❦ On the Nature of the GodsMarcus Tullius Cicero Book III: Cotta’s reply (2)

On the Nature of the Gods · Marcus Tullius Cicero

Book III: Cotta’s reply (2) Liber III

Latin (ed. Plasberg)Yonge (1877)
XX (§51–52)

Illa autem Balbe, quae tu a caelo astrisque ducebas, quam longe serpant non vides: solem deum esse lunamque, quorum alterum Apollinem Graeci alteram Dianam putant. quod si luna dea est, ergo etiam Lucifer ceteraeque errantes numerum deorum optinebunt; igitur etiam inerrantes. cur autem arqui species non in deorum numero reponatur; est enim pulcher (et ob eam speciem, quia causam habeat admirabilem, Thaumante dicitur esse nata). cuius si divina natura est, quid facies nubibus; arcus enim ipse e nubibus efficitur quodam modo coloratis; quarum una etiam Centauros peperisse dicitur. quod si nubes rettuleris in deos, referendae certe erunt tempestates, quae populi Romani ritibus consecratae sunt. ergo imbres nimbi procellae turbines dei putandi; nostri quidem duces mare ingredientes inmolare hostiam fluctibus consuerunt.

Iam si est Ceres a gerendo (ita enim dicebas), terra ipsa dea est (et ita habetur; quae est enim alia Tellus); sin terra, mare etiam, quem Neptunum esse dicebas; ergo et flumina et fontes. itaque et Fontis delubrum Masso ex Corsica dedicavit, et in augurum precatione Tiberinum Spinonem Anemonem Nodinum alia propinquorum fluminum nomina videmus. Ergo hoc aut in inmensum serpet, aut nihil horum recipiemus; nec illa infinita ratio superstitionis probabitur;

Do you not consider, Balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? You deify the sun and the moon, which the Greeks take to be Apollo and Diana. If the moon is a Deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed stars are also Deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be the daughter of Thaumas.258 But if you deify the rainbow, what regard will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth the Centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard to the seasons, which the Roman people have really consecrated. Tempests, showers, storms, and whirlwinds must then be Deities. It is certain, at least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the waves before they embarked on any voyage.

As you deify the earth under the name of Ceres,259 because, as you said, she bears fruits (a gerendo), and the ocean under that of Neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. Thus we see that Maso, the conqueror of Corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and the names of the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring rivers are in the prayers260 of the augurs. Therefore, either the number of such Deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them, and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition.

XXI (§52–54)

nihil ergo horum probandum est.

Dicamus igitur Balbe oportet contra illos etiam, qui hos deos ex hominum genere in caelum translatos non re sed opinione esse dicunt, quos auguste omnes sancteque veneramur. Principio Ioves tres numerant i qui theologi nominantur, ex quibus primum et secundum natos in Arcadia, alterum patre Aethere, ex quo etiam Proserpinam natam ferunt et Liberum, alterum patre Caelo, qui genuisse Minervam dicitur, quam principem et inventricem belli ferunt, tertium Cretensem Saturni filium, cuius in illa insula sepulcrum ostenditur. Dioscoroe etiam apud Graios multis modis nominantur: primi tres, qui appellantur Anactes Athenis, ex rege Iove antiquissimo et Proserpina nati Tritopatreus Eubuleus Dionysus, secundi Iove tertio nati et Leda Castor et Pollux; tertii dicuntur a non nullis Alco et Melampus †euiolus, Atrei filii, qui Pelope natus fuit.

Iam Musae primae quattuor [natae] Iove altero †nata et Thelxinoe† Aoede Arche Melete, secundae Iove tertio et Mnemosyne procreatae novem, tertiae [Iove tertio] Piero natae et Antiopa, quas Pieridas et Pierias solent poetae appellare, isdem nominibus et eodem numero quo proxumae superiores. Cumque tu solem quia solus esset appellatum esse dicas, Soles ipsi quam multi a theologis proferuntur. unus eorum Iove natus nepos Aetheris, alter Hyperione, tertius Volcano Nili filio, cuius urbem Aegyptii volunt esse eam quae Heliopolis appellatur, quartus is quem heroicis temporibus Acantho Rhodi peperisse dicitur, ⟨pater⟩ Ialysi Camiri Lindi, unde Rhodii, quintus qui Colchis fertur Aeetam et Circam procreavisse.

None of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. I must proceed now, Balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public opinion should have the force of reality. To begin, then: they who are called theologists say that there are three Jupiters; the first and second of whom were born in Arcadia; one of whom was the son of Æther, and father of Proserpine and Bacchus; the other the son of Cœlus, and father of Minerva, who is called the Goddess and inventress of war; the third one born of Saturn in the isle of Crete,261 where his sepulchre is shown. The sons of Jupiter (Διόσκουροι) also, among the Greeks, have many names; first, the three who at Athens have the title of Anactes,262 Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus, sons of the most ancient king Jupiter and Proserpine; the next are Castor and Pollux, sons of the third Jupiter and Leda; and, lastly, three others, by some called Alco,263 Melampus, and Tmolus, sons of Atreus, the son of Pelops.

As to the Muses, there were at first four—Thelxiope, Aœde, Arche, and Melete—daughters of the second Jupiter; afterward there were nine, daughters of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; there were also nine others, having the same appellations, born of Pierus and Antiopa, by the poets usually called Pierides and Pieriæ. Though Sol (the sun) is so called, you say, because he is solus (single); yet how many suns do theologists mention? There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson of Æther; another, the son of Hyperion; a third, who, the Egyptians say, was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus; a fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times of the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus; a fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at Colchis.

XXII (§54–57)

Volcani item complures:

primus Caelo natus, ex quo et Minerva Apollinem eum cuius in tutela Athenas antiqui historici esse voluerunt, secundus [in] Nilo natus Opas ut Aegyptii appellant, quem custodem esse Aegypti volunt, tertius ex tertio Iove et Iunone, qui Lemni fabricae traditur praefuisse, quartus Maemalio natus, qui tenuit insulas propter Siciliam quae Volcaniae nominabantur.

Mercurius unus Caelo patre Die matre natus, cuius obscenius excitata natura traditur quod aspectu Proserpinae commotus sit, alter Valentis et Phoronidis filius is qui sub terris habetur idem Trophonius, tertius Iove tertio natus et Maia, ex quo et Penelopa Pana natum ferunt, quartus Nilo patre, quem Aegyptii nefas habent nominare, quintus quem colunt Pheneatae, qui Argum dicitur interemisse ob eamque causam Aegyptum profugisse atque Aegyptiis leges et litteras tradidisse: hunc Aegyptii Theyt appellant, eodemque nomine anni primus mensis apud eos vocatur.

Aesculapiorum primus Apollinis, quem Arcades colunt, qui specillum invenisse primusque volnus dicitur obligavisse, secundus secundi Mercuri frater: is fulmine percussus dicitur humatus esse Cynosuris; tertius Arsippi et Arsinoae, qui primus purgationem alvi dentisque evolsionem ut ferunt invenit, cuius in Arcadia non longe a Lusio flumine sepulcrum et lucus ostenditur.

There are likewise several Vulcans. The first (who had of Minerva that Apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary God of Athens) was the son of Cœlus; the second, whom the Egyptians call Opas,264 and whom they looked upon as the protector of Egypt, is the son of Nilus; the third, who is said to have been the master of the forges at Lemnos, was the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno; the fourth, who possessed the islands near Sicily called Vulcaniæ,265 was the son of Menalius. One Mercury had Cœlus for his father and Dies for his mother; another, who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same as Trophonius, is the son of Valens and Phoronis. A third, of whom, and of Penelope, Pan was the offspring, is the son of the third Jupiter and Maia. A fourth, whom the Egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son of Nilus. A fifth, whom we call, in their language, Thoth, as with them the first month of the year is called, is he whom the people of Pheneum266 worship, and who is said to have killed Argus, to have fled for it into Egypt, and to have given laws and learning to the Egyptians. The first of the Æsculapii, the God of Arcadia, who is said to have invented the probe and to have been the first person who taught men to use bandages for wounds, is the son of Apollo. The second, who was killed with thunder, and is said to be buried in Cynosura,267 is the brother of the second Mercury. The third, who is said to have found out the art of purging the stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of Arsippus and Arsinoe; and in Arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the wood which is consecrated to him, near the river Lusium.

XXIII (§57–60)

Apollinum antiquissimus is quem paulo antea e Volcano natum esse dixi custodem Athenarum, alter Corybantis filius natus in Creta, cuius de illa insula cum Iove ipso certamen fuisse traditur, tertius Iove tertio natus et Latona, quem ex Hyperboreis Delphos ferunt advenisse, quartus in Arcadia, quem Arcades Nomionem appellant quod ab eo se leges ferunt accepisse.

Dianae item plures, prima Iovis et Proserpinae, quae pinnatum Cupidinem genuisse dicitur, secunda notior quam Iove tertio et Latona natam accepimus; tertiae pater Upis traditur Glauce mater: eam saepe Graeci Upim paterno nomine appellant. Dionysos multos habemus, primum Iove et Proserpina natum, secundum Nilo, qui Nysam dicitur interemisse, tertium Cabiro patre, eumque regem Asiae praefuisse dicunt, cui Sabazia sunt instituta, quartum Iove et Luna, cui sacra Orphica putantur confici, quintum Nyso natum et Thyone, a quo trieterides constitutae putantur.

Venus prima Caelo et Die nata, cuius Eli delubrum vidimus, altera spuma procreata, ex qua et Mercurio Cupidinem secundum natum accepimus, tertia Iove nata et Diona, quae nupsit Volcano, sed ex ea et Marte natus Anteros dicitur, quarta Syria Cyproque concepta, quae Astarte vocatur, quam Adonidi nupsisse proditum est. Minerva prima quam Apollinis matrem supra diximus, secunda orta Nilo, quam Aegyptii Saietae colunt, tertia illa quam a Iove generatam supra diximus, quarta Iove nata et Coryphe Oceani filia, quam Arcades Κορίαν nominant et quadrigarum inventricem ferunt, quinta Pallantis, quae patrem dicitur interemisse virginitatem suam violare conantem, cui pinnarum talaria adfigunt.

Cupido primus Mercurio et Diana prima natus dicitur, secundus Mercurio et Venere secunda, tertius qui idem est Anteros Marte et Venere tertia. Atque haec quidem ⟨et alia⟩ eius modi ex vetere Graeciae fama collecta sunt. quibus intellegis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones; vestri autem non modo haec non refellunt verum etiam confirmant interpretando quorsum quidque pertineat.

Sed eo iam unde huc digressi sumus revertamur. Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad haec refellenda?

I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of the Hyperborei268 to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio,269 because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid, is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom the Greeks often call by her father’s name, is the daughter of Upis270 and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was the son of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have killed Nysa, was the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and for whom the Sabazia271 were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The fourth, for whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from Jupiter and Luna. The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the Trieterides, was the son of Nysus and Thyone.

The first Venus, who has a temple at Elis, was the daughter of Cœlus and Dies. The second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by Mercury, the mother of the second Cupid. The third, the daughter of Jupiter and Diana, was married to Vulcan, but is said to have had Anteros by Mars. The fourth was a Syrian, born of Tyro, who is called Astarte, and is said to have been married to Adonis. I have already mentioned one Minerva, mother of Apollo. Another, who is worshipped at Sais, a city in Egypt, sprung from Nilus. The third, whom I have also mentioned, was daughter of Jupiter. The fourth, sprung from Jupiter and Coryphe, the daughter of the Ocean; the Arcadians call her Coria, and make her the inventress of chariots. A fifth, whom they paint with wings at her heels, was daughter of Pallas, and is said to have killed her father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. The first Cupid is said to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the third Venus.

All these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in Greece; the belief in which, Balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest religion should suffer. But you Stoics, so far from refuting them, even give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find in them. Can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there is need to employ more subtle reasonings? But to return from this digression.

XXIV (§61–63)

Nam mentem fidem spem virtutem honorem victoriam salutem concordiam ceteraque huius modi rerum vim habere videmus non deorum. aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens ut spes ut fides ut virtus ut concordia, aut optandae nobis sunt, ut honos ut salus ut victoria; quarum rerum utilitatem video, video etiam consecrata simulacra; quare autem in is vis deorum insit tum intellegam cum cognovero. quo in genere vel maxime est fortuna numeranda, quam nemo ab inconstantia et temeritate seiunget, quae digna certe non sunt deo.

Iam vero quid vos illa delectat explicatio fabularum et enodatio nominum? exsectum a filio Caelum, vinctum itidem a filio Saturnum, haec et alia generis eiusdem ita defenditis, ut i qui ista finxerunt non modo non insani sed etiam fuisse sapientes videantur. in enodandis autem nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis: Saturnus quia se saturat annis, Mavors quia magna vertit, Minerva quia minuit aut quia minatur, Venus quia venit ad omnia, Ceres a gerendo. quam periculosa consuetudo. in multis enim nominibus haerebitis: quid Veiovi facies quid Volcano? quamquam, quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen quod non possis una littera explicare unde ductum sit; in quo quidem magis tu mihi natare visus es quam ipse Neptunus.

Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno post Cleanthes deinde Chrysippus, commenticiarum fabularum reddere rationem, vocabulorum cur quidque ita appellatum sit causas explicare. quod cum facitis illud profecto confitemini, longe aliter se rem habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos enim qui di appellantur rerum naturas esse non figuras deorum.

We see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, health, concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have nothing of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the mind, faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be desired, as honor, health, and victory. I know indeed that they are useful to us, and see that statues have been religiously erected for them; but as to their divinity, I shall begin to believe it when you have proved it for certain. Of this kind I may particularly mention Fortune, which is allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and temerity, which are certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being.

But what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the etymology of names?—that Cœlus was castrated by his son, and that Saturn was bound in chains by his son! By your defence of these and such like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only not to be madmen, but to have been even very wise. But the pains which you take with your etymologies deserve our pity. That Saturn is so called because se saturat annis, he is full of years; Mavors, Mars, because magna vortit, he brings about mighty changes; Minerva, because minuit, she diminishes, or because minatur, she threatens; Venus, because venit ad omnia, she comes to all; Ceres, a gerendo, from bearing. How dangerous is this method! for there are many names would puzzle you. >From what would you derive Vejupiter and Vulcan? Though, indeed, if you can derive Neptune a nando, from swimming, in which you seem to me to flounder about yourself more than Neptune, you may easily find the origin of all names, since it is founded only upon the conformity of some one letter. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, are put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere fables, and giving reasons for the several appellations of every Deity; which is really owning that those whom we call Gods are not the representations of deities, but natural things, and that to judge otherwise is an error.

XXV (§63–68)

Qui tantus error fuit, ut perniciosis etiam rebus non nomen deorum tribueretur sed etiam sacra constituerentur. Febris enim fanum in Palatio et ⟨Orbonae ad⟩ aedem Larum et aram Malae Fortunae Exquiliis consecratam videmus.

Omnis igitur talis a philosophia pellatur error, ut, cum de dis inmortalibus disputemus, dicamus digna dis inmortalibus. de quibus habeo ipse quid sentiam, non habeo autem quid tibi adsentiar. Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intellegentia per mare pertinentem, idem de Cerere; istam autem intellegentiam aut maris aut terrae non modo comprehendere animo sed ne suspicione quidem possum attingere. itaque aliunde mihi quaerendum est et ut esse deos et quales sint dii discere possim, qualis tu eos esse vis […].

[…] videamus ea quae secuntur, primum deorum⟨ne⟩ prudentia mundus regatur, deinde consulantne di rebus humanis. haec enim mihi ex tua partitione restant duo; de quibus si vobis videtur accuratius disserendum puto.

Mihi vero inquit Velleius valde videtur; nam et maiora exspecto et is quae dicta sunt vehementer adsentior.

Tum Balbus Interpellare te inquit Cotta nolo, sed sumemus tempus aliud; efficiam profecto ut fateare. sed […]

[…] Cicero — — cum multa dixisset quae ad eversionem religionum valerent, ait tamen [Cotta] non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis exstinguat Lact. Inst. 2.3.2

[…]adduci enim primum hoc ut credamus non possumus, immortalem illam praestantissimamque naturam divisam esse per sexus — —  ante omnes Tullius — — nullam veritus impietatis invidiam — — quid super tali opinatione sentiret pietate cum maiore monstravit Arnob. Nat. 3.6

[…] deorumne prudentia mundus regatur v. 5

[…]de commodorum quae capimus copia

[…]de temporum ordine caelique constantia

[…]de Chrysippi argumentis, de domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparata, de totius mundi convenientia consensuque de Zenonis conclusionibus

[…]de vi ignea deque eo calore ex quo omnia generentur

[…]num mundus universus et sol et luna et stellae sensum ac mentem habeant de sideribus pastus indigentibus

[…]de natura artificiose ambulante

[…]mundum non aedificatum sed a natura conformatum […]

Primum igitur non est probabile eam materiam rerum unde omnia orta sunt esse divina providentia effectam, sed et habere et habuisse vim et naturam suam. ut igitur faber cum quid aedificaturus est non ipse facit materiam sed utitur ea quae sit parata, fictorque item cera, sic isti providentiae divinae materiam praesto esse oportuit non quam ipse faceret sed quam haberet paratam. quod si materia non est a deo facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aer et ignis a deo factus est. […]

cur, si omnia deus hominum causa fecerit, etiam multa contraria et inimica ⟨et⟩ pestifera nobis reperiantur tam in maria quam in terra. [10] quod Stoici veritatem non perspicientes ineptissime reppulerunt. aiunt enim multa esse in gignentibus et in numero animalium quorum adhuc lateat utilitas, sed eam processu tem- porum inventuiri, sicut iam multa prioribus saeculis incognita necessitas et usus invenerit. [11] quae tandem utilitas potest in muribus in blattis in serpentibus re- periri, quae homini molesta et perniciosa sunt? an medicina in his aliqua latet? quae si est, inueniatur aliquando, nempe adversus mala, cum id illi queran- tur, esse omnino malum. [12] viperam ferunt exustam in cineremque dilapsam mederi eiusdem bestiae mor- sui: quanto melius fuerat eam prorsus non esse quam remedium contra se ab ea ipsa desiderari. Lact. ira 13.9-12 […] deus aut vult tollere mala et non potest, aut potest et non vult, aut neque vult neque potest, aut et vult et potest. [21] vult et non potest, inbecillus est, quod in deum non cadit, si potest et non vult, invidus, quod aeque alienum est a deo; si neque vult neque potest, et invidus et inbecillus est ideoque nec deus; si et vult et potest, quod solum deo conuenit, unde ergo sunt mala aut cur illa non tollit? Lact. ira 13.20-21 […] homines omnibus bestiis antecedunt Diom. GL. 1.313.10 […]

homines omnibus bestiis antecedunt […]

nequaquam istuc istac ibit; magna inest certatio.nam ut ego illi supplicarem tanta blandiloquentia,ni ob rem:

parumne ratiocinari videtur et sibi ipsa nefariam pestem machinari? illud vero quam callida ratione:

qui volt quod volt, ita dat se res ut operam dabit,

qui est versus omnium seminator malorum.

ille traversa mente mihi hodie tradidit repagula,quibus ego iram omnem recludam atque illi perniciem dabo,mihi maerores illi luctum, exitium illi exilium mihi.

hanc videlicet rationem, quam vos divino beneficio homini solum tributam dicitis, bestiae non habent;

videsne igitur quanto munere deorum simus adfecti? Atque eadem Medea patrem patriamque fugiens,

postquam pateradpropinquat iamque paene ut conprehendatur parat,puerum interea obtruncat membraque articulatim dividitperque agros passim dispergit corpus: id ea gratiaut, dum nati dissipatos artus captaret parens,ipsa interea effugeret, illum ut maeror tardaret sequi,sibi salutem ut familiari pareret parricidio.

huic ut scelus sic ne ratio quidem defuit. Quid ille funestas epulas fratri conparans nonne versat huc et illuc cogitatione rationem:

maior mihi moles, maius miscendumst malum,qui illius acerbum cor contundam et conprimam.

Yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also sacrifices offered to them; for Fever has a temple on the Palatine hill, and Orbona another near that of the Lares, and we see on the Esquiline hill an altar consecrated to Ill-fortune. Let all such errors be banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute concerning the immortal Gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. I know myself what I ought to believe; which is far different from what you have said. You take Neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea. You have the same opinion of Ceres with regard to the earth. I cannot, I own, find out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of the sea or the earth is. To learn, therefore, the existence of the Gods, and of what description and character they are, I must apply elsewhere, not to the Stoics.

Let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, “whether there is a divine providence which governs the world;” and lastly, “whether that providence particularly regards mankind;” for these are the remaining propositions of your discourse; and I think that, if you approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. With all my heart, says Velleius, for I readily agree to what you have hitherto said, and expect still greater things from you.

I am unwilling to interrupt you, says Balbus to Cotta, but we shall take another opportunity, and I shall effectually convince you. But272 * * *

XXVI.

Shall I adore, and bend the suppliant knee,Who scorn their power and doubt their deity?

Does not Niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all her misfortunes upon herself? But what a subtle expression is the following!

On strength of will alone depends success;

a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad.

Though I’m confined, his malice yet is vain,His tortured heart shall answer pain for pain;His ruin soothe my soul with soft content,Lighten my chains, and welcome banishment!

This, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. How great, how immense the favor! Observe the same Medea flying from her father and her country:

The guilty wretch from her pursuer flies.By her own hands the young Absyrtus slain,His mangled limbs she scatters o’er the plain,That the fond sire might sink beneath his woe,And she to parricide her safety owe.

Reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal repast for his brother, do it without reflection?

Revenge as great as Atreus’ injuryShall sink his soul and crown his misery.

XXVII (§68–70)

Nec tamen ille ipse est praetereundus,

qui non sat habuit coniugem inlexe in stuprum,

de quo recte et verissume loquitur Atreus:

quod re in summa summum esse arbitrorpericlum, matres coinquinari regias,contaminari stirpem, admisceri genus.

at id ipsum quam callide, qui regnum adulterio quaereret:

addo inquit huc, quod mihi portento caelestum paterprodigium misit, regni stabilimen mei,agnum inter pecudes aurea clarum comaquondam Thyestem clepere ausum esse e regia,[a] qua in re adiutricem coniugem cepit sibi.

videturne summa inprobitate usus non sine summa esse ratione? Nec vero scaena solum referta est his sceleribus sed multo vita communis paene maioribus. sentit domus unius cuiusque sentit forum, sentit curia campus socii provinciae, ut quem ad modum ratione recte fiat sic ratione peccetur, alterumque et a paucis et raro, alterum et semper et a plurimis, ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a dis immortalibus datam esse rationem quam tanta cum pernicie datam. ut vinum aegrotis, quia prodest raro nocet saepissime, melius est non adhibere omnino quam spe dubiae salutis in apertam perniciem incurrere, sic haud scio an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis acumen sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sit multis admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari.

Quam ob rem si mens voluntasque divina idcirco consuluit hominibus quod is est largita rationem, is solis consuluit quos bona ratione donavit, quos videmus si modo ulli sint esse perpaucos. non placet autem paucis a diis inmortalibus esse consultum; sequitur ergo ut nemini consultum sit.

Did not Thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his brother’s bed (of which Atreus with great justice thus complains,

When faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace,With vile adultery stain a royal race,The blood thus mix’d in fouler currents flows,Taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber’d woes)—

did he not, I say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the crown? Atreus thus continues:

A lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece,Promised in vain to fix my crown in peace;But base Thyestes, eager for the prey,Crept to my bed, and stole the gem away.

Do you not perceive that Thyestes must have had a share of reason proportionable to the greatness of his crimes—such crimes as are not only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay, often exceeded, in the common course of life? The private houses of individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and that, in short, the Gods would have shown greater benevolence in denying us any reason at all than in sending us that which is accompanied with so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but often hurtful in diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the patient than to run the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so I do not know whether it would not be better for mankind to be deprived of wit, thought, and penetration, or what we call reason, since it is a thing pernicious to many and very useful to few, than to have it bestowed upon them with so much liberality and in such abundance. But if the divine will has really consulted the good of man in this gift of reason, the good of those men only was consulted on whom a well-regulated one is bestowed: how few those are, if any, is very apparent. We cannot admit, therefore, that the Gods consulted the good of a few only; the conclusion must be that they consulted the good of none.

XXVIII (§70–71)

Huic loco sic soletis occurrere: non idcirco non optume nobis a dis esse provisum, quod multi eorum beneficio perverse uterentur; etiam patrimoniis multos male uti, nec ob eam causam eos beneficium a patribus nullum habere. Quisquam istuc negat, aut quae est in collatione ista similitudo? nec enim Herculi nocere Deianira voluit cum ei tunicam sanguine Centauri tinctam dedit, nec prodesse Pheraeo Iasoni is qui gladio vomicam eius aperuit, quam sanare medici non potuerant. multi enim et cum obesse vellent profuerunt et cum prodesse offuerunt; ita non fit ex eo quod datur ut voluntas eius qui dederit appareat, nec si is qui accepit bene utitur idcirco is qui dedit amice dedit.

Quae enim libido quae avaritia quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto aut sine animi motu et cogitatione di est ratione perficitur; nam omnis opinio ratio est, et quidem bona ratio si vera, mala autem si falsa est opinio. sed a deo tantum rationem habemus, si modo habemus, bonam autem rationem aut non bonam a nobis. Non enim ut patrimonium relinquitur sic ratio est homini beneficio deorum data; quid enim potius hominibus dii dedissent si is nocere voluissent, iniustitiae autem intemperantiae timiditatis quae semina essent si is vitiis ratio non subesset?

You answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make of reason no more takes away the goodness of the Gods, who bestow it as a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they have to their parents for it. We grant you this; but where is the similitude? It was far from Deianira’s design to injure Hercules when she made him a present of the shirt dipped in the blood of the Centaurs. Nor was it a regard to the welfare of Jason of Pheræ that influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the physicians had in vain attempted to cure. For it has often happened that people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have injured one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift is by no means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither does the benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the hands of a benefactor. For, in short, what debauchery, what avarice, what crime among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought and reflection, that is, to reason? For all opinion is reason: right reason, if men’s thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if they are not. The Gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we have any; the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so that the comparison is not just between the present of reason given us by the Gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after all, if the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the Gods, what could they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what seed could there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if reason were not laid as the foundation of these vices?

XXIX (§71–73)

Medea modo et Atreus commemorabatur a nobis, heroicae personae inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes.

quid levitates comicae parumne semper in ratione versantur? parumne subtiliter disputat ille in Eunucho:

quid igitur faciam?

exclusit, revocat; redeam? non si me obsecret.

ille vero in Synephebis Academicorum more contra communem opinionem non dubitat pugnare ratione, qui in amore summo summaque inopia suave esse dicit

parentem habere avarum inlepidum in liberosdifficilem, qui te nec amet nec studeat tui,

atque huic incredibili sententiae ratiunculas suggerit:

aut tu illum fructu fallas aut per litterasavertas aliquod nomen aut per servolumpercutias pavidum; postremo a parco patrequod sumas, quanto dissipes libentius;

idemque facilem et liberalem patrem incommodum esse amanti filio disputat:

quem neque quo pacto fallam nec quid inde auferamnec quem dolum ad eum aut machinam commoliarscio quicquam: ita omnes meos dolos fallaciaspraestrigias praestrinxit commoditas patris.

quid ergo isti doli, quid machinae, quid fallaciae praestrigiaeque num sine ratione esse potuerunt? o praeclarum munus deorum; ut Phormio possit dicere:

cedo senem; iam instructa sunt mihi in corde consilia omnia.

I mentioned just now Medea and Atreus, persons celebrated in heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling characters which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances of this reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the Eunuch, reason with some subtlety?—

What, then, must I resolve upon?She turn’d me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again;Shall I go? no, not if she were to beg it of me.

Another, in the Twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim, after the manner of the Academics, asserts that when a man is in love and in want, it is pleasant

To have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate,Who has no love or affection for his children.

This unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus:

You may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name,Or fright him by your servant into compliance;And what you take from such an old hunks,How much more pleasantly do you spend it!

On the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he,

I can’t tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent,Who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand,To support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosityQuite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.273

What are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of reason? O excellent gift of the Gods! Without this Phormio could not have said,

Find me out the old man: I have something hatching for him in my head.

XXX (§74–75)

Sed exeamus e theatro, veniamus in forum. sessum it praetor. quid ut iudicetur? qui tabularium incenderit. quod facinus occultius: at se Q. Sosius splendidus eques Romanus ex agro Piceno fecisse confessus est. qui transscripserit tabulas publicas: id quoque L. Alenus fecit, cum chirographum sex primorum imitatus est; quid hoc homine sollertius? cognosce alias quaestiones, auri Tolossani coniurationis Iugurthinae; repete superiora: Tubuli de pecunia capta ob rem iudicandam; posteriora: de incestu rogatione Peducaea; tum haec cotidiana: sicae venena peculatus, testamentorum etiam lege nova quaestiones. inde illa actio ope consilioque tuo furtum aio factum esse, inde tot iudicia de fide mala, tutelae mandati pro socio fiduciae, reliqua quae ex empto aut vendito aut conducto aut locato contra fidem fiunt, inde iudicium publicum rei privatae lege Laetoria, inde everriculum malitiarum omnium iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquillius familiaris noster protulit, quem dolum idem Aquillius tum teneri putat cum aliud sit simulatum aliud actum.

Hanc igitur tantam a dis inmortalibus arbitramur malorum sementim esse factam? si enim rationem hominibus di dederunt, malitiam dederunt; est enim malitia versuta et fallax ratio nocendi; idem etiam di fraudem dederunt facinus ceteraque quorum nihil nec suscipi sine ratione nec effici potest. Utinam igitur, ut illa anus optat

ne in nemore Pelio securibuscaesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes

sic istam calliditatem hominibus di ne dedissent, qua perpauci bene utuntur, qui tamen ipsi saepe a male utentibus opprimuntur, innumerabiles autem improbe utuntur, ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus non ad bonitatem impertitum esse videatur.

But let us pass from the stage to the bar. The prætor274 takes his seat. To judge whom? The man who set fire to our archives. How secretly was that villany conducted! Q. Sosius, an illustrious Roman knight, of the Picene field,275 confessed the fact. Who else is to be tried? He who forged the public registers—Alenus, an artful fellow, who counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.276 Let us call to mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of Tolosa, or the conspiracy of Jugurtha. Let us trace back the informations laid against Tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the proceedings of the tribune Peduceus concerning the incest of the vestals. Let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or lending; the public decree on a private affair by the Lætorian Law;277 and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against fraud, proposed by our friend Aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says, by which one thing is pretended and another done. Can we, then, think that this plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal Gods? If they have given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety, for subtlety is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do mischief. To them likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime, which, without the help of reason, would neither have been thought of nor committed. As the old woman wished

That to the fir which on Mount Pelion grewThe axe had ne’er been laid,278

so we should wish that the Gods had never bestowed this ability on man, the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who make a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use of it; so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote virtue among us.

XXXI (§76–78)

Sed urgetis identidem hominum esse istam culpam non deorum. Ut si medicus gravitatem morbi, gubernator vim tempestatis accuset; etsi hi quidem homunculi, sed tamen ridiculi: quis enim te adhibuisset dixerit quispiam si ista non essent. contra deum licet disputare liberius: in hominum vitiis ais esse culpam: eam dedisses hominibus rationem quae vitia culpamque excluderet. Ubi igitur locus fuit errori deorum? nam patrimonia spe bene tradendi relinquimus, qua possumus falli; deus falli qui potuit? an ut Sol in currum quom Phaethontem filium sustulit, aut Neptunus cum Theseus Hippolytum perdidit, cum ter optandi a Neptuno patre habuisset potestatem:

poetarum ista sunt, nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores non fabularum. atque hi tamen ipsi di poetici, si scissent perniciosa fore illa filiis, peccasse in beneficio putarentur. Et si verum est quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat, nocere audientibus philosophos is qui bene dicta male interpretarentur (posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis schola exire)—prorsus, si qui audierunt vitiosi essent discessuri, quod perverse philosophorum disputationem interpretarentur, tacere praestaret philosophis quam iis qui se audissent nocere;

sic, si homines rationem bono consilio a dis immortalibus datam in fraudem malitiamque convertunt, non dari illam quam dari humano generi melius fuit. Ut si medicus sciat eum aegrotum, qui iussus sit vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque periturum, magna sit in culpa, sic vestra ista Providentia reprendenda, quae rationem dederit is quos scierit ea perverse et inprobe ussuros. Nisi forte dicitis eam nescisse. Utinam quidem; sed non audebitis, non enim ignoro quanti eius nomen putetis.

This, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the Gods. But should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? Had there not been danger, we should say, who would have applied to you? This reasoning has still greater force against the Deity. The fault, you say, is in man, if he commits crimes. But why was not man endued with a reason incapable of producing any crimes? How could the Gods err? When we leave our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the Deity be deceived? As Phœbus when he trusted his chariot to his son Phaëthon, or as Neptune when he indulged his son Theseus in granting him three wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of Hippolitus? These are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to proceed from philosophers. Yet if those poetical Deities had foreseen that their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must have been thought blamable for it.

Aristo of Chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus the lectures of Aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of Zeno pedants. If this be true, it were better that philosophers should be silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a misapprehension of their master’s meaning; so if reason, which was bestowed on mankind by the Gods with a good design, tends only to make men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to have received it. There could be no excuse for a physician who prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and immediately expire. Your Providence is no less blamable in giving reason to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. Will you say that it did not foresee it? Nothing could please me more than such an acknowledgment. But you dare not. I know what a sublime idea you entertain of her.

XXXII (§79–81)

Sed hic quidem locus concludi iam potest. nam si stultitia consensu omnium philosophorum maius est malum quam si omnia mala et fortunae et corporis ex altera parte ponantur, sapientiam autem nemo adsequitur, in summis malis omnes sumus, quibus vos optume consultum a dis inmortalibus dicitis. nam ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat an nemo possit valere, sic non intellego quid intersit utrum nemo sit sapiens an nemo esse possit.

Ac nos quidem nimis multa de re apertissuma; Telamo autem uno versu totum locum conficit cur di homines neglegant:

nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest.

debebant illi quidem omnis bonos efficere, si quidem hominum generi consulebant;

sin id minus, bonis quidem certe consulere debebant. Cur igitur duo Scipiones fortissimos et optimos viros in Hispania Poenus oppressit, cur Maximus extulit filium consularem, cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, cur Paulum Cannae sustulerunt, cur Poenorum crudelitati Reguli corpus est praebitum, cur Africanum domestici parietes non texerunt? Sed haec vetera et alia permulta; propiora videamus. cur avunculus meus vir innocentissumus idemque doctissumus P. Rutilius in exilio est, cur sodalis meus interfectus domi suae Drusus, cur temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen ante simulacrum Vestae pontifex maximus est Q. Scaevola trucidatus, cur ante etiam tot civitatis principes a Cinna interempti, cur omnium perfidiosissimus C. Marius Q. Catulum praestantissuma dignitate virum mori potuit iubere?

Dies deficiat si velim numerare quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus si commemorem quibus improbis optime. Cur enim Marius tam feliciter septimum consul domi suae senex est mortuus, cur omnium crudelissimus tam diu Cinna regnavit?

But to conclude. If folly, by the unanimous consent of philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal Gods take care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. For that nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same thing; and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no man can be truly wise, is likewise the same thing. But I will insist no further on so self-evident a point. Telamon in one verse decides the question. If, says he, there is a Divine Providence,

Good men would be happy, bad men miserable.

But it is not so. If the Gods had regarded mankind, they should have made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the virtuous. Why, therefore, was the Carthaginian in Spain suffered to destroy those best and bravest men, the two Scipios? Why did Maximus279 lose his son, the consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus? Why did Cannæ deprive us of Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus delivered up to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why was not Africanus protected from violence in his own house? To these, and many more ancient instances, let us add some of later date. Why is Rutilius, my uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment? Why was my own friend and companion Drusus assassinated in his own house? Why was Scævola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and prudence, massacred before the statue of Vesta? Why, before that, were so many illustrious citizens put to death by Cinna? Why had Marius, the most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of Catulus, a man of the greatest dignity? But there would be no end of enumerating examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. Why did that Marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in his seventh consulship? Why was that inhuman wretch Cinna permitted to enjoy so long a reign?

XXXIII (§81–82)

At dedit poenas. Prohiberi melius fuit impedirique ne tot summos viros interficeret quam ipsum aliquando poenas dare. Summo cruciatu supplicioque Q. Varius homo importunissumus periit; si quia Drusum ferro Metellum veneno sustulerat, illos conservari melius fuit quam poenas sceleris Varium pendere. Duodequadraginta Dionysius tyrannus annos fuit opulentissumae et beatissumae civitatis;

quam multos ante hunc in ipso Graeciae flore Pisistratus. At Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit. Multis quidem ante cruciatis et necatis. Et praedones multi saepe poenas dant, nec tamen possumus dicere non pluris captivos acerbe quam praedones necatos. Anaxarchum Democriteum a Cyprio tyranno excarnificatum accepimus, Zenonem Eleatem in tormentis necatum; quid dicam de Socrate, cuius morti inlacrimare soleo Platonem legens? Videsne igitur deorum iudicio, si vident res humanas, discrimen esse sublatum?

He, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. But would it not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than that the author of them should be punished afterward? Varius, a most impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. If this was his punishment for the murdering Drusus by the sword, and Metellus by poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives than to have their deaths avenged on Varius? Dionysius was thirty-eight years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before him, how many years did Pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of Greece! Phalaris and Apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. Many robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered. Anaxarchus,280 a scholar of Democritus, was cut to pieces by command of the tyrant of Cyprus; and Zeno of Elea281 ended his life in tortures. What shall I say of Socrates,282 whose death, as often as I read of it in Plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? If, therefore, the Gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge they make no distinction between the good and the bad.

XXXIV (§83–84)

Diogenes quidem Cynicus dicere solebat Harpalum, qui temporibus illis praedo felix habebatur, contra deos testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu viveret. Dionysius, de quo ante dixi, cum fanum Proserpinae Locris expilavisset, navigabat Syracusas; isque cum secundissumo vento cursum teneret, ridens videtisne inquit amici quam bona a dis inmortalibus navigatio sacrilegis detur. atque homo acutus cum bene planeque percepisset, in eadem sententia perseverabat. qui quom ad Peloponnesum classem appulisset et in fanum venisset Iovis Olympii, aureum ei detraxit amiculum grandi pondere, quo Iovem ornarat e manubiis Carthaginiensium tyrannus Gelo, atque in eo etiam cavillatus est aestate grave esse aureum amiculum hieme frigidum, eique laneum pallium iniecit, cum id esse ad omne anni tempus diceret. idemque Aesculapi Epidauri barbam auream demi iussit; neque enim convenire barbatum esse filium, cum in omnibus fanis pater imberbis esset.

iam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri, in quibus quod more veteris Graeciae inscriptum esset bonorum deorum, uti se eorum bonitate velle dicebat. idem Victoriolas aureas et pateras coronasque, quae simulacrorum porrectis manibus sustinebantur, sine dubitatione tollebat eaque se accipere non auferre dicebat; esse enim stultitiam a quibus bona precaremur ab is porrigentibus et dantibus nolle sumere. eundemque ferunt haec quae dixi sublata de fanis in forum protulisse et per praeconem vendidisse exactaque pecunia edixisse ut quod quisque a sacris haberet id ante diem certam in suum quicque fanum referret: ita ad impietatem in deos in homines adiunxit iniuriam.

Diogenes the Cynic used to say of Harpalus, one of the most fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a man was a kind of witness against the Gods. Dionysius, of whom we have before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of Proserpine at Locris, set sail for Syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his voyage, said, with a smile, “See, my friends, what favorable winds the immortal Gods bestow upon church-robbers.” Encouraged by this prosperous event, he proceeded in his impiety. When he landed at Peloponnesus, he went into the temple of Jupiter Olympius, and disrobed his statue of a golden mantle of great weight, an ornament which the tyrant Gelo283 had given out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and at the same time, in a jesting manner, he said “that a golden mantle was too heavy in summer and too cold in winter;” and then, throwing a woollen cloak over the statue, added, “This will serve for all seasons.” At another time, he ordered the golden beard of Æsculapius of Epidaurus to be taken away, saying that “it was absurd for the son to have a beard, when his father had none.” He likewise robbed the temples of the silver tables, which, according to the ancient custom of Greece, bore this inscription, “To the good Gods,” saying “he was willing to make use of their goodness;” and, without the least scruple, took away the little golden emblems of victory, the cups and coronets, which were in the stretched-out hands of the statues, saying “he did not take, but receive them; for it would be folly not to accept good things from the Gods, to whom we are constantly praying for favors, when they stretch out their hands towards us.” And, last of all, all the things which he had thus pillaged from the temples were, by his order, brought to the market-place and sold by the common crier; and, after he had received the money for them, he commanded every purchaser to restore what he had bought, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they came. Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he added injustice to man.

XXXV (§84–86)

Hunc igitur nec Olympius Iuppiter fulmine percussit nec Aesculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit, atque in suo lectulo mortuus in †tyrannidis rogum inlatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus erat nanctus, quasi iustam et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit.

Invita in hoc loco versatur oratio, videtur enim auctoritatem adferre peccandi; recte videretur, nisi et virtutis et vitiorum sine ulla divina ratione grave ipsius conscientiae pondus esset, qua sublata iacent omnia. ut enim nec domus nec res publica ratione quadam et disciplina dissignata videatur, si in ea nec recte factis praemia extent ulla nec supplicia peccatis, sic mundi divina in homines moderatio profecto nulla est, si in ea discrimen nullum est bonorum et malorum.

At enim minora di neglegunt, neque agellos singulorum nec viticulas persequuntur, nec, si uredo aut grando cuipiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant: sic enim dicitis. Quasi ego paulo ante de fundo Formiano P. Rutili sim questus non de amissa salute.

Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor did Æsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering death. He died in his bed, had funeral honors284 paid to him, and left his power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful inheritance to his son.

It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot believe that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no distinction between the honest and the wicked.

But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor do kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an instance, I had only complained of the loss of his farm at Formiæ; but I spoke of a personal misfortune, his banishment.285

XXXVI (§86–88)

Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas commoditates, vineta segetes oliveta, ubertatem frugum et fructuum, omnem denique commoditatem prosperitatemque vitae a dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit.

nimirum recte; propter virtutem enim iure laudamur et in virtute recte gloriamur; quod non contingeret, si id donum a deo non a nobis haberemus. at vero aut honoribus aucti aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostrae laudi adsumptum arbitramur. num quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit umquam? at quod dives quod honoratus quod incolumis, Iovemque optimum et maximum ob eas res appellant, non quod nos iustos temperantes sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos incolumis opulentos copiosos;

neque Herculi quisquam decumam vovit umquam, si sapiens factus esset—quamquam Pythagoras, cum in geometria quiddam novi invenisset, Musis bovem immolavisse dicitur; sed id quidem non credo, quoniam ille ne Apollini quidem Deli hostiam immolare voluit, ne aram sanguine aspergeret. ad rem autem ut redeam, iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam. quamvis licet Menti delubra et Virtuti et Fidei consecremus, tamen haec in nobis ipsis sita videmus; spei salutis opis victoriae facultas a dis expetenda est.

Inproborum igitur prosperitates secundaeque res redarguunt, ut Diogenes dicebat, vim omnem deorum ac potestatem.

All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn, olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason, since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory, which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we return thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves. But who ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them, indeed, for riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good and all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice. No one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise. It is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the Muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;286 but, for my part, I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to Apollo at Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to return. It is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the Gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have been consecrated to the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does not contradict their being inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety, assistance, and victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from whence it follows, as Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked destroys the idea of a Divine Providence.

XXXVII (§89–90)

At non numquam bonos exitus habent boni. Eos quidem arripimus adtribuimusque sine ulla ratione dis inmortalibus. at Diagoras cum Samothracam venisset Atheus ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus tu, qui deos putas humana neglegere, nonne animadvertis ex tot tabulis pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in portumque salvi pervenerint, ita fit inquit, illi enim nusquam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt in marique perierunt. idemque, cum ei naviganti vectores adversa tempestate timidi et perterriti dicerent non iniuria sibi illud accidere qui illum in eandem navem recepissent, ostendit eis in eodem cursu multas alias laborantis quaesivitque num etiam in is navibus Diagoram vehi crederent. Sic enim res se habet, ut ad prosperam adversamve fortunam qualis sis aut quem ad modum vixeris nihil intersit.

Non animadvertunt inquit omnia di, ne reges quidem. Quid est simile; reges enim si scientes praetermittunt, magna culpa est; at deo ne excusatio quidem est inscientiae.

But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods. Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his friends showed him several pictures287 of people who had endured very dangerous storms; “See,” says he, “you who deny a providence, how many have been saved by their prayers to the Gods.” “Ay,” says Diagoras, “I see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were shipwrecked?” At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to others under the like distress, asked them “if they believed Diagoras was also aboard those ships?” In short, with regard to good or bad fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods, like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the Gods.

XXXVIII (§90–91)

Quem vos praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse, ut etiam si quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit expetantur eae poenae a liberis a nepotibus a posteris. O miram aequitatem deorum: ferretne civitas ulla latorem istius modi legis, ut condemnaretur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus deliquisset?

quinam Tantalidarum internecioni modusparetur, aut quaenam umquam ob mortem Myrtilipoenis luendis dabitur satias supplici?

Utrum poetae Stoicos depravarint an Stoici poetis dederint auctoritatem non facile dixerim; portenta enim ab utrisque et flagitia dicuntur. neque enim quem Hipponactis iambus laeserat aut qui erat Archilochi versu volneratus a deo immissum dolorem non conceptum a se ipso continebat, nec cum Aegisthi libidinem aut cum Paridis videmus a deo causam requirimus, cum culpae paene vocem audiamus, nec ego multorum aegrorum salutem non ab Hippocrate potius quam ab Aesculapio datam iudico, nec Lacedaemoniorum disciplinam dicam umquam ab Apolline potius Spartae quam a Lycurgo datam. Critolaus inquam evertit Corinthum, Carthaginem Asdrubal; hi duo illos oculos orae maritumae effoderunt, non iratus aliqui, quem omnino irasci posse negatis, deus.

Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children’s children, and all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for a crime committed by the father or the grandfather?

Shall Tantalus’ unhappy offspring knowNo end, no close, of this long scene of woe?When will the dire reward of guilt be o’er,And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?288

Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be condemned. If those persons whose names have been branded in the satires of Hipponax or Archilochus289 were driven to despair, it did not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When we see Ægistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of Æsculapius; that Sparta received her laws from Lycurgus290 rather than from Apollo; that those eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked out, the one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a Deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation.

XXXIX (§92–93)

At subvenire certe potuit et conservare urbis tantas atque talis; vos enim ipsi dicere soletis nihil esse quod deus efficere non possit, et quidem sine labore ullo; ut enim hominum membra nulla contentione mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur, sic numine deorum omnia fingi moveri mutarique posse. neque id dicitis superstitiose atque aniliter sed physica constantique ratione; materiam enim rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexibilem et commutabilem, ut nihil sit quod non ex ea quamvis subito fingi convertique possit, eius autem universae fictricem et moderatricem divinam esse providentiam; haec igitur quocumque se moveat, efficere posse quicquid velit. Itaque aut nescit quid possit, aut neglegit res humanas, aut quid sit optimum non potest iudicare.

Non curat singulos homines. Non mirum: ne civitates quidem; non eas: ne nationes quidem et gentis. quod si has etiam contemnet, quid mirum est omne ab ea genus humanum esse contemptum?

Sed quo modo idem dicitis non omnia deos persequi, idem voltis a diis inmortalibus hominibus dispertiri ac dividi somnia (idcirco haec tecum, quia vestra est de somniorum veritate sententia), atque idem etiam vota suscipi dicitis oportere? Nempe singuli vovent, audit igitur mens divina etiam de singulis; videtis ergo non esse eam tam occupatam quam putabatis. Fac esse distentam, caelum versantem terram tuentem maria moderantem: cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur, cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit, qui a te Balbe innumerabiles explicati sunt?

Haec fere dicere habui de natura deorum, non ut eam tollerem sed ut intellegeretis quam esset obscura et quam difficiles explicatus haberet.

But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those eminent cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine, his power is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but the will is necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will of the Gods, with the like ease, can create, move, and change all things. This you hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on natural and settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which all things are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and changes, and there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an instant; and that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of this universal matter, and consequently can, in any part of the universe, do whatever she pleases: from whence I conclude that this Providence either knows not the extent of her power, or neglects human affairs, or cannot judge what is best for us. Providence, you say, does not extend her care to particular men; there is no wonder in that, since she does not extend it to cities, or even to nations, or people. If, therefore, she neglects whole nations, is it not very probable that she neglects all mankind? But how can you assert that the Gods do not enter into all the little circumstances of life, and yet hold that they distribute dreams among men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your part to solve this difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon the Gods. Those who call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine Providence, therefore, regards individuals, which consequently proves that they are more at leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the Divine Providence to be greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions of the heavens, supports the earth, and rules the seas; why does it suffer so many Gods to be unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of human affairs given to some of those idle Deities which you say are innumerable?

This is the purport of what I had to say concerning “the Nature of the Gods;” not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation of it is attended.

XL (§94–95)

Quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem. Lucilius autem Vehementius inquit Cotta tu quidem invectus es in eam Stoicorum rationem quae de providentia deorum ab illis sanctissume et prudentissume constituta est. sed quoniam advesperascit, dabis nobis diem aliquem ut contra ista dicamus. est enim mihi tecum pro aris et focis certamen et pro deorum templis atque delubris proque urbis muris, quos vos pontifices sanctos esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis moenibus cingitis; quae deseri a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas iudico.

Tum Cotta: Ego vero et opto redargui me Balbe, et ea quae disputavi disserere malui quam iudicare, et facile me a te vinci posse certo scio.

Quippe inquit Velleius qui etiam somnia putet ad nos mitti ab Iove, quae ipsa tamen tam levia non sunt quam est Stoicorum de natura deorum oratio.

Haec cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottae disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior.

Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse—You have been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the greatest importance; it concerns our altars,291 our hearths, our temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold sacred; you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by her ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I cannot abandon without impiety.

There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great superiority in argument. No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter, which, though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance than the discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to have the greater probability.292

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. On the Nature of the Gods. Translated by C. D. Yonge. 1877. The Trove. https://adagraves.com/trove/cicero-de-natura-deorum/book-3-xx-xl/.

Latin text: Otto Plasberg’s Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1917). Translation: C. D. Yonge, in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations; also, Treatises on the Nature of the Gods, and on the Commonwealth (New York: Harper, 1877). Sources