❦ EthicsBaruch Spinoza Part I: Concerning God (Def. – Prop. 19)

Ethics · Baruch Spinoza

Part I: Concerning God (Def. – Prop. 19) Pars prima: De Deo

Latin (1677)Elwes (1883)
Def.

I. Per causam sui intelligo id cujus essentia involvit existentiam sive id cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens.

II. Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita quæ alia ejusdem naturæ terminari potest. Exempli gratia corpus dicitur finitum quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore.

III. Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.

IV. Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.

V. Per modum intelligo substantiæ affectiones sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur.

VI. Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.

EXPLICATIO: Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.

VII. Ea res libera dicitur quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem vel potius coacta quæ ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.

VIII. Per æternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam quatenus ex sola rei æternæ definitione necessario sequi concipitur.

EXPLICATIO: Talis enim existentia ut æterna veritas sicut rei essentia concipitur proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.

I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

V. By mode, I mean the modifications1 of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation— I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

Explanation— Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

Ax.

I. Omnia quæ sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.

II. Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet.

III. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur.

IV. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causæ dependet et eandem involvit.

V. Quæ nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.

VI. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.

VII. Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, ejus essentia non involvit existentiam.

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.

Prop. 1

PROPOSITIO I: Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 3 et 5.

PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.— This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

Prop. 2

PROPOSITIO II: Duæ substantiæ diversa attributa habentes nihil inter se commune habent.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet etiam ex definitione 3. Unaquæque enim in se debet esse et per se debet concipi sive conceptus unius conceptum alterius non involvit.

PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

Proof.— Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

Prop. 3

PROPOSITIO III: Quæ res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per axioma 5) nec per se invicem possunt intelligi adeoque (per axioma 4) una alterius causa esse non potest. Q.E.D.

PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

Proof.— If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.

Prop. 4

PROPOSITIO IV: Duæ aut plures res distinctæ vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnia quæ sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt (per axioma 1) hoc est (per definitiones 3 et 5) extra intellectum nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones. Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt præter substantias sive quod idem est (per definitionem 4) earum attributa earumque affectiones. Q.E.D.

PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.— Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.),—that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.

Prop. 5

PROPOSITIO V: In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ aut plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ sive attributi.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si darentur plures distinctæ, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum vel ex diversitate affectionum (per propositionem præcedentem). Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo non dari nisi unam ejusdem attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substantia sit prior natura suis affectionibus (per propositionem 1) depositis ergo affectionibus et in se considerata hoc est (per definitionem 3 et axioma 6) vere considerata, non poterit concipi ab alia distingui hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) non poterunt dari plures sed tantum una. Q.E.D.

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.— If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications—as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),—it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,—that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.

Prop. 6

PROPOSITIO VI: Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.

DEMONSTRATIO: In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi (per propositionem præcedentem) hoc est (per propositionem 2) quæ aliquid inter se commune habent. Adeoque (per propositionem 3) una alterius causa esse nequit sive ab alia non potest produci. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur substantiam ab alio produci non posse. Nam in rerum natura nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones ut patet ex axiomate 1 et definitionibus 3 et 5. Atqui a substantia produci non potest (per præcedentem propositionem). Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci non potest. Q.E.D.

ALITER: Demonstratur hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, ejus cognitio a cognitione suæ causæ deberet pendere (per axioma 4) adeoque (per definitionem 3) non esset substantia.

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof.— It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be produced by the other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.— Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.

Prop. 7

PROPOSITIO VII: Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere.

DEMONSTRATIO: Substantia non potest produci ab alio (per corollarium propositionis præcedentis); erit itaque causa sui id est (per definitionem 1) ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam sive ad ejus naturam pertinet existere. Q.E.D.

PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

Proof.— Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature.

Prop. 8

PROPOSITIO VIII: Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.

DEMONSTRATIO: Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit (per propositionem 5) et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere (per propositionem 7). Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam (per definitionem 2) deberet terminari ab alia ejusdem naturæ quæ etiam necessario deberet existere (per propositionem 7) adeoque darentur duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi, quod est absurdum (per propositionem 5). Existit ergo infinita. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM I: Cum finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio et infinitum absoluta affirmatio existentiæ alicujus naturæ, sequitur ergo ex sola 7 propositione omnem substantiam debere esse infinitam.

SCHOLIUM II: Non dubito quin omnibus qui de rebus confuse judicant nec res per primas suas causas noscere consueverunt, difficile sit demonstrationem 7 propositionis concipere; nimirum quia non distinguunt inter modificationes substantiarum et ipsas substantias neque sciunt quomodo res producuntur. Unde fit ut principium quod res naturales habere vident, substantiis affingant; qui enim veras rerum causas ignorant, omnia confundunt et sine ulla mentis repugnantia tam arbores quam homines loquentes fingunt et homines tam ex lapidibus quam ex semine formari et quascunque formas in alias quascunque mutari imaginantur. Sic etiam qui naturam divinam cum humana confundunt, facile Deo affectus humanos tribuunt præsertim quamdiu etiam ignorant quomodo affectus in mente producuntur. Si autem homines ad naturam substantiæ attenderent, minime de veritate 7 propositionis dubitarent; imo hæc propositio omnibus axioma esset et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per substantiam intelligerent id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus cognitio non indiget cognitione alterius rei. Per modificationes autem id quod in alio est et quarum conceptus a conceptu rei in qua sunt, formatur: quocirca modificationum non existentium veras ideas possumus habere quandoquidem quamvis non existant actu extra intellectum, earum tamen essentia ita in alio comprehenditur ut per idem concipi possint. Verum substantiarum veritas extra intellectum non est nisi in se ipsis quia per se concipiuntur. Si quis ergo diceret se claram et distinctam hoc est veram ideam substantiæ habere et nihilominus dubitare num talis substantia existat, idem hercle esset ac si diceret se veram habere ideam et nihilominus dubitare num falsa sit (ut satis attendenti sit manifestum); vel si quis statuat substantiam creari, simul statuit ideam falsam factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest adeoque fatendum necessario est substantiæ existentiam sicut ejus essentiam æternam esse veritatem. Atque hinc alio modo concludere possumus non dari nisi unicam ejusdem naturæ, quod hic ostendere operæ pretium esse duxi. Ut autem hoc ordine faciam notandum est Iƒ veram uniuscujusque rei definitionem nihil involvere neque exprimere præter rei definitæ naturam. Ex quo sequitur hoc IIƒ nempe nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuorum involvere neque exprimere quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit quam naturam rei definitæ. Exempli gratia definitio trianguli nihil aliud exprimit quam simplicem naturam trianguli; at non certum aliquem triangulorum numerum. IIIƒ notandum dari necessario uniuscujusque rei existentis certam aliquam causam propter quam existit. IVƒ denique notandum hanc causam propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et definitione rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere) vel debere extra ipsam dari. His positis sequitur quod si in natura certus aliquis numerus individuorum existat, debeat necessario dari causa cur illa individua et cur non plura nec pauciora existunt. Si exempli gratia in rerum natura 20 homines existant (quos majoris perspicuitatis causa suppono simul existere nec alios antea in natura exstitisse) non satis erit (ut scilicet rationem reddamus cur 20 homines existant) causam naturæ humanæ in genere ostendere sed insuper necesse erit causam ostendere cur non plures nec pauciores quam 20 existant quandoquidem (per III notam) uniuscujusque debet necessario dari causa cur existat. At hæc causa (per notam II et III) non potest in ipsa natura humana contineri quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit adeoque (per notam IV) causa cur hi viginti homines existunt et consequenter cur unusquisque existit, debet necessario extra unumquemque dari et propterea absolute concludendum omne id cujus naturæ plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario ut existant causam externam habere. Jam quoniam ad naturam substantiæ (per jam ostensa in hoc scholio) pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessariam existentiam involvere et consequenter ex sola ejus definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. At ex ipsius definitione (ut jam ex nota II et III ostendimus) non potest sequi plurium substantiarum existentia; sequitur ergo ex ea necessario unicam tantum ejusdem naturæ existere, ut proponebatur.

PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.— There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

Note I.— As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.

Note II.— No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion—think that trees might talk just as well as men—that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself—that is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct—that is, a true—idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true—in short, the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning—that there is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:——

1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows that——

2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.

4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.

Prop. 9

PROPOSITIO IX: Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquæque res habet eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 4.

PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

Prop. 10

PROPOSITIO X: Unumquodque unius substantiæ attributum per se concipi debet.

DEMONSTRATIO: Attributum enim est id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejus essentiam constituens (per definitionem 4) adeoque (per definitionem 3) per se concipi debet. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his apparet quod quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere ipsa dua entia sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura substantiæ ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur quandoquidem omnia quæ habet attributa, simul in ipsa semper fuerunt nec unum ab alio produci potuit sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiæ exprimit. Longe ergo abest ut absurdum sit uni substantiæ plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat eo plura attributa quæ et necessitatem sive æternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat et consequenter nihil etiam clarius quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut definitione 6 tradidimus) ens quod constat infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam quærit ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quæ ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quæreretur.

PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Proof.— An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and, therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

Note— It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain.

Prop. 11

PROPOSITIO XI: Deus sive substantia constans infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, Deum non existere. Ergo (per axioma 7) ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per propositionem 7) est absurdum: ergo Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

ALITER: Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio tam cur existit quam cur non existit. Exempli gratia si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet quæ impedit quominus existat sive quæ ejus existentiam tollat. Hæc vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet vel extra ipsam. Exempli gratia rationem cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; nimirum quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur quia scilicet existentiam involvit (vide propositionem 7). At ratio cur circulus vel triangulus existit vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur sed ex ordine universæ naturæ corporeæ; ex eo enim sequi debet vel jam triangulum necessario existere vel impossibile esse ut jam existat. Atque hæc per se manifesta sunt. Ex quibus sequitur id necessario existere cujus nulla ratio nec causa datur quæ impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit quæ impedit quominus Deus existat vel quæ ejus existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est eundem necessario existere. At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura vel extra ipsam dari deberet hoc est in alia substantia alterius naturæ. Nam si ejusdem naturæ esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum. At substantia quæ alterius esset naturæ, nihil cum Deo commune habere (per 2 propositionem) adeoque neque ejus existentiam ponere neque tollere posset. Cum igitur ratio seu causa quæ divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa ejus natura, quæ propterea contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de Ente absolute infinito et summe perfecto affirmare absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur quæ ejus existentiam tollat ac proinde Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

ALITER: Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute infinito atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est; ergo vel nihil existit vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos vel in nobis vel in alio quod necessario existit, existimus (vide axioma 1 et propositionem 7). Ergo Ens absolute infinitum hoc est (per definitionem 6) Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturæ competit eo plus virium a se habere ut existat adeoque Ens absolute infinitum sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit. Multi tamen forsan non facile hujus demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt quia assueti sunt eas solummodo res contemplari quæ a causis externis fiunt et ex his quæ cito fiunt hoc est quæ facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contra eas res factu difficiliores judicant hoc est ad existendum non adeo faciles ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt. Verum ut ab his præjudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere qua ratione hoc enunciatum "quod cito fit cito perit" verum sit nec etiam an respectu totius naturæ omnia æque facilia sint an secus. Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit me hic non loqui de rebus quæ a causis externis fiunt sed de solis substantiis, quæ (per propositionem 6) a nulla causa externa produci possunt. Res enim quæ a causis externis fiunt, sive eæ multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtuti causæ externæ debetur adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causæ externæ, non autem suæ oritur. Contra quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causæ externæ debetur; quare ejus etiam existentia ex sola ejus natura sequi debet, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam ejus essentia. Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit sed contra ponit; imperfectio autem contra eandem tollit adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus quam de existentia Entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti hoc est Dei. Nam quandoquidem ejus essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.

PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

Proof.— If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

Another proof.— Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence—e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him—that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Another proof.— The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely infinite—in other words, God (Def. vi.)—necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Note.— In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence does not follow à priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that those which quickly come to pass—that is, quickly come into existence—quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment—that is, not so easily brought into existence—those things which they conceive as more complicated.

However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause; and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect—that is, of God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader.

Prop. 12

PROPOSITIO XII: Nullum substantiæ attributum potest vere concipi ex quo sequatur substantiam posse dividi.

DEMONSTRATIO: Partes enim in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel naturam substantiæ retinebunt vel non. Si primum, tum (per 8 propositionem) unaquæque pars debebit esse infinita et (per propositionem 6) causa sui et (per propositionem 5) constare debebit ex diverso attributo adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (per propositionem 6) est absurdum. Adde quod partes (per propositionem 2) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent et totum (per definitionem 4 et propositionem 10) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit. Si autem secundum ponatur quod scilicet partes naturam substantiæ non retinebunt, ergo cum tota substantia in æquales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiæ amitteret et esse desineret, quod (per propositionem 7) est absurdum.

PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

Proof.— The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative—namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance—then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.

Prop. 13

PROPOSITIO XIII: Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim divisibilis esset, partes in quas divideretur vel naturam substantiæ absolute infinitæ retinebunt vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ, quod (per propositionem 5) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (ut supra) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (per propositionem 11) est etiam absurdum.

COROLLARIUM: Ex his sequitur nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.

SCHOLIUM: Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc solo intelligitur quod natura substantiæ non potest concipi nisi infinita et quod per partem substantiæ nihil aliud intelligi potest quam substantia finita, quod (per propositionem 8) manifestam contradictionem implicat.

PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Proof.— If it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.

Corollary.— It follows, that no substance, and consequently no extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

Note.— The indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii) involves a manifest contradiction.

Prop. 14

PROPOSITIO XIV: Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum de quo nullum attributum quod essentiam substantiæ exprimit, negari potest (per definitionem 6) isque necessario existat (per propositionem 11) si aliqua substantia præter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei sicque duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi existerent, quod (per propositionem 5) est absurdum adeoque nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest et consequenter non etiam concipi. Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi ut existens; atqui hoc (per primam partem hujus demonstrationis) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc clarissime sequitur Iƒ Deum esse unicum hoc est (per definitionem 6) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in scholio propositionis 10 jam innuimus.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ rem extensam et rem cogitantem vel Dei attributa esse vel (per axioma 1) affectiones attributorum Dei.

PROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Proof.— As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore, besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.— Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

Corollary II.— It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.

Prop. 15

PROPOSITIO XV: Quicquid est, in Deo est et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.

DEMONSTRATIO: Præter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (per 14 propositionem) hoc est (per definitionem 3) res quæ in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (per definitionem 5) sine substantia nec esse nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse et per ipsam solam concipi possunt. Atqui præter substantias et modos nil datur (per axioma 1). Ergo nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Sunt qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto: nam omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo quod per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest. Attamen interim aliis rationibus quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant; quod clare ostendit illos id quod ipsimet dicunt, non intelligere. Ego saltem satis clare meo quidem judicio demonstravi (vide corollarium propositionis 6 et scholium II propositionis 8) nullam substantiam ab alio produci vel creari. Porro propositione 14 ostendimus præter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam atque hinc conclusimus substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Verum ad pleniorem explicationem adversariorum argumenta refutabo quæ omnia huc redeunt primo quod substantia corporea quatenus substantia constat ut putant partibus et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant ex quibus unum aut alterum afferam. Si substantia corporea aiunt est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquæque pars vel finita vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum. Si hoc, datur ergo infinitum duplo majus alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum. Porro si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes æquantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit ut et si partibus mensuretur digitos æquantibus ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies major alio infinito. Denique si ex uno puncto infinitæ cujusdam quantitatis concipiatur duas lineas ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi, certum est distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore. Cum igitur hæc absurda sequantur ut putant ex eo quod quantitas infinita supponitur, inde concludunt substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione. Deus enim inquiunt cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest: atqui substantia corporea quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest; sequitur ergo ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Hæc sunt quæ apud scriptores invenio argumenta quibus ostendere conantur substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse nec ad eandem posse pertinere. Verumenimvero si quis recte attendat, me ad hæc jam respondisse comperiet quandoquidem hæc argumenta in eo tantum fundantur quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi supponunt, quod jam (per propositionem 12 cum corollario propositionis 13) absurdum esse ostendi. Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit omnia illa absurda (siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo non jam disputo) ex quibus concludere volunt substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi quod quantitas infinita supponatur sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflari supponunt; quare ex absurdis quæ inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est quod nos supra (propositione 12 etc.) jam demonstravimus. Quare telum quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera conjiciunt. Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt quam si quis ex eo quod finxit circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit circulum non habere centrum ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam ductæ lineæ sunt æquales. Nam substantiam corpoream quæ non nisi infinita, non nisi unica et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (vide propositiones 8, 5 et 12) eam ipsi ad concludendum eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflari et multiplicem esse et divisibilem concipiunt. Sic etiam alii postquam fingunt lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta quibus ostendant lineam non posse in infinitum dividi. Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineæ denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent et imprimis ii qui negant dari vacuum. Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi ut ejus partes realiter distinctæ essent, cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari manentibus reliquis ut ante inter se connexis? et cur omnes ita aptari debent ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum quæ realiter ab invicem distinctæ sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest. Cum igitur vacuum in natura non detur (de quo alias) sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent ne detur vacuum, sequitur hinc etiam easdem non posse realiter distingui hoc est substantiam corpoream quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi. Si quis tamen jam quærat cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? ei respondeo quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet sive superficialiter prout nempe ipsam imaginamur vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectu fit. Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus prout in imaginatione est, quod sæpe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis et partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam prout in intellectu est, attendimus et eam quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum ut jam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica et indivisibilis reperietur. Quod omnibus qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit, præcipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur quod materia ubique eadem est nec partes in eadem distinguuntur nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde ejus partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Exempli gratia aquam quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus ejusque partes ab invicem separari; at non quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur. Porro aqua quatenus aqua generatur et corrumpitur; at quatenus substantia nec generatur nec corrumpitur. Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur quod materia quatenus substantia divisibilis sit et partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio cur divina natura indigna esset quandoquidem (per propositionem 14) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest a qua ipsa pateretur. Omnia inquam in Deo sunt et omnia quæ fiunt per solas leges infinitæ Dei naturæ fiunt et ex necessitate ejus essentiæ (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur; quare nulla ratione dici potest Deum ab alio pati aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse tametsi divisibilis supponatur dummodo æterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impræsentiarum satis.

PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Proof.— Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.

Note.— Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:——

Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be either finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite, which is also absurd.

Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other.

Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually increased, until at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the nature of God.

The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.

Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that: infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop. xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares, and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible (Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can be multiplied and divided.

So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together as before? And why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one can exist without the other, and can remain in its original condition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided.

If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is extended substance; from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.

I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact, founded on the same assumption as the first—namely, that matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could receive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the present.

Prop. 16

PROPOSITIO XVI: Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio unicuique manifesta esse debet si modo ad hoc attendat quod ex data cujuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quæ revera ex eadem (hoc est ipsa rei essentia) necessario sequuntur et eo plures quo plus realitatis rei definitio exprimit hoc est quo plus realitatis rei definitæ essentia involvit. Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat (per definitionem 6) quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex ejusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur Deum omnium rerum quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.

COROLLARIUM III: Sequitur IIIƒ Deum esse absolute causam primam.

PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Proof.— This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.— Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.

Corollary II.— It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not through an accident of his nature.

Corollary III.— It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely first cause.

Prop. 17

PROPOSITIO XVII: Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus et a nemine coactus agit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex sola divinæ naturæ necessitate vel (quod idem est) ex solis ejusdem naturæ legibus infinita absolute sequi modo propositione 16 ostendimus et propositione 15 demonstravimus nihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse sed omnia in Deo esse; quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest a quo ad agendum determinetur vel cogatur atque adeo Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus et a nemine coactus agit. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur Iƒ nullam dari causam quæ Deum extrinsece vel intrinsece præter ipsius naturæ perfectionem incitet ad agendum.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit (per propositionem 11 et corollarium I propositionis 14) et ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate agit (per propositionem præcedentem). Adeoque (per definitionem 7) solus est causa libera. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam propterea quod potest ut putant efficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus hoc est quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant sive ut ab ipso non producantur. Sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent quod Deus potest efficere ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur ejus tres angulos æquales esse duobus rectis sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est absurdum. Porro infra absque ope hujus propositionis ostendam ad Dei naturam neque intellectum neque voluntatem pertinere. Scio equidem plures esse qui putant se posse demonstrare ad Dei naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere; nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese aiunt quod Deo tribuere possunt quam id quod in nobis summa est perfectio. Porro tametsi Deum actu summe intelligentem concipiant, non tamen credunt eum posse omnia quæ actu intelligit, efficere ut existant nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant. Si omnia inquiunt quæ in ejus intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil tum amplius creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotentiæ repugnare ideoque maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere nec aliud creantem præter id quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit creare. Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto (vide propositionem 16) a summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis hoc est omnia necessario effluxisse vel semper eadem necessitate sequi eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab æterno et in æternum sequitur ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis. Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab æterno fuit et in æternum in eadem actualitate manebit. Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe meo quidem judicio perfectior statuitur. Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri Deum infinita creabilia intelligere quæ tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias si scilicet omnia quæ intelligit crearet, suam juxta ipsos exhauriret omnipotentiam et se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur ut simul statuere debeant ipsum non posse omnia efficere ad quæ ejus potentia se extendit, quo absurdius aut Dei omnipotentiæ magis repugnans non video quid fingi possit. Porro ut de intellectu et voluntate quos Deo communiter tribuimus, hic etiam aliquid dicam, si ad æternam Dei essentiam intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est quam quod vulgo solent homines. Nam intellectus et voluntas qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto cælo differre deberent nec in ulla re præterquam in nomine convenire possent; non aliter scilicet quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum cæleste et canis, animal latrans. Quod sic demonstrabo. Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit uti noster intellectus posterior (ut plerisque placet) vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate (per corollarium I propositionis 16) sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est quia talis in Dei intellectu existit objective. Quare Dei intellectus quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ, quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse animadversum qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt. Cum itaque Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ. Nam causatum differt a sua causa præcise in eo quod a causa habet. Exempli gratia homo est causa existentiæ, non vero essentiæ alterius hominis; est enim hæc æterna veritas et ideo secundum essentiam prorsus convenire possunt; in existendo autem differre debent et propterea si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit sed si unius essentia destrui posset et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam alterius essentia. Quapropter res quæ et essentiæ et existentiæ alicujus effectus est causa, a tali effectu differre debet tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ. Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiæ et existentiæ nostri intellectus causa; ergo Dei intellectus quatenus divinam essentiam constituere concipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ differt nec in ulla re præterquam in nomine cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.

PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.

Proof.— We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist; outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.— It follows: 1. That there can be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

Corollary II.— It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q.E.D.

Note.— Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature—that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things—that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.

Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some significance quite different from those they usually bear. For intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect, God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can easily see.

Prop. 18

PROPOSITIO XVIII: Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnia quæ sunt, in Deo sunt et per Deum concipi debent (per propositionem 15) adeoque (per corollarium I propositionis 16 hujus) Deus rerum quæ in ipso sunt, est causa, quod est primum. Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia (per propositionem 14) hoc est (per definitionem 3) res quæ extra Deum in se sit, quod erat secundum. Deus ergo est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Proof.— All things which are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

Prop. 19

PROPOSITIO XIX: Deus sive omnia Dei attributa sunt æterna.

DEMONSTRATIO: Deus enim (per definitionem 6) est substantia quæ (per propositionem 11) necessario existit hoc est (per propositionem 7) ad cujus naturam pertinet existere sive (quod idem est) ex cujus definitione sequitur ipsum existere adeoque (per definitionem 8) est æternus. Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id quod (per definitionem 4) divinæ substantiæ essentiam exprimit hoc est id quod ad substantiam pertinet: id ipsum inquam ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiæ (ut jam ex propositione 7 demonstravi) pertinet æternitas. Ergo unumquodque attributorum æternitatem involvere debet adeoque omnia sunt æterna. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio quam clarissime etiam patet ex modo quo (propositione 11) Dei existentiam demonstravi; ex ea inquam demonstratione constat Dei existentiam sicut ejus essentiam æternam esse veritatem. Deinde (propositione 19 Principiorum Cartesii) alio etiam modo Dei æternitatem demonstravi nec opus est eum hic repetere.

PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

Proof.— God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.) necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further, by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def. iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance—in other words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.— This proposition is also evident from the manner in which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. 1883. The Trove. https://adagraves.com/trove/spinoza-ethics/part-1-1/.

Latin published 1677; Elwes translation published 1883 (translator died 1931). Sources