Là où en plusieurs animaux, il n'est rien d'eux que nous n'aimions, et qui ne plaise à nos sens: de façon que de leurs excremens mesmes et de leur descharge, nous tirons non seulement de la friandise au manger, mais nos plus riches ornemens et parfums. Ce discours ne touche que nostre commun ordre, et n'est pas si sacrilege d'y vouloir comprendre ces diuines, supernaturelles et extraordinaires beautez, qu'on voit par fois reluire entre nous, comme des astres soubs vn voile corporel et terrestre. Au demeurant la part mesme que nous faisons aux animaux, des faueurs de Nature, par nostre confession, elle leur est bien auantageuse. Nous nous attribuons des biens imaginaires et fantastiques, des biens futurs et absens, desquels l'humaine capacité ne se peut d'elle mesme respondre: ou des biens que nous nous attribuons faucement, par la licence de nostre opinion, comme la raison, la science et l'honneur: et à eux, nous laissons en partage des biens essentiels, maniables et palpables, la paix, le repos, la securité, l'innocence et la santé: la santé, dis-ie, le plus beau et le plus riche present, que Nature nous sçache faire. De façon que la Philosophie, voire la Stoïque, ose bien dire qu'Heraclitus et Pherecydes, s'ils eussent peu eschanger leur sagesse auecques la santé, et se deliurer par ce marché, l'vn de l'hydropisie, l'autre de la maladie pediculaire qui le pressoit, ils eussent bien faict. Par où ils donnent encore plus grand prix à la sagesse, la comparant et contrepoisant à la santé, qu'ils ne font en cette autre proposition, qui est aussi des leurs. Ils disent que si Circé eust presenté à Vlysses deux breuuages, l'vn pour faire deuenir vn homme de fol sage, l'autre de sage fol, qu'Vlysses eust deu plustost accepter celuy de la folie, que de consentir que Circé eust changé sa figure humaine en celle d'vne beste. Et disent que la sagesse mesme eust parlé à luy en cette maniere: Quitte moy, laisse moy là, plustost que de me loger sous la figure et corps d'un asne. Comment? cette grande et diuine sapience, les philosophes la quittent donc, pour ce voile corporel et terrestre? Ce n'est donc plus par la raison, par le discours, et par l'ame, que nous excellons sur les bestes: c'est par nostre beauté, nostre beau teint, et nostre belle disposition de membres, pour laquelle il nous faut mettre nostre intelligence, nostre prudence, et tout le reste à l'abandon. Or i'accepte cette naïfue et franche confession. Certes ils ont cogneu que ces parties là, dequoy nous faisons tant de feste, que ce n'est vaine fantasie. Quand les bestes auroient donc toute la vertu, la science, la sagesse et suffisance Stoique, ce seroyent tousiours des bestes: ny ne seroyent comparables à vn homme miserable, meschant et insensé. Car en fin tout ce qui n'est comme nous sommes, n'est rien qui vaille. Et Dieu pour se faire valoir, il faut qu'il y retire, comme nous dirons tantost. Par où il appert que ce n'est par vray discours, mais par vne fierté folle et opiniastreté, que nous nous preferons aux autres animaux, et nous sequestrons de leur condition et societé. Mais pour reuenir à mon propos, nous auons pour nostre part, l'inconstance, l'irresolution, l'incertitude, le deuil, la superstition, la solicitude des choses à venir, voire apres nostre vie, l'ambition, l'auarice, la ialousie, l'enuie, les appetits desreglez, forcenez et indomptables, la guerre, la mensonge, la desloyauté, la detraction, et la curiosité. Certes nous auons estrangement surpayé ce beau discours, dequoy nous nous glorifions, et cette capacité de iuger et cognoistre, si nous l'auons achetée au prix de ce nombre infiny des passions, ausquelles nous sommes incessamment en prinse. S'il ne nous plaist de faire encore valoir, comme fait bien Socrates, cette notable prerogatiue sur les bestes, que où Nature leur a prescript certaines saisons et limites à la volupté Venerienne, elle nous en a lasché la bride à toutes heures et occasions. Vt vinum ægrotis, quia prodest rarò, nocet sæpissime, melius est non adhibere omnino, quàm, spe dubiæ salutis, in apertam perniciem incurrere: Sic, haud scio, an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, solertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sint multis, admodum paucis salutaria, non dari omnino, quàm tam munificè et tam largè dari. nous estimer auoir esté à Varro et Aristote, cette intelligence de tant de choses? Les a elle exemptez des incommoditez humaines? ont-ils esté deschargez des accidents qui pressent vn crocheteur? ont ils tiré de la logique quelque consolation à la goute? pour auoir sçeu comme cette humeur se loge aux iointures, l'en ont ils moins sentie? sont ils entrez en composition de la mort, pour sçauoir qu'aucunes nations s'en resiouissent: et du cocuage, pour sçauoir les femmes estre communes en quelque region? Au rebours, ayans tenu le premier rang en sçauoir, l'vn entre les Romains, l'autre, entre les Grecs, et en la saison où la science fleurissoit le plus, nous n'auons pas pourtant appris qu'ils ayent eu aucune particuliere excellence en leur vie: voire le Grec a assez affaire à se descharger d'aucunes tasches notables en la sienne. A on trouué que la volupté et la santé soyent plus sauoureuses à celuy qui sçait l'astrologie, et la grammaire:
Illiterati num minus nerui rigent?
whereas, in several animals there is nothing that we do not love, and that does not please our senses; so that from their very excrements we do not only extract wherewith to heighten our sauces, but also our richest ornaments and perfumes. This discourse reflects upon none but the ordinary sort of women, and is not so sacrilegious as to comprehend those divine, supernatural, and extraordinary beauties, which we see shine occasionally among us like stars under a corporeal and terrestrial veil.
As to the rest, the very share that we allow to beasts of the bounty of nature, by our own confession, is very much to their advantage. We attribute to ourselves imaginary and fantastic good, future and absent good, for which human capacity cannot of herself be responsible; or good, that we falsely attribute to ourselves by the license of opinion, as reason, knowledge, and honour, and leave to them for their dividend, essential, durable, and palpable good, as peace, repose, security, innocence, and health; health, I say, the fairest and richest present that nature can make us. Insomuch that philosophy, even the Stoic, is so bold as to say, “That Heraclitus and Pherecides, could they have trucked their wisdom for health, and have delivered themselves, the one of his dropsy, and the other of the lousy disease that tormented him, they had done well.” By which they set a greater value upon wisdom, comparing and putting it into the balance with health, than they do with this other proposition, which is also theirs; they say that if Circe had presented Ulysses with the two potions, the one to make a fool become a wise man, and the other to make a wise man become a fool, that Ulysses ought rather to have chosen the last, than consent to that by which Circe changed his human figure into that of a beast; and say that wisdom itself would have spoke to him after this manner: “Forsake me, let me alone, rather than lodge me under the body and figure of an ass.” How! the philosophers, then will abandon this great and divine wisdom for this corporeal and terrestrial covering? It is then no more by reason, by discourse, and by the soul, that we excel beasts; ‘tis by our beauty, our fair complexion, and our fine symmetry of parts, for which we must quit our intelligence, our prudence, and all the rest. Well, I accept this open and free confession; certainly they knew that those parts, upon which we so much value ourselves, are no other than vain fancy. If beasts then had all the virtue, knowledge, wisdom, and stoical perfection, they would still be beasts, and would not be comparable to man, miserable, wicked, mad, man. For, in short, whatever is not as we are is nothing worth; and God, to procure himself an esteem among us, must put himself into that shape, as we shall show anon. By which it appears that it is not upon any true ground of reason, but by a foolish pride and vain opinion, that we prefer ourselves before other animals, and separate ourselves from their society and condition.
But to return to what I was upon before; we have for our part inconstancy, irresolution, incertitude, sorrow, superstition, solicitude of things to come, even after we shall be no more, ambition, avarice, jealousy, envy, irregular, frantic, and untamed appetites, war, lying, disloyalty, detraction, and curiosity. Doubtless, we have strangely overpaid this fine reason, upon which we so much glorify ourselves, and this capacity of judging and knowing, if we have bought it at the price of this infinite number of passions to which we are eternally subject. Unless we shall also think fit, as even Socrates does, to add to the counterpoise that notable prerogative above beasts, That whereas nature has prescribed them certain seasons and limits for the delights of Venus, she has given us the reins at all hours and all seasons.” Ut vinum ogrotis, quia prodest rar, nocet sopissime, melius est non adhibere omnino, quam, spe dubio salutis, in apertam per-niciem incurrere; sic, haud scio an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, solertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sint multis, ad-modum paucis saluiaria, non dari omnino, quam tam muniice et tam large dari? As it falls out that wine often hurting the sick, and very rarely doing them good, it is better not to give them any at all than to run into an apparent danger out of hope of an uncertain benefit, so I know not whether it had not been better for mankind that this quick motion, this penetration, this subtlety that we call reason, had not been given to man at all; considering how pestiferous it is to many, and useful but to few, than to have been conferred in so abundant manner, and with so liberal a hand.” Of what advantage can we conceive the knowledge of so many things was to Yarro and Aristotle? Did it exempt them from human inconveniences? Were they by it freed from the accidents that lay heavy upon the shoulders of a porter? Did they extract from their logic any consolation for the gout? Or, for knowing how this humour is lodged in the joints, did they feel it the less? Did they enter into composition with death by knowing that some nations rejoice at his approach; or with cuckoldry, by knowing that in some parts of the world wives are in common? On the contrary, having been reputed the greatest men for knowledge, the one amongst the Romans and the other amongst the Greeks, and in a time when learning did most flourish, we have not heard, nevertheless, that they had any particular excellence in their lives; nay, the Greek had enough to do to clear himself from some notable blemishes in his. Have we observed that pleasure and health have a better relish with him that understands astrology and grammar than with others?
Illiterati num minus nervi rigent?
“Th’ illiterate ploughman is as fitFor Venus’ service as the wit:”
et la honte et pauureté moins importunes?
Scilicet et morbis et debilitate carebis,Et luctum et curam effugies, et tempora vitæLonga tibi post hæc facto meliore dabuntur.
I'ay veu en mon temps, cent artisans, cent laboureurs, plus sages et plus heureux que des recteurs de l'vniuersité: et lesquels i'aimerois mieux ressembler. La doctrine, ce m'est aduis, tient rang entre les choses necessaires à la vie, comme la gloire, la noblesse, la dignité, ou pour le plus comme la richesse, et telles autres qualitez qui y seruent voyrement, mais de loing, et plus par fantasie que par nature. Il ne nous faut guere non plus d'offices, de regles, et de loix de viure, en nostre communauté, qu'il en faut aux grues et formis en la leur. Et neantmoins nous voyons qu'elles s'y conduisent tres ordonnément, sans erudition. Si l'homme estoit sage, il prendroit le vray prix de chasque chose, selon qu'elle seroit la plus vtile et propre à sa vie. Qui nous contera par nos actions et deportemens, il s'en trouuera plus grand nombre d'excellens entre les ignorans, qu'entre les sçauans; ie dy en toute sorte de vertu. La vieille Rome me semble en auoir bien porté de plus grande valeur, et pour la paix, et pour la guerre, que cette Rome sçauante, qui se ruina soy-mesme. Quand le demeurant seroit tout pareil, aumoins la preud'hommie et l'innocence demeureroient du costé de l'ancienne: car elle loge singulierement bien auec la simplicité. Mais ie laisse ce discours, qui me tireroit plus loing, que ie ne voudrois suyure. I'en diray seulement encore cela, que c'est la seule humilité et submission, qui peut effectuer vn homme de bien. Il ne faut pas laisser au iugement de chacun la cognoissance de son deuoir: il le luy faut prescrire, non pas le laisser choisir à son discours: autrement selon l'imbecillité et varieté infinie de nos raisons et opinions, nous nous forgerions en fin des deuoirs, qui nous mettroient à nous manger les vns les autres, comme dit Epicurus. La premiere loy, que Dieu donna iamais à l'homme, ce fut vne loy de pure obeyssance: ce fut vn commandement, nud et simple où l'homme n'eust rien à cognoistre et à causer, d'autant que l'obeyr est le propre office d'vne ame raisonnable, recognoissant vn celeste, superieur et bien-facteur. De l'obeyr et ceder naist toute autre vertu, comme du cuider, tout peché. Et au rebours: la premiere tentation qui vint à l'humaine nature de la part du diable, sa premiere poison, s'insinua en nous, par les promesses qu'il nous fit de science et de cognoissance, Eritis sicut dij, scientes bonum et malum Vlysse en Homere, et l'attirer en leurs dangereux et ruineux laqs, luy offrent en don la science. La peste de l'homme c'est l'opinion de sçauoir. Voyla pourquoy l'ignorance nous est tant recommandée par nostre religion, comme piece propre à la creance et à l'obeyssance. Cauete, ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanes seductiones, secundum elementa mundi. conuenance entre tous les philosophes de toutes sectes, que le souuerain bien consiste en la tranquillité de l'ame et du corps. Mais où la trouuons nous?
Ad summum sapiens vno minor est Ioue: diues,Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum:Præcipuè sanus, nisi cùm pituita molesta est.
or shame and poverty less troublesome to the first than to the last?
Scilicet et morbis et debilitate carebis,Et luctum et curam effugies, et tempora vitLonga tibi post hc fato meliore dabuntur.
“Disease thy couch shall flee,And sorrow and care; yes, thou, be sure, wilt seeLong years of happiness, till now unknown.”
I have known in my time a hundred artisans, a hundred labourers, wiser and more happy than the rectors of the university, and whom I had much rather have resembled. Learning, methinks, has its place amongst the necessary, things of life, as glory, nobility, dignity, or at the most, as beauty, riches, and such other qualities, which indeed are useful to it, but remotely, and more by opinion than by nature. We stand very little more in need of offices, rules, and laws of living in our society, than cranes and ants do in theirs; and yet we see that these carry themselves very regularly without erudition. If man was wise, he would take the true value of every thing according as it was useful and proper to his life. Whoever will number us by our actions and deportments will find many more excellent men amongst the ignorant than among the learned; aye, in all sorts of virtue. Old Rome seems to me to have been of much greater value, both for peace and war, than that learned Rome that ruined itself. And, though all the rest should be equal, yet integrity and innocency would remain to the ancients, for they cohabit singularly well with simplicity. But I will leave this discourse, that would lead me farther than I am willing to follow; and shall only say this further, ‘tis only humility and submission that can make a complete good man. We are not to leave the knowledge of his duty to every man’s own judgment; we are to prescribe it to him, and not suffer him to choose it at his own discretion; otherwise, according to the imbecility, and infinite variety of our reasons and opinions, we should at large forge ourselves duties that would, as Epicurus says, enjoin us to eat one another.
The first law that ever God gave to man was a law of pure obedience; it was a commandment naked and simple, wherein man had nothing to inquire after, nor to dispute; forasmuch as to obey is the proper office of a rational soul, acknowledging a heavenly superior and benefactor. From obedience and submission spring all other virtues, as all sin does from selfopinion. And, on the contrary, the first temptation that by the devil was offered to human nature, its first poison insinuated itself into us by the promise made us of knowledge and wisdom; Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum. “Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” And the sirens, in Homer, to allure Ulysses, and draw him within the danger of their snares, offered to give him knowledge. The plague of man is the opinion of wisdom; and for this reason it is that ignorance is so recommended to us, by our religion, as proper to faith and obedience; Cavete ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanes seductiones, secundum elementa mundi. “Take heed, lest any man deceive you by philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and the rudiments of the world.” There is in this a general consent amongst all sorts of philosophers, that the sovereign good consists in the tranquillity of the soul and body; but where shall we find it?
Ad summum, sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives,Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex deniqne regum;Prcipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est:
“In short, the wise is only less than Jove,Rich, free, and handsome; nay, a king aboveAll earthly kings; with health supremely blest,Excepting when a cold disturbs his rest!”
Il semble à la verité, que Nature, pour la consolation de nostre estat miserable et chetif, ne nous ait donné en partage que la presumption. C'est ce que dit Epictete, que l'homme n'a rien proprement sien, que l'vsage de ses opinions. Nous n'auons que du vent et de la fumée en partage. Les Dieux ont la santé en essence, dit la philosophie, et la maladie en intelligence: l'homme au rebours, possede ses biens par fantasie, les maux en essence. Nous auons eu raison de faire valoir les forces de nostre imagination: car tous nos biens ne sont qu'en songe. Oyez brauer ce pauure et calamiteux animal. Il n'est rien, dit Cicero, si doux que l'occupation des lettres: de ces lettres, dis-ie, par le moyen desquelles l'infinité des choses, l'immense grandeur de Nature, les cieux en ce monde mesme, et les terres, et les mers nous sont descouuertes: ce sont elles qui nous ont appris la religion, la moderation, la grandeur de courage: et qui ont arraché nostre ame des tenebres, pour luy faire voir toutes choses hautes, basses, premieres, dernieres, et moyennes: ce sont elles qui nous fournissent dequoy bien et heureusement viure, et nous guident à passer nostre aage sans desplaisir et sans offence. Cestuy-cy ne semble il pas parler de la condition de Dieu tout-viuant et tout-puissant? Et quant à l'effect, mille femmelettes ont vescu au village vne vie plus equable, plus douce, et plus constante, que ne fut la sienne.
Deus ille fuit Deus, inclute Memmi,Qui princeps vitæ rationem inuenit eam, quæNunc appellatur Sapientia, quique per artemFluctibus è tantis vitam tantisque tenebris,In tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locauit.
It seems, in truth, that nature, for the consolation of our miserable and wretched state, has only given us presumption for our inheritance. ‘Tis as Epictetus says, that man has nothing properly his own, but the use of his opinion; we have nothing but wind and smoke for our portion. The gods have health in essence, says philosophy, and sickness in intelligence. Man, on the contrary, possesses his goods by fancy, his ills in essence. We have reason to magnify the power of our imagination; for all our goods are only in dream. Hear this poor calamitous animal huff! “There is nothing,” says Cicero, “so charming as the employment of letters; of letters, I say, by means whereof the infinity of things, the immense grandeur of nature, the heavens even in this world, the earth, and the seas are discovered to us; ‘tis they that have taught us religion, moderation, and the grandeur of courage, and that have rescued our souls from darkness, to make her see all things, high, low, first, last, and middling; ‘tis they that furnish us wherewith to live happily and well, and conduct us to pass over our lives without displeasure, and without offence.” Does not this man seem to speak of the condition of the ever-living and almighty God? But as to effects, a thousand little countrywomen have lived lives more equal, more sweet, and constant than his.
Deus ille fuit, deus, inclyte Memmi,Qui princeps vit rationem invenit earn, quNunc appellatur sapientia; quique per artemFluctibus tantis vitam, tantisque tenebris,In tam tranquilla et tam clara luce locavit:
“That god, great Memmus, was a god no doubtWho, prince of life, first found that reason outNow wisdom called; and by his art, who didThat life in tempests tost, and darkness hid,Place in so great a calm, and clear a light:”
Voyla des paroles tresmagnifiques et belles: mais vn bien leger accident, mit l'entendement de cestuy-cy en pire estat, que celuy du moindre berger: nonobstant ce Dieu precepteur et cette diuine sapience. De mesme impudence est cette promesse du liure de Democritus: Ie m'en vay parler de toutes choses. Et ce sot tiltre qu'Aristote nous preste, de Dieux mortels: et ce iugement de Chrysippus, que Dion estoit aussi vertueux que Dieu. Et mon Seneca recognoist, dit-il, que Dieu luy a donné le viure: mais qu'il a de soy le bien viure. Conformément à cet autre, In virtute verè gloriamur: quod non contingeret, si id donum à Deo non à nobis haberemus. Cecy est aussi de Seneca: Que le sage a la fortitude pareille à Dieu: mais en l'humaine foiblesse, par où il le surmonte. Il n'est rien si ordinaire que de rencontrer des traicts de pareille temerité. Il n'y a aucun de nous qui s'offence tant de se voir apparier à Dieu, comme il fait de se voir deprimer au rang des autres animaux: tant nous sommes plus ialoux de nostre interest, que de celuy de nostre createur. Mais il faut mettre aux pieds cette sotte vanité, et secouër viuement et hardiment les fondemens ridicules, sur quoy ces fausses opinions se bastissent. Tant qu'il pensera auoir quelque moyen et quelque force de soy, iamais l'homme ne recognoistra ce qu'il doit à son maistre: il fera tousiours de ses œufs poulles, comme on dit: il le faut mettre en chemise. Voyons quelque notable exemple de l'effect de sa philosophie. Possidonius estant pressé d'vne si douloureuse maladie, qu'elle luy faisoit tordre les bras, et grincer les dents, pensoit bien faire la figue à la douleur pour s'escrier contre elle: Tu as beau faire, si ne diray-ie pas que tu sois mal. Il sent mesmes passions que mon laquays, mais il se braue sur ce qu'il contient aumoins sa langue sous les loix de sa secte. Re succumbere non oportebat verbis gloriantem. le vint visiter, s'en retournoit tout fasché: il le rappella, et luy montrant ses pieds et sa poittrine: Il n'est rien venu de là icy, luy dit-il. Cestuy cy a vn peu meilleure grace: car il sent auoir du mal, et en voudroit estre depestré. Mais de ce mal pourtant son cœur n'en est pas abbatu et affoibly. L'autre se tient en sa roideur, plus, ce crains-ie, verbale qu'essentielle. Et Dionysius Heracleotes affligé d'vne cuison vehemente des yeux, fut rangé à quitter ces resolutions Stoïques. Mais quand la science feroit par effect ce qu'ils disent, d'émousser et rabattre l'aigreur des infortunes qui nous suyuent, que fait elle, que ce que fait beaucoup plus purement l'ignorance et plus euidemment? Le philosophe Pyrrho courant en mer le hazard d'vne grande tourmente, ne presentoit à ceux qui estoyent auec luy à imiter que la securité d'vn porceau, qui voyageoit auecques eux, regardant cette tempeste sans effroy. La philosophie au bout de ses preceptes nous renuoye aux exemples d'vn athlete et d'vn muletier: ausquels on void ordinairement beaucoup moins de ressentiment de mort, de douleurs, et d'autres inconueniens, et plus de fermeté, que la science n'en fournit onques à aucun, qui n'y fust nay et preparé de soy-mesmes par habitude naturelle. Qui fait qu'on incise et taille les tendres membres d'vn enfant et ceux d'vn cheual plus aisément que les nostres, si ce n'est l'ignorance? Combien en a rendu de malades la seule force de l'imagination? Nous en voyons ordinairement se faire saigner, purger, et medeciner pour guerir des maux qu'ils ne sentent qu'en leur discours. Lors que les vrais maux nous faillent, la science nous preste les siens: cette couleur et ce teint vous presagent quelque defluxion caterreuse: cette saison chaude vous menasse d'vne émotion fieureuse: cette coupeure de la ligne vitale de vostre main gauche, vous aduertit de quelque notable et voisine indisposition. Et en fin elle s'en addresse tout detroussément à la santé mesme. Cette allegresse et vigueur de ieunesse, ne peut arrester en vne assiette, il luy faut desrober du sang et de la force, de peur qu'elle ne se tourne contre vous mesmes. Comparés la vie d'vn homme asseruy à telles imaginations, à celle d'vn laboureur, se laissant aller apres son appetit naturel, mesurant les choses au seul sentiment present, sans science et sans prognostique, qui n'a du mal que lors qu'il l'a: où l'autre a souuent la pierre en l'ame auant qu'il l'ait aux reins: comme s'il n'estoit point assez à temps pour souffrir le mal lors qu'il y sera, il l'anticipe par fantasie, et luy court au deuant. Ce que ie dy de la medecine, se peut tirer par exemple generalement à toute science. De là est venuë cette ancienne opinion des philosophes, qui logeoient le souuerain bien à la recognoissance de la foiblesse de nostre iugement. Mon ignorance me preste autant d'occasion d'esperance que de crainte: et n'ayant autre regle de ma santé, que celle des exemples d'autruy, et des euenemens que ie vois ailleurs en pareille occasion, i'en trouue de toutes sortes: et m'arreste aux comparaisons, qui me sont plus fauorables. Ie reçois la santé les bras ouuerts, libre, plaine, et entiere: et aiguise mon appetit à la iouïr, d'autant plus qu'elle m'est à present moins ordinaire et plus rare: tant s'en faut que ie trouble son repos et sa douceur, par l'amertume d'vne nouuelle et contrainte forme de viure. Les bestes nous montrent assez combien l'agitation de nostre esprit nous apporte de maladies. Ce qu'on nous dit de ceux du Bresil, qu'ils ne mouroyent que de vieillesse, on l'attribue à la serenité et tranquillité de leur air, ie l'attribue plustost à la tranquillité et serenité de leur ame, deschargée de toute passion, pensée et occupation tendue ou desplaisante: comme gents qui passoyent leur vie en vne admirable simplicité et ignorance, sans lettres, sans loy, sans Roy, sans relligion quelconque. Et d'où vient ce qu'on trouue par experience, que les plus grossiers et plus lourds sont plus fermes et plus desirables aux executions amoureuses? et que l'amour d'vn muletier se rend souuent plus acceptable, que celle d'vn gallant homme? sinon qu'en cettuy-cy l'agitation de l'ame trouble sa force corporelle, la rompt, et lasse: comme elle lasse aussi et trouble ordinairement soy-mesmes? Qui la desment, qui la iette plus coustumierement à la manie, que sa promptitude, sa pointe, son agilité, et en fin sa force propre? Dequoy se fait la plus subtile folie que de la plus subtile sagesse? Comme des grandes amitiez naissent des grandes inimitiez, des santez vigoreuses les mortelles maladies: ainsi des rares et vifues agitations de noz ames, les plus excellentes manies, et plus detraquées: il n'y a qu'vn demy tour de cheuille à passer de l'vn à l'autre. Aux actions des hommes insensez, nous voyons combien proprement s'aduient la folie, auec les plus vigoureuses operations de nostre ame. Qui ne sçait combien est imperceptible le voisinage d'entre la folie auec les gaillardes eleuations d'vn esprit libre; et les effects d'vne vertu supreme et extraordinaire? Platon dit les melancholiques plus disciplinables et excellens: aussi n'en est-il point qui ayent tant de propension à la folie. Infinis esprits se treuuent ruinez par leur propre force et soupplesse. Quel sault vient de prendre de sa propre agitation et allegresse, l'vn des plus iudicieux, ingenieux et plus formés à l'air de cette antique et pure poësie, qu'autre poëte Italien aye de long temps esté? N'a-t-il pas dequoy sçauoir gré à cette sienne viuacité meurtriere? à cette clarté qui l'a aueuglé? à cette exacte, et tendue apprehension de la raison, qui l'a mis sans raison? à la curieuse et laborieuse queste des sciences, qui l'a conduit à la bestise? à cette rare aptitude aux exercices de l'ame, qui l'a rendu sans exercice et sans ame? I'eus plus de despit encore que de compassion, de le voir à Ferrare en si piteux estat suruiuant à soy-mesmes, mescognoissant et soy et ses ouurages; lesquels sans son sçeu, et toutesfois à sa veuë, on a mis en lumiere incorrigez et informes.
Voulez vous vn homme sain, le voulez vous reglé, et en ferme et seure posture? affublez le de tenebres d'oisiueté et de pesanteur. Il nous faut abestir pour nous assagir: et nous esblouir, pour nous guider. Et si on me dit que la commodité d'auoir l'appetit froid et mousse aux douleurs et aux maux, tire apres soy cette incommodité, de nous rendre aussi par consequent moins aiguz et frians, à la iouyssance des biens et des plaisirs: cela est vray: mais la misere de nostre condition porte, que nous n'auons tant à iouyr qu'à fuir, et que l'extreme volupté ne nous touche pas comme vne legere douleur: Segnius homines bona quàm mala sentiunt: nous ne sentons point l'entiere santé, comme la moindre des maladies:
PungitIn cute vix summa violatum plagula corpus,Quando valere nihil quemquam mouet. Hoc iuuat vnum,Quòd me non torquet latus, aut pes: cætera quisquamVix queat aut sanum sese, aut sentire valentem.
Nostre bien estre, ce n'est que la priuation d'estre mal. Voyla pourquoy la secte de philosophie, qui a le plus faict valoir la volupté, encore l'a elle rengée à la seule indolence. Le n'auoir point de mal, c'est le plus auoir de bien, que l'homme puisse esperer: comme disoit Ennius.
Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali.
here are brave ranting words; but a very slight accident put this man’s understanding in a worse condition than that of the meanest shepherd, notwithstanding this instructing god, this divine wisdom. Of the same stamp and impudence is the promise of Democritus’s book: “I am going to speak of all things;” and that foolish title that Aristotle prefixes to one of his, order only afforded him a few lucid intervals which he employed in composing his book, and at last made him kill himself,—Eusebius’s Chronicon.
Of the Mortal Gods; and the judgment of Chrysippus, that “Dion was as virtuous as God;” and my Seneca himself says, that “God had given him life; but that to live well was his own;” conformably to this other: In virtute vere gloriamur; quod non contingeret, si id donum Deo, non nobis haberemus: “We truly glory in our virtue; which would not be, if it was given us of God, and not by ourselves;” this is also Seneca’s saying; “that the wise man hath fortitude equal with God, but that his is in spite of human frailty, wherein therefore he more than equals God.” There is nothing so ordinary as to meet with sallies of the like temerity; there is none of us, who take so much offence to see himself equalled with God, as he does to see himself undervalued by being ranked with other creatures; so much more are we jealous of our own interest than that of our Creator.
But we must trample under foot this foolish vanity, and briskly and boldly shake the ridiculous foundation upon which these false opinions are founded. So long as man shall believe he has any means and power of himself, he will never acknowledge what he owes to his Maker; his eggs shall always be chickens, as the saying is; we must therefore strip him to his shirt. Let us see some notable examples of the effects of his philosophy: Posidonius being tormented with a disease so painful as made him writhe his arms and gnash his teeth, thought he sufficiently scorned the dolour, by crying out against it: “Thou mayst do thy worst, I will not confess that thou art an evil.” He was as sensible of the pain as my footman, but he made a bravado of bridling his tongue, at least, and restraining it within the laws of his sect: Re succumbere non oportebat, verbis gloriantem. “It did not become him, that spoke so big, to confess his frailty when he came to the test.” Arcesilas being ill of the gout, and Car-neades, who had come to see him, going away troubled at his condition, he called him back, and showing him his feet and breast: “There is nothing comes thence hither,” said he. This has something a better grace, for he feels himself in pain, and would be disengaged from it; but his heart, notwithstanding, is not conquered nor subdued by it. The other stands more obstinately to his point, but, I fear, rather verbally than really. And Dionysius Heracleotes, afflicted with a vehement smarting in his eyes, was reduced to quit these stoical resolutions. But even though knowledge should, in effect, do as they say, and could blunt the point, and dull the edge, of the misfortunes that attend us, what does she, more than what ignorance does more purely and evidently?—The philosopher Pyrrho, being at sea in very great danger, by reason of a mighty storm, presented nothing to the imitation of those who were with him, in that extremity, but a hog they had on board, that was fearless and unconcerned at the tempest. Philosophy, when she has said all she can, refers us at last to the example of a gladiator, wrestler, or muleteer, in which sort of people we commonly observe much less apprehension of death, sense of pain, and other inconveniences, and more of endurance, than ever knowledge furnished any one withal, that was not bom and bred to hardship. What is the cause that we make incisions, and cut the tender limbs of an infant, and those of a horse, more easily than our own—but ignorance only? How many has mere force of imagination made sick? We often see men cause themselves to be let blood, purged, and physicked, to be cured of diseases they only feel in opinion.—When real infirmities fail us, knowledge lends us her’s; that colour, that complexion, portend some catarrhous defluxion; this hot season threatens us with a fever; this breach in the life-line of your left hand gives you notice of some near and dangerous indisposition; and at last she roundly attacks health itself; saying, this sprightliness and vigour of youth cannot continue in this posture; there must be blood taken, and the heat abated, lest it turn against yourself. Compare the life of a man subjected to such imaginations, to that of a labourer that suffers himself to be led by his natural appetite, measuring things only by the present sense, without knowledge, and without prognostic, that feels no pain or sickness, but when he is really ill. Whereas the other has the stone in his soul, before he has it in his bladder; as if it were not time enough to suffer the evil when it shall come, he must anticipate it by fancy, and run to meet it.
What I say of physic may generally serve in example for all other sciences. Thence is derived that ancient opinion of the philosophers that placed the sovereign good in the discovery of the weakness of our judgment My ignorance affords me as much occasion of hope as of fear; and having no other rule for my health than that of the examples of others, and of events I see elsewhere upon the like occasion, I find of all sorts, and rely upon those which by comparison are most favourable to me. I receive health with open arms, free, full, and entire, and by so much the more whet my appetite to enjoy it, by how much it is at present less ordinary and more rare; so far am I from troubling its repose and sweetness with the bitterness of a new and constrained manner of living. Beasts sufficiently show us how much the agitation of our minds brings infirmities and diseases upon us. That which is told us of those of Brazil, that they never die but of old age, is attributed to the serenity and tranquillity of the air they live in; but I rather attribute it to the serenity and tranquillity of their souls, free from all passion, thought, or employment, extended or unpleasing, a people that pass over their lives in a wonderful simplicity and ignorance, without letters, without law, without king, or any manner of religion. And whence comes that, which we find by experience, that the heaviest and dullest men are most able; and the most to be desired in amorous performances; and that the love of a muleteer often renders itself more acceptable than that of a gentleman, if it be not that the agitation of the soul in the latter disturbs his physical ability, dissolves and tires it, as it also ordinarily troubles and tires itself. What puts the soul beside itself, and more usually throws it into madness, but her own promptness, vigour, and agility, and, finally, her own proper force? Of what is the most subtle folly made, but of the most subtle wisdom? As great friendships spring from great enmities, and vigorous health from mortal diseases, so from the rare and vivid agitations of our souls proceed the most wonderful and most distracted frenzies; ‘tis but half a turn of the toe from the one to the other. In the actions of madmen we see how infinitely madness resembles the most vigorous operations of the soul. Who does not know how indiscernible the difference is betwixt folly and the sprightly elevations of a free soul, and the effects of a supreme and extraordinary virtue? Plato says that melancholy persons are the most capable of discipline, and the most excellent; and accordingly in none is there so great a propension to madness. Great wits are ruined by their own proper force and pliability; into what a condition, through his own agitation and promptness of fancy, is one of the most judicious, ingenious, and nearest formed, of any other Italian poet, to the air of the ancient and true poesy, lately fallen! Has he not vast obligation to this vivacity that has destroyed him? to this light that has blinded him? to this exact and subtle apprehension of reason that has put him beside his own? to this curious and laborious search after sciences, that has reduced him to imbecility? and to this rare aptitude to the exercises of the soul, that has rendered him without exercise and without soul? I was more angry, if possible, than compassionate, to see him at Ferrara in so pitiful a condition surviving himself, forgetting both himself and his works, which, without his knowledge, though before his face, have been published unformed and incorrect.
Would you have a man healthy, would you have him regular, and in a steady and secure posture? Muffle him up in the shades of stupidity and sloth. We must be made beasts to be made wise, and hoodwinked before we are fit to be led. And if one shall tell me that the advantage of having a cold and dull sense of pain and other evils, brings this disadvantage along with it, to render us consequently less sensible also in the fruition of good and pleasure, this is true; but the misery of our condition is such that we have not so much to enjoy as to avoid, and that the extremest pleasure does not affect us to the degree that a light grief does: Segnius homines bona quam mala sentiunt. We are not so sensible of the most perfect health as we are of the least sickness.
PungitIn cute vix sum ma violatum plagula corpus;Quando valere nihil quemquam movet. Hoc juvat unum,Quod me non torquet latus, aut pes;Ctera quisquam Vix queat aut sanum sese, aut sentire valentem.
“The body with a little sting is griev’d,When the most perfect health is not perceiv’d,This only pleases me, that spleen nor goutNeither offend my side nor wring my foot;Excepting these, scarce any one can tell,Or e’er observes, when he’s in health and well.”
Our well-being is nothing but the not being ill. Which is the reason why that sect of philosophers, which sets the greatest value upon pleasure, has yet fixed it chiefly in unconsciousness of pain. To be freed from ill is the greatest good that man can hope for or desire; as Ennius says,—
Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali;
Car ce mesme chatouillement et aiguisement, qui se rencontre en certains plaisirs, et semble nous enleuer au dessus de la santé simple, et de l'indolence; cette volupté actiue, mouuante, et ie ne sçay comment cuisante et mordante, celle là mesme, ne vise qu'à l'indolence, comme à son but. L'appetit qui nous rauit à l'accointance des femmes, il ne cherche qu'à chasser la peine que nous apporte le desir ardent et furieux, et ne demande qu'à l'assouuir, et se loger en repos, et en l'exemption de cette fieure. Ainsi des autres. Ie dy donc, que si la simplesse nous achemine à point n'auoir de mal, elle nous achemine à vn tres-heureux estat selon nostre condition. Si ne la faut-il point imaginer si plombée, qu'elle soit du tout sans sentiment. Car Crantor auoit bien raison de combattre l'indolence d'Epicurus, si on la bastissoit si profonde que l'abort mesme et la naissance des maux en fust à dire. Ie ne louë point cette indolence qui n'est ny possible, ny desirable. Ie suis content de n'estre pas malade: mais si ie le suis, ie veux sçauoir que ie le suis, et si on me cauterise ou incise, ie le veux sentir. De vray, qui desracineroit la cognoissance du mal, il extirperoit quand et quand la cognoissance de la volupté, et en fin aneantiroit l'homme. Istud nihil dolere, non sine magna mercede contingit immanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore. à son tour. Ny la douleur ne luy est tousiours à fuïr, ny la volupté tousiours à suiure. C'est vn tres-grand auantage pour l'honneur de l'ignorance, que la science mesme nous reiecte entre ses bras, quand elle se trouue empeschée à nous roidir contre la pesanteur des maux: elle est contrainte de venir à cette composition, de nous lascher la bride, et donner congé de nous sauuer en son giron, et nous mettre soubs sa faueur à l'abri des coups et iniures de la Fortune. Car que veut elle dire autre chose, quand elle nous presche de retirer notre pensée des maux qui nous tiennent, et l'entretenir des voluptez perdues; et de nous seruir pour consolation des maux presens, de la souuenance des biens passez, et d'appeller à nostre secours vn contentement esuanouy, pour l'opposer à ce qui nous presse? Leuationes ægritudinum in auocatione à cogitanda molestia, et reuocatione ad contemplandas voluptates ponit la force luy manque, elle veut vser de ruse, et donner vn tour de soupplesse et de iambe, où la vigueur du corps et des bras vient à luy faillir. Car non seulement à vn philosophe, mais simplement à vn homme rassis, quand il sent par effect l'alteration cuisante d'vne fieure chaude, quelle monnoye est-ce, de le payer de la souuenance de la douceur du vin Grec? Ce seroit plustost luy empirer son marché,
Che ricordarsi il ben doppia la noia.
for that every tickling and sting which are in certain pleasures, and that seem to raise us above simple health and passiveness, that active, moving, and, I know not how, itching, and biting pleasure; even that very pleasure itself aims at nothing but insensibility as its mark. The appetite that carries us headlong to women’s embraces has no other end but only to cure the torment of our ardent and furious desires, and only requires to be glutted and laid at rest, and delivered from the fever. And so of the rest. I say, then, that if simplicity conducts us to a state free from evil, she leads us to a very happy one according to our condition. And yet we are not to imagine it so stupid an insensibility as to be totally without sense; for Crantor had very good reason to controvert the insensibility of Epicurus, if founded so deep that the very first attack and birth of evils were not to be perceived: “I do not approve such an insensibility as is neither possible nor to be desired. I am very well content not to be sick; but if I am, I would know that I am so; and if a caustic be applied, or incisions made in any part, I would feel them.” In truth, whoever would take away the knowledge and sense of evil, would at the same time eradicate the sense of pleasure, and finally annihilate man himself: Istud nihil dolere, non sine magn mercede contingit, immanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore. “An insensibility that is not to be purchased but at the price of inhumanity in the soul, and of stupidity of the body.” Evil appertains to man of course. Neither is pain always to be avoided, nor pleasure always pursued.
‘Tis a great advantage to the honour of ignorance that knowledge itself throws us into its arms, when she finds herself puzzled to fortify us against the weight of evil; she is constrained to come to this composition, to give us the reins, and permit us to fly into the lap of the other, and to shelter ourselves under her protection from the strokes and injuries of fortune. For what else is her meaning when she instructs us to divert our thoughts from the ills that press upon us, and entertain them with the meditation of pleasures past and gone; to comfort ourselves in present afflictions with the remembrance of fled delights, and to call to our succour a vanished satisfaction, to oppose it to the discomfort that lies heavy upon us? Levationes gritudinum in avocatione a cogitand molesti, et revocation ad contemplandas voluptates, ponit; “He directs us to alleviate our grief and pains by rejecting unpleasant thoughts, and recalling agreeable ideas;” if it be not that where her power fails she would supply it with policy, and make use of sleight of hand where force of limbs will not serve her turn? For not only to a philosopher, but to any man in his right wits, when he has upon him the thirst of a burning fever, what satisfaction can it be to him to remember the pleasure he took in drinking Greek wine a month ago? It would rather only make matters worse to him:—
Che ricordarsi il ben doppia la noia.
“The thinking of pleasure doubles trouble.”
De mesme condition est cet autre conseil, que la Philosophie donne; de maintenir en la memoire seulement le bonheur passé, et d'en effacer les desplaisirs que nous auons soufferts; comme si nous auions en nostre pouuoir la science de l'oubly: et conseil duquel nous valons moins encore vn coup.
Suauis est laborum præteritorum memoria.
Comment? la Philosophie qui me doit mettre les armes à la main, pour combattre la Fortune; qui me doit roidir le courage pour fouller aux pieds toutes les aduersitez humaines, vient elle à cette mollesse, de me faire conniller par ces destours coüards et ridicules? Car la memoire nous represente, non pas ce que nous choisissons, mais ce qui luy plaist. Voire il n'est rien qui imprime si viuement quelque chose en nostre souuenance, que le desir de l'oublier. C'est vne bonne maniere de donner en garde, et d'empreindre en nostre ame quelque chose, que de la solliciter de la perdre. Et cela est faulx, Est situm in nobis, vt et aduersa quasi perpetua obliuione obruamus, et secunda iucundè et suauiter meminerimus vray, Memini etiam quæ nolo: obliuisci non possum quæ volo qui est ce conseil? de celuy, qui se vnus sapientem profiteri sit ausus:
Qui genus humanum ingenio superauit, et omnesPræstrinxit stellas, exortus vti ætherius sol.
Of the same stamp is this other counsel that philosophy gives, only to remember the happiness that is past, and to forget the misadventures we have undergone; as if we had the science of oblivion in our own power, and counsel, wherein we are yet no more to seek.
Suavis laborum est prteritorum rmoria.
“Sweet is the memory of by-gone pain.”
How does philosophy, that should arm me to contend with fortune, and steel my courage to trample all human adversities under foot, arrive to this degree of cowardice to make me hide my head at this rate, and save myself by these pitiful and ridiculous shifts? For the memory represents to us not what we choose, but what she pleases; nay, there is nothing that so much imprints any thing in our memory as a desire to forget it. And ‘tis a good way to retain and keep any thing safe in the soul to solicit her to lose it. And this is false: Est situm in nobis, ut et adversa quasi perpetua oblivione obruamus, et secunda jucunde et suaviter meminerimus; “it is in our power to bury, as it were, in a perpetual oblivion, all adverse accidents, and to retain a pleasant and delightful memory of our successes;” and this is true: Memini etiam quo nolo; oblivisci non possum quo volo. “I do also remember what I would not; but I cannot forget what I would.” And whose counsel is this? His, qui se unies sapiervtem profiteri sit ausus; “who alone durst profess himself a wise man.”
Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit, et omnesPrstinxit stellas, exortus uti thereus Sol.
“Who from mankind the prize of knowledge won,And put the stars out like the rising sun.”
De vuider et desmunir la memoire, est-ce pas le vray et propre chemin à l'ignorance?
Iners malorum remedium ignorantia est.
Nous voyons plusieurs pareils preceptes, par lesquels on nous permet d'emprunter du vulgaire des apparences friuoles, où la raison viue et forte ne peut assez: pourueu qu'elles nous seruent de contentement et de consolation. Où ils ne peuuent guérir la playe, ils sont contents de l'endormir et pallier. Ie croy qu'ils ne me nieront pas cecy, que s'ils pouuoyent adiouster de l'ordre, et de la constance, en vn estat de vie, qui se maintinst en plaisir et en tranquillité par quelque foiblesse et maladie de iugement, qu'ils ne l'acceptassent:
Potare, et spargere floresIncipiam, patiárque vel inconsultus haberi.
To empty and disfurnish the memory, is not this the true way to ignorance?
Iners malorum remedium ignorantia est.
“Ignorance is but a dull remedy for evils.”
We find several other like precepts, whereby we are permitted to borrow frivolous appearances from the vulgar, where we find the strongest reason will not answer the purpose, provided they administer satisfaction and comfort Where they cannot cure the wound, they are content to palliate and benumb it I believe they will not deny this, that if they could add order and constancy in a state of life that could maintain itself in ease and pleasure by some debility of judgment, they would accept it:—
Potare, et spargere floresIncipiam, patiarque vel inconsultus haberi.
“Give me to drink, and, crown’d with flowers, despiseThe grave disgrace of being thought unwise.”
Il se trouueroit plusieurs philosophes de l'aduis de Lycas. Cettuy-cy ayant au demeurant ses mœurs bien reglées, viuant doucement et paisiblement en sa famille, ne manquant à nul office de son deuoir envers les siens et estrangers, se conseruant tresbien des choses nuisibles, s'estoit par quelque alteration de sens imprimé en la ceruelle vne resuerie. C'est qu'il pensoit estre perpetuellement aux theatres à y voir des passetemps, des spectacles, et des plus belles comedies du monde. Guery qu'il fut par les medecins, de cette humeur peccante, à peine qu'il ne les mist en procés pour le restablir en la douceur de ces imaginations.
Pol! me occidistis, amici,Non seruastis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas,Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.
D'vne pareille resuerie à celle de Thrasylaus, fils de Pythodorus, qui se faisoit à croire que tous les nauires qui relaschoient du port de Pyrée, et y abordoient, ne trauailloyent que pour son seruice: se resiouyssant de la bonne fortune de leur nauigation, les recueillant auec ioye. Son frere Crito l'ayant faict remettre en son meilleur sens, il regrettoit cette sorte de condition, en laquelle il auoit vescu en liesse, et deschargé de tout desplaisir. C'est ce que dit ce vers ancien Grec, qu'il y a beaucoup de commodité à n'estre pas si aduisé: Εν τω φρονειν γαρ μηδεν, ἡδιστος βιος Et l'Ecclesiaste; En beaucoup de sagesse, beaucoup de desplaisir: et, Qui acquiert science, s'acquiert du trauail et tourment. Cela mesme, à quoy la Philosophie consent en general, cette derniere recepte qu'elle ordonne à toute sorte de necessitez, qui est de mettre fin à la vie, que nous ne pouuons supporter: Placet? pare. Non placet? quacumque vis exi. Pungit dolor? vel fodiat sanè? si nudus es, da iugulum: sin tectus armis Vulcanijs, id est fortitudine, resiste: et ce mot des Grecs conuiues qu'ils y appliquent, Aut bibat, aut abeat: qui sonne plus sortablement en la langue d'vn Gascon, qu'en celle de Ciceron, qui change volontiers en V. le B:
Viuere si rectè nescis, decede peritis.Lusisti satis, edisti satis, atque bibisti:Tempus abire tibi est, ne potum largius æquoRideat, et pulset lasciua decentius ætas.
There would be a great many philosophers of Lycas’s mind this man, being otherwise of very regular manners, living quietly and contentedly in his family, and not failing in any office of his duty, either towards his own or strangers, and very carefully preserving himself from hurtful things, became, nevertheless, by some distemper in his brain, possessed with a conceit that he was perpetually in the theatre, a spectator of the finest sights and the best comedies in the world; and being cured by the physicians of his frenzy, was hardly prevented from endeavouring by suit to compel them to restore him again to his pleasing imagination:—
Pol I me occidistis, amici,Non servastis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas,Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error;
“By heaven! you’ve killed me, friends, outright,And not preserved me; since my dear delightAnd pleasing error, by my better senseUnhappily return’d, is banished hence;”
with a madness like that of Thrasylaus the son of Pythodorus, who made himself believe that all the ships that weighed anchor from the port of Pirus, and that came into the haven, only made their voyages for his profit; congratulating them upon their successful navigation, and receiving them with the greatest joy; and when his brother Crito caused him to be restored to his better understanding, he infinitely regretted that sort of condition wherein he had lived with so much delight and free from all anxiety of mind. ‘Tis according to the old Greek verse, that “there is a great deal of convenience in not being over-wise.”
And Ecclesiastes, “In much wisdom there is much sorrow;” and “Who gets wisdom gets labour and trouble.”
Even that to which philosophy consents in general, that last remedy which she applies to all sorts of necessities, to put an end to the life we are not able to endure. Placet?—Pare. Non placet?—Qucumque vis, exi. Pungit dolor?—Vel fodiat sane. Si nudus es, da jugulum; sin tectus armis Vulcaniis, id est fortitudine, rsist; “Does it please?—Obey it. Not please?—Go where thou wilt. Does grief prick thee,—nay, stab thee?—If thou art naked, present thy throat; if covered with the arms of Vulcan, that is, fortitude, resist it.” And this word, so used in the Greek festivals, aut bibat, aut abeat, “either drink or go,” which sounds better upon the tongue of a Gascon, who naturally changes the h into v, than on that of Cicero:—
Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis.Lusisti satis, edisti satis, atque bibisti;Tempus abire tibi est, ne potum largius quoRideat et pulset lasciva decentius tas.
“If to live well and right thou dost not know,Give way, and leave thy place to those that do.Thou’st eaten, drunk, and play’d to thy content,‘Tis time to make thy parting compliment,Lest youth, more decent in their follies, scoffThe nauseous scene, and hiss thee reeling off;”
qu'est-ce autre chose qu'vne confession de son impuissance; et vn renuoy, non seulement à l'ignorance, pour y estre à couuert, mais à la stupidité mesme, au non sentir, et au non estre?
Democritum postquàm matura vetustasAdmonuit memorem, motus languescere mentis:Sponte sua letho caput obuius obtulit ipse.
What is it other than a confession of his impotency, and a sending back not only to ignorance, to be there in safety, but even to stupidity, insensibility, and nonentity?
Democritum postquam matura vetustasAdmonuit memorem motus languescere mentis;Sponte sua letho caput obvius obtulit ipse.
“Soon as, through age, Democritus did findA manifest decadence in his mind,He thought he now surviv’d to his own wrong,And went to meet his death, that stay’d too long.”
C'est ce que disoit Antisthenes, qu'il falloit faire prouision ou de sens pour entendre, ou de licol pour se pendre: et ce que Chrysippus alleguoit sur ce propos du poëte Tyrtæus,
De la vertu, ou de mort approcher.
Et Crates disoit, que l'amour se guerissoit par la faim, sinon par le temps: et à qui ces deux moyens ne plairoyent, par la hart. Celuy Sextius, duquel Seneque et Plutarque parlent auec si grande recommandation, s'estant ietté, toutes choses laissées, à l'estude de la philosophie, delibera de se precipiter en la mer, voyant le progrez de ses estudes trop tardif et trop long. Il couroit à la mort, au deffault de la science. Voicy les mots de la loy, sur ce subject: Si d'auenture il suruient quelque grand inconuenient qui ne se puisse remedier, le port est prochain: et se peut-on sauuer à nage, hors du corps, comme hors d'vn esquif qui faict eau: car c'est la crainte de mourir, non pas le desir de viure, qui tient le fol attaché au corps. Comme la vie se rend par la simplicité plus plaisante, elle s'en rend aussi plus innocente et meilleure, comme ie commençois tantost à dire. Les simples, dit S. Paul, et les ignorans, s'esleuent et se saisissent du ciel; et nous, à tout nostre sçauoir, nous plongeons aux abismes infernaux. Ie ne m'arreste ny à Valentian, ennemy declaré de la science et des lettres, ny à Licinius, tous deux Empereurs Romains, qui les nommoient le venin et la peste de tout estat politique: ny à Mahumet, qui, comme i'ay entendu, interdict la science à ses hommes: mais l'exemple de ce grand Lycurgus et son authorité doit certes auoir grand poix, et la reuerence de cette diuine police Lacedemonienne, si grande, si admirable, et si long temps fleurissante en vertu et en bon heur, sans aucune institution ny exercice de lettres. Ceux qui reuiennent de ce monde nouueau qui a esté descouuert du temps de nos peres, par les Espagnols, nous peuuent tesmoigner combien ces nations, sans magistrat, et sans loy, viuent plus legitimement et plus reglément que les nostres, où il y a plus d'officiers et de loix, qu'il n'y a d'autres hommes, et qu'il n'y a d'actions.
Di cittatorie piene e di libelli,D'esamine e di carte, di procureHanno le mani e il seno, e gran fastelliDi chiose, di consigli e di letture,Per cui le facultà de pouerelliNon sono mai ne le citta sicure,Hanno dietro e dinanzi e d'ambi i lati,Notai, procuratori ed aduocati.
‘Tis what Antisthenes said, “That a man should either make provision of sense to understand, or of a halter to hang himself;” and what Chrysippus alleged upon this saying of the poet Tyrtus:—
“Or to arrive at virtue or at death;”
and Crates said, “That love would be cured by hunger, if not by time; and whoever disliked these two remedies, by a rope.” That Sextius, of whom both Seneca and Plutarch speak with so high an encomium, having applied himself, all other things set aside, to the study of philosophy, resolved to throw himself into the sea, seeing the progress of his studies too tedious and slow. He ran to find death, since he could not overtake knowledge. These are the words of the law upon the subject: “If peradventure some great inconvenience happen, for which there is no remedy, the haven is near, and a man may save himself by swimming out of his body as out of a leaky skiff; for ‘tis the fear of dying, and not the love of life, that ties the fool to his body.”
As life renders itself by simplicity more pleasant, so more innocent and better, also it renders it as I was saying before: “The simple and ignorant,” says St. Paul, “raise themselves up to heaven and take possession of it; and we, with all our knowledge, plunge ourselves into the infernal abyss.” I am neither swayed by Valentinian, a professed enemy to all learning and letters, nor by Licinius, both Roman emperors, who called them the poison and pest of all political government; nor by Mahomet, who, as ‘tis said, interdicted all manner of learning to his followers; but the example of the great Lycurgus, and his authority, with the reverence of the divine Lacedemonian policy, so great, so admirable, and so long flourishing in virtue and happiness, without any institution or practice of letters, ought certainly to be of very great weight. Such as return from the new world discovered by the Spaniards in our fathers’ days, testify to us how much more honestly and regularly those nations live, without magistrate and without law, than ours do, where there are more officers and lawyers than there are of other sorts of men and business:—
Di cittatorie piene, e di libelli,D’esamine, e di carte di procure,Hanno le mani e il seno, e gran fastelliDi chioge, di consigli, et di letture:Per cui le faculta de* poverelliNon sono mai nelle citt sicure;Hanno dietro e dinanzi, e d’ambi i lati,Notai, procuratori, ed avvocati.
“Their bags were full of writs, and of citations,Of process, and of actions and arrests,Of bills, of answers, and of replications,In courts of delegates, and of requests,To grieve the simple sort with great vexations;They had resorting to them as their guests,Attending on their circuit, and their journeys,Scriv’ners, and clerks, and lawyers, and attorneys.”
C'estoit ce que disoit vn Senateur Romain des derniers siecles, que leurs predecesseurs auoyent l'aleine puante à l'ail, et l'estomach musqué de bonne conscience: et qu'au rebours, ceux de son temps ne sentoient au dehors que le parfum, puans au dedans à toute sorte de vices: c'est à dire, comme ie pense, qu'ils auoyent beaucoup de sçauoir et de suffisance, et grand faute de preud'hommie. L'inciuilité, l'ignorance, la simplesse, la rudesse s'accompagnent volontiers de l'innocence: la curiosité, la subtilité, le sçauoir trainent la malice à leur suite: l'humilité, la crainte, l'obéissance, la debonnaireté, qui sont les pieces principales pour la conseruation de la societé humaine, demandent vne ame vuide, docile et presumant peu de soy. Les Chrestiens ont vne particuliere cognoissance, combien la curiosité est vn mal naturel et originel en l'homme. Le soing de s'augmenter en sagesse et en science, ce fut la premiere ruine du genre humain; c'est la voye, par où il s'est precipité à la damnation eternelle. L'orgueil est sa perte et sa corruption: c'est l'orgueil qui iette l'homme à quartier des voyes communes, qui luy fait embrasser les nouuelletez, et aymer mieux estre chef d'vne trouppe errante, et desuoyée, au sentier de perdition, aymer mieux estre regent et precepteur d'erreur et de mensonge, que d'estre disciple en l'eschole de verité, se laissant mener et conduire par la main d'autruy, à la voye battuë et droicturiere. C'est à l'aduanture ce que dit ce mot Grec ancien, que la superstition suit l'orgueil, et luy obeit comme à son pere: ἡ δεισιδαιμονια χαταπερ πατρι τω τυφω πειτεται Apres que Socrates fut aduerty, que le Dieu de sagesse luy auoit attribué le nom de Sage, il en fut estonné: et se recherchant et secouant par tout, n'y trouuoit aucun fondement à cette diuine sentence. Il en sçauoit de iustes, temperants, vaillants, sçauants comme luy: et plus eloquents, et plus beaux, et plus vtiles au païs. En fin il se resolut, qu'il n'estoit distingué des autres, et n'estoit sage que par ce qu'il ne se tenoit pas tel: et que son Dieu estimoit bestise singuliere à l'homme, l'opinion de science et de sagesse: et que sa meilleure doctrine estoit la doctrine de l'ignorance, et la simplicité sa meilleure sagesse. La saincte Parole declare miserables ceux d'entre nous, qui s'estiment: Bourbe et cendre, leur dit-elle, qu'as-tu à te glorifier? et ailleurs, Dieu a faict l'homme semblable à l'ombre, de laquelle qui iugera, quand par l'esloignement de la lumiere elle sera esuanouye? Ce n'est rien que de nous. Il s'en faut tant que nos forces conçoiuent la haulteur diuine, que des ouurages de nostre createur, ceux-là portent mieux sa marque, et sont mieux siens, que nous entendons le moins. C'est aux Chrestiens vne occasion de croire, que de rencontrer vne chose incroyable. Elle est d'autant plus selon raison, qu'elle est contre l'humaine raison. Si elle estoit selon raison, ce ne seroit plus miracle; et si elle estoit selon quelque exemple, ce ne seroit plus chose singuliere. Melius scitur Deus nesciendo Tacitus, Sanctius est ac reuerentius de actis Deorum credere quàm scire s'enquerir et de Dieu, et du monde, et des causes premieres des choses. Atque illum quidem parentem huius vniuersitatis inuenire difficile: et, quum iam inueneris, indicare in vulgus, nefas, dit Ciceron. Nous disons bien puissance, verité, iustice: ce sont parolles qui signifient quelque chose de grand: mais cette chose là, nous ne la voyons aucunement, ny ne la conceuons. Nous disons que Dieu craint, que Dieu se courrouce, que Dieu ayme.
Immortalia mortali sermone notantes.
It was what a Roman senator of the latter ages said, that their predecessors’ breath stunk of garlic, but their stomachs were perfumed with a good conscience; and that, on the contrary, those of his time were all sweet odour without, but stunk within of all sorts of vices; that is to say, as I interpret it, that they abounded with learning and eloquence, but were very defective in moral honesty. Incivility, ignorance, simplicity, roughness, are the natural companions of innocence; curiosity, subtlety, knowledge, bring malice in their train; humility, fear, obedience, and affability, which are the principal things that support and maintain human society, require an empty and docile soul, and little presuming upon itself.
Christians have a particular knowledge, how natural and original an evil curiosity is in man; the thirst of knowledge, and the desire to become more wise, was the first ruin of man, and the way by which he precipitated himself into eternal damnation. Pride was his ruin and corruption. ‘Tis pride that diverts him from the common path, and makes him embrace novelties, and rather choose to be head of a troop, lost and wandering in the path of error; to be a master and a teacher of lies, than to be a disciple in the school of truth, suffering himself to be led and guided by the hand of another, in the right and beaten road. ‘Tis, peradventure, the meaning of this old Greek saying, that superstition follows pride, and obeys it as if it were a father: [—Greek—] Ah, presumption, how much dost thou hinder us?
After that Socrates was told that the god of wisdom had assigned to him the title of sage, he was astonished at it, and, searching and examining himself throughout, could find no foundation for this divine judgment. He knew others as just, temperate, valiant, and learned, as himself; and more eloquent, more handsome, and more profitable to their country than he. At last he concluded that he was not distinguished from others, nor wise, but only because he did not think himself so; and that his God considered the opinion of knowledge and wisdom as a singular absurdity in man; and that his best doctrine was the doctrine of ignorance, and simplicity his best wisdom. The sacred word declares those miserable among us who have an opinion of themselves: “Dust and ashes,” says it to such, “what hast thou wherein to glorify thyself?” And, in another place, “God has made man like unto a shadow,” of whom who can judge, when by removing the light it shall be vanished! Man is a thing of nothing.
Our force is so far from being able to comprehend the divine height, that, of the works of our Creator, those best bear his mark, and are with better title his, which we the least understand. To meet with an incredible thing is an occasion to Christians to believe; and it is so much the more according to reason, by how much it is against human reason. If it were according to reason, it would be no more a miracle; and if it were according to example, it would be no longer a singular thing. Melius scitur Deus nesdendo: “God is better known by not knowing him,” says St. Austin: and Tacitus, Sanctius est ac reverentius de actis Deorum credere, quam scire; “it is more holy and reverent to believe the works of God than to know them;” and Plato thinks there is something of impiety in inquiring too curiously into God, the world, and the first causes of things: Atque illum quidem parentem hujus universitaiis invenire, difficile; et, quum jam inveneris, indicare in vulgtis, nefas: “to find out the parent of the world is very difficult; and when found out, to reveal him to the vulgar is sin,” says Cicero. We talk indeed of power, truth, justice; which are words that signify some great thing; but that thing we neither see nor conceive at all. We say that God fears, that God is angry, that God loves,
Immortalia mortali sermone notantes:
“Giving to things immortal mortal names.”
Ce sont toutes agitations et esmotions, qui ne peuuent loger en Dieu selon nostre forme, ny nous l'imaginer selon la sienne: c'est à Dieu seul de se cognoistre et interpreter ses ouurages: et le fait en nostre langue, improprement, pour s'aualler et descendre à nous, qui sommes à terre couchez. La prudence comment luy peut elle conuenir, qui est l'eslite entre le bien et le mal: veu que nul mal ne le touche? Quoy la raison et l'intelligence, desquelles nous nous seruons pour par les choses obscures arriuer aux apparentes: veu qu'il n'y a rien d'obscur à Dieu? La iustice, qui distribue à chacun ce qui luy appartient, engendrée pour la société et communauté des hommes, comment est-elle en Dieu? La temperance, comment? qui est la moderation des voluptez corporelles, qui n'ont nulle place en la diuinité. La fortitude à porter la douleur, le labeur, les dangers, luy appartiennent aussi peu: ces trois choses n'ayans nul accés pres de luy. Parquoy Aristote le tient egallement exempt de vertu et de vice. Neque gratia neque ira teneri potest, quòd quæ talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia. que nous auons à la cognoissance de la verité, quelle qu'elle soit, ce n'est point par nos propres forces que nous l'auons acquise. Dieu nous a assez appris cela par les tesmoings, qu'il a choisi du vulgaire, simples et ignorans, pour nous instruire de ses admirables secrets. Nostre foy ce n'est pas nostre acquest, c'est vn pur present de la liberalité d'autruy. Ce n'est pas par discours ou par nostre entendement que nous auons receu nostre religion, c'est par authorité et par commandement estranger. La foiblesse de nostre iugement nous y aide plus que la force, et nostre aueuglement plus que nostre clair-voyance. C'est par l'entremise de nostre ignorance, plus que de nostre science, que nous sommes sçauans de diuin sçauoir. Ce n'est pas merueille, si nos moyens naturels et terrestres ne peuuent conceuoir cette cognoissance supernaturelle et celeste: apportons y seulement du nostre, l'obeissance et la subiection: car comme il est escrit; Ie destruiray la sapience des sages, et abbattray la prudence des prudens. Où est le sage? où est l'escriuain? où est le disputateur de ce siecle? Dieu n'a-il pas abesty la sapience de ce monde? Car puis que le monde n'a point cogneu Dieu par sapience, il luy a pleu par la vanité de la predication, sauuer les croyans. Si me faut-il voir en fin, s'il est en la puissance de l'homme de trouuer ce qu'il cherche: et si cette queste, qu'il a employé depuis tant de siecles, l'a enrichy de quelque nouuelle force, et de quelque verité solide. Ie croy qu'il me confessera, s'il parle en conscience, que tout l'acquest qu'il a retiré d'vne si longue poursuite, c'est d'auoir appris à recognoistre sa foiblesse. L'ignorance qui estoit naturellement en nous, nous l'auons par longue estude confirmée et auerée. Il est aduenu aux gens veritablement sçauans, ce qui aduient aux espics de bled: ils vont s'esleuant et se haussant la teste droite et fiere, tant qu'ils sont vuides; mais quand ils sont pleins et grossis de grain en leur maturité, ils commencent à s'humilier et baisser les cornes. Pareillement les hommes, ayans tout essayé, tout sondé, et n'ayans trouué en cet amas de science et prouision de tant de choses diuerses, rien de massif et de ferme, et rien que vanité, ils ont renoncé à leur presumption, et recogneu leur condition naturelle. C'est ce que Velleius reproche à Cotta, et à Cicero, qu'ils ont appris de Philo, n'auoir rien appris. Pherecydes, l'vn des sept sages, escriuant à Thales, comme il expiroit, I'ay, dit-il, ordonné aux miens, apres qu'ils m'auront enterré, de te porter mes escrits. S'ils contentent et toy et les autres sages, publie les: sinon, supprime les. Ils ne contiennent nulle certitude qui me satisface à moy-mesme. Aussi ne fay-ie pas profession de sçauoir la verité, ny d'y atteindre. I'ouure les choses plus que ie ne les descouure. Le plus sage homme qui fut onques, quand on luy demanda ce qu'il sçauoit, respondit, qu'il sçauoit cela, qu'il ne sçauoit rien. Il verifioit ce qu'on dit, que la plus grand part de ce que nous sçauons, est la moindre de celles que nous ignorons: c'est à dire, que ce mesme que nous pensons sçauoir, c'est vne piece, et bien petite, de nostre ignorance. Nous sçauons les choses en songe, dit Platon, et les ignorons en verité. Omnes penè veteres, nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbecilles animos, breuia curricula vitæ. deuoit au sçauoir tout son vaillant, Valerius dit que, sur sa vieillesse, il commença à desestimer les lettres. Et pendant qu'il les traictoit, c'estoit sans obligation d'aucun party: suiuant ce qui luy sembloit probable, tantost en l'vne secte, tantost en l'autre: se tenant tousiours soubs la dubitation de l'Academie. Dicendum est, sed ita vt nihil affirmem: quæram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi diffidens. I'auroy trop beau ieu, si ie vouloy considerer l'homme en sa commune façon et en gros: et le pourroy faire pourtant par sa regle propre; qui iuge la verité non par le poids des voix, mais par le nombre. Laissons là le peuple,
Qui vigilans stertit,Mortua cui vita est propè iam viuo atque videnti,
These are all agitations and emotions that cannot be in God, according to our form, nor can we imagine them, according to his. It only belongs to God to know himself, and to interpret his own works; and he does it in our language, going out of himself, to stoop to us who grovel upon the earth. How can prudence, which is the choice between good and evil, be properly attributed to him whom no evil can touch? How can reason and intelligence, which we make use of, to arrive by obscure at apparent things; seeing that nothing is obscure to him? How justice, which distributes to every one what appertains to him, a thing begot by the society and community of men, how is that in God? How temperance, which is the moderation of corporal pleasures, that have no place in the Divinity? Fortitude to support pain, labour, and dangers, as little appertains to him as the rest; these three things have no access to him. For which reason Aristotle holds him equally exempt from virtue and vice: Neque gratia, neque ira teneri potest; quod quo talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia? “He can neither be affected with favour nor indignation, because both these are the effects of frailty.”
The participation we have in the knowledge of truth, such as it is, is not acquired by our own force: God has sufficiently given us to understand that, by the witnesses he has chosen out of the common people, simple and ignorant men, that he has been pleased to employ to instruct us in his admirable secrets. Our faith is not of our own acquiring; ‘tis purely the gift of another’s bounty: ‘tis not by meditation, or by virtue of our own understanding, that we have acquired our religion, but by foreign authority and command wherein the imbecility of our own judgment does more assist us than any force of it; and our blindness more than our clearness of sight: ‘tis more by__ the mediation of our ignorance than of our knowledge that we know any thing of the divine wisdom. ‘Tis no wonder if our natural and earthly parts cannot conceive that supernatural and heavenly knowledge: let us bring nothing of our own, but obedience and subjection; for, as it is written, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe.”
Finally, should I examine whether it be in the power of man to find out that which he seeks and if that quest, wherein he has busied himself so many ages, has enriched him with any new force, or any solid truth; I believe he will confess, if he speaks from his conscience, that all he has got by so long inquiry is only to have learned to know his own weakness. We have only by a long study confirmed and verified the natural ignorance we were in before. The same has fallen out to men truly wise, which befalls the ears of corn; they shoot and raise their heads high and pert, whilst empty; but when full and swelled with grain in maturity, begin to flag and droop. So men, having tried and sounded all things, and having found in that mass of knowledge, and provision of so many various things, nothing solid and firm, and nothing but vanity, have quitted their presumption, and acknowledged their natural condition. ‘Tis what Velleius reproaches Cotta withal and Cicero, “that they had learned of Philo, that they had learned nothing.” Pherecydes, one of the seven sages, writing to Thales upon his death-bed; “I have,” said he, “given order to my people, after my interment, to carry my writings to thee. If they please thee and the other sages, publish; if not, suppress them. They contain no certainty with which I myself am satisfied. Neither do I pretend to know the truth, or to attain to it. I rather open than discover things.” The wisest man that ever was, being asked what he knew, made answer, “He knew this, that he knew nothing.” By which he verified what has been said, that the greatest part of what we know is the least of what we do not; that is to say, that even what we think we know is but a piece, and a very little one, of our ignorance. We know things in dreams, says Plato, and are ignorant of them in truth. Ormes pene veteres nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbecilles animos, brevia curricula vito. “Almost all the ancients have declared that there is nothing to be known, nothing to be perceived or understood; the senses are too limited, men’s minds too weak, and the course of life too short.” And of Cicero himself, who stood indebted to his learning for all he was worth, Valerius says, “That he began to disrelish letters in his old age; and when at his studies, it was with great independency upon any one party; following what he thought probable, now in one sect, and then in another, evermore wavering under the doubts of the academy.” Dicendum est, sed ita ut nihil affirment, quceram omnia, dubitans plerumque, et mihi diffidens. “Something I must say, but so as to affirm nothing; I inquire into all things, but for the most part in doubt and distrust of myself.”
I should have too fair a game should I consider man in his common way of living and in gross; yet I might do it by his own rule, who judges truth not by weight, but by the number of votes. Let us set the people aside,
Qui vigilans stertit,....Mortua cui vita est prope jam vivo atque videnti;
“Half of his life by lazy sleep’s possess’d,And when awake his soul but nods at best;”
qui ne se sent point, qui ne se iuge point, qui laisse la plus part de ses facultez naturelles oisiues. Ie veux prendre l'homme en sa plus haulte assiette. Considerons-le en ce petit nombre d'hommes excellens et triez, qui ayants esté douez d'vne belle et particuliere force naturelle, l'ont encore roidie et aiguisée par soin, par estude et par art, et l'ont montée au plus hault poinct de sagesse, où elle puisse atteindre. Ils ont manié leur ame à tout sens, et à tout biais, l'ont appuyée et estançonnée de tout le secours estranger, qui luy a esté propre, et enrichie et ornée de tout ce qu'ils ont peu emprunter pour sa commodité, du dedans et dehors du monde: c'est en eux que loge la haulteur extreme de l'humaine nature. Ils ont reglé le monde de polices et de loix. Ils l'ont instruit par arts et sciences, et instruit encore par l'exemple de leurs mœurs admirables. Ie ne mettray en compte, que ces gens-là, leur tesmoignage, et leur experience. Voyons iusques où ils sont allez, et à quoy ils se sont tenus. Les maladies et les desfauts que nous trouuerons en ce college-là, le monde les pourra hardiment bien aduouër pour siens.
Quiconque cherche quelque chose, il en vient à ce poinct, ou qu'il dit, qu'il l'a trouuée; ou qu'elle ne se peut trouuer; ou qu'il en est encore en queste. Toute la Philosophie est despartie en ces trois genres. Son dessein est de chercher la verité, la science, et la certitude. Les Peripateticiens, Epicuriens, Stoiciens, et autres, ont pensé l'auoir trouuée. Ceux-cy ont estably les sciences, que nous auons, et les ont traictées, comme notices certaines. Clitomachus, Carneades, et les Academiciens, ont desesperé de leur queste; et iugé que la verité ne se pouuoit conceuoir par nos moyens. La fin de ceux-cy, c'est la foiblesse et humaine ignorance. Ce party a eu la plus grande suitte, et les sectateurs les plus nobles. Pyrrho et autres Sceptiques ou Epechistes, de qui les dogmes plusieurs anciens ont tenu tirez d'Homere, des sept sages, et d'Archilochus, et d'Eurypides, et y attachent Zeno, Democritus, Xenophanes, disent, qu'ils sont encore en cherche de la verité. Ceux-cy iugent, que ceux-là qui pensent l'auoir trouuée, se trompent infiniement; et qu'il y a encore de la vanité trop hardie, en ce second degré, qui asseure que les forces humaines ne sont pas capables d'y atteindre. Car cela, d'establir la mesure de nostre puissance, de cognoistre et iuger la difficulté des choses, c'est vne grande et extreme science, de laquelle ils doubtent que l'homme soit capable.
Nil sciri quisquis putat, id quoque nescit,An sciri possit, quo se nil scire fatetur.
who neither feel nor judge, and let most of their natural faculties lie idle; I will take man in his highest ground. Let us consider him in that little number of men, excellent and culled out from the rest, who, having been endowed with a remarkable and particular natural force, have moreover hardened and whetted it by care, study, and art, and raised it to the highest pitch of wisdom to which it can possibly arrive. They have adjusted their souls to all ways and all biases; have propped and supported them with all foreign helps proper for them, and enriched and adorned them with all they could borrow for their advantage, both within and without the world; ‘tis in these is placed the utmost and most supreme height to which human nature can attain. They have regulated the world with policies and laws. They have instructed it with arts and sciences, and by the example of their admirable manners. I shall make account of none but such men as these, their testimony and experience. Let us examine how far they have proceeded, and where they stopped. The errors and defects that we shall find amongst these men the world may boldly avow as their own.
Whoever goes in search of any thing must come to this, either to say that he has found it, or that it is not to be found, or that he is yet upon the search. All philosophy is divided into these three kinds; her design is to seek out truth, knowledge, and certainty. The Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, and others, have thought they have found it. These established the sciences we have, and have treated of them as of certain knowledge. Clitomachus, Carneades, and the Academics, have despaired in their search, and concluded that truth could not be conceived by our understandings. The result of these is weakness and human ignorance. This sect has had the most and the most noble followers. Pyrrho, and other skeptics or epechists, whose dogmas are held by many of the ancients to be taken from Homer, the seven sages, and from Archilochus and Euripides, and to whose number these are added, Zeno, Democritus, and Xenophanes, say that they are yet upon the inquiry after truth. These conclude that the others, who think they have found it out, are infinitely deceived; and that it is too daring a vanity in the second sort to determine that human reason is not able to attain unto it; for this establishing a standard of our power, to know and judge the difficulty of things, is a great and extreme knowledge, of which they doubt whether man is capable:—
Nil sciri quisquis putat, id quoque nescit,An sciri possit; quam se nil scire fatetur.
“He that says nothing can be known, o’erthrowsHis own opinion, for he nothing knows,So knows not that.”
L'ignorance qui se sçait, qui se iuge, et qui se condamne, ce n'est pas vne entiere ignorance. Pour l'estre, il faut qu'elle s'ignore soy-mesme. De façon que la profession des Pyrrhoniens est, de bransler, doubter, et enquerir, ne s'asseurer de rien, de rien ne se respondre. Des trois actions de l'ame, l'imaginatiue, l'appetitiue, et la consentante, ils en reçoiuent les deux premieres: la derniere, ils la soustiennent, et la maintiennent ambigue, sans inclination, ny approbation d'vne part ou d'autre, tant soit-elle legere. Zenon peignoit de geste son imagination sur cette partition des facultez de l'ame: La main espanduë et ouuerte, c'estoit apparence: la main à demy serrée, et les doigts vn peu croches, consentement: le poing fermé, comprehension: quand de la main gauche il venoit encore à clorre ce poing plus estroit, science. Or cette assiette de leur iugement droicte, et inflexible, receuant tous obiects sans application et consentement, les achemine à leur Ataraxie; qui est vne condition de vie paisible, rassise, exempte des agitations que nous receuons par l'impression de l'opinion et science, que nous pensons auoir des choses. D'où naissent la crainte, l'auarice, l'enuie, les desirs immoderez, l'ambition, l'orgueil, la superstition, l'amour de nouuelleté, la rebellion, la desobeyssance, l'opiniastreté, et la pluspart des maux corporels. Voire ils s'exemptent par là, de la ialousie de leur discipline. Car ils debattent d'vne bien molle façon. Ils ne craignent point la reuenche à leur dispute. Quand ils disent que le poisant va contre-bas, ils seroient bien marris qu'on les en creust; et cherchent qu'on les contredie, pour engendrer la dubitation et surseance de iugement, qui est leur fin. Ils ne mettent en auant leurs propositions, que pour combattre celles qu'ils pensent, que nous ayons en nostre creance. Si vous prenez la leur, ils prendront aussi volontiers la contraire à soustenir: tout leur est vn: ils n'y ont aucun choix. Si vous establissez que la neige soit noire, ils argumentent au rebours, qu'elle est blanche. Si vous dites qu'elle n'est ny l'vn, ny l'autre, c'est à eux à maintenir qu'elle est tous les deux. Si par certain iugement vous tenez, que vous n'en sçauez rien, ils vous maintiendront que vous le sçauez. Ouï, et si par vn axiome affirmatif vous asseurez que vous en doutez, ils vous iront debattant que vous n'en doutez pas; ou que vous ne pouuez iuger et establir que vous en doutez. Et par cette extremité de doubte, qui se secoue soy-mesme, ils se separent et se diuisent de plusieurs opinions, de celles mesmes, qui ont maintenu en plusieurs façons, le doubte et l'ignorance. Pourquoy ne leur sera-il permis, disent-ils, comme il est entre les dogmatistes, à l'vn dire vert, à l'autre iaulne, à eux aussi de doubter? Est-il chose qu'on vous puisse proposer par l'aduouer ou refuser, laquelle il ne soit pas loisible de considerer comme ambigue? Et où les autres sont portez, ou par la coustume de leur païs, ou par l'institution des parens, ou par rencontre, comme par vne tempeste, sans iugement et sans choix, voire le plus souuent auant l'aage de discretion, à telle ou telle opinion, à la secte ou Stoïque ou Epicurienne, à laquelle ils se treuuent hypothequez, asseruiz et collez, comme à vne prise qu'ils ne peuuent desmordre: ad quamcumque disciplinam, velut tempestate, delati, ad eam, tanquam ad saxum, adhærescunt: pourquoy, à ceux-cy, ne sera-il pareillement concedé, de maintenir leur liberté, et considerer les choses sans obligation et seruitude? Hoc liberiores et solutiores, quòd integra illis est iudicandi potestas. desengagé de la necessité, qui bride les autres? Vaut-il pas mieux demeurer en suspens que de s'infrasquer en tant d'erreurs que l'humaine fantasie a produictes? Vaut-il pas mieux suspendre sa persuasion, que de se mesler à ces diuisions seditieuses et querelleuses? Qu'iray-ie choisir? Ce qu'il vous plaira, pourueu que vous choisissiez. Voila vne sotte responce: à laquelle il semble pourtant que tout le dogmatisme arriue: par qui il ne nous est pas permis d'ignorer ce que nous ignorons. Prenez le plus fameux party, iamais il ne sera si seur, qu'il ne vous faille pour le deffendre, attaquer et combattre cent et cent contraires partis. Vaut-il pas mieux se tenir hors de cette meslée? Il vous est permis d'espouser comme vostre honneur et vostre vie, la creance d'Aristote sur l'eternité de l'ame, et desdire et desmentir Platon là dessus, et à eux il sera interdit d'en doubter? S'il est loisible à Panætius de soustenir son iugement autour des aruspices, songes, oracles, vaticinations, desquelles choses les Stoiciens ne doubtent aucunement: pourquoy vn sage n'osera-il en toutes choses, ce que cettuy-cy ose en celles qu'il a apprinses de ses maistres: establies du commun consentement de l'eschole, de laquelle il est sectateur et professeur? Si c'est vn enfant qui iuge, il ne sçait que c'est: si c'est vn sçauant, il est præoccuppé. Ils se sont reseruez vn merueilleux aduantage au combat, s'estans deschargez du soin de se couurir. Il ne leur importe qu'on les frappe, pourueu qu'ils frappent; et font leurs besongnes de tout. S'ils vainquent, vostre proposition cloche; si vous, la leur: s'ils faillent, ils verifient l'ignorance; si vous faillez, vous la verifiez: s'ils prouuent que rien ne se sçache, il va bien; s'ils ne le sçauent pas prouuer, il est bon de mesmes: Vt quum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta inueniuntur, facilius ab vtraque parte assertio sustineatur. pourquoy vne chose soit fausse, que non pas qu'elle soit vraye; et ce qui n'est pas, que ce qui est: et ce qu'ils ne croyent pas, que ce qu'ils croyent. Leurs façons de parler sont, Ie n'establis rien: Il n'est non plus ainsi qu'ainsin, ou que ny l'vn ny l'autre: Ie ne le comprens point. Les apparences sont egales par tout: la loy de parler, et pour et contre, est pareille. Rien ne semble vray qui ne puisse sembler faux. Leur mot sacramental, c'est επεχω refreins, et autres de pareille substance. Leur effect, c'est vne pure, entiere, et tres-parfaicte surceance et suspension de iugement. Ils se seruent de leur raison, pour enquerir et pour debattre: mais non pas pour arrester et choisir. Quiconque imaginera vne perpetuelle confession d'ignorance, vn iugement sans pente, et sans inclination, à quelque occasion que ce puisse estre, il conçoit le Pyrrhonisme. I'exprime cette fantasie autant que ie puis, par ce que plusieurs la trouuent difficile à conceuoir; et les autheurs mesmes la representent vn peu obscurement et diuersement. Quant aux actions de la vie, ils sont en cela de la commune façon. Ils se prestent et accommodent aux inclinations naturelles, à l'impulsion et contrainte des passions, aux constitutions des loix et des coustumes, et à la tradition des arts: non enim nos Deus ista scire, sed tantummodo vti voluit choses là, leurs actions communes, sans aucune opination ou iugement. Qui fait que ie ne puis pas bien assortir à ce discours, ce qu'on dit de Pyrrho. Ils le peignent stupide et immobile, prenant vn train de vie farouche et inassociable, attendant le hurt des charrettes, se presentant aux precipices, refusant de s'accommoder aux loix. Cela est encherir sur sa discipline. Il n'a pas voulu se faire pierre ou souche: il a voulu se faire homme viuant, discourant, et raisonnant, iouyssant de tous plaisirs et commoditez naturelles, embesoignant et se seruant de toutes ses pieces corporelles et spirituelles, en regle et droicture. Les priuileges fantastiques, imaginaires, et faulx, que l'homme s'est vsurpé, de regenter, d'ordonner, d'establir, il les a de bonne foy renoncez et quittez. Si n'est-il point de secte, qui ne soit contrainte de permettre à son sage de suiure assez de choses non comprinses, ny perceuës ny consenties, s'il veut viure. Et quand il monte en mer, il suit ce dessein, ignorant s'il luy sera vtile: et se plie, à ce que le vaisseau est bon, le pilote experimenté, la saison commode: circonstances probables seulement. Apres lesquelles il est tenu d'aller, et se laisser remuer aux apparances, pourueu qu'elles n'ayent point d'expresse contrarieté. Il a vn corps, il a vne ame: les sens le poussent, l'esprit l'agite. Encore qu'il ne treuue point en soy cette propre et singuliere marque de iuger, et qu'il s'apperçoiue, qu'il ne doit engager son consentement, attendu qu'il peut estre quelque faulx pareil à ce vray: il ne laisse de conduire les offices de sa vie pleinement et commodement. Combien y a il d'arts, qui font profession de consister en la coniecture, plus qu'en la science? qui ne decident pas du vray et du faulx, et suiuent seulement ce qu'il semble? Il y a, disent-ils, et vray et faulx, et y a en nous dequoy le chercher, mais non pas dequoy l'arrester à la touche. Nous en valons bien mieux, de nous laisser manier sans inquisition, à l'ordre du monde. Vne ame garantie de preiugé, a vn merueilleux auancement vers la tranquillité. Gents qui iugent et contrerollent leurs iuges, ne s'y soubsmettent iamais deuëment.
Combien et aux loix de la religion, et aux loix politiques se trouuent plus dociles et aisez à mener, les esprits simples et incurieux, que ces esprits surueillants et pedagogues des causes diuines et humaines? Il n'est rien en l'humaine inuention, où il y ait tant de verisimilitude et d'vtilité. Cette-cy presente l'homme nud et vuide, recognoissant sa foiblesse naturelle, propre à receuoir d'en hault quelque force estrangere, desgarni d'humaine science, et d'autant plus apte à loger en soy la diuine, aneantissant son iugement, pour faire plus de place à la foy: ny mescreant ny establissant aucun dogme contre les loix et obseruances communes, humble, obeïssant, disciplinable, studieux; ennemy iuré d'heresie, et s'exemptant par consequent des vaines et irreligieuses opinions introduites par les fauces sectes. C'est vne carte blanche preparée à prendre du doigt de Dieu telles formes qu'il luy plaira d'y grauer. Plus nous nous renuoyons et commettons à Dieu, et renonçons à nous, mieux nous en valons. Accepte, dit l'Ecclesiaste, en bonne part les choses au visage et au goust qu'elles se presentent à toy, du iour à la iournée: le demeurant est hors de ta cognoissance. Dominus nouit cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanæ sunt. les deux font expresse profession de dubitation et d'ignorance: et en celle des dogmatistes, qui est troisiesme, il est aysé à descouurir, que la plus part n'ont pris le visage de l'asseurance que pour auoir meilleure mine. Ils n'ont pas tant pensé nous establir quelque certitude, que nous montrer iusques où ils estoient allez en cette chasse de la verité, quam docti fingunt magis quàm norunt. Timæus ayant à instruire Socrates de ce qu'il sçait des Dieux, du monde, et des hommes, propose d'en parler comme vn homme à vn homme; et qu'il suffit, si ses raisons sont probables, comme les raisons d'vn autre: car les exactes raisons n'estre en sa main, ny en mortelle main. Ce que l'vn de ses sectateurs a ainsin imité: Vt potero, explicabo: nec tamen, vt Pythius Apollo, certa vt sint et fixa, quæ dixero: sed, vt homunculus, probabilia coniectura sequens. naturel et populaire. Ailleurs il l'a traduit, sur le propos mesme de Platon. Si fortè, de Deorum natura ortúque mundi disserentes, minus id quod habemus in animo consequimur, haud erit mirum. Æquum est enim meminisse, et me, qui disseram, hominem esse, et vos qui iudicetis: vt, si probabilia dicentur, nihil vltrà requiratis. Aristote nous entasse ordinairement vn grand nombre d'autres opinions, et d'autres creances, pour y comparer la sienne, et nous faire voir de combien il est allé plus outre, et combien il approche de plus pres la verisimilitude. Car la verité ne se iuge point par authorité et tesmoignage d'autruy. Et pourtant euita religieusement Epicurus d'en alleguer en ses escrits. Cettuy-là est le prince des dogmatistes, et si nous apprenons de luy, que le beaucoup sçauoir apporte l'occasion de plus doubter. On le void à escient se couurir souuent d'obscurité si espesse et inextricable, qu'on n'y peut rien choisir de son aduis. C'est par effect vn Pyrrhonisme soubs vne forme resolutiue. Oyez la protestation de Cicero, qui nous explique la fantasie d'autruy par la sienne. Qui requirunt, quid de quaque re ipsi sentiamus: curiosius id faciunt, quàm necesse est. Hæc in philosophia ratio, contra omnia disserendi, nullamque rem apertè iudicandi, profecta à Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata à Carneade, vsque ad nostram viget ætatem. Hi sumus, qui omnibus veris falsa quædam adiuncta esse dicamus, tanta similitudine, vt in ijs nulla insit certè iudicandi et assentiendi nota. des philosophes, ont ils affecté la difficulté, si ce n'est pour faire valoir la vanité du subject, et amuser la curiosité de nostre esprit, luy donnant où se paistre, à ronger cet os creuz et descharné? Clytomachus affermoit n'auoir iamais sçeu, par les escrits de Carneades, entendre de quelle opinion il estoit. Pourquoy a euité aux siens Epicurus, la facilité, et Heraclytus en a esté surnommé σχοτεινος comme les joueurs de passe-passe pour ne descouurir la vanité de leur art: et de laquelle l'humaine bestise se paye aysément.
Clarus ob obscuram linguam, magis inter inanes:Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amántque,Inuersis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt.
The ignorance that knows itself, judges and condemns itself, is not an absolute ignorance; to be such, it must be ignorant of itself; so that the profession of the Pyrrhonians is to waver, doubt, and inquire, not to make themselves sure of, or responsible to themselves for any thing. Of the three actions of the soul, imaginative, appetitive, and consentive, they receive the two first; the last they kept ambiguous, without inclination or approbation, either of one thing or another, so light as it is. Zeno represented the motion of his imagination upon these divisions of the faculties of the soul thus: “An open and expanded hand signified appearance; a hand half shut, and the fingers a little bending, consent; a clenched fist, comprehension; when with the left he yet thrust the right fist closer, knowledge.” Now this situation of their judgment upright and inflexible, receiving all objects without application or consent, leads them to their ataraxy, which is a peaceable condition of life, temperate, and exempt from the agitations we receive by the impression of opinion and knowledge that we think we have of things; whence spring fear, avarice, envy, immoderate desires, ambition, pride, superstition, love of novelty, rebellion, disobedience, obstinacy, and the greatest part of bodily ills; nay, and by that they are exempt from the jealousy of their discipline; for they debate after a very gentle manner; they fear no requital in their disputes; when they affirm that heavy things descend they would be sorry to be believed, and love tobe contradicted, to engender doubt and suspense of judgment, which is their end. They only put forward their propositions to contend with those they think we have in our belief. If you take their arguments, they will as readily maintain the contrary; ‘tis all one to them, they have no choice. If you maintain that snow is black, they will argue on the contrary that it is white; if you say it is neither the one nor the other, they will maintain that it is both. If you hold, of certain judgment, that you know nothing, they will maintain that you do. Yea, and if by an affirmative axiom you assure them that you doubt, they will argue against you that you doubt not; or that you cannot judge and determine that you doubt. And by this extremity of doubt, which jostles itself, they separate and divide themselves from many opinions, even of those they have several ways maintained, both concerning doubt and ignorance. “Why shall not they be allowed to doubt,” say they, “as well as the dogmatists, one of whom says green, another yellow? Can any thing be proposed to us to grant, or deny, which it shall not be permitted to consider as ambiguous?” And where others are carried away, either by the custom of their country, or by the instruction of parents, or by accident, as by a tempest, without judgment and without choice, nay, and for the most part before the age of discretion, to such and such an opinion, to the sect whether Stoic or Epicurean, with which they are prepossessed, enslaved, and fast bound, as to a thing they cannot forsake: Ad quamcumque disciplinant, velut tempestate, delati, ad earn, tanquam ad saxum, adhorescunt; “every one cleaves to the doctrine he has happened upon, as to a rock against which he has been thrown by tempest;” why shall not these likewise be permitted to maintain their liberty, and consider things without obligation or slavery? hoc liberiores et solutiores, quod integra illis est judicandi potestas: “in this more unconstrained and free, because they have the greater power of judging.” Is it not of some advantage to be disengaged from the necessity that curbs others? Is it not better to remain in suspense than to entangle one’s self in the innumerable errors that human fancy has produced? Is it not much better to suspend one’s persuasion than to intermeddle with these wrangling and seditious divisions: “What shall I choose?” “What you please, provided you will choose.” A very foolish answer; but such a one, nevertheless, as all dogmatism seems to point at, and by which we are not permitted to be ignorant of what we are ignorant of.
Take the most eminent side, that of the greatest reputation; it will never be so sure that you shall not be forced to attack and contend with a hundred and a hundred adversaries to defend it. Is it not better to keep out of this hurly-burly? You are permitted to embrace Aristotle’s opinions of the immortality of the soul with as much zeal as your honour and life, and to give the lie to Plato thereupon, and shall they be interdicted to doubt him? If it be lawful for Pantius to maintain his opinion about augury, dreams, oracles, vaticinations, of which the Stoics made no doubt at all; why may not a wise man dare to do the same in all things that he dared to do in those he had learned of his masters, established by the common consent of the school, whereof he is a professor and a member? If it be a child that judges, he knows not what it is; if a wise man, he is prepossessed. They have reserved for themselves a marvellous advantage in battle, having eased themselves of the care of defence. If you strike them, they care not, provided they strike too, and they turn every thing to their own use. If they overcome, your argument is lame; if you, theirs; if they fall short, they verify ignorance; if you fall short, you do it; if they prove that nothing is known, ‘tis well; if they cannot prove it, ‘tis also well: Ut quurn in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta inveniuntur, facilius ab utraque parte assertio sustineatur: “That when like sentiments happen pro and con in the same thing, the assent may on both sides be more easily suspended.” And they make account to find out, with much greater facility, why a thing is false, than why ‘tis true; that which is not, than that which is; and what they do not believe, than what they do. Their way of speaking is: “I assert nothing; it is no more so than so, or than neither one nor t’other; I understand it not. Appearances are everywhere equal; the law of speaking, pro or con, is the same. Nothing seems true, that may not seem false.” Their sacramental word is that is to say, “I hold, I stir not.” This is the burden of their song, and others of like stuff. The effect of which is a pure, entire, perfect, and absolute suspension of judgment. They make use of their reason to inquire and debate, but not to fix and determine. Whoever shall imagine a perpetual confession of ignorance, a judgment without bias, propension, or inclination, upon any occasion whatever, conceives a true idea of Pyrrhonism. I express this fancy as well as I can, by reason that many find it hard to conceive, and the authors themselves represent it a little variously and obscurely.
As to what concerns the actions of life, they are in this of the common fashion. They yield and give up themselves to their natural inclinations, to the power and impulse of passions, to the constitution of laws and customs, and to the tradition of arts; Non enim nos Deus ista scire, sed tantummodo uti, voluit. “For God would not have us know, but only use those things.” They suffer their ordinary actions to be guided by those things, without any dispute or judgment. For which reason I cannot consent to what is said of Pyrrho, by those who represent him heavy and immovable, leading a kind of savage and unsociable life, standing the jostle of carts, going upon the edge of precipices, and refusing to accommodate himself to the laws. This is to enhance upon his discipline; he would never make himself a stock or a stone, he would show himself a living man, discoursing, reasoning, enjoying all reasonable conveniences and pleasures, employing and making use of all his corporal and spiritual faculties in rule and reason. The fantastic, imaginary, and false privileges that man had usurped of lording it, ordaining, and establishing, he has utterly quitted and renounced. Yet there is no sect but is constrained to permit her sage to follow several things not comprehended, perceived, or consented to, if he means to live. And if he goes to sea, he follows that design, not knowing whether his voyage shall be successful or no; and only insists upon the tightness of the vessel, the experience of the pilot, and the convenience of the season, and such probable circumstances; after which he is bound to go, and suffer himself to be governed by appearances, provided there be no express and manifest contrariety in them. He has a body, he has a soul; the senses push them, the mind spurs them on. And although he does not find in himself this proper and singular sign of judging, and that he perceives that he ought not to engage his consent, considering that there may be some false, equal to these true appearances, yet does he not, for all that, fail of carrying on the offices of his life with great liberty and convenience. How many arts are there that profess to consist more in conjecture than knowledge; that decide not on true and false, and only follow that which seems so! There are, say they, true and false, and we have in us wherewith to seek it; but not to make it stay when we touch it. We are much more prudent, in letting ourselves be regulated by the order of the world, without inquiry. A soul clear from prejudice has a marvellous advance towards tranquillity and repose. Men that judge and control their judges, do never duly submit to them.
How much more docile and easy to be governed, both by the laws of religion and civil polity, are simple and incurious minds, than those over-vigilant wits, that will still be prating of divine and human causes! There is nothing in human invention that carries so great a show of likelihood and utility as this; this presents man, naked and empty, confessing his natural weakness, fit to receive some foreign force from above, unfurnished of human, and therefore more apt to receive into him the divine knowledge, making nought of his own judgment, to give more room to faith; neither disbelieving nor establishing any dogma against common observances; humble, obedient, disciplinable, and studious; a sworn enemy of heresy; and consequently freeing himself from vain and irreligious opinions, introduced by false sects. ‘Tis a blank paper prepared to receive such forms from the finger of God as he shall please to write upon it. The more we resign and commit ourselves to God, and the more we renounce ourselves, of the greater value we are. “Take in good part,” says Ecclesiastes, “the things that present themselves to thee, as they seem and taste from hand to mouth; the rest is out of thy knowledge.” Dominus novit cogitationes hominum, quoniam van sunt: “The Lord knoweth the hearts of men, that they are but vanity.”
Thus we see that of the three general sects of philosophy, two make open profession of doubt and ignorance; and in that of the Dogmatists, which is the third, it is easy to discover that the greatest part of them only assume this face of confidence and assurance that
they may produce the better effect; they have not so much thought to establish any certainty for us, as to show us how far they have proceeded in their search of truth: Quam docti jingunt magis quam nrunt: “Which the learned rather feign than know.” Timus, being to instruct Socrates in what he knew of the gods, the world, and men, proposes to speak to him as a man to a man; and that it is sufficient, if his reasons are probable as those of another; for that exact reasons were neither in his nor any other mortal hand; which one of his followers has thus imitated: Ut potero, explicabo: nec tamen, ut Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa qu dixero; sed, ut homunculus, probabilia conjectur sequens: “I will, as well as I am able, explain; affirming, yet not as the Pythian oracle, that what I say is fixed and certain, but like a mere man, that follows probabilities by conjecture.” And this, upon the natural and common subject of the contempt of death; he has elsewhere translated from the very words of Plato: Si forte, de Deorum natur ortuque mundi disserentes, minus id quod habemiis in animo consequi-mur, haud erit mirum; oquum est enim meminisse, et me, qui disseram, hominem esse, et vos, qui judicetis, ut, si probabilia dicentur, nihil ultra requiratis? “If perchance, when we discourse of the nature of God, and the world’s original, we cannot do it as we desire, it will be no great wonder. For it is just you should remember that both I who speak and you who are to judge, are men; so that if probable things are delivered, you shall require and expect no more.” Aristotle ordinarily heaps up a great number of other men’s opinions and beliefs, to compare them with his own, and to let us see how much he has gone beyond them, and how much nearer he approaches to the likelihood of truth; for truth is not to be judged by the authority and testimony of others; which made Epicurus religiously avoid quoting them in his writings. This is the prince of all dogmatists, and yet we are told by him that the more we know the more we have room for doubt. In earnest, we sometimes see him shroud and muffle up himself in so thick and so inextricable an obscurity that we know not what to make of his advice; it is, in effect, a Pyrrhonism under a resolutive form. Hear Cicero’s protestation, who expounds to us another’s fancy by his own: Qui requirunt quid de quque re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est,... Hoc in philosophi ratio, contra omnia disserendi, nuttamque rem aperte judicandi, profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, conjirmata a Gameade, usqu ad nostram viget cetatem..........Hi sumus, qui omnibus veris falsa quodam adjuncta esse dicamus, tanta similitudine, ut in iis nulla insit certe judicandi et assentiendi nota. “They who desire to know what we think of every thing are therein more inquisitive than is necessary. This practice in philosophy of disputing against every thing, and of absolutely concluding nothing, begun by Socrates, repeated by Arcesilaus, and confirmed by Cameades, has continued in use even to our own times. We are they who declare that there is so great a mixture of things false amongst all that are true, and they so resemble one another, that there can be in them no certain mark to direct us either to judge or assent.” Why hath not Aristotle only, but most of the philosophers, affected difficulty, if not to set a greater value upon the vanity of the subject, and amuse the curiosity of our minds by giving them this hollow and fleshless bone to pick? Clitomachus affirmed “That he could never discover by Carneades’s writings what opinion he was of.” This was it that made Epicurus affect to be abstruse, and that procured Heraclitus the epithet of [—Greek—] Difficulty is a coin the learned make use of, like jugglers, to conceal the vanity of their art, and which human sottishness easily takes for current pay.
Claras, ob obscuram linguam, magis inter manes...Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantqueInversis qu sub verbis latitantia cemunt.
“Bombast and riddle best do puppies please,For fools admire and love such things as these;And a dull quibble, wrapt in dubious phrase,Up to the height doth their wise wonder raise.”
Cicero reprend aucuns de ses amis d'auoir accoustumé de mettre à l'astrologie, au droit, à la dialectique, et à la geometrie, plus de temps, que ne meritoyent ces arts: et que cela les diuertissoit des deuoirs de la vie, plus vtiles et honnestes. Les philosophes Cyrenaïques mesprisoyent esgalement la physique et la dialectique. Zenon tout au commencement des liures de la republique, declaroit inutiles toutes les liberales disciplines. Chrysippus disoit, que ce que Platon et Aristote auoyent escrit de la logique, ils l'auoyent escrit par ieu et par exercice: et ne pouuoit croire qu'ils eussent parlé à certes d'vne si vaine matiere. Plutarque le dit de la metaphysique, Epicurus l'eust encores dict de la rhetorique, de la grammaire, poësie, mathematique, et hors la physique, de toutes les autres sciences: et Socrates de toutes, sauf celle des mœurs et de la vie. De quelque chose qu'on s'enquist à luy, il ramenoit en premier lieu tousiours l'enquerant à rendre compte des conditions de sa vie, presente et passée, lesquelles il examinoit et iugeoit: estimant tout autre apprentissage subsecutif à celuy-la et supernumeraire. Parum mihi placeant eæ litteræ quæ ad virtutem doctoribus nihil profuerunt. esté ainsi mesprisés par le mesme sçauoir. Mais ils n'ont pas pensé qu'il fust hors de propos, d'exercer leur esprit és choses mesmes, où il n'y auoit nulle solidité profitable. Au demeurant, les vns ont estimé Plato dogmatiste, les autres dubitateur, les autres en certaines choses l'vn, et en certaines choses l'autre. Le conducteur de ses dialogismes, Socrates, va tousiours demandant et esmouuant la dispute, iamais l'arrestant, iamais satisfaisant: et dit n'auoir autre science, que la science de s'opposer. Homere leur autheur a planté egalement les fondements à toutes les sectes de philosophie, pour montrer, combien il estoit indifferent par où nous allassions. De Platon nasquirent dix sectes diuerses, dit-on. Aussi, à mon gré, iamais instruction ne fut titubante, et rien asseuerante, si la sienne ne l'est. Socrates disoit, que les sages femmes en prenant ce mestier de faire engendrer les autres, quittent le mestier d'engendrer elles. Que luy par le tiltre de sage homme, que les Dieux luy auoyent deferé, s'estoit aussi desfaict en son amour virile et mentale, de la faculté d'enfanter: se contentant d'ayder et fauorir de son secours les engendrants: ouurir leur nature; graisser leurs conduits: faciliter l'yssue de leur enfantement: iuger d'iceluy: le baptizer: le nourrir: le fortifier: l'emmaillotter, et circoncir: exerçant et maniant son engin, aux perils et fortunes d'autruy. Il est ainsi de la plus part des autheurs de ce tiers genre, comme les anciens ont remerqué des escripts d'Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, et autres. Ils ont vne forme d'escrire douteuse en substance et en dessein, enquerant plustost qu'instruisant: encore qu'ils entresement leur stile de cadances dogmatistes. Cela se voit il pas aussi bien en Seneque et en Plutarque? combien disent ils tantost d'vn visage, tantost d'vn autre, pour ceux qui y regardent de prez? Et les reconciliateurs des iurisconsultes deuoyent premierement les concilier chacun à soy. Platon me semble auoir aymé cette forme de philosopher par dialogues, à escient, pour loger plus decemment en diuerses bouches la diuersité et variation de ses propres fantasies. Diuersement traitter les matieres, est aussi bien les traitter, que conformement, et mieux: à sçauoir plus copieusement et vtilement. Prenons exemple de nous. Les arrests font le point extreme du parler dogmatiste et resolutif: si est ce que ceux que noz parlements presentent au peuple, les plus exemplaires, propres à nourrir en luy la reuerence qu'il doit à cette dignité, principalement par la suffisance des personnes qui l'exercent, prennent leur beauté, non de la conclusion, qui est à eux quotidienne, et qui est commune à tout iuge, tant comme de la disceptation et agitation des diuerses et contraires ratiocinations, que la matiere du droit souffre. Et le plus large champ aux reprehensions des vns philosophes à l'encontre des autres, se tire des contradictions et diuersitez, en quoy chacun d'eux se trouue empestré: ou par dessein, pour montrer la vacillation de l'esprit humain autour de toute matiere, ou forcé ignoramment, par la volubilité et incomprehensibilité de toute matiere. Que signifie ce refrein? en vn lieu glissant et coulant suspendons nostre creance: car, comme dit Eurypides,
Les œuures de Dieu en diuersesFaçons, nous donnent des trauerses.
Semblable à celuy qu'Empedocles semoit souuent en ses liures, comme agité d'vne diuine fureur, et forcé de la verité. Non non, nous ne sentons rien, nous ne voyons rien, toutes choses nous sont occultes, il n'en est aucune de laquelle nous puissions establir quelle elle est: reuenant à ce mot diuin, Cogitationes mortalium timidæ, et incertæ adinuentiones nostræ, et providentiæ pas trouuer estrange, si gens desesperez de la prise n'ont pas laissé d'auoir plaisir à la chasse, l'estude estant de soy vne occupation plaisante: et si plaisante, que parmy les voluptez, les Stoïciens defendent aussi celle qui vient de l'exercitation de l'esprit, y veulent de la bride, et trouuent de l'intemperance à trop sçauoir. Democritus ayant mangé à sa table des figues, qui sentoient le miel, commença soudain à chercher en son esprit, d'où leur venoit cette douceur inusitee, et pour s'en esclaircir, s'alloit leuer de table, pour voir l'assiette du lieu où ces figues auoyent esté cueillies: sa chambriere, ayant entendu la cause de ce remuëment, luy dit en riant, qu'il ne se penast plus pour cela, car c'estoit qu'elle les auoit mises en vn vaisseau, où il y auoit eu du miel. Il se despita, dequoy elle luy auoit osté l'occasion de cette recherche, et desrobé matiere à sa curiosité. Va, luy dit-il, tu m'as faict desplaisir, ie ne lairray pourtant d'en chercher la cause, comme si elle estoit naturelle. Et volontiers n'eust failly de trouuer quelque raison vraye, à vn effect faux et supposé. Cette histoire d'vn fameux et grand philosophe, nous represente bien clairement cette passion studieuse, qui nous amuse à la poursuyte des choses, de l'acquest desquelles nous sommes desesperez. Plutarque recite vn pareil exemple de quelqu'vn, qui ne vouloit pas estre esclaircy de ce, dequoy il estoit en doute, pour ne perdre le plaisir de le chercher: comme l'autre, qui ne vouloit pas que son medecin luy ostast l'alteration de la fieure, pour ne perdre le plaisir de l'assouuir en beuuant. Satius est superuacua discere, quàm nihil. il y a le plaisir souuent seul, et tout ce que nous prenons, qui est plaisant, n'est pas tousiours nutritif, ou sain: pareillement ce que nostre esprit tire de la science, ne laisse pas d'estre voluptueux, encore qu'il ne soit ny alimentant ny salutaire. Voicy comme ils disent: La consideration de la nature est vne pasture propre à nos esprits, elle nous esleue et enfle, nous fait desdaigner les choses basses et terriennes, par la comparaison des superieures et celestes: la recherche mesme des choses occultes et grandes est tresplaisante, voire à celuy qui n'en acquiert que la reuerence, et crainte d'en iuger. Ce sont des mots de leur profession. La vaine image de cette maladiue curiosité, se voit plus expressement encores en cet autre exemple, qu'ils ont par honneur si souuent en la bouche. Eudoxus souhaittoit et prioit les Dieux, qu'il peust vne fois voir le soleil de pres, comprendre sa forme, sa grandeur, et sa beauté, à peine d'en estre bruslé soudainement. Il veut au prix de sa vie, acquerir vne science, de laquelle l'vsage et possession luy soit quand et quand ostée. Et pour cette soudaine et volage cognoissance, perdre toutes autres cognoissances qu'il a, et qu'il peut acquerir par apres. Ie ne me persuade pas aysement, qu'Epicurus, Platon, et Pythagoras nous ayent donné pour argent contant leurs Atomes, leurs Idées, et leurs Nombres. Ils estoyent trop sages pour establir leurs articles de foy, de chose si incertaine, et si debattable. Mais en cette obscurité et ignorance du monde, chacun de ces grands personnages, s'est trauaillé d'apporter vne telle quelle image de lumiere: et ont promené leur ame à des inuentions, qui eussent au moins vne plaisante et subtile apparence, pourueu que toute fausse, elle se peust maintenir contre les oppositions contraires: Vnicuique ista pro ingenio finguntur, non ex scientiæ vi faisoit profession de la Philosophie, de laquelle pourtant en son iugement, il ne tenoit pas grand compte, respondit que cela, c'estoit vrayement philosopher. Ils ont voulu considerer tout, balancer tout, et ont trouué cette occupation propre à la naturelle curiosité qui est en nous. Aucunes choses, ils les ont escrites pour le besoin de la societé publique, comme leurs religions: et a esté raisonnable pour cette consideration, que les communes opinions, ils n'ayent voulu les esplucher au vif, aux fins de n'engendrer du trouble en l'obeyssance des loix et coustumes de leur pays. Platon traitte ce mystere d'vn ieu assez descouuert. Car où il escrit selon soy, il ne prescrit rien à certes. Quand il fait le legislateur, il emprunte vn style regentant et asseuerant: et si y mesle hardiment les plus fantastiques de ses inuentions: autant vtiles à persuader à la commune, que ridicules à persuader à soy-mesme: sçachant combien nous sommes propres à receuoir toutes impressions, et sur toutes, les plus farouches et enormes. Et pourtant en ses loix, il a grand soing, qu'on ne chante en publiq que des poësies, desquelles les fabuleuses feintes tendent à quelque vtile fin: estant si facile d'imprimer touts fantosmes en l'esprit humain, que c'est iniustice de ne le paistre plustost de mensonges profitables, que de mensonges ou inutiles ou dommageables. Il dit tout destrousseement en sa Republique, que pour le profit des hommes, il est souuent besoin de les piper. Il est aisé à distinguer, les vnes sectes auoir plus suiuy la verité, les autres l'vtilité, par où celles cy ont gaigné credit. C'est la misere de nostre condition, que souuent ce qui se presente à nostre imagination pour le plus vray, ne s'y presente pas pour le plus vtile à nostre vie. Les plus hardies sectes, Epicurienne, Pyrrhonienne, nouuelle Academique, encore sont elles contrainctes de se plier à la loy ciuile, au bout du compte. Il y a d'autres subiects qu'ils ont belutez, qui à gauche, qui à dextre, chacun se trauaillant d'y donner quelque visage, à tort ou à droit. Car n'ayans rien trouué de si caché, dequoy ils n'ayent voulu parler, il leur est souuent force de forger des coniectures foibles et foles: non qu'ils les prinssent eux mesmes pour fondement, ne pour establir quelque verité, mais pour l'exercice de leur estude. Non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quàm exercere ingenia materiæ difficultate videntur voluisse. si grande inconstance, varieté, et vanité d'opinions, que nous voyons auoir esté produites par ces ames excellentes et admirables?
Car pour exemple, qu'est-il plus vain, que de vouloir deuiner Dieu par nos analogies et coniectures: le regler, et le monde, à nostre capacité et à nos loix? et nous seruir aux despens de la diuinité, de ce petit eschantillon de suffisance qu'il luy a pleu despartir à nostre naturelle condition? et par ce que nous ne pouuons estendre nostre veuë iusques en son glorieux siege, l'auoir ramené ça bas à nostre corruption et à nos miseres? De toutes les opinions humaines et anciennes touchant la religion, celle là me semble auoir eu plus de vray-semblance et plus d'excuse, qui recognoissoit Dieu comme vne puissance incomprehensible, origine et conseruatrice de toutes choses, toute bonté, toute perfection, receuant et prenant en bonne part l'honneur et la reuerence, que les humains luy rendoient soubs quelque visage, soubs quelque nom et en quelque maniere que ce fust.
Iupiter omnipotens, rerum, regúmque, Deûmque,Progenitor, genitrixque.
Cicero reprehends some of his friends for giving more of their time to the study of astrology, logic, and geometry, than they were really worth; saying that they were by these diverted from the duties of life, and more profitable and proper studies. The Cyrenaick philosophers, in like manner, despised physics and logic. Zeno, in the very beginning of the books of the commonwealth, declared all the liberal arts of no use. Chrysippus said “That what Plato and Aristotle had writ, concerning logic, they had only done in sport, and by way of exercise;” and could not believe that they spoke in earnest of so vain a thing. Plutarch says the same of metaphysics. And Epicurus would have said as much of rhetoric, grammar, poetry, mathematics, and, natural philosophy excepted, of all the sciences; and Socrates of them all, excepting that which treats of manners and of life. Whatever any one required to be instructed in, by him, he would ever, in the first place, demand an account of the conditions of his life present and past, which he examined and judged, esteeming all other learning subsequent to that and supernumerary: Parum mihi placeant e littero quo ad virtutem doctoribus nihil pro-fuerunt. “That learning is in small repute with me which nothing profited the teachers themselves to virtue.” Most of the arts have been in like manner decried by the same knowledge; but they did not consider that it was from the purpose to exercise their wits in those very matters wherein there was no solid advantage.
As to the rest, some have looked upon Plato as a dogmatist, others as a doubter, others in some things the one, and in other things the other. Socrates, the conductor of his dialogues, is eternally upon questions and stirring up disputes, never determining, never satisfying, and professes to have no other science but that of opposing himself. Homer, their author, has equally laid the foundations of all the sects of philosophy, to show how indifferent it was which way we should choose. ‘Tis said that ten several sects sprung from Plato; yet, in my opinion, never did any instruction halt and stumble, if his does not.
Socrates said that midwives, in taking upon them the trade of helping others to bring forth, left the trade of bringing forth themselves; and that by the title of a wise man or sage, which the gods had conferred upon him, he was disabled, in his virile and mental love, of the faculty of bringing forth, contenting himself to help and assist those that could; to open their nature, anoint the passes, and facilitate their birth; to judge of the infant, baptize, nourish, fortify, swath, and circumcise it, exercising and employing his understanding in the perils and fortunes of others.
It is so with the most part of this third sort of authors, as the ancients have observed in the writings of Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, and others. They have a way of writing, doubtful in substance and design, rather inquiring than teaching, though they mix their style with some dogmatical periods. Is not the same thing seen in Seneca and Plutarch? How many contradictions are there to be found if a man pry narrowly into them! So many that the reconciling lawyers ought first to reconcile them every one to themselves. Plato seems to have affected this method of philosophizing in dialogues; to the end that he might with greater decency, from several mouths, deliver the diversity and variety of his own fancies. It is as well to treat variously of things as to treat of them conformably, and better, that is to say, more copiously and with greater profit. Let us take example from ourselves: judgments are the utmost point of all dogmatical and determinative speaking; and yet those arrets that our parliaments give the people, the most exemplary of them, and those most proper to nourish in them the reverence due to that dignity, principally through the sufficiency of the persons acting, derive their beauty not so much from the conclusion, which with them is quotidian and common to every judge, as from the dispute and heat of divers and contrary arguments that the matter of law and equity will permit And the largest field for reprehension that some philosophers have against others is drawn from the diversities and contradictions wherein every one of them finds himself perplexed, either on purpose to show the vacillation of the human mind concerning every thing, or ignorantly compelled by the volubility and incomprehensibility of all matter; which is the meaning of the maxim—“In a slippery and sliding place let us suspend our belief;” for, as Euripides says,—
“God’s various works perplex the thoughts of men.”
Like that which Empedocles, as if transported with a divine fury, and compelled by truth, often strewed here and there in his writings: “No, no, we feel nothing, we see nothing; all things are concealed from us; there is not one thing of which we can positively say what it is;” according to the divine saying: Cogitationes mortalium timid, et incert adinventiones nostro et providentice. “For the thoughts of mortal men are doubtful; and our devices are but uncertain.” It is not to be thought strange if men, despairing to overtake what they hunt after, have not however lost the pleasure of the chase; study being of itself so pleasant an employment; and so pleasant that amongst the pleasures, the Stoics forbid that also which proceeds from the exercise of the mind, will have it curbed, and find a kind of intemperance in too much knowledge.
Democritus having eaten figs at his table that tasted of honey, fell presently to considering with himself whence they should derive this unusual sweetness; and to be satisfied in it, was about to rise from the table to see the place whence the figs had been gathered; which his maid observing, and having understood the cause, smilingly told him that “he need not trouble himself about that, for she had put them into a vessel in which there had been honey.” He was vexed at this discovery, and that she had deprived him of the occasion of this inquiry, and robbed his curiosity of matter to work upon: “Go thy way,” said he, “thou hast done me an injury; but, for all that, I will seek out the cause as if it were natural;” and would willingly have found out some true reason for a false and imaginary effect. This story of a famous and great philosopher very clearly represents to us that studious passion that puts us upon the pursuit of things, of the acquisition of which we despair. Plutarch gives a like example of some one who would not be satisfied in that whereof he was in doubt, that he might not lose the pleasure of inquiring into it; like the other who would not that his physician should allay the thirst of his fever, that he might not lose the pleasure of quenching it by drinking. Satius est supervacua discere, quam nihil. “‘Tis better to learn more than necessary than nothing at all.” As in all sorts of feeding, the pleasure of eating is very often single and alone, and that what we take, which is acceptable to the palate, is not always nourishing or wholesome; so that which our minds extract from science does not cease to be pleasant, though there be nothing in it either nutritive or healthful. Thus they say: “The consideration of nature is a diet proper for our minds, it raises and elevates us, makes us disdain low and terrestrial things, by comparing them with those that are celestial and high. The mere inquisition into great and occult things is very pleasant, even to those who acquire no other benefit than the reverence and fear of judging it.” This is what they profess. The vain image of this sickly curiosity is yet more manifest in this other example which they so often urge. “Eudoxus wished and begged of the gods that he might once see the sun near at hand, to comprehend the form, greatness, and beauty of it; even though he should thereby be immediately burned.” He would at the price of his life purchase a knowledge, of which the use and possession should at the same time be taken from him; and for this sudden and vanishing knowledge lose all the other knowledge he had in present, or might afterwards have acquired.
I cannot easily persuade myself that Epicurus, Plato, and Pytagoras, have given us their atom, idea and numbers, for current pay. They were too wise to establish their articles of faith upon things so disputable and uncertain. But in that obscurity and ignorance in which the world then was, every one of these great men endeavoured to present some kind of image or reflection of light, and worked their brains for inventions that might have a pleasant and subtle appearance; provided that, though false, they might make good their ground against those that would oppose them. Unicuique ista pro ingenio finguntur, non ex scienti vi. “These things every one fancies according to his wit, and not by any power of knowledge.”
One of the ancients, who was reproached, “That he professed philosophy, of which he nevertheless in his own judgment made no great account,” made answer, “That this was truly to philosophize.”
They wished to consider all, to balance every thing, and found that an employment well suited to our natural curiosity. Some things they wrote for the benefit of public society, as their religions; and for that consideration it was but reasonable that they should not examine public opinions to the quick, that they might not disturb the common obedience to the laws and customs of their country.
Plato treats of this mystery with a raillery manifest enough; for where he writes according to his own method he gives no certain rule. When he plays the legislator he borrows a magisterial and positive style, and boldly there foists in his most fantastic inventions, as fit to persuade the vulgar, as impossible to be believed by himself; knowing very well how fit we are to receive all sorts of impressions, especially the most immoderate and preposterous; and yet, in his Laws, he takes singular care that nothing be sung in public but poetry, of which the fiction and fabulous relations tend to some advantageous end; it being so easy to imprint all sorts of phantasms in human minds, that it were injustice not to feed them rather with profitable untruths than with untruths that are unprofitable and hurtful. He says very roundly, in his Republic, “That it is often necessary, for the benefit of men, to deceive them.” It is very easy to distinguish that some of the sects have more followed truth, and the others utility, by which the last have gained their reputation. ‘Tis the misery of our condition that often that which presents itself to our imagination for the truest does not appear the most useful to life. The boldest sects, as the Epicurean, Pyrrhonian, and the new Academic, are yet constrained to submit to the civil law at the end of the account.
There are other subjects that they have tumbled and tossed about, some to the right and others to the left, every one endeavouring, right or wrong, to give them some kind of colour; for, having found nothing so abstruse that they would not venture to speak of, they are very often forced to forge weak and ridiculous conjectures; not that they themselves looked upon them as any foundation, or establishing any certain truth, but merely for exercise. Non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quam exercere ingnia materio difficultate videntur voluisse. “They seem not so much themselves to have believed what they said, as to have had a mind to exercise their wits in the difficulty of the matter.” And if we did not take it thus, how should we palliate so great inconstancy, variety, and vanity of opinions, as we see have been produced by those excellent and admirable men? As, for example, what can be more vain than to imagine, to guess at God, by our analogies and conjectures? To direct and govern him and the world by our capacities and our laws? And to serve ourselves, at the expense of the divinity, with what small portion of capacity he has been pleased to impart to our natural condition; and because we cannot extend our sight to his glorious throne, to have brought him down to our corruption and our miseries?
Of all human and ancient opinions concerning religion, that seems to me the most likely and most excusable, that acknowledged God as an incomprehensible power, the original and preserver of all things, all goodness, all perfection, receiving and taking in good part the honour and reverence that man paid him, under what method, name, or ceremonies soever—
Jupiter omnipotens, rerum, regumque, demque,Progenitor, genitrixque.
“Jove, the almighty, author of all things,The father, mother, of both gods and kings.”