❦ Essays (Selection)Michel de Montaigne II.12 Apology for Raimond Sebond (5 of 7)

Essays (Selection) · Michel de Montaigne

II.12 Apology for Raimond Sebond (5 of 7) Apologie de Raimond Sebond

French (1595)Cotton (1685–86, rev. Hazlitt 1877)
¶1

Mais nostre condition porte, que la cognoissance de ce que nous auons entre mains, est aussi esloignée de nous, et aussi bien au dessus des nuës, que celle des astres. Comme dit Socrates en Platon, qu'à quiconque se mesle de la philosophie, on peut faire le reproche que fait cette femme à Thales, qu'il ne void rien de ce qui est deuant luy. Car tout philosophe ignore ce que fait son voisin: ouï et ce qu'il fait luy-mesme, et ignore ce qu'ils sont tous deux, ou bestes, ou hommes. Ces gens icy, qui trouuent les raisons de Sebonde trop foibles, qui n'ignorent rien, qui gouuernent le monde, qui sçauent tout:

Quæ mare compescant causæ, quid temperet annum,Stellæ sponte sua, iussæue vagentur et errent:Quid premat obscurum Lunæ, quid proferat orbem,Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors:

n'ont ils pas quelquesfois sondé parmy leurs liures, les difficultez qui se presentent, à cognoistre leur estre propre? Nous voyons bien que le doigt se meut, et que le pied se meut, qu'aucunes parties se branslent d'elles mesmes sans nostre congé, et que d'autres nous les agitons par nostre ordonnance, que certaine apprehension engendre la rougeur, certaine autre la palleur, telle imagination agit en la rate seulement, telle autre au cerueau, l'vne nous cause le rire, l'autre le pleurer, telle autre transit et estonne tous noz sens, et arreste le mouuement de noz membres, à tel object l'estomach se sousleue, à tel autre quelque partie plus basse. Mais comme vne impression spirituelle, face vne telle faucée dans vn subject massif, et solide, et la nature de la liaison et cousture de ces admirables ressorts, iamais homme ne l'a sçeu: Omnia incerta ratione, et in naturæ maiestate abdita Modus, quo corporibus adhærent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendi ab homine potest: et hoc ipse homo est pas pourtant en doubte: car les opinions des hommes, sont receuës à la suitte des creances anciennes, par authorité et à credit, comme si c'estoit religion et loy. On reçoit comme vn iargon ce qui en est communement tenu: on reçoit cette verité, auec tout son bastiment et attelage d'argumens et de preuues, comme vn corps ferme et solide, qu'on n'esbranle plus, qu'on ne iuge plus. Au contraire, chacun à qui mieux mieux, va plastrant et confortant cette creance receue, de tout ce que peut sa raison, qui est vn vtil soupple contournable, et accommodable à toute figure. Ainsi se remplit le monde et se confit en fadeze et en mensonge. Ce qui fait qu'on ne doubte de guere de choses, c'est que les communes impressions on ne les essaye iamais; on n'en sonde point le pied, où git la faute et la foiblesse: on ne debat que sur les branches: on ne demande pas si cela est vray, mais s'il a esté ainsin ou ainsin entendu. On ne demande pas si Galen a rien dict qui vaille: mais s'il a dict ainsin, ou autrement. Vrayement c'estoit bien raison que cette bride et contrainte de la liberté de noz iugements, et cette tyrannie de noz creances, s'estendist iusques aux escholes et aux arts. Le Dieu de la science scholastique, c'est Aristote: c'est religion de debattre de ses ordonnances, comme de celles de Lycurgus à Sparte. Sa doctrine nous sert de loy magistrale: qui est à l'aduanture autant faulce que vne autre. Ie ne sçay pas pourquoy ie n'acceptasse autant volontiers ou les idées de Platon, ou les atomes d'Epicurus, ou le plein et le vuide de Leucippus et Democritus, ou l'eau de Thales, ou l'infinité de Nature d'Anaximander, ou l'air de Diogenes, ou les nombres et symmetrie de Pythagoras, ou l'infiny de Parmenides, ou l'vn de Musæus, ou l'eau et le feu d'Apollodorus, ou les parties similaires d'Anaxagoras, ou la discorde et amitié d'Empedocles, ou le feu de Heraclitus, ou toute autre opinion, (de cette confusion infinie d'aduis et de sentences, que produit cette belle raison humaine par sa certitude et clair-voyance, en tout ce dequoy elle se mesle) que ie feroy l'opinion d'Aristote, sur ce subject des principes des choses naturelles: lesquels principes il bastit de trois pieces, matiere, forme, et priuation. Et qu'est-il plus vain que de faire l'inanité mesme, cause de la production des choses? La priuation c'est vne negatiue: de quelle humeur en a-il peu faire la cause et origine des choses qui sont? Cela toutesfois ne s'oseroit esbranler que pour l'exercice de la logique. On n'y debat rien pour le mettre en doute, mais pour deffendre l'autheur de l'escole des obiections estrangeres: son authorité c'est le but, au delà duquel il n'est pas permis de s'enquerir. Il est bien aisé sur des fondemens auouez, de bastir ce qu'on veut; car selon la loy et ordonnance de ce commencement, le reste des pieces du bastiment se conduit aisément, sans se dementir. Par cette voye nous trouuons nostre raison bien fondée, et discourons à boule-veuë. Car nos maistres præoccupent et gaignent auant main, autant de lieu en nostre creance, qu'il leur en faut pour conclurre apres ce qu'ils veulent; à la mode des geometriens par leurs demandes auouées: le consentement et approbation que nous leurs prestons, leur donnant dequoy nous trainer à gauche et à dextre, et nous pyrouetter à leur volonté. Quiconque est creu de ses presuppositions, il est nostre maistre et nostre Dieu: il prendra le plant de ses fondemens si ample et si aisé, que par iceux il nous pourra monter, s'il veut, iusques aux nuës. En cette pratique et negotiation de science, nous auons pris pour argent content le mot de Pythagoras, que chaque expert doit estre creu en son art. Le dialecticien se rapporte au grammairien de la signification des mots: le rhetoricien emprunte du dialecticien les lieux des argumens: le poëte, du musicien les mesures: le geometrien, de l'arithmeticien les proportions: les metaphysiciens prennent pour fondement les coniectures de la physique. Car chasque science a ses principes presupposez, par où le iugement humain est bridé de toutes parts. Si vous venez à chocquer cette barriere, en laquelle gist la principale erreur, ils ont incontinent cette sentence en la bouche; qu'il ne faut pas debattre contre ceux qui nient les principes. Or n'y peut-il auoir des principes aux hommes, si la diuinité ne les leur a reuelez: de tout le demeurant, et le commencement, et le milieu et la fin, ce n'est que songe et fumée. A ceux qui combattent par presupposition, il leur faut presupposer au contraire, le mesme axiome, dequoy on debat. Car toute presupposition humaine, et toute enunciation, a autant d'authorité que l'autre, si la raison n'en faict la difference. Ainsin il les faut toutes mettre à la balance: et premierement les generalles, et celles qui nous tyrannisent. La persuasion de la certitude, est vn certain tesmoignage de folie, et d'incertitude extreme. Et n'est point de plus folles gents, ny moins philosophes, que les Philodoxes de Platon. Il faut sçauoir si le feu est chault, si la neige est blanche, s'il y a rien de dur ou de mol en nostre cognoissance. Et quant à ces responses, dequoy il se fait des comtes anciens: comme à celuy qui mettoit en doubte la chaleur, à qui on dit qu'il se iettast dans le feu: à celuy qui nioit la froideur de la glace, qu'il s'en mist dans le sein: elles sont tres-indignes de la profession philosophique. S'ils nous eussent laissé en nostre estat naturel, receuans les apparences estrangeres selon qu'elles se presentent à nous par nos sens; et nous eussent laissé aller apres nos appetits simples, et reglez par la condition de nostre naissance, ils auroient raison de parler ainsi. Mais c'est d'eux que nous auons appris de nous rendre iuges du monde: c'est d'eux que nous tenons cette fantasie, que la raison humaine est contrerolleuse generalle de tout ce qui est au dehors et au dedans de la voute celeste, qui embrasse tout, qui peut tout: par le moyen de laquelle tout se sçait, et cognoist. Cette response seroit bonne parmy les Canibales, qui iouyssent l'heur d'vne longue vie, tranquille, et paisible, sans les preceptes d'Aristote, et sans la cognoissance du nom de la physique. Cette response vaudroit mieux à l'aduenture, et auroit plus de fermeté, que toutes celles qu'ils emprunteront de leur raison et de leur inuention. De cette-cy seroient capables auec nous, tous les animaux, et tout ce, où le commandement est encor pur et simple de la loy naturelle: mais eux ils y ont renoncé. Il ne faut pas qu'ils me dient, il est vray, car vous le voyez et sentez ainsin: il faut qu'ils me dient, si ce que ie pense sentir, ie le sens pourtant en effect: et si ie le sens, qu'ils me dient apres pourquoy ie le sens, et comment, et quoy: qu'ils me dient le nom, l'origine, les tenans et aboutissans de la chaleur, du froid; les qualitez de celuy qui agit, et de celuy qui souffre: ou qu'ils me quittent leur profession, qui est de ne receuoir ny approuuer rien, que par la voye de la raison: c'est leur touche à toutes sortes d'essais. Mais certes c'est vne touche pleine de fauceté, d'erreur, de foiblesse, et defaillance. Par où la voulons nous mieux esprouuer, que par elle mesme? S'il ne la faut croire parlant de soy, à peine sera elle propre à iuger des choses estrangeres: si elle cognoist quelque chose, aumoins sera-ce son estre et son domicile. Elle est en l'ame, et partie, ou effect d'icelle: car la vraye raison et essentielle, de qui nous desrobons le nom à fauces enseignes, elle loge dans le sein de Dieu, c'est là son giste et sa retraite, c'est de là où elle part, quand il plaist à Dieu nous en faire voir quelque rayon: comme Pallas saillit de la teste de son pere, pour se communiquer au monde. Or voyons ce que l'humaine raison nous a appris de soy et de l'ame: non de l'ame en general, de laquelle quasi toute la philosophie rend les corps celestes et les premiers corps participants: ny de celle que Thales attribuoit aux choses mesmes, qu'on tient inanimées, conuié par la consideration de l'aimant: mais de celle qui nous appartient, que nous deuons mieux cognoistre.

Ignoratur enim quæ sit natura animaï:Nata sit, an contrà nascentibus insinuetur,Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta;An tenebras Orci visat, vastásque lacunas,An pecudes alias diuinitus insinuet se.

But our condition will have it so, that the knowledge of what we have in hand is as remote from us, and as much above the clouds, as that of the stars. As Socrates says, in Plato, “That whoever meddles with philosophy may be reproached as Thales was by the woman, that he sees nothing of that which is before him. For every philosopher is ignorant of what his neighbour does; aye, and of what he does himself, and is ignorant of what they both are, whether beasts or men.”

Those people, who find Sebond’s arguments too weak, that are ignorant of nothing, that govern the world, that know all,—

Qu mare compescant caus; quid temperet annum;Stell sponte su, jussve, vagentur et errent;Quid premat obscurum lun, quid profrt orbem;Quid velit et posait rerum concordia discors;

“What governs ocean’s tides,And through the various year the seasons guides;Whether the stars by their own proper force,Or foreign power, pursue their wand’ring course;Why shadows darken the pale queen of night;Whence she renews her orb and spreads her light;—What nature’s jarring sympathy can mean;”

have they not sometimes in their writings sounded the difficulties they have met with of knowing their own being? We see very well that the finger moves, that the foot moves, that some parts assume a voluntary motion of themselves without our consent, and that others work by our direction; that one sort of apprehension occasions blushing; another paleness; such an imagination works upon the spleen only, another upon the brain; one occasions laughter, another tears; another stupefies and astonishes all our senses, and arrests the motion of all our members; at one object the stomach will rise, at another a member that lies something lower; but how a spiritual impression should make such a breach into a massy and solid subject, and the nature of the connection and contexture of these admirable springs and movements, never yet man knew: Omnia incerta ratione, et in natur majestate abdita. “All uncertain in reason, and concealed in the majesty of nature,” says Pliny. And St Augustin, Modus quo corporibus adhorent spiritus.... omnino minis est, nec comprehendi ab homine potest; et hoc ipse homo est, “The manner whereby souls adhere to bodies is altogether wonderful, and cannot be conceived by man, and yet this is man.” And yet it is not so much as doubted; for the opinions of men are received according to the ancient belief, by authority and upon trust, as if it were religion and law. ‘Tis received as gibberish which is commonly spoken; this truth, with all its clutter of arguments and proofs, is admitted as a firm and solid body, that is no more to be shaken, no more to be judged of; on the contrary, every one, according to the best of his talent, corroborates and fortifies this received belief with the utmost power of his reason, which is a supple utensil, pliable, and to be accommodated to any figure; and thus the world comes to be filled with lies and fopperies. The reason that men doubt of divers things is that they never examine common impressions; they do not dig to the root, where the faults and defects lie; they only debate upon the branches; they do not examine whether such and such a thing be true, but if it has been so and so understood; it is not inquired into whether Galen has said any thing to purpose, but whether he has said so or so. In truth it was very good reason that this curb to the liberty of our judgments and that tyranny over our opinions, should be extended to the schools and arts. The god of scholastic knowledge is Aristotle; ‘tis irreligion to question any of his decrees, as it was those of Lucurgus at Sparta; his doctrine is a magisterial law, which, peradventure, is as false as another. I do not know why I should not as willingly embrace either the ideas of Plato, or the atoms of Epicurus, or the plenum or vacuum of Leucippus and Democritus, or the water of Thales, or the infinity of nature of Anaximander, or the air of Diogenes, or the numbers and symmetry of Pythagoras, or the infinity of Parmenides, or the One of Musus, or the water and fire of Apollodorus, or the similar parts of Anaxagoras, or the discord and friendship of Empedocles, or the fire of Heraclitus, or any other opinion of that infinite confusion of opinions and determinations, which this fine human reason produces by its certitude and clearsightedness in every thing it meddles withal, as I should the opinion of Aristotle upon this subject of the principles of natural things; which principles he builds of three pieces—matter, form, and privation. And what can be more vain than to make inanity itself the cause of the production of things? Privation is a negative; of what humour could he then make the cause and original of things that are? And yet that were not to be controverted but for the exercise of logic; there is nothing disputed therein to bring it into doubt, but to defend the author of the school from foreign objections; his authority is the non-ultra, beyond which it is not permitted to inquire.

It is very easy, upon approved foundations, to build whatever we please; for, according to the law and ordering of this beginning, the other parts of the structure are easily carried on without any failure. By this way we find our reason well-grounded, and discourse at a venture; for our masters prepossess and gain beforehand as much room in our belief as is necessary towards concluding afterwards what they please, as geometricians do by their granted demands, the consent and approbation we allow them giving them wherewith to draw us to the right and left, and to whirl us about at their pleasure. Whatever springs from these presuppositions is our master and our God; he will take the level of his foundations so ample and so easy that by them he may mount us up to the clouds, if he so please. In this practice and negotiation of science we have taken the saying of Pythagoras, “That every expert person ought to be believed in his own art” for current pay. The logician refers the signification of words to the grammarians; the rhetorician borrows the state of arguments from the logician; the poet his measure from the musician: the geometrician his proportions from the arithmetician, and the metaphysicians take physical conjectures for their foundations; for every science has its principle presupposed, by which human judgment is everywhere kept in check. If you come to rush against the bar where the principal error lies, they have presently this sentence in their mouths, “That there is no disputing with persons who deny principles.” Now men can have no principles if not revealed to them by the divinity; of all the rest the beginning, the middle, and the end, is nothing but dream and vapour. To those that contend upon presupposition we must, on the contrary, presuppose to them the same axiom upon which the dispute is. For every human presupposition and declaration has as much authority one as another, if reason do not make the difference. Wherefore they are all to be put into the balance, and first the generals and those that tyrannize over us. The persuasion of certainty is a certain testimony of folly and extreme incertainty; and there are not a more foolish sort of men, nor that are less philosophers, than the Philodoxes of Plato; we must inquire whether fire be hot? whether snow be white? if there be any such things as hard or soft within our knowledge?

And as to those answers of which they make old stories, as he that doubted if there was any such thing as heat, whom they bid throw himself into the fire; and he that denied the coldness of ice, whom they bid to put ice into his bosom;—they are pitiful things, unworthy of the profession of philosophy. If they had let us alone in our natural being, to receive the appearance of things without us, according as they present themselves to us by our senses, and had permitted us to follow our own natural appetites, governed by the condition of our birth, they might then have reason to talk at that rate; but ‘tis from them we have learned to make ourselves judges of the world; ‘tis from them that we derive this fancy, “That human reason is controller-general of all that is without and within the roof of heaven; that comprehends every thing, that can do every thing; by the means of which every thing is known and understood.” This answer would be good among the cannibals, who enjoy the happiness of a long, quiet, and peaceable life, without Aristotle’s precepts, and without the knowledge of the name of physics; this answer would perhaps be of more value and greater force than all those they borrow from their reason and invention; of this all animals, and all where the power of the law of nature is yet pure and simple, would be as capable as we, but as for them they have renounced it. They need not tell us, “It is true, for you see and feel it to be so;” they must tell me whether I really feel what I think I do; and if I do feel it, they must then tell me why I feel it, and how, and what; let them tell me the name, original, the parts and junctures of heat and cold, the qualities of the agent and patient; or let them give up their profession, which is not to admit or approve of any thing but by the way of reason; that is their test in all sorts of essays; but, certainly, ‘tis a test full of falsity, error, weakness, and defect.

Which way can we better prove it than by itself? If we are not to believe her when speaking of herself, she can hardly be thought fit to judge of foreign things; if she know any thing, it must at least be her own being and abode; she is in the soul, and either a part or an effect of it; for true and essential reason, from which we by a false colour borrow the name, is lodged in the bosom of the Almighty; there is her habitation and recess; ‘tis thence that she imparts her rays, when God is pleased to impart any beam of it to mankind, as Balias issued from her father’s head, to communicate herself to the world.

Now let us see what human reason tells us of herself and of the soul, not of the soul in general, of which almost all philosophy makes the celestial and first bodies participants; nor of that which Thales attributed to things which themselves are reputed inanimate, lead thereto by the consideration of the loadstone; but of that which appertains to us, and that we ought the best to know:—

Ignoratur enim, qu sit natura animai;Nata sit; an, contra, nascentibus insinuetur;Et simnl intereat nobiscum morte dirempta;An tenebras Orci visat, vastasque lacunas,An pecudes alias divinitns insinuet se.

“For none the nature of the soul doth know,Whether that it be born with us, or no;Or be infused into us at our birth,And dies with us when we return to earth,Or then descends to the black shades below,Or into other animals does go.”

¶2

A Crates et Dicæarchus, qu'il n'y en auoit du tout point, mais que le corps s'esbranloit ainsi d'vn mouuement naturel: à Platon, que c'estoit vne substance se mouuant de soy-mesme: à Thales, vne nature sans repos: à Asclepiades, vne exercitation des sens: à Hesiodus et Anaximander, chose composée de terre et d'eau: à Parmenides, de terre et de feu: à Empedocles, de sang:

Sanguineam vomit ille animam:

Crates and Dicarchus were of opinion that there was no soul at all, but that the body thus stirs by a natural motion; Plato, that it was a substance moving of itself; Thales, a nature without repose; Aedepiades, an exercising of the senses; Hesiod and Anaximander, a thing composed of earth and water; Parmenides, of earth and fire; Empedocles, of blood:—

Sanguineam vomit ille animam;

“He vomits up his bloody soul.”

¶3

à Possidonius, Cleanthes et Galen, vne chaleur ou complexion chaleureuse,

Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo:

à Hippocrates, vn esprit espandu par le corps: à Varro, vn air receu par la bouche, eschauffé au poulmon, attrempé au cœur, et espandu par tout le corps: à Zeno, la quint'-essence des quatre elemens: à Heraclides Ponticus, la lumiere: à Xenocrates, et aux Ægyptiens, vn nombre mobile: aux Chaldées, vne vertu sans forme determinée.

Habitum quemdam vitalem corporis esse,Harmoniam Græci quam dicunt.

Posidonius, Cleanthes, and Galen, that it was heat or a hot complexion—

Igneus est ollis vigor, et colestis origo;

“Their vigour of fire and of heavenly race.”

Hippocrates, a spirit diffused all over the body; Varro, that it was an air received at the mouth, heated in the lungs, moistened in the heart, and diffused throughout the whole body; Zeno, the quintessence of the four elements; Heraclides Ponticus, that it was the light; Zenocrates and the Egyptians, a mobile number; the Chaldeans, a virtue without any determinate form:—

Habitum quemdam vitalem corporis esse,Harmoniam Grci quam dicunt.

“A certain vital habit in man’s frame,Which harmony the Grecian sages name.”

¶4

N'oublions pas Aristote, ce qui naturellement fait mouuoir le corps, qu'il nomme entelechie: d'vne autant froide inuention que nulle autre: car il ne parle ny de l'essence, ny de l'origine, ny de la nature de l'ame, mais en remerque seulement l'effect. Lactance, Seneque, et la meilleure part entre les dogmatistes, ont confessé que c'estoit chose qu'ils n'entendoient pas. Et apres tout ce denombrement d'opinions: Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit Dieu est incomprehensible, puis que les pieces de mon estre propre, ie ne les puis comprendre. Heraclitus, qui tenoit, tout estre plein d'ames et de daimons, maintenoit pourtant, qu'on ne pouuoit aller tant auant vers la cognoissance de l'ame, qu'on y peust arriuer, si profonde estre son essence. Il n'y a pas moins de dissension, ny de debat à la loger. Hippocrates et Hierophilus la mettent au ventricule du cerueau: Democritus et Aristote, par tout le corps:

Vt bona sæpe valet udo cùm dicitur esseCorporis, et non est tamen hæc pars vlla valentis.

Let us not forget Aristotle, who held the soul to be that which naturally causes the body to move, which he calls entelechia, with as cold an invention as any of the rest; for he neither speaks of the essence, nor of the original, nor of the nature of the soul, but only takes notice of the effect Lactantius, Seneca, and most of the Dogmatists, have confessed that it was a thing they did not understand; after all this enumeration of opinions, Harum sententiarum quo vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit: “Of these opinions which is the true, let some god determine,” says Cicero. “I know by myself,” says St Bernard, “how incomprehensible God is, seeing I cannot comprehend the parts of my own being.”

Heraclitus, who was of opinion that every being was full of souls and demons, did nevertheless maintain that no one could advance so far towards the knowledge of the soul as ever to arrive at it; so profound was the essence of it.

Neither is there less controversy and debate about seating of it. Hippocrates and Hierophilus place it in the ventricle of the brain; Democritus and Aristotle throughout the whole body;—

Ut bona spe valetudo cum dicitur esseCorporis, et non est tamen hc pars ulla ralentis;

“As when the body’s health they do it call,When of a sound man, that’s no part at all.”

¶5

Epicurus, en l'estomach:

Hîc exultat enim pauor ac metus, hæc loca circúmLætitiæ mulcent.

Les Stoïciens, autour et dedans le cœur: Erasistratus, ioignant la membrane de l'epicrane: Empedocles, au sang: comme aussi Moyse, qui fut la cause pourquoy il defendit de manger le sang des bestes, auquel leur ame est iointe: Galen a pensé que chaque partie du corps ait son ame: Strato l'a logée entre les deux sourcils: Qua facie quidem sit animus, aut vbi habitet, ne quærendum quidem est Iroy-ie à l'éloquence alterer son parler? Ioint qu'il y a peu d'acquest à desrober la matiere de ses inuentions. Elles sont et peu frequentes, et peu roides, et peu ignorées. Mais la raison pourquoy Chrysippus l'argumente autour du cœur, comme les autres de sa secte, n'est pas pour estre oubliée: C'est par ce, dit-il, que quand nous voulons asseurer quelque chose, nous mettons la main sur l'estomach: et quand nous voulons prononcer, εγω moy, nous baissons vers l'estomach la machouëre d'embas. Ce lieu ne se doit passer, sans remerquer la vanité d'vn si grand personnage: car outre ce que ces considerations sont d'elles mesmes infiniment legeres, la derniere ne preuue qu'aux Grecs, qu'ils ayent l'ame en cet endroit là. Il n'est iugement humain, si tendu, qui ne sommeille par fois. Que craignons nous à dire? Voyla les Stoiciens peres de l'humaine prudence, qui trouuent, que l'ame d'vn homme accablé sous vne ruine, traine et ahanne long temps à sortir, ne se pouuant desmesler de la charge, comme vne sourix prinse à la trapelle. Aucuns tiennent, que le monde fut faict pour donner corps par punition, aux esprits decheus par leur faute, de la pureté en quoy ils auoyent esté creés: la premiere creation n'ayant esté qu'incorporelle: et que selon qu'ils se sont plus ou moins esloignez de leur spiritualité, on les incorpore plus et moins alaigrement ou lourdement. De là vient la varieté de tant de matiere creée. Mais l'esprit, qui fut pour sa peine inuesti du corps du soleil, deuoit auoir vne mesure d'alteration bien rare et particuliere. Les extremitez de nostre perquisition tombent toutes en esblouyssement. Comme dit Plutarque de la teste des histoires, qu'à la mode des chartes, l'orée des terres cognuës est saisie de marests, forests profondes, deserts et lieux inhabitables. Voyla pourquoy les plus grossieres et pueriles rauasseries, se trouuent plus en ceux qui traittent les choses plus hautes, et plus auant: s'abysmants en leur curiosité et presomption. La fin et le commencement de science, se tiennent en pareille bestise. Voyez prendre à mont l'essor à Platon en ses nuages poëtiques. Voyez chez luy le iargon des Dieux. Mais à quoy songeoit-il, quand il definit l'homme, vn animal à deux pieds, sans plume: fournissant à ceux qui auoyent enuie de se moquer de luy, vne plaisante occasion? car ayans plumé vn chapon vif, ils alloyent le nommant, l'homme de Platon. Et quoy les Epicuriens, de quelle simplicité estoyent ils allez premierement imaginer, que leurs atomes, qu'ils disoyent estre des corps ayants quelque pesanteur, et vn mouuement naturel contre bas, eussent basti le monde: iusques à ce qu'ils fussent auisez par leurs aduersaires, que par cette description, il n'estoit pas possible qu'ils se ioignissent et se prinsent l'vn à l'autre, leur cheute estant ainsi droite et perpendiculaire, et engendrant par tout des lignes paralleles? Parquoy il fut force, qu'ils y adioustassent depuis vn mouuement de costé, fortuite: et qu'ils fournissent encore à leurs atomes, des queuës courbes et crochuës, pour les rendre aptes à s'attacher et se coudre. Et lors mesme, ceux qui les poursuyuent de cette autre consideration, les mettent ils pas en peine? Si les atomes ont par sort formé tant de sortes de figures, pourquoy ne se sont ils iamais rencontrez à faire vne maison et vn soulier? Pourquoy de mesme ne croid on, qu'vn nombre infini de lettres Grecques versées emmy la place, seroyent pour arriuer à la contexture de l'Iliade? Ce qui est capable de raison, dit Zenon, est meilleur, que ce qui n'en est point capable: il n'est rien meilleur que le monde: il est donc capable de raison. Cotta par cette mesme argumentation fait le monde mathematicien: et le fait musicien et organiste, par cette autre argumentation aussi de Zenon: Le tout est plus que la partie: nous sommes capables de sagesse, et sommes parties du monde: il est donc sage. Il se void infinis pareils exemples, non d'argumens faux seulement, mais ineptes, ne se tenans point, et accusans leurs autheurs non tant d'ignorance que d'imprudence, és reproches que les philosophes se font les vns aux autres sur les dissentions de leurs opinions, et de leurs sectes. Qui fagoteroit suffisamment vn amas des asneries de l'humaine sapience, il diroit merueilles. I'en assemble volontiers, comme vne montre, par quelque biais non moins vtile que les instructions plus moderees. Iugeons par là ce que nous auons à estimer de l'homme, de son sens et de sa raison, puis qu'en ces grands personnages, et qui ont porté si haut l'humaine suffisance, il s'y trouue des deffauts si apparens et si grossiers. Moy i'aime mieux croire qu'ils ont traitté la science casuelement ainsi, qu'vn iouët à toutes mains, et se sont esbatus de la raison, comme d'vn instrument vain et friuole, mettans en auant toutes sortes d'inuentions et de fantasies tantost plus tenduës, tantost plus lasches. Ce mesme Platon, qui definit l'homme comme vne poulle, dit ailleurs apres Socrates, qu'il ne sçait à la verité que c'est que l'homme, et que c'est l'vne des pieces du monde d'autant difficile cognoissance. Par cette varieté et instabilité d'opinions, ils nous menent comme par la main tacitement à cette resolution de leur irresolution. Ils font profession de ne presenter pas tousiours leur auis à visage descouuert et apparent: ils l'ont caché tantost soubs des vmbrages fabuleux de la poësie, tantost soubs quelque autre masque: car nostre imperfection porte encores cela, que la viande crue n'est pas tousiours propre à nostre estomach: il la faut assecher, alterer et corrompre. Ils font de mesmes: ils obscurcissent par fois leurs naïfues opinions et iugemens, et les falsifient pour s'accommoder à l'vsage publique. Ils ne veulent pas faire profession expresse d'ignorance, et de l'imbecillité de la raison humaine, pour ne faire peur aux enfans: mais ils nous la descouurent assez soubs l'apparence d'vne science trouble et inconstante.

Ie conseillois en Italie à quelqu'vn qui estoit en peine de parler Italien, que pourueu qu'il ne cherchast qu'à se faire entendre, sans y vouloir autrement exceller, qu'il employast seulement les premiers mots qui luy viendroyent à la bouche, Latins, François, Espagnols, ou Gascons, et qu'en y adioustant la terminaison Italienne, il ne faudroit iamais à rencontrer quelque idiome du pays, ou Thoscan, ou Romain, ou Venetien, ou Piemontois, ou Napolitain, et de se ioindre à quelqu'vne de tant de formes. Ie dis de mesme de la philosophie: elle a tant de visages et de varieté, et a tant dict, que tous nos songes et resueries s'y trouuent. L'humaine phantasie ne peut rien conceuoir en bien et en mal qui n'y soit: Nihil tam absurdè dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum public: d'autant que bien qu'ils soyent nez chez moy, et sans patron, ie sçay qu'ils trouueront leur relation à quelque humeur ancienne, et ne faudra quelqu'vn de dire: Voyla d'où il le print. Mes mœurs sont naturelles: ie n'ay point appellé à les bastir, le secours d'aucune discipline. Mais toutes imbecilles qu'elles sont, quand l'enuie m'a prins de les reciter, et que pour les faire sortir en publiq, vn peu plus decemment, ie me suis mis en deuoir de les assister, et de discours, et d'exemples: ç'a esté merueille à moy mesme, de les rencontrer par cas d'aduenture, conformes à tant d'exemples et discours philosophiques. De quel regiment estoit ma vie, ie ne l'ay appris qu'apres qu'elle est exploittée et employée. Nouuelle figure: Vn philosophe impremedité et fortuit. Pour reuenir à nostre ame, ce que Platon a mis la raison au cerueau, l'ire au cœur, et la cupidité au foye, il est vray-semblable que ç'a esté plustost vne interpretation des mouuemens de l'ame, qu'vne diuision, et separation qu'il en ayt voulu faire, comme d'vn corps en plusieurs membres. Et la plus vray-semblable de leurs opinions est, que c'est tousiours vne ame, qui par sa faculté ratiocine, se souuient, comprend, iuge, desire et exerce toutes ses autres operations par diuers instrumens du corps, comme le nocher gouuerne son nauire selon l'experience qu'il en a, ores tendant ou laschant vne corde, ores haussant l'antenne, ou remuant l'auiron, par vne seule puissance conduisant diuers effets: et qu'elle loge au cerueau: ce qui appert de ce que les blessures et accidens qui touchent cette partie, offensent incontinent les facultez de l'ame: de là il n'est pas inconuenient qu'elle s'escoule par le reste du corps:

Medium non deserit vnquamCœli Phœbus iter: radiis tamen omnia lustrat.

Epicurus in the stomach;

Hic exsultat enim pavor ac metus;Hc loca circum Ltiti mulcent.

“For this the seat of horror is and fear,And joys in turn do likewise triumph here.”

The Stoics, about and within the heart; Erasistratus, adjoining the membrane of the epicranium; Empedocles, in the blood; as also Moses, which was the reason why he interdicted eating the blood of beasts, because the soul is there seated; Galen thought that every part of the body had its soul; Strato has placed it betwixt the eyebrows; Qu facie quidem sit animus, aut ubi habitet, ne quorendum quidem est: “What figure the soul is of, or what part it inhabits, is not to be inquired into,” says Cicero. I very willingly deliver this author to you in his own words; for should I alter eloquence itself? Besides, it were but a poor prize to steal the matter of his inventions; they are neither very frequent, nor of any great weight, and sufficiently known. But the reason why Chrysippus argues it to be about the heart, as all the rest of that sect do, is not to be omitted; “It is,” says he, “because when we would affirm any things we lay our hand upon our breasts; and when we would pronounce y, which signifies I, we let the lower jaw fall towards the stomach.” This place ought not to be passed over without a remark upon the vanity of so great a man; for besides that these considerations are infinitely light in themselves, the last is only a proof to the Greeks that they have their souls lodged in that part. No human judgment is so sprightly and vigilant that it does not sometimes sleep. Why do we fear to say? The Stoics, the fathers of human prudence, think that the soul of a man, crushed under a ruin, long labours and strives to get out, like a mouse caught in a trap, before it can disengage itself from the burden. Some hold that the world was made to give bodies, by way of punishment, to the spirits fallen, by their own fault, from the purity wherein they had been created, the first creation having been incorporeal; and that, according as they are more or less depraved from their spirituality, so are they more or less jocundly or dully incorporated; and that thence proceeds all the variety of so much created matter. But the spirit that for his punishment was invested with the body of the sun must certainly have a very rare and particular measure of change.

The extremities of our perquisition do all fall into astonishment and blindness; as Plutarch says of the testimony of histories, that, according to charts and maps, the utmost bounds of known r countries are taken up with marshes, impenetrable forests, deserts, and uninhabitable places; this is the reason why the most gross and childish ravings were most found in those authors who treat of the most elevated subjects, and proceed the furthest in them, losing themselves in their own curiosity and presumption. The beginning and end of knowledge are equally foolish; observe to what a pitch Plato flies in his poetic clouds; do but take notice there of the gibberish of the gods; but what did he dream of when he defined a man to be “a two-legged animal without feathers: giving those who had a mind to deride him a pleasant occasion; for, having pulled a capon alive, they went about calling it the man of Plato.”

And what did the Epicureans think of, out of what simplicity did they first imagine that their atoms that they said were bodies having some weight, and a natural motion downwards, had made the world; till they were put in mind, by their adversaries, that, according to this description, it was impossible they should unite and join to one another, their fall being so direct and perpendicular, and making so many parallel lines throughout? Wherefore there was a necessity that they should since add a fortuitous and sideways motion, and that they should moreover accoutre their atoms with hooked tails, by which they might unite and cling to one another. And even then do not those that attack them upon this second consideration put them hardly to it? “If the atoms have by chance formed so many sorts of figures, why did it never fall out that they made a house or a shoe? Why at the same rate should we not believe that an infinite number of Greek letters, strewed all over a certain place, might fall into the contexture of the Iliad?”—“Whatever is capable of reason,” says Zeno, “is better than that which is not capable; there is nothing better than the world; the world is therefore capable of reason.” Cotta, by this way of argumentation, makes the world a mathematician; ‘and tis also made a musician and an organist by this other argumentation of Zeno: “The whole is more than a part; we are capable of wisdom, and are part of the world; therefore the world is wise.” There are infinite like examples, not only of arguments that are false in themselves, but silly ones, that do not hold in themselves, and that accuse their authors not so much of ignorance as imprudence, in the reproaches the philosophers dash one another in the teeth withal, upon their dissensions in their sects and opinions.

Whoever should bundle up a lusty faggot of the fooleries of human wisdom would produce wonders. I willingly muster up these few for a pattern, by a certain meaning not less profitable to consider than the most sound and moderate instructions. Let us judge by these what opinion we are to have of man, of his sense and reason, when in these great persons that have raised human knowledge so high, so many gross mistakes and manifest errors are to be found.

For my part, I am apt to believe that they have treated of knowledge casually, and like a toy, with both hands; and have contended about reason as of a vain and frivolous instrument, setting on foot all sorts of fancies and inventions, sometimes more sinewy, and sometimes weaker. This same Plato, who defines man as if he were a cock, says elsewhere, after Socrates, “That he does not, in truth, know what man is, and that he is a member of the world the hardest to understand.” By this variety and instability of opinions, they tacitly lead us, as it were by the hand, to this resolution of their irresolution. They profess not always to deliver their opinions barefaced and apparent to us; they have one while disguised them in the fabulous shadows of poetry, and at another in some other vizor; for our imperfection carries this also along with it, that crude meat is not always proper for our stomachs; we must dry, alter, and mix it; they do the same; they sometimes conceal their real opinions and judgments, and falsify them to accommodate themselves to the public use. They will not make an open profession of ignorance, and of the imbecility of human reason, that they may not fright children; but they sufficiently discover it to us under the appearance of a troubled and inconstant science.

I advised a person in Italy, who had a great mind to speak Italian, that provided he only had a desire to make himself understood, without being ambitious in any other respect to excel, that he should only make use of the first word that came to the tongue’s end, whether Latin, French, Spanish, or Gascon, and that, by adding the Italian termination, he could not fail of hitting upon some idiom of the country, either Tuscan, Roman, Venetian, Piedmontese, or Neapolitan, and so fall in with some one of those many forms. I say the same of Philosophy; she has so many faces, so much variety, and has said so many things, that all our dreams and ravings are there to be found. Human fancy can conceive nothing good or bad that is not there: Nihil tam absurde did potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum. “Nothing can be said so absurd, that has not been said before by some of the philosophers.” And I am the more willing to expose my whimsies to the public; forasmuch as, though they are spun out of myself, and without any pattern, I know they will be found related to some ancient humour, and some will not stick to say, “See whence he took it!” My manners are natural, I have not called in the assistance of any discipline to erect them; but, weak as they are, when it came into my head to lay them open to the world’s view, and that to expose them to the light in a little more decent garb I went to adorn them with reasons and examples, it was a wonder to myself accidentally to find them conformable to so many philosophical discourses and examples. I never knew what regimen my life was of till it was near worn out and spent; a new figure—an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher.

But to return to the soul. Inasmuch as Plato has placed reason in the brain, anger in the heart, and concupiscence in the liver; ‘tis likely that it was rather an interpretation of the movements of

the soul, than that he intended a division and separation of it, as of a body, into several members. And the most likely of their opinions is that ‘tis always a soul, that by its faculty, reasons, remembers, comprehends, judges, desires, and exercises all its other operations by divers instruments of the body; as the pilot guides his ship according to his experience, one while straining or slacking the cordage, one while hoisting the mainyard, or removing the rudder, by one and the same power carrying on several effects; and that it is lodged in the brain; which appears in that the wounds and accidents that touch that part do immediately offend the faculties of the soul; and ‘tis not incongruous that it should thence diffuse itself through the other parts of the body

Medium non deserit unquamCoeli Phoebus iter; radiis tamen omnia lustrt.

“Phoebus ne’er deviates from the zodiac’s way;Yet all things doth illustrate with his ray.”

¶6

comme le soleil espand du ciel en hors sa lumiere et ses puissances, et en remplit le monde.

Cætera pars animæ, per totum dissita corpusParet, et ad numen mentis moménque mouetur.

Aucuns ont dict, qu'il y auoit vne ame generale, comme vn grand corps, duquel toutes les ames particulieres estoyent extraictes, et s'y en retournoyent, se remeslant tousiours à cette matiere vniuerselle:

Deum namque ire per omnesTerrásque, tractúsque maris, cœlúmque profundum:Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas:Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac resoluta referriOmnia: nec morti esse locum:

As the sun sheds from heaven its light and influence, and fills the world with them:—

Ctera pars animas, per totum dissita corpus,Paret, et ad numen mentis momenque movetur.

“The other part o’ th’ soul diffus’d all o’erThe body, does obey the reason’s lore.”

Some have said that there was a general soul, as it were a great body, whence all the particular souls were extracted, and thither again return, always restoring themselves to that universal matter:—

Deum namque ire per omnesTerrasque, tractusque maris, columque profundum;Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas:Scilicet hue reddi deinde, ac resoluta referriOmnia; nec morti esse locum:

“For God goes forth, and spreads throughout the wholeHeaven, earth, and sea, the universal soul;Each at its birth, from him all beings share,Both man and brute, the breath of vital air;To him return, and, loos’d from earthly chain,Fly whence they sprung, and rest in God again,Spurn at the grave, and, fearless of decay,Dwell in high heaven, and star th’ ethereal way.”

¶7

d'autres, qu'elles ne faisoyent que s'y resioindre et r'attacher: d'autres, qu'elle estoyent produites de la substance diuine: d'autres, par les anges, de feu et d'air. Aucuns, de toute ancienneté: aucuns, sur l'heure mesme du besoin. Aucuns les font descendre du rond de la lune, et y retourner. Le commun des anciens, qu'elles sont engendrées de pere en fils, d'vne pareille maniere et production que toutes autres choses naturelles: argumentants cela par la ressemblance des enfans aux peres,

Instillata patris virtus tibi:Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis:

Others, that they only rejoined and reunited themselves to it; others, that they were produced from the divine substance; others, by the angels of fire and air; others, that they were from all antiquity; and some that they were created at the very point of time the bodies wanted them; others make them to descend from the orb of the moon, and return thither; the generality of the ancients believed that they were begotten from father to son, after a like manner, and produced with all other natural things; taking their argument from the likeness of children to their fathers;

Instillata patris virtus tibi;Fortes creantur fortibus, et bonis;

“Thou hast thy father’s virtues with his blood:For still the brave spring from the brave and good;”

¶8

et qu'on void escouler des peres aux enfans, non seulement les marques du corps, mais encores vne ressemblance d'humeurs, de complexions, et inclinations de l'ame:

Denique cur acris violentia triste leonumSeminium sequitur? dolus vulpibus, et fuga ceruisA patribus datur, et patrius pauor incitat artus?Si non certa suo quia semine seminióque,Vis animi pariter crescit cum corpore toto?

and that we see descend from fathers to their children not only bodily marks, but moreover a resemblance of humours, complexions, and inclinations of the soul:—

Denique cur acris violentia triste leonumSeminium sequitur? dolus vulpibus, et fuga, cervisA patribus datur, et patrius pavor incitt artus?Si non certa suo quia semine seminioqueVis animi pariter crescit cum corpore toto.

“For why should rage from the fierce lion’s seed,Or from the subtle fox’s craft, proceed;Or why the tim’rous and flying hartHis fear and trembling to his race impart;But that a certain force of mind does grow,And still increases as the bodies do?”

¶9

que là dessus se fonde la iustice diuine, punissant aux enfans la faute des peres: d'autant que la contagion des vices paternels est aucunement empreinte en l'ame des enfans, et que le desreglement de leur volonté les touche. Dauantage, que si les ames venoyent d'ailleurs, que d'vne suitte naturelle, et qu'elles eussent esté quelque autre chose hors du corps, elles auroyent recordation de leur estre premier; attendu les naturelles facultez, qui luy sont propres, de discourir, raisonner et se souuenir.

Si in corpus nascentibus insinuatur,Cur super anteactam ætatem meminesse nequimus,Nec vestigia gestarum rerum vlla tenemus?

That thereupon the divine justice is grounded, punishing in the children the faults of their fathers; forasmuch as the contagion of paternal vices is in some sort imprinted in the soul of children, and that the ill government of their will extends to them; moreover, that if souls had any other derivation than a natural consequence, and that they had been some other thins out of the body, they would retain some memory of their first being, the natural faculties that are proper to them of discoursing, reasoning, and remembering, being considered:—

Si in corpus nascentibus insinuatur,Cur super anteactam tatem meminisse nequimus,Nec vestigia gestarum rerum ulla tenemus?

“For at our birth if it infused be,Why do we then retain no memoryOf our foregoing life, and why no moreRemember any thing we did before?”

¶10

Car pour faire valoir la condition de nos ames, comme nous voulons, il les faut presupposer toutes sçauantes, lors qu'elles sont en leur simplicité et pureté naturelle. Par ainsin elles eussent esté telles, estans exemptes de la prison corporelle, aussi bien auant que d'y entrer, comme nous esperons qu'elles seront apres qu'elles en seront sorties. Et de ce sçauoir, il faudroit qu'elles se ressouuinssent encore estans au corps, comme disoit Platon, que ce que nous apprenions, n'estoit qu'vn ressouuenir de ce que nous auions sçeu: chose que chacun par experience peut maintenir estre fauce. En premier lieu d'autant qu'il ne nous ressouuient iustement que de ce qu'on nous apprend: et que si la memoire faisoit purement son office, aumoins nous suggereroit elle quelque traict outre l'apprentissage. Secondement ce qu'elle sçauoit estant en sa pureté, c'estoit vne vraye science, cognoissant les choses comme elles sont, par sa diuine intelligence: là où icy on luy fait receuoir la mensonge et le vice, si on l'en instruit; en quoy elle ne peut employer sa reminiscence, cette image et conception n'ayant iamais logé en elle. De dire que la prison corporelle estouffe de maniere ses facultez naifues, qu'elles y sont toutes esteintes: cela est premierement contraire à cette autre creance, de recognoistre ses forces si grandes, et les operations que les hommes en sentent en cette vie, si admirables, que d'en auoir conclu cette diuinité et eternité passée, et l'immortalité à venir;

Nam si tantopere est animi mutata potestas,Omnis vt actarum exciderit retinentia rerum,Non, vt opinor, ea ab letho iam longior errat.

for, to make the condition of our souls such as we would have it to be, we must suppose them all-knowing, even in their natural simplicity and purity; by these means they had been such, being free from the prison of the body, as well before they entered into it, as we hope they shall be after they are gone out of it; and from this knowledge it should follow that they should remember, being got in the body, as Plato said, “That what we learn is no other than a remembrance of what we knew before;” a thing which every one by experience may maintain to be false. Forasmuch, in the first place, as that we do not justly remember any thing but what we have been taught, and that if the memory did purely perform its office it would at least suggest to us something more than what we have learned. Secondly, that which she knew being in her purity, was a true knowledge, knowing things as they are by her divine intelligence; whereas here we make her receive falsehood and vice when we instruct her; wherein she cannot employ her reminiscence, that image and conception having never been planted in her. To say that the corporal prison does in such sort suffocate her natural faculties, that they are there utterly extinct, is first contrary to this other belief of acknowledging her power to be so great, and the operations of it that men sensibly perceive in this life so admirable, as to have thereby concluded that divinity and eternity past, and the immortality to come:—

Nam si tantopere est anirai mutata potestas,Omnia ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum,Non, ut opinor, ea ab letho jam longior errat.

“For if the mind be changed to that degreeAs of past things to lose all memory,So great a change as that, I must confess,Appears to me than death but little less.”

¶11

En outre, c'est icy chez nous, et non ailleurs, que doiuent estre considerées les forces et les effects de l'ame: tout le reste de ses perfections, luy est vain et inutile: c'est de l'estat present, que doit estre payée et recognue toute son immortalité, et de la vie de l'homme, qu'elle est comtable seulement. Ce seroit iniustice de luy auoir retranché ses moyens et ses puissances, de l'auoir desarmée, pour du temps de sa captiuité et de sa prison, de sa foiblesse et maladie, du temps où elle auroit esté forcée et contrainte, tirer le iugement et vne condemnation de durée infinie et perpetuelle: et de s'arrester à la consideration d'vn temps si court, qui est à l'aduenture d'vne ou de deux heures, ou au pis aller, d'vn siecle (qui n'ont non plus de proportion à l'infinité qu'vn instant) pour de ce moment d'interualle, ordonner et establir definitiuement de tout son estre. Ce seroit vne disproportion inique, de tirer vne recompense eternelle en consequence d'vne si courte vie. Platon, pour se sauuer de cet inconuenient, veut que les payements futurs se limitent à la durée de cent ans, relatiuement à l'humaine durée: et des nostres assez leur ont donné bornes temporelles. Par ainsin ils iugeoyent, que sa generation suyuoit la commune condition des choses humaines: comme aussi sa vie, par l'opinion d'Epicurus et de Democritus, qui a esté la plus receuë, suyuant ces belles apparences: Qu'on la voyoit naistre; à mesme que le corps en estoit capable; on voyoit esleuer ses forces comme les corporelles; on y recognoissoit la foiblesse de son enfance, et auec le temps sa vigueur et sa maturité: et puis sa declination et sa vieillesse, et en fin sa decrepitude:

Gigni pariter cum corpore, et vnàCrescere sentimus, paritérque senescere mentem.

Furthermore, ‘tis here with us, and not elsewhere, that the force and effects of the soul ought to be considered; all the rest of her perfections are vain and useless to her; ‘tis by her present condition that all her immortality is to be rewarded and paid, and of the life of man only that she is to render an account It had been injustice to have stripped her of her means and powers; to have disarmed her in order, in the time of her captivity and imprisonment in the flesh, of her weakness and infirmity in the time wherein she was forced and compelled, to pass an infinite and perpetual sentence and condemnation, and to insist upon the consideration of so short a time, peradventure but an hour or two, or at the most but a century, which has no more proportion with infinity than an instant; in this momentary interval to ordain and definitively to determine of her whole being; it were an unreasonable disproportion, too, to assign an eternal recompense in consequence of so short a life. Plato, to defend himself from this inconvenience, will have future payments limited to the term of a hundred years, relatively to human duration; and of us ourselves there are enough who have given them temporal limits. By this they judged that the generation of the soul followed the common condition of human things, as also her life, according to the opinion of Epicurus and Democritus, which has been the most received; in consequence of these fine appearances that they saw it bom, and that, according as the body grew more capable, they saw it increase in vigour as the other did; that its feebleness in infancy was very manifest, and in time its better strength and maturity, and after that its declension and old age, and at last its decrepitude:—

Gigni pariter cum corpore, et unaCrescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem.

“Souls with the bodies to be born we mayDiscern, with them t’ increase, with them decay.”

¶12

Ils l'apperceuoient capable de diuerses passions et agitée de plusieurs mouuemens penibles, d'où elle tomboit en lassitude et en douleur, capable d'alteration et de changement, d'allegresse, d'assopissement, et de langueur, subjecte à ses maladies et aux offences, comme l'estomach ou le pied:

Mentem sanari, corpus vt ægrumCernimus, et flecti medicina posse videmus:

They perceived it to be capable of divers passions, and agitated with divers painful motions, whence it fell into lassitude and uneasiness; capable of alteration and change, of cheerfulness, of stupidity and languor, and subject to diseases and injuries, as the stomach or the foot;

Mentem sanari, corpus ut grum,Ceraimus, et flecti medicin posse videmus;

“Sick minds, as well as bodies, we do seeBy Med’cine’s virtue oft restored to be;”

¶13

esblouye et troublée par la force du vin: desmue de son assiette, par les vapeurs d'vne fieure chaude: endormie par l'application d'aucuns medicamens, et reueillée par d'autres.

Corpoream naturam animi esse necesse est,Corporeis quoniam telis ictúque laborat.

dazzled and intoxicated with the fumes of wine, jostled from her seat by the vapours of a burning fever, laid asleep by the application of some medicaments, and roused by others,—

Corpoream naturam animi esse necesse est,Corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat;

“There must be of necessity, we find,A nature that’s corporeal of the mind,Because we evidently see it smartsAnd wounded is with shafts the body darts;”

¶14

On luy voyoit estonner et renuerser toutes ses facultez par la seule morsure d'vn chien malade, et n'y auoir nulle si grande fermeté de discours, nulle suffisance, nulle vertu, nulle resolution philosophique, nulle contention de ses forces, qui la peust exempter de la subjection de ces accidens: la saliue d'vn chetif mastin versée sur la main de Socrates, secouër toute sa sagesse et toutes ses grandes et si reglées imaginations, les aneantir de maniere qu'il ne restast aucune trace de sa cognoissance premiere:

Vis. . . . . . . animaïConturbatur, et . . . . . diuisa seorsumDisiectatur, eodem illo distracta veneno:

et ce venin ne trouuer non plus de resistance en cette ame, qu'en celle d'vn enfant de quatre ans: venin capable de faire deuenir toute la philosophie, si elle estoit incarnée, furieuse et insensée: si que Caton, qui tordoit le col à la mort mesme et à la fortune, ne peust souffrir la veuë d'vn miroir, ou de l'eau, accablé d'espouuantement et d'effroy, quand il seroit tombé par la contagion d'vn chien enragé, en la maladie que les medecins nomment Hydroforbie.

Vis morbi distracta per artusTurbat agens animam, spumantes æquore salsoVentorum vt validis feruescunt viribus vndæ.

they saw it astonished and overthrown in all its faculties through the mere bite of a mad dog, and in that condition to have no stability of reason, no sufficiency, no virtue, no philosophical resolution, no resistance that could exempt it from the subjection of such accidents; the slaver of a contemptible cur shed upon the hand of Socrates, to shake all his wisdom and all his great and regulated imaginations, and so to annihilate them, ad that there remained no trace of his former knowledge,—

Vis.... animal Conturbatur, et.... divisa seorsumDisjectatur, eodem illo distracta veneno;

“The power of the soul’s disturbed; and whenThat once is but sequestered from her, thenBy the same poison ‘tis dispersed abroad;”

and this poison to find no more resistance in that great soul than in an infant of four years old; a poison sufficient to make all philosophy, if it were incarnate, become furious and mad; insomuch that Cato, who ever disdained death and fortune, could not endure the sight of a looking-glass, or of water, overwhelmed with horror and affright at the thought of falling, by the contagion of a mad dog, into the disease called by physicians hydrophobia:—

Vis morbi distracta per artusTurbat agens animam, spumantes quore salsoVentorum ut validis fervescunt viribus und.

“Throughout the limbs diffused, the fierce diseaseDisturbs the soul, as in the briny seas,The foaming waves to swell and boil we see,Stirred by the wind’s impetuosity.”

¶15

Or quant à ce poinct, la philosophie a bien armé l'homme pour la souffrance de tous autres accidens, ou de patience, ou si elle couste trop à trouuer, d'vne deffaitte inffallible, en se desrobant tout à faict du sentiment: mais ce sont moyens, qui seruent à vne ame estant à soy, et en ses forces, capable de discours et de deliberation: non pas à cet inconuenient, où chez vn philosophe, vne ame deuient l'ame d'vn fol, troublée, renuersée, et perdue. Ce que plusieurs occasions produisent, comme vne agitation trop vehemente, que, par quelque forte passion, l'ame peut engendrer en soy-mesme: ou vne blessure en certain endroit de la personne: ou vne exhalation de l'estomach, nous iectant à vn esblouyssement et tournoyement de teste:

Morbis in corporis auius erratSæpe animus; dementit enim, deliráque fatur,Interdúmque graui lethargo fertur in altumÆternúmqùe soporem, oculis nutúque cadenti.

Now, as to this particular, philosophy has sufficiently armed man to encounter all other accidents either with patience, or, if the search of that costs too dear, by an infallible defeat, in totally depriving himself of all sentiment; but these are expedients that are only of use to a soul being itself, and in its full power, capable of reason and deliberation; but not at all proper for this inconvenience, where, in a philosopher, the soul becomes the soul of a madman, troubled, overturned, and lost; which many occasions may produce, as a too vehement agitation that any violent passion of the soul may beget in itself; or a wound in a certain part of the person, or vapours from the stomach, any of which may stupefy the understanding and turn the brain.

Morbis in corporis avius erratSpe animus; dementit enim, deliraque fatur;Interdumque gravi lethargo fertur in altumternumque soporem, oculis mi tuque cadenti:

“For when the body’s sick, and ill at ease,The mind doth often share in the disease;Wonders, grows wild, and raves, and sometimes byA heavy and a stupid lethargy,Is overcome and cast into a deep,A most profound and everlasting sleep.”

¶16

Les philosophes n'ont, ce me semble, guere touché cette corde, non plus qu'vne autre de pareille importance. Ils ont ce dilemme tousiours en la bouche, pour consoler nostre mortelle condition: Ou l'ame est mortelle, ou immortelle: Si mortelle, elle sera sans peine: Si immortelle, elle ira en amendant. Ils ne touchent iamais l'autre branche: Quoy, si elle va en empirant? Et laissent aux poëtes les menaces des peines futures. Mais par là ils se donnent vn beau ieu. Ce sont deux omissions qui s'offrent à moy souvent en leurs discours. Ie reuiens à la premiere. Cette ame pert l'vsage du souuerain bien Stoïque, si constant et si ferme. Il faut que nostre belle sagesse se rende en cet endroit, et quitte les armes. Au demeurant, ils consideroient aussi par la vanité de l'humaine raison, que le meslange et société de deux pieces si diuerses, comme est le mortel et l'immortel, est inimaginable:

Quippe etenim mortale æterno iungere, et vnàConsentire putare, et fungi mutua posse,Desipere est. Quid enim diuersius esse putandum est,Aut magis inter se disiunctum discrepitánsque,Quàm, mortale quod est, immortali atque perenniIunctum in concilio sæuas tolerare procellas?

The philosophers, methinks, have not much touched this string, no more than another of equal importance; they have this dilemma continually in their mouths, to console our mortal condition: “The soul is either mortal or immortal; if mortal, it will suffer no pain; if immortal, it will change for the better.”—They never touch the other branch, “What if she change for the worse?” and leave to the poets the menaces of future torments. But thereby they make themselves a good game. These are two omissions that I often meet with in their discourses. I return to the first.

This soul loses the use of the sovereign stoical good, so constant and so firm. Our fine human wisdom must here yield, and give up her arms. As to the rest, they also considered, by the vanity of human reason, that the mixture and association of two so contrary things as the mortal and the immortal, was unimaginable:—

Quippe etenim mortale terao jungere, et unaConsentire putare, et fungi mutua posse,Desipere est. Quid enim diversius esse putandum est,Aut magis inter se disjunctum discrepitansque,Quam, mortale quod est, immortali atque perenniJunctum, in concilio, svas tolerare procellas?

“The mortal and th’ eternal, then, to blend,And think they can pursue one common end,Is madness: for what things more diff’rent are.Distinct in nature, and disposed to jar?How can it then be thought that these should bear,When thus conjoined, of harms an equal share?”

¶17

Dauantage ils sentoyent l'ame s'engager en la mort, comme le corps.

Simul æuo fessa fatiscit.

Ce que, selon Zeno, l'image du sommeil nous montre assez. Car il estime que c'est vne defaillance et cheute de l'ame aussi bien que du corps. Contrahi animum, et quasi labi putat atque decidere. qu'on aperceuoit en aucuns, sa force, et sa vigueur se maintenir en la fin de la vie, ils le rapportoyent à la diuersité des maladies, comme on void les hommes en cette extremité, maintenir, qui vn sens, qui vn autre, qui l'ouïr, qui le fleurer, sans alteration: et ne se voit point d'affoiblissement si vniuersel, qu'il n'y reste quelques parties entieres et vigoureuses:

Non alio pacto, quàm si pes cùm dolet ægri,In nullo caput interea sit fortè dolore.

Moreover, they perceived the soul tending towards death as well as the body:—

Simul ovo fessa fatiscit:

“Fatigued together with the weight of years:”

which, according to Zeno, the image of sleep does sufficiently demonstrate to us; for he looks upon it “as a fainting and fall of the soul, as well as of the body:” Contrahi animum et quasi labi putat atque decidere: and, what they perceived in some, that the soul maintained its force and vigour to the last gasp of life, they attributed to the variety of diseases, as it is observable in men at the last extremity, that some retain one sense, and some another; one the hearing, and another the smell, without any manner of defect or alteration; and that there is not so universal a deprivation that some parts do not remain vigorous and entire:—

Non alio pacto, quam si, pes cum dolet gri,In nullo caput interea sit forte dolore.

“So, often of the gout a man complains,Whose head is, at the same time, free from pains.”

¶18

La veuë de nostre iugement se rapporte à la verité, comme fait l'œil du chat-huant, à la splendeur du soleil, ainsi que dit Aristote. Par où le sçaurions nous mieux conuaincre que par si grossiers aueuglemens en vne si apparente lumiere? Car l'opinion contraire, de l'immortalité de l'ame, laquelle Cicero dit auoir esté premierement introduitte, au moins du tesmoignage des liures, par Pherecydes Syrius du temps du Roy Tullus (d'autres en attribuent l'inuention à Thales: et autres à d'autres) c'est la partie de l'humaine science traictée auec plus de reseruation et de doute. Les dogmatistes les plus fermes, sont contraints en cet endroit principalement, de se reietter à l'abry des ombrages de l'Academie. Nul ne sçait ce qu'Aristote a estably de ce subiect, non plus que touts les anciens en general, qui le manient d'vne vacillante creance: rem gratissimam promittentium magis quàm probantium soubs le nuage des paroles et sens difficiles, et non intelligibles, et a laissé à ses sectateurs, autant à debattre sur son iugement que sur la matiere. Deux choses leur rendoient cette opinion plausible: l'vne, que sans l'immortalité des ames, il n'y auroit plus dequoy asseoir les vaines esperances de la gloire, qui est vne consideration de merueilleux credit au monde: l'autre, que c'est vne tres-vtile impression, comme dit Platon, que les vices, quand ils se desroberont de la veuë et cognoissance de l'humaine iustice, demeurent tousiours en butte à la diuine, qui les poursuyura, voire apres la mort des coulpables. Vn soing extreme tient l'homme d'alonger son estre; il y a pourueu par toutes ses pieces. Et pour la conseruation du corps, sont les sepultures: pour la conseruation du nom, la gloire. Il a employé toute son opinion à se rebastir, impatient de sa fortune, et à s'estançonner par ses inuentions. L'ame par son trouble et sa foiblesse, ne pouuant tenir sur son pied, va questant de toutes parts des consolations, esperances et fondements, et des circonstances estrangeres, où elle s'attache et se plante. Et pour legers et fantastiques que son inuention les luy forge, s'y repose plus seurement qu'en soy, et plus volontiers. Mais les plus aheurtez à cette si iuste et claire persuasion de l'immortalité de nos esprits; c'est merueille comme ils se sont trouuez courts et impuissans à l'establir par leurs humaines forces. Somnia sunt non docentis, sed optantis recognoistre par ce tesmoignage, qu'il doit à la fortune et au rencontre, la verité qu'il descouure luy seul; puis que lors mesme, qu'elle luy est tombée en main, il n'a pas dequoy la saisir et la maintenir, et que sa raison n'a pas la force de s'en preualoir. Toutes choses produites par nostre propre discours et suffisance, autant vrayes que fauces, sont subiectes à incertitude et debat. C'est pour le chastiment de nostre fierté, et instruction de nostre misere et incapacité, que Dieu produisit le trouble, et la confusion de l'ancienne tour de Babel. Tout ce que nous entreprenons sans son assistance, tout ce que nous voyons sans la lampe de sa grace, ce n'est que vanité et folie. L'essence mesme de la verité, qui est vniforme et constante, quand la fortune nous en donne la possession, nous la corrompons et abastardissons par nostre foiblesse. Quelque train que l'homme prenne de soy, Dieu permet qu'il arriue tousiours à cette mesme confusion, de laquelle il nous represente si viuement l'image par le iuste chastiement, dequoy il batit l'outrecuidance de Nemroth, et aneantit les vaines entreprinses du bastiment de sa pyramide. Perdam sapientiam sapientium, et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo. et de langues, dequoy il troubla cet ouurage, qu'est-ce autre chose, que cette infinie et perpetuelle altercation et discordance d'opinions et de raisons, qui accompaigne et embrouille le vain bastiment de l'humaine science? Et l'embrouille vtilement. Qui nous tiendroit, si nous auions un grain de connoissance? Ce sainct m'a faict grand plaisir: Ipsa vtilitatis occultatio, aut humilitatis exercitatio est, aut elationis attritio et d'insolence, ne portons nous nostre aueuglement et nostre bestise? Mais pour reprendre mon propos: c'estoit vrayement bien raison, que nous fussions tenus à Dieu seul, et au benefice de sa grace, de la verité d'vne si noble creance, puis que de sa seule liberalité, nous receuons le fruict de l'immortalité, lequel consiste en la iouyssance de la beatitude eternelle. Confessons ingenuement, que Dieu seul nous l'a dict, et la foy: car leçon n'est-ce pas de Nature et de nostre raison. Et qui retentera son estre et ses forces, et dedans et dehors, sans ce priuilege diuin: qui verra l'homme, sans le flatter, il n'y verra ny efficace, ny faculté, qui sente autre chose que la mort et la terre. Plus nous donnons, et deuons, et rendons à Dieu, nous en faisons d'autant plus chrestiennement. Ce que ce philosophe Stoïcien dit tenir du fortuit consentement de la voix populaire, valoit-il pas mieux qu'il le tinst de Dieu? Cùm de animorum æternitate disserimus, non leue momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. Vtor hac publica persuasione. humains sur ce subiect, se connoist singulierement par les fabuleuses circonstances, qu'ils ont adioustees à la suite de cette opinion, pour trouuer de quelle condition estoit cette nostre immortalité. Laissons les Stoïciens, Vsuram nobis largiuntur tanquam cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant donnent aux ames vne vie au delà de ceste cy, mais finie. La plus vniuerselle et plus receuë fantaisie, et qui dure iusques à nous, ç'a esté celle, de laquelle on fait autheur Pythagoras; non qu'il en fust le premier inuenteur, mais d'autant qu'elle receut beaucoup de poix, et de credit, par l'authorité de son approbation: C'est que les ames au partir de nous, ne faisoient que rouler de l'vn corps à vn autre, d'vn lyon à un cheual, d'vn cheual à vn Roy, se promenants ainsi sans cesse, de maison en maison. Et luy, disoit se souuenir auoir esté Æthalides, depuis Euphorbus, en apres Hermotimus, en fin de Pyrrhus estre passé en Pythagoras: ayant memoire de soy de deux cents six ans. Adioustoyent aucuns, que ces mesmes ames remontent au ciel par fois, et en deuallent encores:

O pater, ànne aliquas ad cœlum hinc ire putandum estSublimes animas, iterúmque ad tarda reuertiCorpora? quæ lucis miseris tam dira cupido?

The sight of our judgment is, to truth, the same that the owl’s eyes are to the splendour of the sun, says Aristotle. By what can we better convince him, than by so gross blindness in so apparent a light? For the contrary opinion of the immortality of the soul, which, Cicero says, was first introduced, according to the testimony of books at least, by Pherecydes

Syrius, in the time of King Tullus (though some attribute it to Thales, and others to others), ‘tis the part of human science that is treated of with the greatest doubt and

reservation. The most positive dogmatists are fain, in this point principally, to fly to the refuge of the Academy. No one doubts what Aristotle has established upon this subject, no more than all the ancients in general, who handle it with a wavering belief: Rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium: “A thing more acceptable in the promisors than the provers.” He conceals himself in clouds of words of difficult, unintelligible sense, and has left to those of his sect as great a dispute about his judgment as about the matter itself.

Two things rendered this opinion plausible to them; one, that, without the immortality of souls, there would be nothing whereon to ground the vain hopes of glory, which is a consideration of wonderful

repute in the world; the other, that it is a very profitable impression, as Plato says, that vices, when they escape the discovery and cognizance of human justice, are still within the reach of the divine, which will pursue them even after the death of the guilty. Man is excessively solicitous to prolong his being, and has to the utmost of his power provided for it; there are monuments for the conservation of the body, and glory to preserve the name. He has employed all his wit and opinion to the rebuilding of himself, impatient of his fortune, and to prop himself by his inventions. The soul, by reason of its anxiety and impotence, being unable to stand by itself, wanders up and down to seek out consolations, hopes, and foundations, and alien circumstances, to which she adheres and fixes; and how light or fantastic soever invention delivers them to her, relies more willingly, and with greater assurance, upon them than upon herself. But ‘tis wonderful to observe how the most constant and obstinate maintainers of this just and clear persuasion of the immortality of the soul fall short, and how weak their arguments are, when they go about to prove it by human reason: Somnia sunt non docentis, sed optantis: “They are dreams, not of the teacher, but wisher,” says one of the ancients. By which testimony man may know that he owes the truth he himself finds out to fortune and accident; since that even then, when it is fallen into his hand, he has not wherewith to hold and maintain it, and that his reason has not force to make use of it. All things produced by our own meditation and understanding, whether true or false, are subject to incertitude and controversy. ‘Twas for the chastisement of our pride, and for the instruction of our miserable condition and incapacity, that God wrought the perplexity and confusion of the tower of Babel. Whatever we undertake without his assistance, whatever we see without the lamp of his grace, is but vanity and folly. We corrupt the very essence of truth, which is uniform and constant, by our weakness, when fortune puts it into our possession. What course soever man takes of himself, God still permits it to come to the same confusion, the image whereof he so lively represents to us in the just chastisement wherewith he crushed Nimrod’s presumption, and frustrated the vain attempt of his proud structure; Perdam sapientiam sapientium, et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo. “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent.” The diversity of idioms and tongues, with which he disturbed this work, what are they other than this infinite and perpetual alteration and discordance of opinions and reasons, which accompany and confound the vain building of human wisdom, and to very good effect too; for what would hold us, if we had but the least grain of knowledge? This saint has very much obliged me: Ipsa veritatis occultatio ant humili-tatis exercitatio est, aut elationis attritio “The very concealment of the truth is either an exercise of humility or a quelling of presumption.” To what a pitch of presumption and insolence do we raise our blindness and folly!

But to return to my subject. It was truly very good reason that we should be beholden to God only, and to the favour of his grace, for the truth of so noble a belief, since from his sole bounty we receive the fruit of immortality, which consists in the enjoyment of eternal beatitude. Let us ingenuously confess that God alone has dictated it to us, and faith; for ‘tis no lesson of nature and our own reason. And whoever will inquire into his own being and power, both within and without, without this divine privilege; whoever shall consider man impartially, and without flattery, will see in him no efficacy or faculty that relishes of any thing but death and earth. The more we give and confess to owe and render to God, we do it with the greater Christianity. That which this Stoic philosopher says he holds from the fortuitous consent of the popular voice; had it not been better that he had held it from God? Cum de animarum otemitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. Utor hc public persuasione. “When we discourse of the immortality of souls, the consent of men that either fear or adore the infernal powers, is of no small advantage. I make use of this public persuasion.” Now the weakness of human arguments upon this subject is particularly manifested by the fabulous circumstances they have superadded as consequences of this opinion, to find out of what condition this immortality of ours was. Let us omit the Stoics, (usuram nobis largiuntur tanquam cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt animos; semper, negant. “They give us a long life, as also they do to crows; they say our soul shall continue long, but that it shall continue always they deny,”) who give to souls a life after this, but finite. The most universal and received fancy, and that continues down to our times in various places, is that of which they make Pythagoras the author; not that he was the original inventor, but because it received a great deal of weight and repute by the authority of his approbation: “That souls, at their departure out of us, did nothing but shift from one body to another, from a lion to a horse, from a horse to a king, continually travelling at this rate from habitation to habitation;” and he himself said that he remembered he had been tha-lides, since that Euphorbus, afterwards Hermotimus, and, finally, from Pyrrhus was passed into Pythagoras; having a memory of himself of two hundred and six years. And some have added that these very souls sometimes mount up to heaven, and come down again:—

O pater, aime aliquas ad colum hinc ire putandum estSublimes animas, iterumque ad tarda revertiCorpora? Qu lucis miseris tam dira cupido?

“O, father, is it then to be conceiv’dThat any of these spirits, so sublime,Should hence to the celestial regions climb,And thence return to earth to reassumeTheir sluggish bodies rotting in a tomb?For wretched life whence does such fondness come?”

¶19

Origene les fait aller et venir eternellement du bon au mauuais estat. L'opinion que Varro recite, est, qu'en quatre cens quarante ans de reuolution elles se reioignent à leur premier corps. Chrysippus, que cela doibt aduenir apres certain espace de temps incognu et non limité. Platon (qui dit tenir de Pindare et de l'ancienne poësie cette croyance) des infinies vicissitudes de mutation, ausquelles l'ame est preparée, n'ayant ny les peines, ny les recompenses en l'autre monde, que temporelles, comme sa vie en cestuy-cy n'est que temporelle, conclud en elle vne singuliere sçience des affaires du ciel, de l'enfer, et d'icy, où elle a passé, repassé, et seiourné à plusieurs voyages: matiere à sa reminiscence. Voicy son progrés ailleurs: Qui a bien vescu, il se reioint à l'astre, auquel il est assigné: qui mal, il passe en femme: et si lors mesme il ne se corrige point, il se rechange en beste de condition conuenable à ses mœurs vicieuses: et ne verra fin à ses punitions, qu'il ne soit reuenu à sa naïue constitution, s'estant par la force de la raison défaict des qualitez grossieres, stupides, et elementaires, qui estoyent en luy. Mais ie ne veux oublier l'obiection que font les Epicuriens à cette transmigration de corps en autre. Elle est plaisante. Ils demandent quel ordre il y auroit, si la presse des mourans venoit à estre plus grande que des naissans. Car les ames deslogées de leur giste seroyent à se fouler à qui prendroit place la premiere dans ce nouuel estuy. Et demandent aussi, à quoy elles passeroient leur temps, ce pendant qu'elles attendroient qu'vn logis leur fust appresté: ou au rebours s'il naissoit plus d'animaux, qu'il n'en mourroit, ils disent que les corps seroient en mauuais party, attendant l'infusion de leur ame, et en aduiendroit qu'aucuns d'iceux se mourroient auant que d'auoir esté viuans.

Denique connubia ad veneris, partúsque ferarum,Esse animas præsto deridiculum esse videtur,Et spectare immortales mortalia membraInnumero numero, certaréque præproperanterInter se, quæ prima potissimáque insinuetur.

Origen makes them eternally to go and come from a better to a worse estate. The opinion that Varro mentions is that, after four hundred and forty years’ revolution, they should be reunited to their first bodies; Chrysippus held that this would happen after a certain space of time unknown and unlimited. Plato, who professes to have embraced this belief from Pindar and the ancient poets, that we are to undergo infinite vicissitudes of mutation, for which the soul is prepared, having neither punishment nor reward in the other world but what is temporal, as its life here is but temporal, concludes that it has a singular knowledge of the affairs of heaven, of hell, of the world, through all which it has passed, repassed, and made stay in several voyages, are matters for her memory. Observe her progress elsewhere: “The soul that has lived well is reunited to the stars to which it is assigned; that which has lived ill removes into a woman, and if it do not there reform, is again removed into a beast of condition suitable to its vicious manners, and shall see no end of its punishments till it be returned to its natural constitution, and that it has, by the force of reason, purged itself from those gross, stupid, and elementary qualities it was polluted with.” But I will not omit the objection the Epicureans make against this transmigration from one body to another; ‘tis a pleasant one; they ask what expedient would be found out if the number of the dying should chance to be greater than that of those who are coming into the world. For the souls, turned out of their old habitation, would scuffle and crowd which should first get possession of their new lodging; and they further demand how they shall pass away their time, whilst waiting till new quarters are made ready for them? Or, on the contrary, if more animals should be born than die, the body, they say, would be but in an ill condition whilst waiting for a soul to be infused into it; and it would fall out that some bodies would die before they had been alive.

Denique comrabia ad Veneris, partusque ferarumEsse animas prsto, deridiculum esse videtur;Et spectare immortales mortalia membraInnumero numro, certareque prproperanterInter se, qu prima potissimaq insinueter.

“Absurd to think that whilst wild beasts beget,Or bear their young, a thousand souls do wait,Expect the falling body, fight and striveWhich first shall enter in and make it live.”

¶20

D'autres ont arresté l'ame au corps des trespassez, pour en animer les serpents, les vers, et autres bestes, qu'on dit s'engendrer de la corruption de nos membres, voire et de nos cendres. D'autres la diuisent en vne partie mortelle, et l'autre immortelle. Autres la font corporelle, et ce neantmoins immortelle. Aucuns la font immortelle, sans science et sans cognoissance. Il y en a aussi des nostres mesmes qui ont estimé, que des ames des condamnez, il s'en faisoit des diables: comme Plutarque pense, qu'il se face des dieux de celles qui sont sauuées. Car il est peu de choses que cet autheur là establisse d'vne façon de parler si resolue, qu'il fait ceste-cy: maintenant par tout ailleurs vne maniere dubitatrice et ambigue. Il faut estimer, dit-il, et croire fermement, que les ames des hommes vertueux selon nature et selon iustice diuine, deuiennent d'hommes saincts, et de saincts demy-dieux, et de demy-dieux, apres qu'ils sont parfaictement, comme és sacrifices de purgation, nettoyez et purifiez, estans deliurez de toute passibilité et de toute mortalité, ils deuiennent, non par aucune ordonnance ciuile, mais à la verité, et selon raison vray-semblable, dieux entiers et parfaicts, en receuant vne fin tres heureuse et tres-glorieuse. Mais qui le voudra voir, luy, qui est des plus retenus pourtant et moderez de la bande, s'escarmoucher auec plus de hardiesse, et nous conter ses miracles sur ce propos, ie le renuoye à son discours de la lune, et du Dæmon de Socrates, là où aussi euidemment qu'en nul autre lieu, il se peut aduerer, les mysteres de la philosophie auoir beaucoup d'estrangetez communes auec celles de la poësie: l'entendement humain se perdant à vouloir sonder et contreroller toutes choses iusques au bout: tout ainsi comme, lassez et trauaillez de la longue course de nostre vie, nous retombons en enfantillage. Voyla les belles et certaines instructions, que nous tirons de la science humaine, sur le subiect de nostre ame. Il n'y a point moins de temerité en ce qu'elle nous apprend des parties corporelles. Choisissons en vn, ou deux exemples: car autrement nous nous perdrions dans cette mer trouble et vaste des erreurs medecinales. Sçachons, si on s'accorde au moins en cecy, de quelle matiere les hommes se produisent les vns des autres. Car quant à leur premiere production, ce n'est pas merueille, si en chose si haute et ancienne, l'entendement humain se trouble et dissipe. Archelaüs le physicien, duquel Socrates fut le disciple et le mignon, selon Aristoxenus, disoit, et les hommes et les animaux auoir esté faicts d'vn limon laicteux, exprimé par la chaleur de la terre. Pythagoras dit nostre semence estre l'escume de nostre meilleur sang: Platon, l'escoulement de la moëlle de l'espine du dos: ce qu'il argumente de ce, que cet endroit se sent le premier, de la lasseté de la besongne: Alcmeon, partie de la substance du cerueau: et qu'il soit ainsi, dit-il, les yeux troublent à ceux qui se trauaillent outre mesure à cet exercice: Democritus, vne substance extraite de toute la masse corporelle: Epicurus, extraicte de l'ame et du corps: Aristote, vn excrement tiré de l'aliment du sang le dernier qui s'espand en nos membres: autres, du sang, cuit et digeré par la chaleur des genitoires: ce qu'ils iugent de ce qu'aux extremes efforts, on rend des gouttes de pur sang: enquoy il semble qu'il y ayt plus d'apparence, si on peut tirer quelque apparence d'vne confusion si infinie. Or pour mener à effect cette semence, combien en font-ils d'opinions contraires? Aristote et Democritus tiennent que les femmes n'ont point de sperme: et que ce n'est qu'vne sueur qu'elles eslancent par la chaleur du plaisir et du mouuement, qui ne sert de rien à la generation. Galen au contraire, et ses suyuans, que sans la rencontre des semences, la generation ne se peut faire. Voyla les medecins, les philosophes, les iurisconsultes, et les theologiens, aux prises pesle mesle auec nos femmes, sur la dispute, à quels termes les femmes portent leur fruict. Et moy ie secours par l'exemple de moy-mesme, ceux d'entre eux, qui maintiennent la grossesse d'onze moys. Le monde est basty de cette experience, il n'est si simple femmelette qui ne puisse dire son aduis sur toutes ces contestations, et si nous n'en sçaurions estre d'accord. En voyla assez pour verifier que l'homme n'est non plus instruit de la cognoissance de soy, en la partie corporelle, qu'en la spirituelle. Nous l'auons proposé luy mesmes à soy, et sa raison, à sa raison, pour voir ce qu'elle nous en diroit. Il me semble assez auoir montré combien peu elle s'entend en elle mesme. Et, qui ne s'entend en soy, en quoy se peut il entendre? Quasi veró mensuram vllius rei possit agere, qui sui nesciat. en comtoit de belles, faisant l'homme la mesure de toutes choses, qui ne sçeut iamais seulement la sienne. Si ce n'est luy, sa dignité ne permettra pas qu'autre creature ayt cet aduantage. Or luy estant en soy si contraire, et l'vn iugement subuertissant l'autre sans cesse, cette fauorable proposition n'estoit qu'vne risée, qui nous menoit à conclurre par necessité la neantise du compas et du compasseur. Quand Thales estime la cognoissance de l'homme tres-difficile à l'homme, il luy apprend, la cognoissance de toute autre chose luy estre impossible. Vous, pour qui i'ay pris la peine d'estendre vn si long corps, contre ma coustume, ne refuyrez point de maintenir vostre Sebonde, par la forme ordinaire d'argumenter, dequoy vous estes tous les iours instruite, et exercerez en cela vostre esprit et vostre estude: car ce dernier tour d'escrime icy, il ne le faut employer que comme vn extreme remede. C'est vn coup desesperé, auquel il faut abandonner vos armes, pour faire perdre à vostre aduersaire les siennes: et vn tour secret, duquel il se faut seruir rarement et reseruément. C'est grande temerité de vous perdre pour perdre vn autre. Il ne faut pas vouloir mourir pour se venger, comme fit Gobrias. Car estant aux prises bien estroictes auec vn Seigneur de Perse, Darius y suruenant l'espée au poing, qui craignoit de frapper, de peur d'assener Gobrias: il luy cria, qu'il donnast hardiment, quand il deuroit donner au trauers tous les deux. I'ay veu reprouuer pour iniustes, des armes et conditions de combat singulier desesperées, et ausquelles celuy qui les offroit, mettoit luy et son compaignon en termes d'vne fin à tous deux ineuitable. Les Portugais prindrent en la mer des Indes certains Turcs prisonniers: lesquels impatiens de leur captiuité, se resolurent, et leur succeda, frottant des clous de nauire l'vn à l'autre, et faisans tomber vne estincelle de feu dans les caques de poudre (qu'il y auoit en l'endroit où ils estoyent gardez) d'embraser et mettre en cendre eux, leurs maistres et le vaisseau. Nous secouons icy les limites et dernieres clostures des sciences: ausquelles l'extremité est vitieuse, comme en la vertu. Tenez vous dans la route commune, il ne fait mie bon estre si subtil et si fin. Souuienne vous de ce que dit le prouerbe Thoscan,

Chi troppo s'assottiglia, si scauezza.

Others have arrested the soul in the body of the deceased, with it to animate serpents, worms, and other beasts, which are said to be bred out of the corruption of our members, and even out of our ashes; others divide them into two parts, the one mortal, the other immortal; others make it corporeal, and nevertheless immortal. Some make it immortal, without

sense or knowledge. There are others, even among ourselves, who have believed that devils were made of the souls of the damned; as Plutarch thinks that gods were made of those that were saved; for there are few things which that author is so positive in as he is in this; maintaining elsewhere a doubtful and ambiguous way of expression. “We are told,” says he, “and steadfastly should believe, that the souls of virtuous men, both according to nature and the divine justice, become saints, and from saints demigods, and from demigods, after they are perfectly, as in sacrifices of purgation, cleansed and purified, being delivered from all passibility and all mortality, they become, not by any civil decree, but in real truth, and according to all probability of reason, entire and perfect gods, in receiving a most happy and glorious end.” But who desires to see him—him, who is yet the most sober and moderate of the whole gang of philosophers, lay about him with greater boldness, and relate his miracles upon this subject, I refer him to his treatise of the Moon, and of the Demon of Socrates, where he may, as evidently as in any other place whatever, satisfy himself that the mysteries of philosophy have many strange things in common with those of poetry; human understanding losing itself in attempting to sound and search all things to the bottom; even as we, tired and worn out with a long course of life, return to infancy and dotage. See here the fine and certain instructions which we extract from human knowledge concerning the soul.

Neither is there less temerity in what they teach us touching our corporal parts. Let us choose out one or two examples; for otherwise we should lose ourselves in this vast and troubled ocean of medical errors. Let us first know whether, at least, they agree about the matter whereof men produce one another; for as to their first production it is no wonder if, in a thing so high and so long since past, human understanding finds itself puzzled and perplexed. Archelaus, the physician, whose disciple and favourite Socrates was, according to Aristoxenus, said that both men and beasts were made of a lacteous slime, expressed by the heat of the earth; Pythagoras says that our seed is the foam or cream of our better blood; Plato, that it is the distillation of the marrow of the backbone; raising his argument from this, that that part is first sensible of being weary of the work; Alcmeon, that it is part of the substance of the brain, and that it is so, says he, is proved by the weakness of the eyes in those who are immoderate in that exercise; Democritus, that it is a substance extracted from the whole mass of the body; Epicurus, an extract from soul and body; Aristotle, an excrement drawn from the aliment of the blood, the last which is diffused over our members; others, that it is a blood concocted and digested by the heat of the genitals, which they judge, by reason that in excessive endeavours a man voids pure blood; wherein there seems to be more likelihood, could a man extract any appearance from so infinite a confusion. Now, to bring this seed to do its work, how many contrary opinions do they set on foot? Aristotle and Democritus are of opinion that women have no sperm, and that ‘tis nothing but a sweat that they distil in the heat of pleasure and motion, and that contributes nothing at all to generation. Galen, on the contrary, and his followers, believe that without the concurrence of seeds there can be no generation. Here are the physicians, the philosophers, the lawyers, and divines, by the ears with our wives about the dispute, “For what term women carry their fruit?” and I, for my part, by the example of myself, stick with those that maintain a woman goes eleven months with child. The world is built upon this experience; there is no so commonplace a woman that cannot give her judgment in all these controversies; and yet we cannot agree.

Here is enough to verify that man is no better instructed in the knowledge of himself, in his corporal than in his spiritual part We have proposed himself to himself, and his reason to his reason, to see what she could say. I think I have sufficiently demonstrated how little she understands herself in herself; and who understands not himself in himself, in what can he? Quasi vero mensuram ullius rei possit agere, qui sui nesciat. “As if he could understand the measure of any other thing, that knows not his own.” In earnest, Protagoras told us a pretty flam in making man the measure of all things, that never knew so much as his own; and if it be not he, his dignity will not permit that any other creature should have this advantage; now he being so contrary in himself, and one judgment so incessantly subverting another, this favourable proposition was but a mockery, which induced us necessarily to conclude the nullity of the compass and the compasser. When Thales reputes the knowledge of man very difficult for man to comprehend, he at the same time gives him to understand that all other knowledge is impossible.

You,* for whom I have taken the pains, contrary to my custom, to write so long a discourse, will not refuse to support your Sebond by the ordinary forms of arguing, wherewith you are every day instructed, and in this will exercise both your wit and learning; for this last fencing trick is never to be made use of but as an extreme remedy; ‘tis a desperate thrust, wherein you are to quit your own arms to make your adversary abandon his; and a secret sleight, which must be very rarely, and then very reservedly, put in practice. ‘Tis great temerity to lose yourself that you may destroy another; you must not die to be revenged, as Gobrias did; for, being closely grappled in combat with a lord of Persia, Darius coming in sword in hand, and fearing to strike lest he should kill Gobrias, he called out to him boldly to fall on,

* The author, as we have already mentioned, is addressingMargaret de Valois.

though he should run them both through at once. I have known desperate weapons, and conditions of single combat, and wherein he that offered them put himself and his adversary upon terms of inevitable death to them both, censured for unjust. The Portuguese, in the Indian Sea, took certain Turks prisoners, who, impatient of their captivity, resolved, and it succeeded, by striking the nails of the ship one against another, and making a spark to fall into the barrels of powder that were set in the place where they were guarded, to blow up and reduce themselves, their masters, and the vessel to ashes. We here touch the out-plate and utmost limits of sciences, wherein the extremity is vicious, as in virtue. Keep yourselves in the common road; it is not good to be so subtle and cunning. Remember the Tuscan proverb:—

Chi troppo s’assottiglia, si scavezza.

“Who makes himself too wise, becomes a fool.”

¶21

Ie vous conseille en vos opinions et en vos discours, autant qu'en vos mœurs, et en toute autre chose, la moderation et l'attrempance, et la fuite de la nouuelleté et de l'estrangeté. Toutes les voyes extrauagantes me faschent. Vous qui par l'authorité que vostre grandeur vous apporte, et encores plus par les auantages que vous donnent les qualitez plus vostres, pouuez d'vn clin d'œil commander à qui il vous plaist, deuiez donner cette charge à quelqu'un, qui fist profession des lettres, qui vous eust bien autrement appuyé et enrichy cette fantasie. Toutesfois en voicy assez, pour ce que vous en auez à faire. Epicurus disoit des loix, que les pires nous estoyent si necessaires, que sans elles, les hommes s'entremangeroient les vns les autres. Et Platon verifie que sans loix, nous viurions comme bestes. Nostre esprit est vn vtil vagabond, dangereux et temeraire: il est malaisé d'y ioindre l'ordre et la mesure: de mon temps ceux qui ont quelque rare excellence au dessus des autres, et quelque viuacité extraordinaire, nous les voyons quasi tous, desbordez en licence d'opinions, et de mœurs: c'est miracle s'il s'en rencontre vn rassis et sociable. On a raison de donner à l'esprit humain les barrieres les plus contraintes qu'on peut. En l'estude, comme au reste, il luy faut compter et regler ses marches: il luy faut tailler par art les limites de sa chasse. On le bride et garotte de religions, de loix, de coustumes, de science, de preceptes, de peines, et recompenses mortelles et immortelles: encores voit-on que par sa volubilité et dissolution, il eschappe à toutes ces liaisons. C'est vn corps vain, qui n'a par où estre saisi et assené: vn corps diuers et difforme, auquel on ne peut asseoir nœud ny prise. Certes il est peu d'ames si reglées, si fortes et bien nées, à qui on se puisse fier de leur propre conduicte: et qui puissent auec moderation et sans temerité, voguer en la liberté de leurs iugemens, au delà des opinions communes. Il est plus expedient de les mettre en tutelle. C'est vn outrageux glaiue à son possesseur mesme, que l'esprit, à qui ne sçait s'en armer ordonnément et discrettement. Et n'y a point de beste, à qui il faille plus iustement donner des orbieres, pour tenir sa veuë subjecte, et contrainte deuant ses pas; et la garder d'extrauaguer ny çà ny là, hors les ornieres que l'vsage et les loix luy tracent. Parquoy il vous siera mieux de vous resserrer dans le train accoustumé, quel qu'il soit, que de ietter vostre vol à cette licence effrenée. Mais si quelqu'vn de ces nouueaux docteurs, entreprend de faire l'ingenieux en vostre presence, aux despens de son salut et du vostre: pour vous deffaire de cette dangereuse peste, qui se respand tous les iours en vos cours, ce preseruatif à l'extreme necessité, empeschera que la contagion de ce venin n'offencera, ny vous, ny vostre assistance. La liberté donc et gaillardise de ces esprits anciens, produisoit en la philosophie et sciences humaines, plusieurs sectes d'opinions differentes, chacun entreprenant de iuger et de choisir pour prendre party. Mais à present, que les hommes vont tous vn train: qui certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis addicti et consecrati sunt, vt étiam, quæ non probant, cogantur defendere les arts par ciuile authorité et ordonnance: si que les escholes n'ont qu'vn patron et pareille institution et discipline circonscripte, on ne regarde plus ce que les monnoyes poisent et valent, mais chacun à son tour, les reçoit selon le prix, que l'approbation commune et le cours leur donne: on ne plaide pas de l'alloy, mais de l'vsage: ainsi se mettent egallement toutes choses. On reçoit la medecine, comme la geometrie; et les battelages, les enchantemens, les liaisons, le commerce des esprits des trespassez, les prognostications, les domifications, et iusques à cette ridicule poursuitte de la pierre philosophale, tout se met sans contredict. Il ne faut que sçauoir, que le lieu de Mars loge au milieu du triangle de la main, celuy de Venus au pouce, et de Mercure au petit doigt: et que quand la mensale couppe le tubercle de l'enseigneur, c'est signe de cruauté: quand elle faut soubs le mitoyen, et que la moyenne naturelle fait vn angle auec la vitale, soubs mesme endroit, que c'est signe d'vne mort miserable: que si à vne femme, la naturelle est ouuerte, et ne ferme point l'angle auec la vitale, cela denote qu'elle sera mal chaste. Ie vous appelle vous mesme à tesmoin, si auec cette science, vn homme ne peut passer auec reputation et faueur parmy toutes compagnies. Theophrastus disoit, que l'humaine cognoissance, acheminée par les sens, pouuoit iuger des causes des choses iusques à certaine mesure, mais qu'estant arriuée aux causes extremes et premieres, il falloit qu'elle s'arrestast, et qu'elle rebouchast: à cause ou de sa foiblesse, ou de la difficulté des choses. C'est vne opinion moyenne et douce; que nostre suffisance nous peut conduire iusques à la cognoissance d'aucunes choses, et qu'elle a certaines mesures de puissance, outre lesquelles c'est temerité de l'employer. Cette opinion est plausible, et introduicte par gens de composition: mais il est malaisé de donner bornes à nostre esprit: il est curieux et auide, et n'a point occasion de s'arrester plus tost à mille pas qu'à cinquante. Ayant essayé par experience, que ce à quoy l'vn s'estoit failly, l'autre y est arriué: et que ce qui estoit incogneu à vn siecle, le siecle suyuant l'a esclaircy: et que les sciences et les arts ne se iettent pas en moule, ains se forment et figurent peu à peu, en les maniant et pollissant à plusieurs fois, comme les ours façonnent leurs petits en les leschant à loisir: ce que ma force ne peut descouurir, ie ne laisse pas de le sonder et essayer: et en retastant et pestrissant cette nouuelle matiere, la remuant et l'eschauffant, i'ouure à celuy qui me suit, quelque facilité pour en iouyr plus à son ayse, et la luy rends plus soupple, et plus maniable:

Vt Hymettia soleCera remollescit, tractatáque pollice multasVertitur in facies, ipsóque fit vtilis vsu.

I advise you that, in all your opinions and discourses, as well as in your manners and all other things, you keep yourself moderate and temperate, and avoid novelty; I am an enemy to all extravagant ways. You, who by the authority of your grandeur, and yet more by the advantages which those qualities give you that are more your own, may with the twinkle of an eye command whom you please, ought to have given this charge to some one who made profession of letters, who might after a better manner have proved and illustrated these things to you. But here is as much as you will stand in need of.

Epicurus said of the laws, “That the worst were so necessary for us that without them men would devour one another.” And Plato affirms, “That without laws we should live like beasts.” Our wit is a wandering, dangerous, and temerarious utensil; it is hard to couple any order or measure to it; in those of our own time, who are endued with any rare excellence above others, or any extraordinary vivacity of understanding, we see them almost all lash out into licentiousness of opinions and manners; and ‘tis almost a miracle to find one temperate and sociable. ‘Tis all the reason in the world to limit human wit within the strictest limits imaginable; in study, as in all the rest, we ought to have its steps and advances numbered and fixed, and that the limits of its inquisition be bounded by art. It is curbed and fettered by religions, laws, customs, sciences, precepts, mortal and immortal penalties. And yet we see that it escapes from all these bonds by its volubility and dissolution; *tis a vain body which has nothing to lay hold on or to seize; a various and difform body, incapable of being either bound or held. In earnest, there are few souls so regular, firm, and well descended, as are to be trusted with their own conduct, and that can with moderation, and without temerity, sail in the liberty of their own judgments, beyond the common and received opinions; *tis more expedient to put them under pupilage. Wit is a dangerous weapon, even to the possessor, if he knows not how to use it discreetly; and there is not a beast to whom a headboard is more justly to be given, to keep his looks down and before his feet, and to hinder him from wandering here and there out of the tracks which custom and the laws have laid before him. And therefore it will be better for you to keep yourself in the beaten path, let it be what it will, than to fly out at a venture with this unbridled liberty. But if any of these new doctors will pretend to be ingenious in your presence, at the expense both of your soul and his own, to avoid this dangerous plague, which is every day laid in your way to infect you, this preservative, in the extremest necessity, will prevent the danger and hinder the contagion of this poison from offending either you or your company.

The liberty, then, and frolic forwardness of these ancient wits produced in philosophy and human sciences several sects of different opinions, every one undertaking to judge and make choice of what he would stick to and maintain. But now that men go all one way, Qui certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis addicti et consecrati sunt, ut etiam, qu non probant, cogantur defendere, “Who are so tied and obliged to certain opinions that they are bound to defend even those they do not approve,” and that we receive the arts by civil authority and decree, so that the schools have but one pattern, and a like circumscribed institution and discipline, we no more take notice what the coin weighs, and is really worth, but every one receives it according to the estimate that common approbation and use puts upon it; the alloy is not questioned, but how much it is current for. In like manner all things pass; we take physic as we do geometry; and tricks of hocus-pocus, enchantments, and love-spells, the correspondence of the souls of the dead, prognostications, domifications, and even this ridiculous pursuit of the philosophers’ stone, all things pass for current pay, without any manner of scruple or contradiction. We need to know no more but that Mars’ house is in the middle of the triangle of the hand, that of Venus in the thumb, and that of Mercury in the little finger; that when the table-line cuts the tubercle of the forefinger ‘tis a sign of cruelty, that when it falls short of the middle finger, and that the natural median-line makes an angle with the vital in the same side, ‘tis a sign of a miserable death; that if in a woman the natural line be open, and does not close the angle with the vital, this denotes that she shall not be very chaste. I leave you to judge whether a man qualified with such knowledge may not pass with reputation and esteem in all companies.

Theophrastus said that human knowledge, guided by the senses, might judge of the causes of things to a certain degree; but that being arrived to first and extreme causes, it must stop short and retire, by reason either of its own infirmity or the difficulty of things. ‘Tis a moderate and gentle opinion, that our own understandings may conduct us to the knowledge of some things, and that it has certain measures of power, beyond which ‘tis temerity to employ it; this opinion is plausible, and introduced by men of well composed minds, but ‘tis hard to limit our wit, which is curious and greedy, and will no more stop at a thousand than at fifty paces; having experimentally found that, wherein one has failed, the other has hit, and that what was unknown to one age, the age following has explained; and that arts and sciences are not cast in a mould, but are formed and perfected by degrees, by often handling and polishing, as bears leisurely lick their cubs into form; what my force cannot discover, I do not yet desist to sound and to try; and by handling and kneading this new matter over and over again, by turning and heating it, I lay open to him that shall succeed me, a kind of facility to enjoy it more at his ease, and make it more maniable and supple for him,

Ut hymettia soleCera remollescit, tractataque poll ice multasVertitur in facies, ipsoque fit utilis usu;

“As wax doth softer in the sun become,And, tempered ‘twixt the finger and the thumb,Will varions forms, and several shapes admit,Till for the present use ‘tis rendered fit;”

¶22

Autant en fera le second au tiers: qui est cause que la difficulté ne me doit pas desesperer; ny aussi peu mon impuissance, car ce n'est que la mienne. L'homme est capable de toutes choses, comme d'aucunes. Et s'il aduouë, comme dit Theophrastus, l'ignorance des causes premieres et des principes, qu'il me quitte hardiment tout le reste de sa science. Si le fondement luy faut, son discours est par terre. Le disputer et l'enquerir, n'a autre but et arrest que les principes: si cette fin n'arreste son cours, il se iecte à vne irresolution infinie. Non potest aliud alio magis minùsue comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum vna est definitio comprehendendi. Or il est vray-semblable que si l'ame sçauoit quelque chose, elle se sçauroit premierement elle mesme; et si elle sçauoit quelque chose hors d'elle, ce seroit son corps et son estuy, auant toute autre chose. Si on void iusques auiourd'huy les dieux de la medecine se debattre de nostre anatomie,

Mulciber in Troiam, pro Troia stabat Apollo:

as much will the second do for the third; which is the cause that the difficulty ought not to make me despair, and my own incapacity as little; for ‘tis nothing but my own.

Man is as capable of all things as of some; and if he confesses, as Theophrastus says, the ignorance of first causes, let him at once surrender all the rest of his knowledge; if he is defective in foundation, his reason is aground; disputation and inquiry have no other aim nor stop but principles; if this aim do not stop his career, he runs into an infinite irresolution. Non potest aliud alio magis minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est dejinitio comprehendendi:

“One thing can no more or less be comprehended than another, because the definition of comprehending all things is the same.” Now ‘tis very likely that, if the soul knew any thing, it would in the first place know itself; and if it knew any thing out of itself, it would be its own body and case, before any thing else. If we see the gods of physic to this very day debating about our anatomy,

Mulciber in Trojam, pro Troj stabat Apollo;

“Vulcan against, for Troy Apollo stood;”

¶23

quand attendons nous qu'ils en soyent d'accord? Nous nous sommes plus voisins, que ne nous est la blancheur de la nege, ou la pesanteur de la pierre. Si l'homme ne se cognoist, comment cognoist-il ses functions et ses forces? Il n'est pas à l'aduanture, que quelque notice veritable ne loge chez nous; mais c'est par hazard. Et d'autant que par mesme voye, mesme façon et conduitte, les erreurs se reçoiuent en nostre ame, elle n'a pas dequoy les distinguer, ny dequoy choisir la verité du mensonge. Les Academiciens receuoyent quelque inclination de iugement; et trouuoyent trop crud, de dire qu'il n'estoit pas plus vray-semblable que la nege fust blanche, que noire; et que nous ne fussions non plus asseurez du mouuement d'vne pierre, qui part de nostre main, que de celuy de la huictiesme sphere. Et pour euiter cette difficulté et estrangeté, qui ne peut à la verité loger en nostre imagination, que malaisément; quoy qu'ils establissent que nous n'estions aucunement capables de sçauoir, et que la verité est engoufrée dans des profonds abysmes, où la veuë humaine ne peut penetrer: si aduouoyent ils, les vnes choses plus vray-semblables que les autres; et receuoyent en leur iugement cette faculté, de se pouuoir incliner plustost à vne apparence, qu'à vne autre. Ils luy permettoyent cette propension, luy deffendant toute resolution. L'aduis des Pyrrhoniens est plus hardy, et quant et quant plus vray-semblable. Car cette inclination Academique, et cette propension à vne proposition plustost qu'à vne autre, qu'est-ce autre chose que la recognoissance de quelque plus apparente verité, en cette-cy qu'en celle-là? Si nostre entendement est capable de la forme, des lineamens, du port, et du visage, de la verité, il la verroit entiere, aussi bien que demie, naissante, et imperfaicte. Cette apparence de verisimilitude, qui les fait prendre plustost à gauche qu'à droite, augmentez la; cette once de verisimilitude, qui incline la balance, multipliez la de cent, de mille onces; il en aduiendra en fin, que la balance prendra party tout à faict, et arrestera vn chois et vne verité entiere. Mais comment se laissent ils plier à la vray-semblance, s'ils ne cognoissent le vray? Comment cognoissent ils la semblance de ce, dequoy ils ne cognoissent pas l'essence? Ou nous pouuons iuger tout à faict, ou tout à faict nous ne le pouuons pas. Si noz facultez intellectuelles et sensibles, sont sans fondement et sans pied, si elles ne font que flotter et vanter, pour neant laissons nous emporter nostre iugement à aucune partie de leur operation, quelque apparence qu'elle semble nous presenter. Et la plus seure assiette de nostre entendement, et la plus heureuse, ce seroit celle-là, où il se maintiendroit rassis, droit, inflexible, sans bransle et sans agitation. Inter visa vera, aut falsa, ad animi assensum, nihil interest. forme et en leur essence, et n'y facent leur entrée de leur force propre et authorité, nous le voyons assez. Par ce que s'il estoit ainsi, nous les receurions de mesme façon: le vin seroit tel en la bouche du malade, qu'en la bouche du sain. Celuy qui a des creuasses aux doigts, ou qui les a gourdz, trouueroit vne pareille durté au bois ou au fer, qu'il manie, que fait vn autre. Les subjets estrangers se rendent donc à nostre mercy, ils logent chez nous, comme il nous plaist. Or si de nostre part nous receuions quelque chose sans alteration, si les prises humaines estoient assez capables et fermes, pour saisir la verité par noz propres moyens, ces moyens estans communs à tous les hommes, cette verité se reiecteroit de main en main de l'vn à l'autre. Et au moins se trouueroit-il vne chose au monde, de tant qu'il y en a, qui se croiroit par les hommes d'vn consentement vniuersel. Mais ce, qu'il ne se void aucune proposition, qui ne soit debattue et controuersée entre nous, ou qui ne le puisse estre, montre bien que nostre iugement naturel ne saisit pas bien clairement ce qu'il saisit: car mon iugement ne le peut faire receuoir au iugement de mon compagnon: qui est signe qui ie l'ay saisi par quelque autre moyen, que par vne naturelle puissance, qui soit en moy et en tous les hommes.

Laissons à part cette infinie confusion d'opinions, qui se void entre les philosophes mesmes, et ce debat perpetuel et vniuersel en la cognoissance des choses. Car cela est presupposé tres-veritablement, que d'aucune chose les hommes, ie dy les sçauans, les mieux nais, les plus suffisans, ne sont d'accord: non pas que le ciel soit sur nostre teste: car ceux qui doubtent de tout, doubtent aussi de cela: et ceux qui nient que nous puissions comprendre aucune chose, disent que nous n'auons pas compris que le ciel soit sur nostre teste: et ces deux opinions sont, en nombre, sans comparaison les plus fortes. Outre cette diuersité et diuision infinie, par le trouble que nostre iugement nous donne à nous mesmes, et l'incertitude que chacun sent en soy, il est aysé à voir qu'il a son assiette bien mal asseurée. Combien diuersement iugeons nous des choses? combien de fois changeons nous noz fantasies? Ce que ie tiens auiourd'huy, et ce que ie croy, ie le tiens, et le croy de toute ma croyance: tous mes vtils et tous mes ressorts empoignent cette opinion, et m'en respondent, sur tout ce qu'ils peuuent: ie ne sçaurois embrasser aucune verité ny conseruer auec plus d'asseurance, que ie fay cette-cy. I'y suis tout entier; i'y suis voyrement: mais ne m'est-il pas aduenu non vne fois, mais cent, mais mille, et tous les iours, d'auoir embrassé quelque autre chose à tout ces mesmes instrumens, en cette mesme condition, que depuis i'ay iugée fauce? Au moins faut-il deuenir sage à ses propres despens. Si ie me suis trouué souuent trahy soubs cette couleur, si ma touche se trouue ordinairement faulce, et ma balance inegale et iniuste, quelle asseurance en puis-ie prendre à cette fois, plus qu'aux autres? N'est-ce pas sottise, de me laisser tant de fois pipper à vn guide? Toutesfois, que la Fortune nous remue cinq cens fois de place, qu'elle ne face que vuyder et remplir sans cesse, comme dans vn vaisseau, dans nostre croyance, autres et autres opinions, tousiours la presente et la derniere c'est la certaine, et l'infaillible. Pour cette-cy, il faut abandonner les biens, l'honneur, la vie, et le salut, et tout,

Posterior res illa reperta,Perdit, et immutat sensus ad pristina quæque.

when are we to expect that they will be agreed? We are nearer neighbours to ourselves than whiteness to snow, or weight to stones. If man do not know himself, how should he know his force and functions? It is not, perhaps, that we have not some real knowledge in us; but ‘tis by chance; forasmuch as errors are received into our soul by the same way, after the same manner, and by the same conduct, it has not wherewithal to distinguish them, nor wherewithal to choose the truth from falsehood.

The Academics admitted a certain partiality of judgment, and thought it too crude to say that it was not more likely to say that snow was white than black; and that we were no more assured of the motion of a stone, thrown by the hand, than of that of the eighth sphere. And to avoid this difficulty and strangeness, that can in truth hardly lodge in our imagination, though they concluded that we were in no sort capable of knowledge, and that truth is engulfed in so profound an abyss as is not to be penetrated by human sight; yet they acknowledged some things to be more likely than others, and received into their judgment this faculty, that they had a power to incline to one appearance more than another, they allowed him this propension, interdicting all resolution. The Pyrrhonian opinion is more bold, and also somewhat more likely; for this academic inclination, and this propension to one proposition rather than another, what is it other than a recognition of some more apparent truth in this than in that? If our understanding be capable of the form, lineaments, port, and face of truth, it might as well see it entire as by halves, springing and imperfect This appearance of likelihood, which makes them rather take the left hand than the right, augments it; multiply this ounce of verisimilitude that turns the scales to a hundred, to a thousand, ounces; it will happen in the end that the balance will itself end the controversy, and determine one choice, one entire truth. But why do they suffer themselves to incline to and be swayed by verisimilitude, if they know not the truth? How should they know the similitude of that whereof they do not know the essence? Either we can absolutely judge, or absolutely we cannot If our intellectual and sensible faculties are without foot or foundation, if they only pull and drive, ‘tis to no purpose that we suffer our judgments to be carried away with any part of their operation, what appearance soever they may seem to present us; and the surest and most happy seat of our understanding would be that where it kept itself temperate, upright, and inflexible, without tottering, or without agitation: Inter visa, vera aut falsa, ad animi assensum, nihil interest: “Amongst things that seem, whether true or false, it signifies nothing to the assent of the mind.” That things do not lodge in us in their form and essence, and do not there make their entry by their own force and authority, we sufficiently see; because, if it were so, we should receive them after the same manner; wine would have the same relish with the sick as with the healthful; he who has his finger chapt or benumbed would find the same hardness in wood or iron that he handles that another does; foreign subjects then surrender themselves to our mercy, and are seated in us as we please. Now if on our part we received any thing without alteration, if human grasp were capable and strong enough to seize on truth by our own means, these means being common to all men, this truth would be conveyed from hand to hand, from one to another; and at least there would be some one thing to be found in the world, amongst so many as there are, that would be believed by men with an universal consent; but this, that there is no one proposition that is not debated and controverted amongst us, or that may not be, makes it very manifest that our natural judgment does not very clearly discern what it embraces; for my judgment cannot make my companions approve of what it approves; which is a sign that I seized it by some other means than by a natural power that is in me and in all other men.

Let us lay aside this infinite confusion of opinions, which we see even amongst the philosophers themselves, and this perpetual and universal dispute about the knowledge of things; for this is truly presupposed, that men, I mean the most knowing, the best bom, and of the best parts, are not agreed about any one thing, not that heaven is over our heads; for they that doubt of every thing, do also doubt of that; and they who deny that we are able to comprehend any thing, say that we have not comprehended that the heaven is over our heads, and these two opinions are, without comparison, the stronger in number.

Besides this infinite diversity and division, through the trouble that our judgment gives ourselves, and the incertainty that every one is sensible of in himself, ‘tis easy to perceive that its seat is very unstable and insecure. How variously do we judge of things?—How often do we alter our opinions? What I hold and believe to-day I hold and believe with my whole belief; all my instruments and engines seize and take hold of this opinion, and become responsible to me for it, at least as much as in them lies; I could not embrace nor conserve any truth with greater confidence and assurance than I do this; I am wholly and entirely possessed with it; but has it not befallen me, not only once, but a hundred, a thousand times, every day, to have embraced some other thing with all the same instruments, and in the same condition, which I have since judged to be false? A man must at least become wise at his own expense; if I have often found myself betrayed under this colour; if my touch proves commonly false, and my balance unequal and unjust, what assurance can I now have more than at other times? Is it not stupidity and madness to suffer myself to be so often deceived by my guide? Nevertheless, let fortune remove and shift us five hundred times from place to place, let her do nothing but incessantly empty and fill into our belief, as into a vessel, other and other opinions; yet still the present and the last is the certain and infallible one; for this we must abandon goods, honour, life, health, and all.

Posterior.... res ilia repertaPerdit, et immutat sensus ad pristina qnqne.

“The last things we find out are always best,And make us to disrelish all the rest.”

Montaigne, Michel de. Essays (Selection). Translated by Charles Cotton. 1877. The Trove. https://adagraves.com/trove/montaigne-essays/book-2-12-5/.

French text 1595; Cotton translation 1685–86, Hazlitt revision 1877. Sources