PROPOSITIO XX: Dei existentia ejusque essentia unum et idem sunt.
DEMONSTRATIO: Deus (per antecedentem propositionem) ejusque omnia attributa sunt æterna hoc est (per definitionem 8) unumquodque ejus attributorum existentiam exprimit. Eadem ergo Dei attributa quæ (per definitionem 4) Dei æternam essentiam explicant, ejus simul æternam existentiam explicant hoc est illud ipsum quod essentiam Dei constituit, constituit simul ipsius existentiam adeoque hæc et ipsius essentia unum et idem sunt. Q.E.D.
COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur I Dei existentiam sicut ejus essentiam æternam esse veritatem.
COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur II Deum sive omnia Dei attributa esse immutabilia. Nam si ratione existentiæ mutarentur, deberent etiam (per propositionem præcedentem) ratione essentiæ mutari hoc est (ut per se notum) ex veris falsa fieri, quod est absurdum.
PROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.
Proof.— God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal existence—in other words, that which constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.
Coroll. I.— Hence it follows that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.
Coroll. II— Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence—that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.
PROPOSITIO XXI: Omnia quæ ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequuntur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt sive per idem attributum æterna et infinita sunt.
DEMONSTRATIO: Concipe si fieri potest (siquidem neges) aliquid in aliquo Dei attributo ex ipsius absoluta natura sequi quod finitum sit et determinatam habeat existentiam sive durationem exempli gratia ideam Dei in cogitatione. At cogitatio quandoquidem Dei attributum supponitur, est necessario (per propositionem 11) sua natura infinita. Verum quatenus ipsa ideam Dei habet, finita supponitur. At (per definitionem 2) finita concipi non potest nisi per ipsam cogitationem determinetur. Sed non per ipsam cogitationem quatenus ideam Dei constituit; eatenus enim finita supponitur esse: ergo per cogitationem quatenus ideam Dei non constituit, quæ tamen (per propositionem 11) necessario existere debet. Datur igitur cogitatio non constituens ideam Dei ac propterea ex ejus natura quatenus est absoluta cogitatio, non sequitur necessario idea Dei (concipitur enim ideam Dei constituens et non constituens). Quod est contra hypothesin. Quare si idea Dei in cogitatione aut aliquid (perinde est quicquid sumatur quandoquidem demonstratio universalis est) in aliquo Dei attributo ex necessitate absolutæ naturæ ipsius attributi sequatur, id debet necessario esse infinitum; quod erat primum.
Deinde id quod ex necessitate naturæ alicujus attributi ita sequitur, non potest determinatam habere existentiam sive durationem. Nam si neges, supponatur res quæ ex necessitate naturæ alicujus attributi sequitur, dari in aliquo Dei attributo exempli gratia idea Dei in cogitatione eaque supponatur aliquando non exstitisse vel non exstitura. Cum autem cogitatio Dei attributum supponatur, debet et necessario et immutabilis existere (per propositionem 11 et corollarium II propositionis 20). Quare ultra limites durationis ideæ Dei (supponitur enim aliquando non exstitisse aut non exstitura) cogitatio sine idea Dei existere debebit; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin; supponitur enim ex data cogitatione necessario sequi ideam Dei. Ergo idea Dei in cogitatione aut aliquid quod necessario ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequitur, non potest determinatam habere durationem sed per idem attributum æternum est, quod erat secundum. Nota hoc idem esse affirmandum de quacunque re quæ in aliquo Dei attributo ex Dei absoluta natura necessario sequitur.
PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
Proof.— Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily exist.
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point.
Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.
Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's absolute nature.
PROPOSITIO XXII: Quicquid ex aliquo Dei attributo quatenus modificatum est tali modificatione quæ et necessario et infinita per idem existit, sequitur, debet quoque et necessario et infinitum existere.
DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus propositionis demonstratio procedit eodem modo ac demonstratio præcedentis.
PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.
Proof.— The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.
PROPOSITIO XXIII: Omnis modus qui et necessario et infinitus existit, necessario sequi debuit vel ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei vel ex aliquo attributo modificato modificatione quæ et necessario et infinita existit.
DEMONSTRATIO: Modus enim in alio est per quod concipi debet (per definitionem 5) hoc est (per propositionem 15) in solo Deo est et per solum Deum concipi potest. Si ergo modus concipitur necessario existere et infinitus esse, utrumque hoc debet necessario concludi sive percipi per aliquod Dei attributum quatenus idem concipitur infinitatem et necessitatem existentiæ sive (quod per definitionem 8 idem est) æternitatem exprimere hoc est (per definitionem 6 et propositionem 19) quatenus absolute consideratur. Modus ergo qui et necessario et infinitus existit, ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequi debuit hocque vel immediate (de quo vide propositionem 21) vel mediante aliqua modificatione quæ ex ejus absoluta natura sequitur hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) quæ et necessario et infinita existit. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
Proof.— A mode exists in something else, through which it must be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily and as infinite.
PROPOSITIO XXIV: Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam.
DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 1. Id enim cujus natura (in se scilicet considerata) involvit existentiam, causa est sui et ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit.
COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur Deum non tantum esse causam ut res incipiant existere sed etiam ut in existendo perseverent sive (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. Nam sive res existant sive non existant, quotiescunque ad earum essentiam attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere comperimus adeoque earum essentia neque suæ existentiæ neque suæ durationis potest esse causa sed tantum Deus ad cujus solam naturam pertinet existere (per corollarium I propositionis 14).
PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
Proof.— This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
Corollary.— Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
PROPOSITIO XXV: Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiæ sed etiam essentiæ.
DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, ergo rerum essentiæ Deus non est causa adeoque (per axioma 4) potest rerum essentia sine Deo concipi: atqui hoc (per propositionem 15) est absurdum. Ergo rerum etiam essentiæ Deus est causa. Q.E.D.
SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio clarius sequitur ex propositione 16. Ex ea enim sequitur quod ex data natura divina tam rerum essentia quam existentia debeat necessario concludi et ut verbo dicam eo sensu quo Deus dicitur causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti corollario constabit.
COROLLARIUM: Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones sive modi quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demonstratio patet ex propositione 15 et definitione 5.
PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
Proof.— If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things. Q.E.D.
Note.— This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence—in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
Corollary.— Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
PROPOSITIO XXVI: Res quæ ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata et quæ a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare.
DEMONSTRATIO: Id per quod res determinatæ ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque tam ejus essentiæ quam existentiæ Deus ex necessitate suæ naturæ est causa efficiens (per propositiones 25 et 16) quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam quod secundo proponitur clarissime sequitur. Nam si res quæ a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars hujus falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.
PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.
Proof.— That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is absurd.
PROPOSITIO XXVII: Res quæ a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest.
DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex axiomate tertio.
PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Proof.— This proposition is evident from the third axiom.
PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Quodcunque singulare sive quævis res quæ finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus hæc causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum et sic in infinitum.
DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per propositionem 26 et corollarium propositionis 24). At id quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequitur, id infinitum et æternum est (per propositionem 21). Debuit ergo ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo sequi quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; præter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axioma 1 et definitionibus 3 et 5) et modi (per corollarium propositionis 25) nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus affectum est modificatione quæ æterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per propositionem 22). Debuit ergo sequi vel ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus modificatum est modificatione quæ finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum. Deinde hæc rursus causa sive hic modus (per eandem rationem qua primam partem hujus jam jam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus hæc ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q.E.D.
SCHOLIUM: Cum quædam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt videlicet ea quæ ex absoluta ejus natura necessario sequuntur et alia mediantibus his primis quæ tamen sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt, hinc sequitur I quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima, non vero in suo genere ut aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per propositionem 15 et corollarium propositionis 24). Sequitur II quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium nisi forte ea de causa ut scilicet has ab iis quas immediate produxit vel potius quæ ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus quæ cum effectu nullo modo conjuncta est. At omnia quæ sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint.
PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
Proof.— Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).
But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite, and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification (for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity. Q.E.D.
Note.— As certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows:—1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv. Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
PROPOSITIO XXIX: In rerum natura nullum datur contingens sed omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.
DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid est in Deo est (per propositionem 15): Deus autem non potest dici res contingens. Nam (per propositionem 11) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinæ naturæ ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (per propositionem 16) idque vel quatenus divina natura absolute (per propositionem 21) vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (per propositionem 27). Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa quatenus simpliciter existunt (per corollarium propositionis 24) sed etiam (per propositionem 26) quatenus ad aliquid operandum determinati considerantur. Quod si a Deo (per eandem propositionem) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos determinent et contra (per propositionem 27) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant. Quare omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandum nullumque datur contingens. Q.E.D.
SCHOLIUM: Antequam ulterius pergam, hic quid nobis per Naturam naturantem et quid per Naturam naturatam intelligendum sit, explicare volo vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus jam constare existimo nempe quod per Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se concipitur sive talia substantiæ attributa quæ æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt hoc est (per corollarium I propositionis 14 et corollarium II propositionis 17) Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturæ sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur hoc est omnes Dei attributorum modos quatenus considerantur ut res quæ in Deo sunt et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt.
PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
Proof.— Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.). If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.
Note.— Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
PROPOSITIO XXX: Intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.
DEMONSTRATIO: Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axioma 6) hoc est (ut per se notum) id quod in intellectu objective continetur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per corollarium I propositionis 14) non nisi una substantia datur nempe Deus nec ullæ aliæ affectiones (per propositionem 15) quam quæ in Deo sunt et quæ (per eandem propositionem) sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; ergo intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else.
Proof.— A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITIO XXXI: Intellectus actu sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad Naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent.
DEMONSTRATIO: Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc. differt adeoque (per definitionem 5) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet nempe (per propositionem 15 et definitionem 6) per aliquod Dei attributum quod æternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit ac propterea (per scholium propositionis 29) ad Naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q.E.D.
SCHOLIUM: Ratio cur hic loquar de intellectu actu non est quia concedo ullum dari intellectum potentia sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus quod ad perfectiorem intellectionis cognitionem non conducat.
PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.
Proof.— By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.) requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of thinking. Q.E.D.
Note.— I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality: but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding.
PROPOSITIO XXXII: Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera sed tantum necessaria.
DEMONSTRATIO: Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28) unaquæque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia causa determinetur et hæc rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et æternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23). Quocunque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur adeoque (per definitionem 7) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria vel coacta. Q.E.D.
COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur I Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.
COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur II voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut motus et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quæ (per propositionem 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quæ ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quæ ostendimus ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.
PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause.
Proof.— Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def. vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or constrained cause. Q.E.D.
Coroll. I.— Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the will.
Coroll. II.— It follows, secondly, that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.
PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt quam productæ sunt.
DEMONSTRATIO: Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario sequutæ sunt (per propositionem 16) et ex necessitate naturæ Dei determinatæ sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per propositionem 29). Si itaque res alterius naturæ potuissent esse vel alio modo ad operandum determinari ut naturæ ordo alius esset, ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est ac proinde (per propositionem 11) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo vel plures possent dari Dii, quod (per corollarium I propositionis 14) est absurdum. Quapropter res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine etc. Q.E.D.
SCHOLIUM I: Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi nihil absolute in rebus dari propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare jam paucis volo quid nobis per contingens erit intelligendum sed prius quid per necessarium et impossibile. Res aliqua necessaria dicitur vel ratione suæ essentiæ vel ratione causæ. Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata. At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur nisi respectu defectus nostræ cognitionis. Res enim cujus essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus vel de qua probe scimus eandem nullam contradictionem involvere et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.
SCHOLIUM II: Ex præcedentibus clare sequitur res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutæ sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex hujus contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi) Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia si res alio modo fuissent productæ, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda, diversa ab ea quam ex consideratione Entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere. Verum non dubito quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint idque nulla alia de causa quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa quæ a nobis (definitione 7) tradita est videlicet absolutam voluntatem. Verum neque etiam dubito si rem meditari vellent nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem qualem jam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam sed ut magnum scientiæ obstaculum plane rejiciant. Nec opus est ut ea quæ in scholio propositionis 17 dicta sunt, hic repetam. Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam quod quamvis concedatur voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex ejus perfectione nihilominus sequatur res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere si prius consideremus id quod ipsimet concedunt videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere ut unaquæque res id quod est sit. Nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset. Deinde quod omnia decreta ab æterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt. Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstantiæ argueretur. At cum in æterno non detur quando, ante nec post, hinc ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione sequitur Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse nec unquam potuisse sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse nec sine ipsis esse posse. At dicent quod quamvis supponeretur quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset vel quod ab æterno aliud de natura ejusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio. Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul Deum posse sua mutare decreta. Nam si Deus de natura ejusque ordine aliud quam decrevit decrevisset hoc est ut aliud de natura voluisset et concepisset, alium necessario quam jam habet intellectum et aliam quam jam habet voluntatem habuisset. Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet absque ulla ejus essentiæ ejusque perfectionis mutatione, quid causæ est cur jam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare et nihilominus æque perfectus manere? Ejus enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem in respectu suæ essentiæ et perfectionis perinde est, quomodocunque concipiatur. Deinde omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia sed tantum actu; cum autem et ejus intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur ut etiam omnes concedunt, sequitur ergo hinc etiam quod si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset et aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia necessario esset ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi) si aliter res quam jam sunt, a Deo productæ essent, Dei intellectus ejusque voluntas hoc est (ut conceditur) ejus essentia alia esse deberet, quod est absurdum.
Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint et hoc verum esse ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur, nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest ut credamus quod Deus noluerit omnia quæ in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione qua ipsa intelligit, creare. At dicent in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem sed id quod in ipsis est propter quod perfectæ sunt aut imperfectæ et bonæ aut malæ dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere ut id quod jam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio et contra. Verum quid hoc aliud esset quam aperte affirmare quod Deus qui id quod vult necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest ut res alio modo quam intelligit, intelligat, quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum. Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum hoc modo. Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntas aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus). Ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt. Fateor hanc opinionem quæ omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subjicit et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare quam illorum qui statuunt Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere. Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus tanquam ad exemplar in operando attendit vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collineat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est quam Deum fato subjicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ primam et unicam liberam causam esse. Quare non est ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.
PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.
Proof— All things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore, could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, God's nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature also would have perforce existed, and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner, &c. Q.E.D.
Note I.— As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,—such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
Note II.— It clearly follows from what we have said, that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop. xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order, different from those which he has ordained—in other words, if he had willed and conceived something different concerning nature—he would perforce have had a different intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a different will, without any change in his essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the same, in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a different actual intellect and a different will, his essence would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at first, if things had been brought into being by God in a different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have been different, which is absurd.
As these things could not have been brought into being by God in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he had understood them.
But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versâ. What is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its employers, as follows:—All things depend on the power of God. In order that things should be different from what they are, God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly demonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither can things be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting such wild theories.
PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia.
DEMONSTRATIO: Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiæ sequitur Deum esse causam sui (per propositionem 11) et (per propositionem 16 ejusque corollarium) omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei qua ipse et omnia sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence.
Proof.— From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is identical with his essence. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITIO XXXV: Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.
DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (per propositionem præcedentem) in ejus essentia ita debet comprehendi ut ex ea necessario sequatur adeoque necessario est. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.
Proof.— Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.) be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Nihil existit ex cujus natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.
DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (per corollarium propositionis 25) hoc est (per propositionem 34) quicquid existit, Dei potentiam quæ omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit adeoque (per propositionem 16) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow.
Proof.— Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is, (by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things, therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow. Q.E.D.
His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui ut quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prædeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis sive absoluto beneplacito sed ex absoluta Dei natura sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, præjudicia quæ impedire poterant quominus meæ demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi sed quia non pauca adhuc restant præjudicia quæ etiam imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo, amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operæ pretium duxi. Et quoniam omnia quæ hic indicare suscipio præjudicia pendent ab hoc uno quod scilicet communiter supponant homines omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere pro certo statuant: dicunt enim Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem ut ipsum coleret. Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo quærendo scilicet primo causam cur plerique hoc in præjudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum. Deinde ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem quomodo ex hoc orta sint præjudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate et de aliis hujus generis. Verum hæc ab humanæ mentis natura deducere non est hujus loci: satis hic erit si pro fundamento id capiam quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso nempe hoc quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quærendi, cujus rei sunt conscii. Ex his enim sequitur primo quod homines se liberos esse opinentur quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii et de causis a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur secundo homines omnia propter finem agere videlicet propter utile quod appetunt; unde fit ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat nisi ut ad semet se convertant et ad fines a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant. Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media quæ ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant ut exempli gratia oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, hinc factum ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt aliquem alium esse qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt easdem se ipsas fecisse sed ex mediis quæ sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt dari aliquem vel aliquos naturæ rectores humana præditos libertate qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt atque hinc statuerunt Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum cæcæ illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiæ dirigeret. Atque ita hoc præjudicium in superstitionem versum et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quæsiverunt ostendere naturam nihil frustra (hoc est quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse quam naturam Deosque æque ac homines delirare. Vide quæso quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturæ commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terræ motus, morbos etc. atque hæc statuerunt propterea evenire quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis æque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato præjudicio destiterunt: facilius enim iis fuit hoc inter alia incognita quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic præsentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiæ retinere quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare: quæ sane unica fuisset causa ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret nisi mathesis, quæ non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset et præter mathesin aliæ etiam adsignari possunt causæ (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est) a quibus fieri potuit ut homines communia hæc præjudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur.
His satis explicui id quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis unde hoc præjudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi quam ex propositione 16 et corollariis propositionis 32 et præterea ex iis omnibus quibus ostendi omnia naturæ æterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere. Hoc tamen adhuc addam nempe hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat et contra. Deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius. Et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum. Nam (duobus prioribus omissis quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex propositionibus 21, 22 et 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est qui a Deo immediate producitur et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res quæ immediate a Deo productæ sunt, ea de causa factæ essent ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimæ quarum de causa priores factæ sunt, omnium præstantissimæ essent. Deinde hæc doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiæ et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse quia nihil ante creationem præter Deum assignare possunt propter quod Deus ageret adeoque necessario fateri coguntur Deum iis propter quæ media parare voluit, caruisse eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum. Nec hic prætereundum est quod hujus doctrinæ sectatores qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile sed ad ignorantiam, quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinæ argumentandi medium. Nam si exempli gratia ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse. Ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiæ (sæpe enim multæ simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse id ex eo quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? Cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas ventum tum ortum quia mare præcedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat, instabunt iterum quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt donec ad Dei voluntatem hoc est ignorantiæ asylum confugeris. Sic etiam ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo quod tantæ artis causas ignorant, concludunt eandem non mechanica sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari talique modo constitui ut una pars alteram non lædat. Atque hinc fit ut qui miraculorum causas veras quærit quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hæretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis quos vulgus tanquam naturæ Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod sublata ignorantia stupor hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendæque suæ auctoritatis medium quod habent, tollitur. Sed hæc relinquo et ad id quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo.
Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quæ fiunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re præcipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum et illa omnia præstantissima æstimare a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones quibus rerum naturas explicarent scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem et quia se liberos existimant, inde hæ notiones ortæ sunt scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum sed has infra postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum, quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt. Et quia ii qui rerum naturam non intelligunt sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suæque naturæ ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositæ ut cum nobis per sensus repræsentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas, si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas sive confusas esse dicimus. Et quoniam ea nobis præ cæteris grata sunt quæ facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni præferunt quasi ordo aliquid in natura præter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt nisi velint forte Deum humanæ imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet quod infinita reperiantur quæ nostram imaginationem longe superant et plurima quæ ipsam propter ejus imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis. Cæteræ deinde notiones etiam præter imaginandi modos quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt et tamen ab ignaris tanquam præcipua rerum attributa considerantur quia ut jam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Exempli gratia si motus quem nervi ab objectis per oculos repræsentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta a quibus causatur pulchra dicuntur, quæ autem contrarium motum cient, deformia. Quæ deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel fætida vocant, quæ per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc. Quæ autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lævia etc. Et quæ denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi qui sibi persuaserint motus cælestes harmoniam componere. Quæ omnia satis ostendunt unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus) quod inter homines tot quot experimur, controversiæ ortæ sint ex quibus tandem scepticismus. Nam quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de cæteris quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sensu abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina": quæ sententiæ satis ostendunt homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illæ omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.
Videmus itaque omnes notiones quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi nec ullius rei naturam sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis sed imaginationis voco atque adeo omnia argumenta quæ contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimæ Dei naturæ sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortæ? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad fætorem usque, rerum deformitas quæ nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc. Sed ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est æstimanda nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectæ sunt propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanæ naturæ conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem qui quærunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda vel magis proprie loquendo quia ipsius naturæ leges adeo amplæ fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quæ ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut propositione 16 demonstravi.
Hæc sunt quæ hic notare suscepi præjudicia. Si quædam hujus farinæ adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.
In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.
All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that God's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth.
I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God: for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he desired them.
We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory—namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why," they will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?" If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?" So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God—in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another.
Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my third point.
After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and blame, sin and merit.
I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good, everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are ill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion—as though there were any order in nature, except in relation to our imagination—and say that God has created all things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, &c.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony—all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates." All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged.
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.