lurida prterea fiunt, qucunque tuentur Arquati.
“Besides, whatever jaundic’d eyes do viewLooks pale as well as those, and yellow too.”
Ceux qui ont cette maladie que les medecins nomment Hyposphragma, qui est vne suffusion de sang soubs la peau, voient toutes choses rouges et sanglantes. Ces humeurs, qui changent ainsi les operations de nostre veuë, que sçauons nous si elles predominent aux bestes, et leur sont ordinaires? Car nous en voyons les vnes, qui ont les yeux iaunes, comme noz malades de iaunisse, d'autres qui les ont sanglans de rougeur: à celles là, il est vray-semblable, que la couleur des obiects paroist autre qu'à nous: quel iugement des deux sera le vray? Car il n'est pas dict, que l'essence des choses, se rapporte à l'homme seul. La dureté, la blancheur, la profondeur, et l'aigreur, touchent le seruice et science des animaux, comme la nostre: Nature leur en a donné l'vsage comme à nous. Quand nous pressons l'œil, les corps que nous regardons, nous les apperceuons plus longs et estendus: plusieurs bestes ont l'œil ainsi pressé: cette longueur est donc à l'aduanture la veritable forme de ce corps, non pas celle que noz yeux luy donnent en leur assiette ordinaire. Si nous serrons l'œil par dessoubs, les choses nous semblent doubles:
Bina lucernarum florentia lumina flammis,Et duplices hominum facies, et corpora bina.
They who are troubled with the disease that the physicians call hyposphagma—which is a suffusion of blood under the skin—see all things red and bloody. What do we know but that these humours, which thus alter the operations of sight, predominate in beasts, and are usual with them? for we see some whose eyes are yellow, like us who have the jaundice; and others of a bloody colour; ‘tis likely that the colours of objects seem other to them than to us. Which of the two shall make a right judgment? for it is not said that the essence of things has a relation to man only; hardness, whiteness, depth, and sharpness, have reference to the service and knowledge of animals as well as to us, and nature has equally designed them for their use. When we press down the eye, the body that we look upon we perceive to be longer and more extended;—many beasts have their eyes so pressed down; this length, therefore, is perhaps the true form of that body, and not that which our eyes give it in the usual state. If we close the lower part of the eye things appear double to us:—
Bina lucemarum fiorentia lumina flammis...Et duplices hominum facis, et corpora bina.
“One lamp seems double, and the men appearEach on two bodies double heads to bear.”
Si nous auons les oreilles empeschées de quelque chose, ou le passage de l'ouye resserré, nous receuons le son autre, que nous ne faisons ordinairement: les animaux qui ont les oreilles velues, ou qui n'ont qu'vn bien petit trou au lieu de l'oreille, ils n'oyent par consequent pas ce que nous oyons, et reçoiuent le son autre. Nous voyons aux festes et aux theatres, qu'opposant à la lumiere des flambeaux, vne vitre teinte de quelque couleur, tout ce qui est en ce lieu, nous appert ou vert, ou iaune, ou violet:
Et vulgò faciunt id lutea russáque vela,Et ferrugina, cùm, magnis intenta theatris,Per malos volgata trabésque trementia pendent:Namque ibi consessum caueai subter, et omnemScenai speciem, patrum, matrúmque, deroúmqueInficiunt, cogùntque suo volitare colore.
If our ears be hindered, or the passage stopped with any thing, we receive the sound quite otherwise than we usually do; animals, likewise, who have either the ears hairy, or but a very little hole instead of an ear, do not, consequently, hear as we do, but receive another kind of sound. We see at festivals and theatres that, opposing a painted glass of a certain colour to the light of the flambeaux, all things in the place appear to us green, yellow, or violet:—
Et vulgo faciunt id lutea russaque vela,Et ferrugina, cum, magnis intenta theatris,Per malos vulgata trabesque, trementia pendent;Namque ibi consessum caveai subter, et omnemScenai speciem, patrum, matrumque, deorumqueInficiunt, coguntque suo volitare colore:
“Thus when pale curtains, or the deeper red,O’er all the spacious theatre are spread,Which mighty masts and sturdy pillars bear,And the loose curtains wanton in the air;Whole streams of colours from the summit flow,The rays divide them in their passage through,And stain the scenes, and men, and gods below:”
Il est vray-semblable que les yeux des animaux, que nous voyons estre de diuerse couleur, leur produisent les apparences des corps de mesmes leurs yeux. Pour le iugement de l'operation des sens, il faudroit donc que nous en fussions premierement d'accord auec les bestes, secondement entre nous mesmes. Ce que nous ne sommes aucunement: et entrons en debat tous les coups de ce que l'vn oyt, void, ou gouste, quelque chose autrement qu'vn autre: et debattons autant que d'autre chose, de la diuersité des images que les sens nous rapportent. Autrement oit, et voit par la regle ordinaire de nature, et autrement gouste, vn enfant qu'vn homme de trente ans: et cettuy-cy autrement qu'vn sexagenaire. Les sens sont aux vns plus obscurs et plus sombres, aux autres plus ouuerts et plus aigus. Nous receuons les choses autres et autres selon que nous sommes, et qu'il nous semble. Or nostre sembler estant si incertain et controuersé, ce n'est plus miracle, si on nous dit, que nous pouuons auouër que la neige nous apparoist blanche, mais que d'establir si de son essence elle est telle, et à la verité, nous ne nous en sçaurions respondre: et ce commencement esbranlé, toute la science du monde s'en va necessairement à vau-l'eau. Quoy, que noz sens mesmes s'entr'empeschent l'vn l'autre? vne peinture semble esleuée à la veue, au maniement elle semble plate: dirons nous que le musque soit aggreable ou non, qui resiouit nostre sentiment, et offence nostre goust? Il y a des herbes et des vnguens propres à vne partie du corps, qui en blessent vne autre: le miel est plaisant au goust, mal plaisant à la veue. Ces bagues qui sont entaillées en forme de plumes, qu'on appelle en deuise, pennes sans fin, il n'y a œil qui en puisse discerner la largeur, et qui se sçeust deffendre de cette pipperie, que d'vn costé elle n'aille en eslargissant, et s'appointant et estressissant par l'autre, mesmes quand on la roulle autour du doigt: toutesfois au maniement elle vous semble equable en largeur et par tout pareille. Ces personnes qui pour aider leur volupté, se seruoyent anciennement de miroirs, propres à grossir et aggrandir l'obiect qu'ils representent, affin que les membres qu'ils auoient à embesongner, leur pleussent d'auantage par cette accroissance oculaire: auquel des deux sens donnoient-ils gaigné, ou à la veue qui leur representoit ces membres gros et grands à souhait, ou à l'attouchement qui les leur presentoit petits et desdaignables? Sont-ce nos sens qui prestent au subject ces diuerses conditions, et que les subjects n'en ayent pourtant qu'vne? Comme nous voyons du pain que nous mangeons; ce n'est que pain, mais nostre vsage en fait des os, du sang, de la chair, des poils, et des ongles:
Vt cibus, in membra atque artus cùm diditur omnes,Disperit, atque aliam naturam sufficit ex se.
‘tis likely that the eyes of animals, which we see to be of divers colours, produce the appearance of bodies the same with their eyes.
We should, therefore, to make a right judgment of the oppositions of the senses, be first agreed with beasts, and secondly amongst ourselves; which we by no means are, but enter into dispute every time that one hears, sees, or tastes something otherwise than another does, and contests, as much as upon any other thing, about the diversity of the images that the senses represent to us. A child, by the ordinary rule of nature, hears, sees, and talks otherwise than a man of thirty years old; and he than one of threescore. The senses are, in some, more obscure and dusky, and more open and quick in others. We receive things variously, according as we are, and according as they appear to us. Those rings which are cut out in the form of feathers, which are called endless feathers, no eye can discern their size, or can keep itself from the deception that on one side they enlarge, and on the other contract, and come So a point, even when the ring is being turned round the finger; yet, when you feel them, they seem all of an equal size. Now, our perception being so uncertain and so controverted, it is no more a wonder if we are told that we may declare that snow appears white to us; but that to affirm that it is in its own essence really so is more than we are able to justify; and, this foundation being shaken, all the knowledge in the world must of necessity fall to ruin. What! do our senses themselves hinder one another? A picture seems raised and embossed to the sight; in the handling it seems flat to the touch. Shall we say that musk, which delights the smell, and is offensive to the taste, is agreeable or no? There are herbs and unguents proper for one part o the body, that are hurtful to another; honey is pleasant to the taste, but offensive to the sight. They who, to assist their lust, used in ancient times to make use of magnifying-glasses to represent the members they were to employ bigger, by that ocular tumidity to please themselves the more; to which of their senses did they give the prize,—whether to the sight, that represented the members as large and great as they would desire, or to the feeling, which represented them little and contemptible? Are they our senses that supply the subject with these different conditions, and have the subjects themselves, nevertheless, but one? As we see in the bread we eat, it is nothing but bread, but, by being eaten, it becomes bones, blood, flesh, hair; and nails:—
Ut cibus in membra atque artus cum diditur omnes,Disperit,, atque aliam naturam sufficit ex se;
“As meats, diffus’d through all the members, loseTheir former state, and different things compose;”
L'humeur que succe la racine d'vn arbre, elle se fait tronc, feuille et fruict: l'air n'estant qu'vn, il se fait par l'application à vne trompette, diuers en mille sortes de sons. Sont-ce, dis-ie, noz sens qui façonnent de mesme, de diuerses qualitez ces subjects; ou s'ils les ont telles? Et sur ce doubte, que pouuons nous resoudre de leur veritable essence? D'auantage puis que les accidens des maladies, de la resuerie, ou du sommeil, nous font paroistre les choses autres, qu'elles ne paroissent aux sains, aux sages, et à ceux qui veillent: n'est-il pas vray-semblable que nostre assiette droicte, et noz humeurs naturelles, ont aussi dequoy donner vn estre aux choses, se rapportant à leur condition, et les accommoder à soy, comme font les humeurs desreglées: et nostre santé aussi capable de leur fournir son visage, comme la maladie? Pourquoy n'a le temperé quelque forme des obiects relatiue à soy, comme l'intemperé: et ne leur imprimera-il pareillement son charactere? Le desgousté charge la fadeur au vin; le sain la saueur; l'alteré la friandise. Or nostre estat accommodant les choses à soy, et les transformant selon soy, nous ne sçauons plus quelles sont les choses en verité, car rien ne vient à nous que falsifié et alteré par noz sens. Où le compas, l'esquarre, et la regle sont gauches, toutes les proportions qui s'en tirent, tous les bastimens qui se dressent à leur mesure, sont aussi necessairement manques et deffaillans. L'incertitude de noz sens rend incertain tout ce qu'ils produisent.
Denique vt in fabrica, si praua est regula prima,Normáque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,Et libella aliqua si ex parte claudicat hilum,Omnia mendosè fieri, atque obstipa necessum est,Praua, cubantia, prona, supina, atque absona tecta,Iam ruere vt quædam videantur velle, ruántqueProdita iudiciis fallacibus omnia primis.Hic igitur ratio tibi rerum praua necesse est,Falsáque sit falsis quæcumque à sensibus orta est.
the humidity sucked up by the root of a tree becomes trunk, leaf, and fruit; and the air, being but one, is modulated, in a trumpet, to a thousand sorts of sounds; are they our senses, I would fain know, that, in like manner, form these subjects into so many divers qualities, or have they them really such in themselves? And upon this doubt what can we determine of their true essence? Moreover, since the accidents of disease, of raving, or sleep, make things appear otherwise to us than they do to the healthful, the wise, and those that are awake, is it not likely that our right posture of health and understanding, and our natural humours, have, also, wherewith to give a being to things that have a relation to their own condition, and accommodate them to themselves, as well as when they are disordered;—that health is as capable of giving them an aspect as sickness? Why has not the temperate a certain form of objects relative to it, as well as the intemperate? and why may it not as well stamp it with its own character as the other? He whose mouth is out of taste, says the wine is flat; the healthful man commends its flavour, and the thirsty its briskness. Now, our condition always accommodating things to itself, and transforming them according to its own posture, we cannot know what things truly are in themselves, seeing that nothing comes to us but what is falsified and altered by the senses. Where the compass, the square, and the rule, are crooked, all propositions drawn thence, and all buildings erected by those guides, must, of necessity, be also defective; the uncertainty of our senses renders every thing uncertain that they produce:—
Denique ut in fabric, si prava est rgula prima,Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,Et libella aliqu si ex parte claudicat hilum;Omnia mendose fieri, atque obstipa necessum est,Prava, cubantia, prona, supina, atque absona tecta;Jam ruere ut qudam videantux’velle, ruantqueProdita judiciis fallacibus omnia primis;Sic igitur ratio tibi reram prava necesse est,Falsaque sit, falsis qucunque ab sensibus orta est.
“But lastly, as in building, if the lineBe not exact and straight, the rule decline,Or level false, how vain is the design!Uneven, an ill-shap’d and tottering wallMust rise; this part must sink, that part must fall,Because the rules were false that fashion’d all;Thus reason’s rules are false if all commenceAnd rise from failing and from erring sense.”
Au demeurant, qui sera propre à iuger de ces differences? Comme nous disons aux debats de la religion, qu'il nous faut vn iuge non attaché à l'vn ny à l'autre party, exempt de choix et d'affection, ce qui ne se peut parmy les Chrestiens: il aduient de mesme en cecy: car s'il est vieil, il ne peut iuger du sentiment de la vieillesse, estant luy mesme partie en ce debat: s'il est ieune, de mesme: sain, de mesme, de mesme malade, dormant, et veillant: il nous faudroit quelqu'vn exempt de toutes ces qualitez, afin que sans præoccupation de iugement, il iugeast de ces propositions, comme à luy indifferentes: et à ce compte il nous faudroit vn iuge qui ne fust pas. Pour iuger des apparences que nous receuons des subjects, il nous faudroit vn instrument iudicatoire: pour verifier cet instrument, il nous y faut de la demonstration: pour verifier la demonstration, vn instrument, nous voila au rouet. Puis que les sens ne peuuent arrester nostre dispute, estans pleins eux-mesmes d'incertitude, il faut que ce soit la raison: aucune raison ne s'establira sans vne autre raison, nous voyla à reculons iusques à l'infiny. Nostre fantasie ne s'applique pas aux choses estrangeres, ains elle est conceue par l'entremise des sens, et les sens ne comprennent pas le subject estranger, ains seulement leurs propres passions: et par ainsi la fantasie et apparence n'est pas du subject, ains seulement de la passion et souffrance du sens; laquelle passion, et subject, sont choses diuerses: parquoy qui iuge par les apparences, iuge par chose autre que le subject. Et de dire que les passions des sens, rapportent à l'ame, la qualité des subjects estrangers par ressemblance; comment se peut l'ame et l'entendement asseurer de cette ressemblance, n'ayant de soy nul commerce, auec les subjects estrangers? Tout ainsi comme, qui ne cognoist pas Socrates, voyant son pourtraict, ne peut dire qu'il luy ressemble. Or qui voudroit toutesfois iuger par les apparences: si c'est par toutes, il est impossible, car elles s'entr'empeschent par leurs contrarietez et discrepances, comme nous voyons par experience. Sera ce qu'aucunes apparences choisies reglent les autres? Il faudra verifier cette choisie par vne autre choisie, la seconde par la tierce: et par ainsi ce ne sera iamais faict. Finalement, il n'y a aucune constante existence, ny de nostre estre, ny de celuy des obiects. Et nous, et nostre iugement, et toutes choses mortelles, vont coulant et roulant sans cesse. Ainsin il ne se peut establir rien de certain de l'vn à l'autre, et le iugeant, et le iugé, estans en continuelle mutation et branle. Nous n'auons aucune communication à l'estre, par ce que toute humaine nature est tousiours au milieu, entre le naistre et le mourir, ne baillant de soy qu'vne obscure apparence et ombre, et vne incertaine et debile opinion. Et si de fortune vous fichez vostre pensée à vouloir prendre son estre, ce sera ne plus ne moins que qui voudroit empoigner l'eau: car tant plus il serrera et pressera ce qui de sa nature coule par tout, tant plus il perdra ce qu'il vouloit tenir et empoigner. Ainsi veu que toutes choses sont subjectes à passer d'vn changement en autre, la raison qui y cherche vne reelle subsistance, se trouue deceuë, ne pouuant rien apprehender de subsistant et permanant: par ce que tout ou vient en estre, et n'est pas encore du tout, ou commence à mourir auant qu'il soit nay. Platon disoit que les corps n'auoient iamais existence, ouy bien naissance, estimant qu'Homere eust faict l'Ocean pere des Dieux, et Thetis la mere: pour nous montrer, que toutes choses sont en fluxion, muance et variation perpetuelle. Opinion commune à tous les philosophes auant son temps, comme il dit: sauf le seul Parmenides, qui refusoit mouuement aux choses: de la force duquel il fait grand cas. Pythagoras, que toute matiere est coulante et labile. Les Stoiciens, qu'il n'y a point de temps present, et que ce que nous appellons present, n'est que la iointure et assemblage du futur et du passé: Heraclitus, que iamais homme n'estoit deux fois entré en mesme riuiere: Epicharmus, que celuy qui a pieça emprunté de l'argent, ne le doit pas maintenant; et que celuy qui cette nuict a esté conuié à venir ce matin disner, vient auiourd'huy non conuié; attendu que ce ne sont plus eux, ils sont deuenus autres: et qu'il ne se pouuoit trouuer vne substance mortelle deux fois en mesme estat: car par soudaineté et legereté de changement, tantost elle dissipe tantost elle rassemble, elle vient, et puis s'en va, de façon, que ce qui commence à naistre, ne paruient iamais iusques à perfection d'estre. Pourautant que ce naistre n'acheue iamais, et iamais n'arreste, comme estant à bout, ains depuis la semence, va tousiours se changeant et muant d'vn à autre. Comme de semence humaine se fait premierement dans le ventre de la mere vn fruict sans forme: puis vn enfant formé, puis estant hors du ventre, vn enfant de mammelle; apres il deuient garçon; puis consequemment vn iouuenceau; apres vn homme faict; puis vn homme d'aage; à la fin decrepite vieillard. De maniere que l'aage et generation subsequente va tousiours deffaisant et gastant la precedente.
Mutat enim mundi naturam totius ætas,Ex alióque alius status excipere omnia debet,Nec manet vlla sui similis res: omnia migrant,Omnia commutat natura et vertere cogit.
Et puis nous autres sottement craignons vne espece de mort, là où nous en auons desia passé et en passons tant d'autres. Car non seulement, comme disoit Heraclitus, la mort du feu est generation de l'air, et la mort de l'air, generation de l'eau. Mais encor plus manifestement le pouuons nous voir en nous mesmes. La fleur d'aage se meurt et passe quand la vieillesse suruient: et la ieunesse se termine en fleur d'aage d'homme faict: l'enfance en la ieunesse: et le premier aage meurt en l'enfance: et le iour d'hier meurt en celuy du iourd'huy, et le iourd'huy mourra en celuy de demain: et n'y a rien qui demeure, ne qui soit tousiours vn. Car qu'il soit ainsi, si nous demeurons tousiours mesmes et vns, comment est-ce que nous nous esiouyssons maintenant d'vne chose, et maintenant d'vne autre? comment est-ce que nous aymons choses contraires, ou les hayssons, nous les louons, ou nous les blasmons? comment auons nous differentes affections, ne retenants plus le mesme sentiment en la mesme pensée? Car il n'est pas vray-semblable que sans mutation nous prenions autres passions: et ce qui souffre mutation ne demeure pas vn mesme: et s'il n'est pas vn mesme, il n'est donc pas aussi: ains quant et l'estre tout vn, change aussi l'estre simplement, deuenant tousiours autre d'vn autre. Et par consequent se trompent et mentent les sens de nature, prenans ce qui apparoist, pour ce qui est, à faute de bien sçauoir que c'est qui est. Mais qu'est-ce donc qui est veritablement? ce qui est eternel: c'est à dire, qui n'a iamais eu de naissance, ny n'aura iamais fin, à qui le temps n'apporte iamais aucune mutation. Car c'est chose mobile que le temps, et qui apparoist comme en ombre, auec la matiere coulante et fluante tousiours, sans iamais demeurer stable ny permanente: à qui appartiennent ces mots, deuant et apres, et, a esté, ou sera. Lesquels tout de prime face montrent euidemment, que ce n'est pas chose qui soit: car ce seroit grande sottise et fauceté toute apparente, de dire que cela soit, qui n'est pas encore en estre, ou qui desia a cessé d'estre. Et quant à ces mots, present, instant, maintenant, par lesquels il semble que principalement nous soustenons et fondons l'intelligence du temps, la raison le descouurant, le destruit tout sur le champ: car elle le fend incontinent, et le partit en futur et en passé: comme le voulant voir necessairement desparty en deux. Autant en aduient-il à la nature, qui est mesurée, comme au temps, qui la mesure: car il n'y a non plus en elle rien qui demeure, ne qui soit subsistant, ains y sont toutes choses ou nées, ou naissantes, ou mourantes. Au moyen dequoy ce seroit peché de dire de Dieu, qui est le seul qui est, que il fut, ou il sera: car ces termes là sont declinaisons, passages, ou vicissitudes de ce qui ne peut durer, ny demeurer en estre. Parquoy il faut conclure Dieu seul est, non point selon aucune mesure du temps, mais selon vne eternité immuable et immobile, non mesurée par temps, ny subjecte à aucune declinaison: deuant lequel rien n'est, ny ne sera apres, ny plus nouueau ou plus recent; ains vn realement estant, qui par vn seul maintenant emplit le tousiours, et n'y a rien, qui veritablement soit, que luy seul: sans qu'on puisse dire, il a esté, ou, il sera, sans commencement et sans fin. A cette conclusion si religieuse, d'vn homme payen, ie veux ioindre seulement ce mot, d'vn tesmoing de mesme condition, pour la fin de ce long et ennuyeux discours, qui me fourniroit de matiere sans fin. O la vile chose, dit-il, et abiecte, que l'homme, s'il ne s'esleue au dessus de l'humanité! Voyla vn bon mot, et vn vtile desir: mais pareillement absurde. Car de faire la poignée plus grande que le poing, la brassée plus grande que le bras, et d'esperer eniamber plus que de l'estenduë de noz iambes, cela est impossible et monstrueux: ny que l'homme se monte au dessus de soy et de l'humanité: car il ne peut voir que de ses yeux, ny saisir que de ses prises. Il s'esleuera si Dieu luy preste extraordinairement la main. Il s'esleuera abandonnant et renonçant à ses propres moyens, et se laissant hausser et sousleuer par les moyens purement celestes. C'est à nostre foy Chrestienne, non à sa vertu Stoïque, de pretendre à cette diuine et miraculeuse metamorphose.
As to what remains, who can be fit to judge of and to determine those differences? As we say in controversies of religion that we must have a judge neither inclining to the one side nor the other, free from all choice and affection, which cannot be amongst Christians, just so it falls out in this; for if he be old he cannot judge of the sense of old age, being himself a party in the case; if young, there is the same exception; if healthful, sick, asleep, or awake, he is still the same incompetent judge. We must have some one exempt from all these propositions, as of things indifferent to him; and by this rule we must have a judge that never was.
To judge of the appearances that we receive of subjects, we ought t have a deciding instrument; to verify this instrument we must have demonstration; to verify this demonstration an instrument; and here we are round again upon the wheel, and no further advanced. Seeing the senses cannot determine our dispute, being full of uncertainty themselves, it must then be reason that must do it; but no reason can be erected upon any other foundation than that of another reason; and so we run back to all infinity. Our fancy does not apply itself to things that are strange, but is conceived by the mediation of the senses; and the senses do not comprehend a foreign subject, but only their own passions; by which means fancy and appearance are no part of the subject, but only of the passion and sufferance of sense; which passion and subject are different things; wherefore whoever judges by appearances judges by another thing than the subject. And to say that the passions of the senses convey to the soul the quality of foreign subjects by resemblance, how can the soul and understanding be assured of this resemblance, having of itself no commerce with foreign subjects? As they who never knew Socrates cannot, when they see his picture, say it is like him. Now, whoever would, notwithstanding, judge by appearances, if it be by all, it is impossible, because they hinder one another by their contrarieties and discrepancies, as we by experience see: shall some select appearances govern the rest? you must verify this select by another select, the second by a third, and thus there will never be any end to it. Finally, there is no constant existence, neither of the objects’ being nor our own; both we, and our judgments, and all mortal things, are evermore incessantly running and rolling; and consequently nothing certain can be established from the one to the other, both the judging and the judged being in a continual motion and mutation.
We have no communication with being, by reason that all human nature is always in the middle, betwixt being bom and dying, giving but an obscure appearance and shadow, a weak and uncertain opinion of itself; and if, perhaps, you fix your thought to apprehend your being, it would be but like grasping water; for the more you clutch your hand to squeeze and hold what is in its own nature flowing, so much more you lose of what you would grasp and hold. So, seeing that all things are subject to pass from one change to another, reason, that there looks for a real substance, finds itself deceived, not being able to apprehend any thing that is subsistent and permanent, because that every thing is either entering into being, and is not yet arrived at it, or begins to die before it is bom. Plato said, that bodies had never any existence, but only birth; conceiving that Homer had made the Ocean and Thetis father and mother of the gods, to show us that all things are in a perpetual fluctuation, motion, and variation; the opinion of all the philosophers, as he says, before his time, Parmenides only excepted, who would not allow things to have motion, on the power whereof he sets a mighty value. Pythagoras was of opinion that all matter was flowing and unstable; the Stoics, that there is no time present, and that what we call so is nothing but the juncture and meeting of the future and the past; Heraclitus, that never any man entered twice into the same river; Epichar-mus, that he who borrowed money but an hour ago does not owe it now; and that he who was invited over-night to come the next day to dinner comes nevertheless uninvited, considering that they are no more the same men, but are become others; and that there could not a mortal substance be found twice in the same condition; for, by the suddenness and quickness of the change, it one while disperses, and another reunites; it comes and goes after such a manner that what begins to be born never arrives to the perfection of being, forasmuch as that birth is never finished and never stays, as being at an end, but from the seed is evermore changing and shifting one to another; as human seed is first in the mother’s womb made a formless embryo, after delivered thence a sucking infant, afterwards it becomes a boy, then a youth, then a man, and at last a decrepit old man; so that age and subsequent generation is always destroying and spoiling that which went before:—
Mutt enira mundi naturam totius tas,Ex alioque alius status excipere omnia debet;Nec manet ulla sui similis res; omnia migrant,Omnia commutt natura, et vertere cogit.
“For time the nature of the world translates,And from preceding gives all things new states;Nought like itself remains, but all do range,And nature forces every thing to change.”
“And yet we foolishly fear one kind of death, whereas we have already passed, and do daily pass, so many others; for not only, as Heraclitus said, the death of fire is generation of air, and the death of air generation of water; but, moreover, we may more manifestly discern it in ourselves; manhood dies, and passes away when age comes on; and youth is terminated in the flower of age of a full-grown man, infancy in youth, and the first age dies in infancy; yesterday died in to-day, and to-day will die in to-morrow; and there is nothing that remains in the same state, or that is always the same thing. And that it is so let this be the proof; if we are always one and the same, how comes it to pass that we are now pleased with one thing, and by and by with another? How comes it to pass that we love or hate contrary things, that we praise or condemn them? How comes it to pass that we have different affections, and no more retain the same sentiment in the same thought? For it is not likely that without mutation we should assume other passions; and, that which suffers mutation does not remain the same, and if it be not the same it is not at all; but the same that the being is does, like it, unknowingly change and alter; becoming evermore another from another thing; and consequently the natural senses abuse and deceive themselves, taking that which seems for that which is, for want of well knowing what that which is, is. But what is it then that truly is? That which is eternal; that is to say, that never had beginning, nor never shall have ending, and to which time can bring no mutation. For time is a mobile thine, and that appears as in a shadow, with a matter evermore flowing and running, without ever remaining stable and permanent; and to which belong those words, before and after, has been, or shall be: which at the first sight, evidently show that it is not a thing that is; for it were a great folly, and a manifest falsity, to say that that is which is not et being, or that has already ceased to be. And as to these words, present, instant, and now, by which it seems that we principally support and found the intelligence of time, reason, discovering, does presently destroy it; for it immediately divides and splits it into the future and past, being of necessity to consider it divided in two. The same happens to nature, that is measured, as to time that measures it; for she has nothing more subsisting and permanent than the other, but all things are either born, bearing, or dying. So that it were sinful to say of God, who is he only who is, that he was, or that he shall be ; for those are terms of declension, transmutation, and vicissitude, of what cannot continue or remain in being; wherefore we are to conclude that God alone is, not according to any measure of time, but according to an immutable and an immovable eternity, not measured by time, nor subject to any declension; before whom nothing was, and after whom nothing shall be, either more new or more recent, but a real being, that with one sole now fills the for ever, and that there is nothing that truly is but he alone; without our being able to say, he has been, or shall be; without beginning, and without end.” To this so religious conclusion of a pagan I shall only add this testimony of one of the same condition, for the close of this long and tedious discourse, which would furnish me with endless matter: “What a vile and abject thing,” says he, “is man, if he do not raise himself above humanity!” ‘Tis a good word and a profitable desire, but withal absurd; for to make the handle bigger than the hand, the cubic longer than the arm, and to hope to stride further than our legs can reach, is both impossible and monstrous; or that man should rise above himself and humanity; for he cannot see but with his eyes, nor seize but with his hold. He shall be exalted, if God will lend him an extraordinary hand; he shall exalt himself, by abandoning and renouncing his own proper means, and by suffering himself to be raised and elevated by means purely celestial. It belongs to our Christian faith, and not to the stoical virtue, to pretend to that divine and miraculous metamorphosis.