❦ EthicsBaruch Spinoza Part II: On the Nature and Origin of the Mind (Prop. 25 – Prop. 49)

Ethics · Baruch Spinoza

Part II: On the Nature and Origin of the Mind (Prop. 25 – Prop. 49) Pars secunda: De natura et origine mentis

Latin (1677)Elwes (1883)
Prop. 25

PROPOSITIO XXV: Idea cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adæquatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ideam affectionis corporis humani eatenus corporis externi naturam involvere ostendimus (vide propositionem 16 hujus) quatenus externum ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo determinat. At quatenus externum corpus individuum est quod ad corpus humanum non refertur, ejus idea sive cognitio in Deo est (per propositionem 9 hujus) quatenus Deus affectus consideratur alterius rei idea quæ (per propositionem 7 hujus) ipso corpore externo prior est natura. Quare corporis externi adæquata cognitio in Deo non est quatenus ideam affectionis humani corporis habet sive idea affectionis corporis humani adæquatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

Proof.— We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

Prop. 26

PROPOSITIO XXVI: Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit nisi per ideas affectionum sui corporis.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si a corpore aliquo externo corpus humanum nullo modo affectum est, ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus) nec idea corporis humani hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) nec mens humana idea existentiæ illius corporis ullo etiam modo affecta est sive existentiam illius corporis externi ullo modo percipit. At quatenus corpus humanum a corpore aliquo externo aliquo modo afficitur eatenus (per propositionem 16 hujus cum corollario I ejusdem) corpus externum percipit. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Quatenus mens humana corpus externum imaginatur eatenus adæquatam ejus cognitionem non habet.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum mens humana per ideas affectionum sui corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) nec mens alia ratione (per propositionem præcedentem) corpora externa ut actu existentia imaginari potest. Atque adeo (per propositionem 25 hujus) quatenus mens corpora externa imaginatur, eorum adæquatam cognitionem non habet. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body.

Proof.— If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far (II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.

Corollary.— In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Proof.— When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

Prop. 27

PROPOSITIO XXVII: Idea cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adæquatam ipsius humani corporis cognitionem non involvit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quælibet idea cujuscunque affectionis humani corporis eatenus naturam corporis humani involvit quatenus ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo affici consideratur (vide propositionem 16 hujus). At quatenus corpus humanum individuum est quod multis aliis modis affici potest, ejus idea etc. Vide demonstrationem propositionis 25 hujus.

PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.— Every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But, inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c. Q.E.D.

Prop. 28

PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Ideæ affectionum corporis humani quatenus ad humanam mentem tantum referuntur, non sunt claræ et distinctæ sed confusæ.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ideæ enim affectionum corporis humani tam corporum externorum quam ipsius humani corporis naturam involvunt (per propositionem 16 hujus) nec tantum corporis humani sed ejus etiam partium naturam involvere debent; affectiones namque modi sunt (per postulatum 3) quibus partes corporis humani et consequenter totum corpus afficitur. At (per propositiones 24 et 25 hujus) corporum externorum adæquata cognitio ut et partium corpus humanum componentium in Deo non est quatenus humana mente sed quatenus aliis ideis affectus consideratur. Sunt ergo hæ affectionum ideæ quatenus ad solam humanam mentem referuntur, veluti consequentiæ absque præmissis hoc est (ut per se notum) ideæ confusæ. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Idea quæ naturam mentis humanæ constituit, demonstratur eodem modo non esse, in se sola considerata, clara et distincta, ut etiam idea mentis humanæ et ideæ idearum affectionum corporis humani quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, quod unusquisque facile videre potest.

PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Proof.— The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies (II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes (Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.

Note.— The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

Prop. 29

PROPOSITIO XXIX: Idea ideæ cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adæquatam humanæ mentis cognitionem non involvit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea enim affectionis corporis humani (per propositionem 27 hujus) adæquatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit sive ejus naturam adæquate non exprimit hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) cum natura mentis non convenit adæquate adeoque (per axioma 6 partis I) hujus ideæ idea adæquate humanæ mentis naturam non exprimit sive adæquatam ejus cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam quoties ex communi naturæ ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adæquatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem. Nam mens se ipsam non cognoscit nisi quatenus ideas affectionum corporis percipit (per propositionem 23 hujus). Corpus autem suum (per propositionem 19 hujus) non percipit nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas per quas etiam tantum (per propositionem 26 hujus) corpora externa percipit atque adeo quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (per propositionem 29 hujus) nec sui corporis (per propositionem 27 hujus) nec corporum externorum (per propositionem 25 hujus) habet adæquatam cognitionem sed tantum (per propositionem 28 hujus cum ejus scholio) mutilatam et confusam. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Dico expresse quod mens nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adæquatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam cognitionem habeat quoties ex communi naturæ ordine res percipit hoc est quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum; quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Proof.— The idea of a modification of the human body (II. xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is (II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

Corollary.— Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II. xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note). Q.E.D.

Note.— I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

Prop. 30

PROPOSITIO XXX: Nos de duratione nostri corporis nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nostri corporis duratio ab ejus essentia non dependet (per axioma 1 hujus) nec etiam ab absoluta Dei natura (per propositionem 21 partis I). Sed (per propositionem 28 partis I) ad existendum et operandum determinatur a talibus causis quæ etiam ab aliis determinatæ sunt ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et hæ iterum ab aliis et sic in infinitum. Nostri igitur corporis duratio a communi naturæ ordine et rerum constitutione pendet. Qua autem ratione constitutæ sint, ejus rei adæquata cognitio datur in Deo quatenus earum omnium ideas et non quatenus tantum humani corporis ideam habet (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus); quare cognitio durationis nostri corporis est in Deo admodum inadæquata quatenus tantum naturam mentis humanæ constituere consideratur hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) hæc cognitio est in nostra mente admodum inadæquata. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

Proof.— The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I. xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.) Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.

Prop. 31

PROPOSITIO XXXI: Nos de duratione rerum singularium quæ extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.

DEMONSTRATIO: Unaquæque enim res singularis sicuti humanum corpus ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum (per propositionem 28 partis I). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in præcedenti propositione demonstraverimus nos de duratione nostri corporis non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere, ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum quod scilicet ejus non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adæquatam cognitionem habere possumus (per propositionem præcedentem) et hoc est id quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum (vide scholium I propositionis 33 partis I). Nam (per propositionem 29 partis I) præter hoc nullum datur contingens.

PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves.

Proof.— Every particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I. xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

Corollary.— Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I. xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing is contingent.

Prop. 32

PROPOSITIO XXXII: Omnes ideæ quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes enim ideæ quæ in Deo sunt, cum suis ideatis omnino conveniunt (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) adeoque (per axioma 6 partis I) omnes veræ sunt. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.

Proof.— All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are all true. Q.E.D.

Prop. 33

PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Nihil in ideis positivum est propter quod falsæ dicuntur.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, modum positivum cogitandi qui formam erroris sive falsitatis constituat. Hic cogitandi modus non potest esse in Deo (per propositionem præcedentem); extra Deum autem etiam nec esse nec concipi potest (per propositionem 15 partis I). Atque adeo nihil potest dari positivum in ideis propter quod falsæ dicuntur. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false.

Proof.— If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Q.E.D.

Prop. 34

PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Omnis idea quæ in nobis est absoluta sive adæquata et perfecta, vera est.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum dicimus dari in nobis ideam adæquatam et perfectam, nihil aliud dicimus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) quam quod in Deo quatenus nostræ mentis essentiam constituit, detur idea adæquata et perfecta et consequenter (per propositionem 32 hujus) nihil aliud dicimus quam quod talis idea sit vera. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true.

Proof.— When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such an idea is true. Q.E.D.

Prop. 35

PROPOSITIO XXXV: Falsitas consistit in cognitionis privatione quam ideæ inadæquatæ sive mutilatæ et confusæ involvunt.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nihil in ideis positivum datur quod falsitatis formam constituat (per propositionem 33 hujus); at falsitas in absoluta privatione consistere nequit (mentes enim, non corpora errare nec falli dicuntur) neque etiam in absoluta ignorantia; diversa enim sunt ignorare et errare; quare in cognitionis privatione quam rerum inadæquata cognitio sive ideæ inadæquatæ et confusæ involvunt, consistit. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: In scholio propositionis 17 hujus partis explicui qua ratione error in cognitionis privatione consistit sed ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum dabo nempe falluntur homines quod se liberos esse putant, quæ opinio in hoc solo consistit quod suarum actionum sint conscii et ignari causarum a quibus determinantur. Hæc ergo est eorum libertatis idea quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam. Nam quod aiunt humanas actiones a voluntate pendere, verba sunt quorum nullam habent ideam. Quid enim voluntas sit et quomodo moveat corpus, ignorant omnes; qui aliud jactant et animæ sedes et habitacula fingunt, vel risum vel nauseam movere solent. Sic cum solem intuemur, eum ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur, qui error in hac sola imaginatione non consistit sed in eo quod dum ipsum sic imaginamur, veram ejus distantiam et hujus imaginationis causam ignoramus. Nam tametsi postea cognoscamus eundem ultra 600 terræ diametros a nobis distare, ipsum nihilominus prope adesse imaginabimur; non enim solem adeo propinquum imaginamur propterea quod veram ejus distantiam ignoramus sed propterea quod affectio nostri corporis essentiam solis involvit quatenus ipsum corpus ab eodem afficitur.

PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

Proof.— There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.

Note.— In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.

Prop. 36

PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Ideæ inadæquatæ et confusæ eadem necessitate consequuntur ac adæquatæ sive claræ ac distinctæ ideæ.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ideæ omnes in Deo sunt (per propositionem 15 partis I) et quatenus ad Deum referuntur, sunt veræ (per propositionem 32 hujus) et (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) adæquatæ adeoque nullæ inadæquatæ nec confusæ sunt nisi quatenus ad singularem alicujus mentem referuntur (qua de re vide propositiones 24 et 28 hujus) adeoque omnes tam adæquatæ quam inadæquatæ eadem necessitate (per corollarium propositionis 6 hujus) consequuntur. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

Proof.— All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.) adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.

Prop. 37

PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Id quod omnibus commune (de his vide supra lemma 2) quodque æque in parte ac in toto est, nullius rei singularis essentiam constituit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, id essentiam alicujus rei singularis constituere nempe essentiam B. Ergo (per definitionem 2 hujus) id sine B non poterit esse neque concipi; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin: ergo id ad essentiam B non pertinet nec alterius rei singularis essentiam constituit. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II., above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.

Proof.— If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance, the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.

Prop. 38

PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Illa quæ omnibus communia quæque æque in parte ac in toto sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adæquate.

DEMONSTRATIO: Sit A aliquid quod omnibus corporibus commune quodque æque in parte cujuscunque corporis ac in toto est. Dico A non posse concipi nisi adæquate. Nam ejus idea (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) erit necessario in Deo adæquata tam quatenus ideam corporis humani quam quatenus ideas habet ejusdem affectionum quæ (per propositiones 16, 25 et 27 hujus) tam corporis humani quam corporum externorum naturam ex parte involvunt hoc est (per propositiones 12 et 13 hujus) hæc idea erit necessario in Deo adæquata quatenus mentem humanam constituit sive quatenus ideas habet quæ in mente humana sunt; mens igitur (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) A necessario adæquate percipit idque tam quatenus se quam quatenus suum vel quodcunque externum corpus percipit nec A alio modo potest concipi. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur dari quasdam ideas sive notiones omnibus hominibus communes. Nam (per lemma 2) omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quæ (per propositionem præcedentem) ab omnibus debent adæquate sive clare et distincte percipi.

PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.

Proof.— Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Q.E.D.

Corollary— Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

Prop. 39

PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis a quibus corpus humanum affici solet, commune est et proprium quodque in cujuscunque horum parte æque ac in toto est, ejus etiam idea erit in mente adæquata.

DEMONSTRATIO: Sit A id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis commune est et proprium quodque æque in humano corpore ac in iisdem corporibus externis et quod denique æque in cujuscunque corporis externi parte ac in toto est. Ipsius A dabitur in Deo idea adæquata (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) tam quatenus ideam corporis humani quam quatenus positorum corporum externorum ideas habet. Ponatur jam humanum corpus a corpore externo affici per id quod cum eo habet commune hoc est ab A; hujus affectionis idea proprietatem A involvet (per propositionem 16 hujus) atque adeo (per idem corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) idea hujus affectionis quatenus proprietatem A involvit, erit in Deo adæquata quatenus idea corporis humani affectus est hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) quatenus mentis humanæ naturam constituit adeoque (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) hæc idea est etiam in mente humana adæquata. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod mens eo aptior est ad plura adæquate percipiendum quo ejus corpus plura habet cum aliis corporibus communia.

PROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

Proof.— If A be that, which is common to and a property of the human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is affected by an external body through that, which it has in common therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi. Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.

Corollary.— Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies.

Prop. 40

PROPOSITIO XL: Quæcunque ideæ in mente sequuntur ex ideis quæ in ipsa sunt adæquatæ, sunt etiam adæquatæ.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam cum dicimus in mente humana ideam sequi ex ideis quæ in ipsa sunt adæquatæ, nihil aliud dicimus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) quam quod in ipso divino intellectu detur idea cujus Deus est causa, non quatenus infinitus est nec quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus est sed quatenus tantum humanæ mentis essentiam constituit.

SCHOLIUM I: His causam notionum quæ communes vocantur quæque ratiocinii nostri fundamenta sunt, explicui. Sed aliæ quorundam axiomatum sive notionum causæ dantur quas hac nostra methodo explicare e re foret; ex iis namque constaret quænam notiones præ reliquis utiliores, quænam vero vix ullius usus essent. Deinde quænam communes et quænam iis tantum qui præjudiciis non laborant, claræ et distinctæ et quænam denique male fundatæ sint. Præterea constaret unde notiones illæ quas secundas vocant et consequenter axiomata quæ in iisdem fundantur suam duxerunt originem et alia quæ circa hæc aliquando meditatus sum. Sed quoniam hæc alii dicavi tractatui et etiam ne propter nimiam hujus rei prolixitatem fastidium crearem, hac re hic supersedere decrevi. Attamen ne quid horum omittam quod scitu necessarium sit, causas breviter addam ex quibus termini transcendentales dicti suam duxerunt originem ut Ens, Res, Aliquid. Hi termini ex hoc oriuntur quod scilicet humanum corpus quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri (quid imago sit explicui in scholio propositionis 17 hujus) in se distincte simul formandi, qui si excedatur, hæ imagines confundi incipient et si hic imaginum numerus quarum corpus est capax ut eas in se simul distincte formet, longe excedatur, omnes inter se plane confundentur. Cum hoc ita se habeat, patet ex corollario propositionis 17 et propositione 18 hujus quod mens humana tot corpora distincte simul imaginari poterit quot in ipsius corpore imagines possunt simul formari. At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet nempe sub attributo entis, rei etc. Potest hoc etiam ex eo deduci quod imagines non semper æque vigeant et ex aliis causis his analogis quas hic explicare non est opus nam ad nostrum ad quem collimamus scopum, unam tantum sufficit considerare. Nam omnes huc redeunt quod hi termini ideas significent summo gradu confusas. Ex similibus deinde causis ortæ sunt notiones illæ quas universales vocant ut Homo, Equus, Canis etc. videlicet quia in corpore humano tot imagines exempli gratia hominum formantur simul ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus sed eo usque tamen superent ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscujusque colorem, magnitudinem etc.) eorumque determinatum numerum mens imaginari nequeat et id tantum in quo omnes quatenus corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur nam ab eo corpus maxime scilicet ab unoquoque singulari affectum fuit atque hoc nomine hominis exprimit hocque de infinitis singularibus prædicat. Nam singularium determinatum numerum ut diximus imaginari nequit. Sed notandum has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei a qua corpus affectum sæpius fuit quamque facilius mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Exempli gratia qui sæpius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine hominis intelligent animal erectæ staturæ; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt nempe hominem esse animal risibile, animal bipes sine plumis, animal rationale et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit. Quare non mirum est quod inter philosophos qui res naturales per solas rerum imagines explicare voluerunt, tot sint ortæ controversiæ.

SCHOLIUM II: Ex omnibus supra dictis clare apparet nos multa percipere et notiones universales formare I° ex singularibus nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum repræsentatis (vide corollarium propositionis 29 hujus) et ideo tales perceptiones cognitionem ab experientia vaga vocare consuevi. II° ex signis exempli gratia ex eo quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis per quas res imaginamur (vide scholium propositionis 18 hujus). Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum cognitionem primi generis, opinionem vel imaginationem in posterum vocabo. III° denique ex eo quod notiones communes rerumque proprietatum ideas adæquatas habemus (vide corollarium propositionis 38 et propositionem 39 cum ejus corollario et propositionem 40 hujus) atque hunc rationem et secundi generis cognitionem vocabo. Præter hæc duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium quod scientiam intuitivam vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adæquata idea essentiæ formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adæquatam cognitionem essentiæ rerum. Hæc omnia unius rei exemplo explicabo. Dantur exempli gratia tres numeri ad quartum obtinendum qui sit ad tertium ut secundus ad primum. Non dubitant mercatores secundum in tertium ducere et productum per primum dividere quia scilicet ea quæ a magistro absque ulla demonstratione audiverunt, nondum tradiderunt oblivioni vel quia id sæpe in numeris simplicissimis experti sunt vel ex vi demonstrationis propositionis 19 libri 7 Euclidis nempe ex communi proprietate proportionalium. At in numeris simplicissimis nihil horum opus est. Exempli gratia datis numeris 1, 2, 3, nemo non videt quartum numerum proportionalem esse 6 atque hoc multo clarius quia ex ipsa ratione quam primum ad secundum habere uno intuitu videmus, ipsum quartum concludimus.

PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

Proof.— This proposition is self-evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Note I.— I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note II.— From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:—(1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.4

(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.

Prop. 41

PROPOSITIO XLI: Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ad primi generis cognitionem illas omnes ideas diximus in præcedenti scholio pertinere quæ sunt inadæquatæ et confusæ atque adeo (per propositionem 35 hujus) hæc cognitio unica est falsitatis causa. Deinde ad cognitionem secundi et tertii illas pertinere diximus quæ sunt adæquatæ adeoque (per propositionem 34 hujus) est necessario vera. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Proof.— To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II. xxxiv.). Q.E.D.

Prop. 42

PROPOSITIO XLII: Secundi et tertii et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio per se patet. Qui enim inter verum et falsum scit distinguere, debet adæquatam veri et falsi habere ideam hoc est (per II scholium propositionis 40 hujus) verum et falsum secundo aut tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.

PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

Proof.— This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

Prop. 43

PROPOSITIO XLIII: Qui veram habet ideam, simul scit se veram habere ideam nec de rei veritate potest dubitare.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea vera in nobis est illa quæ in Deo quatenus per naturam mentis humanæ explicatur, est adæquata (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus). Ponamus itaque dari in Deo quatenus per naturam mentis humanæ explicatur, ideam adæquatam A. Hujus ideæ debet necessario dari etiam in Deo idea quæ ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac idea A (per propositionem 20 hujus cujus demonstratio universalis est). At idea A ad Deum referri supponitur quatenus per naturam mentis humanæ explicatur; ergo etiam idea ideæ A ad Deum eodem modo debet referri hoc est (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) hæc adæquata idea ideæ A erit in ipsa mente quæ ideam adæquatam A habet adeoque qui adæquatam habet ideam sive (per propositionem 34 hujus) qui vere rem cognoscit, debet simul suæ cognitionis adæquatam habere ideam sive veram cognitionem hoc est (ut per se manifestum) debet simul esse certus. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: In scholio propositionis 21 hujus partis explicui quid sit idea ideæ sed notandum præcedentem propositionem per se satis esse manifestam. Nam nemo qui veram habet ideam, ignorat veram ideam summam certitudinem involvere; veram namque habere ideam nihil aliud significat quam perfecte sive optime rem cognoscere nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest nisi putet ideam quid mutum instar picturæ in tabula et non modum cogitandi esse nempe ipsum intelligere et quæso quis scire potest se rem aliquam intelligere nisi prius rem intelligat? hoc est quis potest scire se de aliqua re certum esse nisi prius de ea re certus sit? Deinde quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest quod norma sit veritatis? Sane sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est. Atque his me ad has quæstiones respondisse puto nempe si idea vera quatenus tantum dicitur cum suo ideato convenire, a falsa distinguitur, nihil ergo realitatis aut perfectionis idea vera habet præ falsa (quandoquidem per solam denominationem extrinsecam distinguuntur) et consequenter neque etiam homo qui veras præ illo qui falsas tantum ideas habet? Deinde unde fit ut homines falsas habeant ideas? Et denique unde aliquis certo scire potest se ideas habere quæ cum suis ideatis conveniant? Ad has inquam quæstiones me jam respondisse puto. Nam quod ad differentiam inter ideam veram et falsam attinet, constat ex propositione 35 hujus illam ad hanc sese habere ut ens ad non-ens. Falsitatis autem causas a propositione 19 usque ad 35 cum ejus scholio clarissime ostendi. Ex quibus etiam apparet quid homo qui veras habet ideas, homini qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit. Quod denique ultimum attinet nempe undenam homo scire potest se habere ideam quæ cum suo ideato conveniat, id modo satis superque ostendi ex hoc solo oriri quod ideam habet quæ cum suo ideato convenit sive quod veritas sui sit norma. His adde quod mens nostra quatenus res vere percipit, pars est infiniti Dei intellectus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) adeoque tam necesse est ut mentis claræ et distinctæ ideæ veræ sint ac Dei ideæ.

PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.

Proof.— A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind (II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx., whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.

Note.— I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking—namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions—namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question—as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object—in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.

Prop. 44

PROPOSITIO XLIV: De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes sed ut necessarias contemplari.

DEMONSTRATIO: De natura rationis est res vere percipere (per propositionem 41 hujus) nempe (per axioma 6 partis I) ut in se sunt hoc est (per propositionem 29 partis I) non ut contingentes sed ut necessarias. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur a sola imaginatione pendere quod res tam respectu præteriti quam futuri ut contingentes contemplemur.

SCHOLIUM: Qua autem ratione hoc fiat paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (propositione 17 hujus cum ejus corollario) mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi præsentes imaginari nisi causæ occurrant quæ earum præsentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (propositione 18 hujus) ostendimus quod si corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur hoc est ambo ut sibi præsentia contemplabitur nisi causæ occurrant quæ eorum præsentem existentiam secludant. Præterea nemo dubitat quin etiam tempus imaginemur nempe ex eo quod corpora alia aliis tardius vel celerius vel æque celeriter moveri imaginemur. Ponamus itaque puerum qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum et vespertina Simeonem atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum. Ex propositione 18 hujus patet quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem cæli quam die præcedenti viderit partem percurrentem sive diem integrum et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur hoc est Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur et contra si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus præteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore præterito imaginando atque hæc eo constantius quo sæpius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit. Quod si aliquando contingat ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Jacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino jam Simeonem jam Jacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur. Fluctuabitur itaque ejus imaginatio et cum futuro tempore vespertino jam hunc jam illum imaginabitur hoc est neutrum certo sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque hæc imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit si imaginatio rerum sit quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus præteritum vel præsens contemplamur et consequenter res tam ad tempus præsens quam ad præteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.

COROLLARIUM II: De natura rationis est res sub quadam æternitatis specie percipere.

DEMONSTRATIO: De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut contingentes contemplari (per propositionem præcedentem). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (per propositionem 41 hujus) vere hoc est (per axioma 6 partis I) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per propositionem 16 partis I) hæc rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei æternæ naturæ necessitas; ergo de natura rationis est res sub hac æternitatis specie contemplari. Adde quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per propositionem 38 hujus) quæ illa explicant quæ omnibus communia sunt quæque (per propositionem 37 hujus) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant quæque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione sed sub quadam æternitatis specie debent concipi. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.

Proof.— It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves—that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.— Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent.

Note.— How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other—that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon—that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other—that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.

Corollary II.— It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie).

Proof.— It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly—that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.

Prop. 45

PROPOSITIO XLV: Unaquæque cujuscunque corporis vel rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea rei singularis actu existentis ipsius rei tam essentiam quam existentiam necessario involvit (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus). At res singulares (per propositionem 15 partis I) non possunt sine Deo concipi sed quia (per propositionem 6 hujus) Deum pro causa habent quatenus sub attributo consideratur cujus res ipsæ modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideæ (per axioma 4 partis I) ipsarum attributi conceptum hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis I) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem hoc est existentiam quatenus abstracte concipitur et tanquam quædam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existentiæ quæ rebus singularibus tribuitur propterea quod ex æterna necessitate Dei naturæ infinita infinitis modis sequuntur (vide propositionem 16 partis I). Loquor inquam de ipsa existentia rerum singularium quatenus in Deo sunt. Nam etsi unaquæque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum, vis tamen qua unaquæque in existendo perseverat, ex æterna necessitate naturæ Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide corollarium propositionis 24 partis I.

PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.— The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the attributes of those ideas—that is (I. vi.), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Note.— By existence I do not here mean duration—that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).

Prop. 46

PROPOSITIO XLVI: Cognitio æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei quam unaquæque idea involvit, est adæquata et perfecta.

DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratio præcedentis propositionis universalis est et sive res ut pars sive ut totum consideretur, ejus idea sive totius sit sive partis (per propositionem præcedentem) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id quod cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei dat, omnibus commune et æque in parte ac in toto est adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus) erit hæc cognitio adæquata. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

Proof.— The proof of the last proposition is universal; and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.), will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.

Prop. 47

PROPOSITIO XLVII: Mens humana adæquatam habet cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens humana ideas habet (per propositionem 22 hujus) ex quibus (per propositionem 23 hujus) se suumque corpus (per propositionem 19 hujus) et (per corollarium I propositionis 16 et per propositionem 17 hujus) corpora externa ut actu existentia percipit adeoque (per propositiones 45 et 46 hujus) cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei habet adæquatam. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc videmus Dei infinitam essentiam ejusque æternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere quæ adæquate cognoscamus atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare de quo diximus in scholio II propositionis 40 hujus partis et de cujus præstantia et utilitate in quinta parte erit nobis dicendi locus. Quod autem homines non æque claram Dei ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora et quod nomen "Deus" junxerunt imaginibus rerum quas videre solent; quod homines vix vitare possunt quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait lineas quæ ex centro circuli ad ejusdem circumferentiam ducuntur esse inæquales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit quam mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare quem nuper audivi clamantem suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur. Atque hinc pleræque oriuntur controversiæ nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant ita ut quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.

PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.— The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II. xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Note.— Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents.

Prop. 48

PROPOSITIO XLVIII: In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per propositionem 11 hujus) adeoque (per corollarium II propositionis 17 partis I) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per propositionem 28 partis I) determinari debet a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc. Unde sequitur has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias vel nihil esse præter entia metaphysica vel universalia quæ ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem cur homines se liberos esse putent explicuimus in appendice partis primæ. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem inquam intelligo qua mens quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat et non cupiditatem qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. At postquam demonstravimus has facultates notiones esse universales quæ a singularibus ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est an ipsæ volitiones aliquid sint præter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum inquam est an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem propositionem ut et demonstrationem 3 hujus ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.

PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.

Proof.— The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II. xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I. xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.— In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.

Prop. 49

PROPOSITIO XLIX: In mente nulla datur volitio sive affirmatio et negatio præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit.

DEMONSTRATIO: In mente (per propositionem præcedentem) nulla datur absoluta facultas volendi et nolendi sed tantum singulares volitiones nempe hæc et illa affirmatio et hæc et illa negatio. Concipiamus itaque singularem aliquam volitionem nempe modum cogitandi quo mens affirmat tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis. Hæc affirmatio conceptum sive ideam trianguli involvit hoc est sine idea trianguli non potest concipi. Idem enim est si dicam quod A conceptum B debeat involvere ac quod A sine B non possit concipi. Deinde hæc affirmatio (per axioma 3 hujus) non potest etiam sine idea trianguli esse. Hæc ergo affirmatio sine idea trianguli nec esse nec concipi potest. Porro hæc trianguli idea hanc eandem affirmationem involvere debet nempe quod tres ejus anguli æquentur duobus rectis. Quare et vice versa hæc trianguli idea sine hac affirmatione nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque (per definitionem 2 hujus) hæc affirmatio ad essentiam ideæ trianguli pertinet nec aliud præter ipsam est. Et quod de hac volitione diximus (quandoquidem eam ad libitum sumpsimus) dicendum etiam est de quacunque volitione nempe quod præter ideam nihil sit. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.

DEMONSTRATIO: Voluntas et intellectus nihil præter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt (per propositionem 48 hujus et ejusdem scholium). At singularis volitio et idea (per propositionem præcedentem) unum et idem sunt, ergo voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: His causam quæ communiter erroris esse statuitur, sustulimus. Supra autem ostendimus falsitatem in sola privatione quam ideæ mutilatæ et confusæ involvunt, consistere. Quare idea falsa quatenus falsa est, certitudinem non involvit. Cum itaque dicimus hominem in falsis acquiescere nec de iis dubitare, non ideo ipsum certum esse sed tantum non dubitare dicimus vel quod in falsis acquiescit quia nullæ causæ dantur quæ efficiant ut ipsius imaginatio fluctuetur. Qua de re vide scholium propositionis 44 hujus partis. Quantumvis igitur homo falsis adhærere supponatur, nunquam tamen ipsum certum esse dicemus. Nam per certitudinem quid positivum intelligimus (vide propositionem 43 hujus cum ejusdem scholio) non vero dubitationis privationem. At per certitudinis privationem falsitatem intelligimus. Sed ad uberiorem explicationem præcedentis propositionis quædam monenda supersunt. Superest deinde ut ad objectiones quæ in nostram hanc doctrinam objici possunt, respondeam et denique ut omnem amoveam scrupulum, operæ pretium esse duxi hujus doctrinæ quasdam utilitates indicare. Quasdam inquam nam præcipuæ ex iis quæ in quinta parte dicemus, melius intelligentur.

Incipio igitur a primo lectoresque moneo ut accurate distinguant inter ideam sive mentis conceptum et inter imagines rerum quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est ut distinguant inter ideas et verba quibus res significamus. Nam quia hæc tria, imagines scilicet verba et ideæ, a multis vel plane confunduntur vel non satis accurate vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam scitu prorsus necessariam tam ad speculationem quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam plane ignorarunt. Quippe qui putant ideas consistere in imaginibus quæ in nobis ex corporum occursu formantur, sibi persuadent ideas illas rerum quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas sed tantum figmenta quæ ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas aspiciunt et hoc præjudicio præoccupati non vident ideam quatenus idea est, affirmationem aut negationem involvere. Deinde qui verba confundunt cum idea vel cum ipsa affirmatione quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id quod sentiunt velle quando aliquid solis verbis contra id quod sentiunt affirmant aut negant. Hæc autem præjudicia exuere facile is poterit qui ad naturam cogitationis attendit, quæ extensionis conceptum minime involvit atque adeo clare intelliget ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicujus imagine neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt. Atque hæc pauca de his monuisse sufficiat, quare ad prædictas objectiones transeo.

Harum prima est quod constare putant voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum atque adeo ab eodem diversam esse. Ratio autem cur putant voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum est quia se experiri aiunt se non majore assentiendi sive affirmandi et negandi facultate indigere ad infinitis aliis rebus quas non percipimus, assentiendum quam jam habemus, at quidem majore facultate intelligendi. Distinguitur ergo voluntas ab intellectu quod finitus hic sit, illa autem infinita.

Secundo nobis objici potest quod experientia nihil clarius videatur docere quam quod nostrum judicium possumus suspendere ne rebus quas percipimus, assentiamur; quod hinc etiam confirmatur quod nemo dicitur decipi quatenus aliquid percipit sed tantum quatenus assentitur aut dissentitur. Exempli gratia qui equum alatum fingit, non ideo concedit dari equum alatum hoc est non ideo decipitur nisi simul concedat dari equum alatum; nihil igitur clarius videtur docere experientia quam quod voluntas sive facultas assentiendi libera sit et a facultate intelligendi diversa.

Tertio objici potest quod una affirmatio non plus realitatis videtur continere quam alia hoc est non majore potentia indigere videmur ad affirmandum verum esse id quod verum est, quam ad aliquid quod falsum est, verum esse affirmandum; at unam ideam plus realitatis sive perfectionis quam aliam habere percipimus; quantum enim objecta alia aliis præstantiora tantum etiam eorum ideæ aliæ aliis perfectiores sunt; ex quibus etiam constare videtur differentia inter voluntatem et intellectum.

Quarto objici potest si homo non operatur ex libertate voluntatis, quid ergo fiet si in æquilibrio sit ut Buridani asina? Famene et siti peribit? Quod si concedam, viderer asinam vel hominis statuam, non hominem concipere; si autem negem, ergo seipsum determinabit et consequenter eundi facultatem et faciendi quicquid velit, habet. Præter hæc alia forsan possunt objici sed quia inculcare non teneor quid unusquisque somniare potest, ad has objectiones tantum respondere curabo idque quam potero breviter.

Et quidem ad primam dico me concedere voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum si per intellectum claras tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant sed nego voluntatem latius se extendere quam perceptiones sive concipiendi facultatem nec sane video cur facultas volendi potius dicenda est infinita quam sentiendi facultas; sicut enim infinita (unum tamen post aliud nam infinita simul affirmare non possumus) eadem volendi facultate possumus affirmare, sic etiam infinita corpora (unum nempe post aliud) eadem sentiendi facultate possumus sentire sive percipere. Quod si dicant infinita dari quæ percipere non possumus? regero nos ea ipsa nulla cogitatione et consequenter nulla volendi facultate posse assequi. At dicunt si Deus vellet efficere ut ea etiam perciperemus, majorem quidem facultatem percipiendi deberet nobis dare sed non majorem quam dedit volendi facultatem; quod idem est ac si dicerent quod si Deus velit efficere ut infinita alia entia intelligeremus, necesse quidem esset ut nobis daret majorem intellectum sed non universaliorem entis ideam quam dedit ad eadem infinita entia amplectendum. Ostendimus enim voluntatem ens esse universale sive ideam qua omnes singulares volitiones hoc est id quod iis omnibus commune est, explicamus. Cum itaque hanc omnium volitionum communem sive universalem ideam facultatem esse credant, minime mirum si hanc facultatem ultra limites intellectus in infinitum se extendere dicant. Universale enim æque de uno ac de pluribus ac de infinitis individuis dicitur.

Ad secundam objectionem respondeo negando nos liberam habere potestatem judicium suspendendi. Nam cum dicimus aliquem judicium suspendere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod videt se rem non adæquate percipere. Est igitur judicii suspensio revera perceptio et non libera voluntas. Quod ut clare intelligatur, concipiamus puerum equum alatum imaginantem nec aliud quicquam percipientem. Quandoquidem hæc imaginatio equi existentiam involvit (per corollarium propositionis 17 hujus) nec puer quicquam percipit quod equi existentiam tollat, ille necessario equum ut præsentem contemplabitur nec de ejus existentia poterit dubitare quamvis de eadem non sit certus. Atque hoc quotidie in somnis experimur nec credo aliquem esse qui putet se, dum somniat, liberam habere potestatem suspendendi de iis quæ somniat, judicium efficiendique ut ea quæ se videre somniat, non somniet et nihilominus contingit ut etiam in somnis judicium suspendamus nempe cum somniamus nos somniare. Porro concedo neminem decipi quatenus percipit hoc est mentis imaginationes in se consideratas nihil erroris involvere concedo (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) sed nego hominem nihil affirmare quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere quam alas de equo affirmare? Si enim mens præter equum alatum nihil aliud perciperet, eundem sibi præsentem contemplaretur nec causam haberet ullam dubitandi de ejusdem existentia nec ullam dissentiendi facultatem nisi imaginatio equi alati juncta sit ideæ quæ existentiam ejusdem equi tollit vel quod percipit ideam equi alati quam habet esse inadæquatam atque tum vel ejusdem equi existentiam necessario negabit vel de eadem necessario dubitabit.

Atque his puto me ad tertiam etiam objectionem respondisse nempe quod voluntas universale quid sit quod de omnibus ideis prædicatur quodque id tantum significat quod omnibus ideis commune est nempe affirmationem. Cujus propterea adæquata essentia quatenus sic abstracte concipitur, debet esse in unaquaque idea et hac ratione tantum in omnibus eadem sed non quatenus consideratur essentiam ideæ constituere nam eatenus singulares affirmationes æque inter se differunt ac ipsæ ideæ. Exempli gratia affirmatio quam idea circuli ab illa quam idea trianguli involvit æque differt ac idea circuli ab idea trianguli. Deinde absolute nego nos æquali cogitandi potentia indigere ad affirmandum verum esse id quod verum est quam ad affirmandum verum esse id quod falsum est. Nam hæ duæ affirmationes, si mentem spectes, se habent ad invicem ut ens ad non-ens; nihil enim in ideis positivum est quod falsitatis formam constituit (vide propositionem 35 hujus cum ejus scholio et scholium propositionis 47 hujus). Quare hic apprime venit notandum quam facile decipimur quando universalia cum singularibus, et entia rationis et abstracta cum realibus confundimus.

Quod denique ad quartam objectionem attinet, dico me omnino concedere quod homo in tali æquilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum qui æque ab eo distant) fame et siti peribit. Si me rogant an talis homo non potius asinus quam homo sit æstimandus? dico me nescire ut etiam nescio quanti æstimandus sit ille qui se pensilem facit et quanti æstimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani, etc.

Superest tandem indicare quantum hujus doctrinæ cognitio ad usum vitæ conferat, quod facile ex his animadvertemus. Nempe

I° quatenus docet nos ex solo Dei nutu agere divinæque naturæ esse participes et eo magis quo perfectiores actiones agimus et quo magis magisque Deum intelligimus. Hæc ergo doctrina præterquam quod animum omnimode quietum reddit, hoc etiam habet quod nos docet in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitudo consistit nempe in sola Dei cognitione ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur quæ amor et pietas suadent. Unde clare intelligimus quantum illi a vera virtutis æstimatione aberrant qui pro virtute et optimis actionibus tanquam pro summa servitute, summis præmiis a Deo decorari exspectant quasi ipsa virtus Deique servitus non esset ipsa felicitas et summa libertas.

II° Quatenus docet quomodo circa res fortunæ sive quæ in nostra potestate non sunt hoc est circa res quæ ex nostra natura non sequuntur, nos gerere debeamus nempe utramque fortunæ faciem æquo animo exspectare et ferre: nimirum quia omnia ab æterno Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur ac ex essentia trianguli sequitur quod tres ejus anguli sunt æquales duobus rectis.

III° Confert hæc doctrina ad vitam socialem quatenus docet neminem odio habere, contemnere, irridere, nemini irasci, invidere. Præterea quatenus docet ut unusquisque suis sit contentus et proximo auxilio, non ex muliebri misericordia, partialitate neque superstitione sed ex solo rationis ductu prout scilicet tempus et res postulat ut in quarta parte ostendam.

IV° Denique confert etiam hæc doctrina non parum ad communem societatem quatenus docet qua ratione cives gubernandi sint et ducendi nempe non ut serviant sed ut libere ea quæ optima sunt, agant. Atque his quæ in hoc scholio agere constitueram, absolvi et eo finem huic nostræ secundæ parti impono in qua puto me naturam mentis humanæ ejusque proprietates satis prolixe et quantum rei difficultas fert, clare explicuisse atque talia tradidisse ex quibus multa præclara, maxime utilia et cognitu necessaria concludi possunt, ut partim ex sequentibus constabit.

PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves.

Proof.— There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.

Corollary.— Will and understanding are one and the same.

Proof.— Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are one and the same. Q.E.D.

Note.— We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby we signify things. These three—namely, images, words, and ideas—are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought.

These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions—in other words, that which is common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends—that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II. xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false is true. These two affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to one another as being and not-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, madmen, &c.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.

Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. 1883. The Trove. https://adagraves.com/trove/spinoza-ethics/part-2-2/.

Latin published 1677; Elwes translation published 1883 (translator died 1931). Sources